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ABSTRACT

This thesis reports on my attempts to 're-align' the purpose, behaviour and
underlying culture of a large military organisation through heuristic, selfreflective enquiry - to 'find its future' - with and through its people. I use the word
re-align with great care as I recognised that change would have been too
ambitious and would (probably have) result(ed) in failure. Whilst I cannot claim
total success, I have made new and valuable discoveries in knowledge elicitation
and methods of integrating the views of a large number of people to 'build and
reinforce consensus around initiatives for change'.

In the process of completing this research I developed a novel approach to
strategic planning/policy making that advances the ends, ways and means
construct of decision-making into a purer and more refined approach. One that
anchors these elements firmly to the organisation and its environment
simultaneously through a knowledge management system, enabling the strengths
and weaknesses within the organisation to be drawn into sharp focus - an effectsbased planning approach. I have also fused together the more systematic and
disciplined approaches embodied within a knowledge management system with
existing and more creative scenario planning/future focussed methods. Thus
allowing organisations to undertake 'self-constructed' audits that have an
immediate interest or are situated well into their future, doubling its value as a
planning device.

As I report, the methods have been presented at the highest levels of Defence,
attracting interest from the Australian Minister of Defence. The New Zealand
Defence Force, Naval Warfare Development Command of the United States Navy
and Australia's Chief of Air Force have also expressed an interest in the potential
of an effects-based orientation to planning and policy-making.
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Whether the concepts and underpinning ideas become established, leading to the
discovery of a post-modem military is uncertain. What is clear is that there is a
definite move away from a pre-occupation with the means, or the things that are
done, towards a more comprehensive understanding of what are we trying to
make happen as a guiding principle. This is certainly of value within military
'organisations and has potential for others involved in complex problem-solving in
social settings.

A heuristic, self-reflective approach has enriched this search for focussed and
'change-finding' knowledge, allowing a more purposeful, complete and forthright
account of the involvement of others.
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GLOSSARY

This glossary is a compilation of military and civil terminology drawn from a
range of government, military (and necessarily not of a restricted nature) and open
source locations. There are many terms that the reader will have encountered
before, but it has been necessary to assign a slightly different meaning to align
more completely with the focus and product of this thesis. Many may cause
confusion on initial reading. This is to be expected, as the true meaning will only
become clear after having read the entire thesis and understanding the contexts in
which these terms are used. Many are also 'nested' within others to give a more
complex expression.

As this work has proven to have wide applicability outside of the military the
reader should also remain open-minded about how these terms may have
relevance in the commercial or private sector.

In a departure from convention I have omitted the sources of these definitions.
Although most are freely available from United States military web pages. Where
a new term is introduced that the reader may not be familiar with, or one that has
a specific meaning within this thesis, it will be contained within single quotations
in its first appearance and presented as normal text from then on.

Active Adaptation

is the meta-learning state of ideal seeking, purposeful behaviour. It is
synonymous with Kohlberg's 3.2 level of moral development. Changing,
as an anticipatory response to stimuli not yet readily discernable.

ADFP

stands for Australian Defence Force Publication. It is usually combined with a number to indicate the specific publication, for example ADFP 25
Psychological Operations.
vii
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Campaign Planning

integrates both deliberate and immediate planning processes and seeks to
orchestrate and sequence the ways for tactical means to achieve strategic
ends.

Capability

is defined within the military as the combination of force structure and
preparedness. More commonly taken to refer to the capacity of the
military to conduct a particular type, or form of military activity.
Capability is expressed with~n the three elements, or domains, of physical,
moral and intellectual: the means to fight, the will to fight and the
knowledge to fight.

Capacities

are the descriptors that bring additional information to the 'means', they
are simple, action oriented phrases that bundle together in various
configurations to enable means to be undertaken. The expressions used _
should have a competency orientation (see competencies). Whilst it could
be reasonably expected that a capability secures the ability to undertake a
means - a quality of being able, a capacity is more expressive of the state
of possibility that attaches to various parts of the organisation. A simple
example could be: capable of improvement, but not in the possession of
the necessary capacity.

Clandestine Operations

accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence and other similar activities
sponsored or conducted in such a way as to assume secrecy or
concealment. They differ from covert operations in which emphasis is
placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor.
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Competencies

are used interchangeably with capacities. In the formal domain of training
it is the specification of knowledge and skill and the application of that
knowledge and skill to the standard of performance required in the
employment. I use the term here in a broader sense.

Components of Capability

are: the Physical, the Moral and the Intellectual.
•

The Physical component- is expressed through six inter-linked
elements of: people, organisation, support and facilities,
training, equipm.ent and doctrine. These are coupled in
different ways through Battlespace Operating Systems (BOS)
to generate military power. The mechanisms through which
these abstract interelationships occur has not been fully
explained within the doctrine.

•

The Moral component - combines all those individual,
organisational and institutional aspects that ensures there is a
morally sound, appropriate and defensible basis upon which
action (of any type) is authorised. It governs and shapes the
behaviour that is linked to a common purpose.

•

The Intellectual component - combines professional mastery
and innovative concepts. It is an expression of individual and
team competence and striving for advancement through a
concept-led approach.

Covert Operations

are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit
plausible denial by, the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations
in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor
rather than on concealment of the operation.
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Doctrine

is the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions
in support of national objectives. Doctrine guides the development of
tactics, techniques and procedures that allow soldiers and units to
cooperatively channel their activities to the outcome being sought.

Effects

is an extension of the Clausewitzian approach to policy/politik in that it is
necessary to 'impose our will' upon our opponent in order to secure
success. Effects are, therefore, the (sometimes) behavioural expressions
that indicate the directions of these changes in will. They can be coercive
or seductive. They are the outcomes that we are endeavouring to bring
about as a result of our actions. From an Effects-Based Operations (EBO)
purist's perspective the effects should not be derived from a consideration
of what actions can produce them. They must offer a solution, or change
in the strategic conditions, that deliver the desired end-state.

Effects-Based Operations

or EBO is an approach to the planning and sequencing of actions to
achieve objectives. I believe it is the next Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA). Its use is informed by a thorough understanding of, Effects-Based
Strategy, which forms the strategy/policy issues which occupy the
problem space at a national or international level. EBO is gaining interest
and a following throughout, at least, Western military planning. It has a
critical point of origin for all analysis that demands an expression of
"What is it that we want to have happen?" It lifts military planning out of
the delivery of destruction-based (causing heat and blast) effects that have
only a military consequence. The effect within EBO can be an expression
of the physical, psychological, environmental, political, social, industrial,
technical and/or economic. It allows for a more complete expression of the
use of national power and a whole of government approach.
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Effectiveness
has been variously described as the extent to which the area/item of
interest is accomplishing its purpose. Whilst it is a simple concept, it is
used in a multitude of contexts, but remains both a quantitative (albeit
subjectively derived) and qualitative measure of fitness for purpose. Its
meaning within this thesis will be dealt with at length in Chapter 4,
aligning principally with the degree to which the area of interest fulfils its
raison d'etre.

Efficiency
although not dealt with in detail within this thesis, efficiency is a
necessary partner to effectiveness and reflects the relative costs (not only
in dollar terms) of undertaking an action.

Elite Conventional Operations
are those activities which, while requiring selected personnel, technology,
training, and strategic direction, are conceived and planned from within
the current universal military expectations for the conduct of operations.
At their most sophisticated, these operations are strategically projected,
high risk, short notice and politically sensitive. To maximise their chances
of success, and in an effort to concentrate scarce resources, they are
regarded as beyond the range and capabilities of conventional units. The
fact that an adversary may expect these operations make them
conventional, their need for specialist personnel and skills make them
elite.

Ends
are similar to objectives, they are what we are in pursuit of, but within this
thesis they have been combined with another word - states - to produce
end-states: an expressive account of a changed (and ideally more

xi

Glossary
favourable) condition that results from undertaking a series of actions.
This element will be fully explained in Chapter Four.

End-state

is the set of desired conditions which will achieve the strategic objectives.
This definition is somewhat incomplete and almost a reversal of reality,
the objectives could also be considered to be the embodiment of the endstate. Within this thesis the definition has been broadened to accommodate
.the fullest expression of conditional and contextual ingredients that
provide an unambiguous account of the state arrived at following the
successful deployment of an orchestrated series of actions. End-state
describes the commander's desired outcome for the operation or the state
that the commander wishes to exist when the operation is complete. It
defines the success criteria for the operation and may include descriptions
of status and locations of actors.

Environmental Textures

describe the existence of interdependencies between various elements
around and within an organisation that create their own dynamic causeeffect behaviour.

Force Structure

is the term used to describe a grouping of physical capabilities into a
particular arrangement that aligns against a specific task or allows training
to be undertaken.

HUMINT
human intelligence is the specific information derived from the
intelligence collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources
and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection
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instrument. It is the only method that can capture information on the mood
of a people or society - critical for the success of psychological operations.

Government Strategic Guidance

Government provides direction and guidance to the Chief of the Defence
Force, which would include:
a statement of the required national end-state;
a definition of national interests which require a military response;
a statement of the circumstances in which the Australian Defence
Force (ADF) may be committed;
constraints and limitations within which operations are to be
conducted;
the extent to which national resources would be devoted to the
ADF;
the legal basis for deployment; and
a statement to allow the framing of National Policy (NATPOL)
and subsequent Rules Of Engagement (ROE).

Campaigns and operations are planned and directed at the operational
level to achieve. strategic objectives. It is the level that links military
strategic objectives and all tactical activity in the theatre. Operational
planning cannot be accomplished in isolation from the strategic level; the
two processes are inextricably linked. Ideally, operational and strategic
level planning will be initiated at the same time with each process
informing the other.

The link between the strategic and tactical levels must provide the ways of
using the tactical means to achieve the required strategic/national ends.
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Means

are the actions that can be undertaken that make a contribution towards the
achievement of the desired effects. They are context-free and aid planning
in a future-focussed manner; when a context is encountered then specific
adjustments are undertaken to tailor the response using micro-alignments
in the organisation, which are themselves informed by deeper levels of
analysis. This element will be fully explained in Chapter Four.

Military Creativity

requires the constructive application of military expertise, broad
educational influences, imagination, experimentation and critical analysis
to produce novel solutions to unique problems which are timely, relevant
and attuned to a commander's needs and intent.

Mission

is a clear concise statement of the task and its purpose. When used in a
military context as a mission statement it must have a verb leading to
afford an action-orientation and contain the phrase in order to as a prefix
to the purpose.

National Interests

are the general and continuing ends for which a State acts.

National Military Strategy

is the art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain
national objectives in peace and war.

National Security Strategy

is the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the
instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and
informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.
xiv
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National Strategy

is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic and
psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during
peace and war to secure national objectives.

Non-Government Organisation

is a transnational organisation of private citizens that maintain a
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations. Non-governmental organisations (NGO) may be professional
associations, foundations, mpltinational businesses or simply groups with
a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities such as
development and relief.

Operational Art

In seeking to structure campaigns and major operations in pursuit of
strategic objectives, theatre commanders should design their plans around
a number of building blocks, which help them to conceptualise how
operations will unfold. Their skill at this stage forms the essence of
operational art. The key elements of operational art are listed below:

Operational Objectives. These are the objectives that need to be
achieved in the campaign to reach the military strategic end-state.
Correct assessment of operational objectives is crucial to success at
the operational level.
End-state. Will be identified at the national and military levels as
follows:
The national end-state is the set of desired conditions,
incorporating the elements of national power that will
achieve the national objectives.
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The military strategic end-state is the set of desired
conditions beyond which the use of military force is no
longer required to achieve national objectives.

Overt Operations

are conducted in such a manner that detection by a potentially hostile unit
or force is either desired or is not a factor to be considered in the conduct
of assigned missions.

Passive Mal-adaptation

offers a contrast to active adaptation. It describes a condition whereby
subsystems seek to disengage in the interests of their own survival and
benefit at the cost of the larger systems of which they are part (Crombie,
1972, p.ll9).

Peace Building

is a set of strategies which aim to ensure that disputes, armed conflicts and
other major crises do not arise in the first place, or if they do arise that
they do not subsequently recur.

Peace Enforcement

is the coercive use of civil and military sanctions and collective security
actions, by legitimate, international intervention forces, to assist
diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents, who may not
consent to that intervention.

Peacekeeping

is a non-coercive instrument of diplomacy, where a legitimate,
international civil and/or military coalition is employed with the consent
of the belligerent parties, in an impartial, noncombatant manner, to
xvi
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implement conflict resolution arrangements or assist humanitarian aid
operations.

Peacemaking

is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement
through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter 6 of the UN
Charter.

Preparedness

is the degree of readiness to undertake operations against an assigned
notice to move, expressed in .units of time.

Preventive diplomacy

is action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent
existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of
conflicts when they occur.

Psychological Action

is the use of psychological media and supporting activities in peace and
war designed to reduce the enemy's potential or actual prestige and
influence in potentially hostile or neutral countries and to increase friendly
influence and attitudes in these countries.

Psychological Operations

are planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy,
friendly or neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour
affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They
include strategic psychological activities, consolidation psychological
operations and battlefield psychological activities.
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Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

is a term used to describe the catastrophic changes that occur at key
periods in technological development. The paradigm changes that result
are massive, affect all participants and force considerable re-analysis of all
existing doctrine. It is generally accepted that there have been nine RMA:
•

Gunpowder Revolution.

•

Infantry Revolution, whereby cavalry were defeated by foot
soldiers.

•

Fortress Revolution.

•

Artillery Revolution, in which cannon fire could defeat stone
fortifications, and later deliver exploding shells.

•

Napoleonic Revolution in logistics and administration.

•

Revolution in Sail and Shot, in which naval vessels were
transformed into sail-powered gunnery platforms.

•

Land Warfare Revolution in firepower, transportation and
communication.

•

Naval revolutions of steam, iron and submarine.

•

Nuclear Revolution.

It is evident from this progression that the ability to wage war has undergone a
gradual increase in sophistication and ability to strike with greater accuracy over
greater distances. The RMA that I propose involves a massing of political, social,
economic, psychological, technical and judicial effects to bring 'outcome
precision' to planning, rather than the bluntness of violence and offensive action
to coerce which is the stuff of all the revolutions above.

Special Forces

are specially selected military personnel, trained in a broad range of basic
and specialised skills, who are organised, equipped and trained to conduct
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special operations. Special forces can be employed to achieve strategic,
operational or tactical level objectives across the operational continuum.

Special Forces Group

is a brigade strength organisation compnsmg the Special Air Service
Regiment in Perth;

1st

Commando Regiment with a headquarters in

Sydney and sub-units in Watsonia and Williamstown in Melbourne, and
Mosman in Sydney;

4th

Battalion (Commando) in Sydney and a Special

Forces Training Centre based in Singleton in New South Wales.

Special Operations

are those measures and activities conducted by specially trained, organised
and equipped forces to achieve military, political, economic or
psychological objectives by means outside the scope of conventional
forces. These operations may be conducted during peacetime, conflict and
war, independently or in c.onjunction with conventional forces.

Strategic

is used in many contexts. Within this thesis it refers to the application of
measures to achieve political (diplomatic) ends. The strategic level of
conflict is that level of war that is concerned with the art and science of
employing national power.

Strategic Concept (NATO)

is the course of action accepted as a result of the estimate of the strategic
situation. It is a statement of what is to be done expressed in broad terms
sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the military, diplomatic,
economic, psychological and other measures that stem from it.
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Strategy

is the art and science of developing and using political, economic,
psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to
afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the
probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the
chances of defeat. See also military strategy and national strategy.

Unconventional Warfare

exploits military, political, economic or psychological vulnerabilities of an
enemy. Special Forces

impl~ment

it by providing support and direction to

indigenous resistance forces where appropriate, or by unilateral offensive
operations. The conduct of unconventional warfare involves the
application of guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, escape and evasion;
and psychological operations is a general term used to describe operations
conducted for military, political or economic purposes within an area
occupied by the enemy and making use of the local inhabitants and
resources.

Unconventional Operations

are those activities conducted by a military force in support of national
policy which are outside contemporary military practices- an environment
commonly termed the conventional. They may build upon, reapply or
overturn accepted military fundamentals. This may involve reinventing
techniques or methods long discarded or leaping beyond the bounds of
established military activity. The strength of unconventional operations
lie in their psychological nature, which may produce subtle influence,
surprise and or shock.

They aim to deter, disorientate, dislocate, or

paralyse an adversary's will, and or support our nation's will.

Their

execution requires judgement and timing due to often-limited windows of
opportunity.
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Ways

are the means-effects pairs that result from a thorough and comprehensive
effects-based analysis of a situation, problem or area of strategic concern.
In the research reported in this thesis there were 306 pairs, or ways, each
with their own unique, numerically expressed profile of political exposure,
immediacy, totality and capability to undertake. These ways eventually
read like a military mission statement that always contains the linking
phrase - in order to: "undertake X in order to bring about Y". The
development of these ideas is fully explained in Chapter Four.
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Chapter One - Introduction

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Preliminary Comments

Before beginning I must alert the reader to the three different writing styles that I
use.

Firstly,there is pragmatism and a military preciseness that allows the expression
of concepts dominated by a functionalist perspective. Things are as they are stated
and understood to be. The ideas expressed are rich in fact and doctrine. Concepts
are grounded in definition. There is no ambiguity. This style allows me to
describe and "structure [an] organisational reality in a way that makes controlled
performance possible" (Hassard & Pym, 1990, p. 16). My aim is not to confront
the reader with objectivity but to bring depth to the story and draw in theories in
use. I use arguments based on a pragmatic approach to set up thoughts and
opinions that I later reinforce, remain neutral towards or strike down - a discourse
with boundaries that I assist in the formation of, but simultaneously demand that
these beliefs remain boundaryless and free-ranging. This pragmatic style also
builds cohesion: ideas fit with those around them, relationships are ordered and
knowledge is tightly bound to practice. This is the world and our understanding of
it as we have constructed it.

Secondly, I use a heuristic style that primarily celebrates doubt and my own
uncertainty and incompleteness. I am honest and open in my accounts of engaging
with the subject, I seek the mystery and uncertainty that comes with learning. Its
presence is not uncomfortable, it is vital, it is what makes me worthy. Mezirow's
disorientating dilemmas is an apt description of the state that allows meaning to
be made (Mezirow, 1990a). I objectify the new perspective through words that
remain clumsy and inadequate when viewed in the third person. It is impossible to
communicate the richness of personal experience. Interpretation, even into words
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dulls the moment and leaves one with a somehow colourless duplicate that can
never retain the qualities of the original. This heuristic style combines an
interpretivist and radical humanist perspective, recognising that I "am attempting
to understand and explain the social world primarily from the point of view of the
actors directly involved in the social process" (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 227). It
invokes Kantianism and a search for intuition and involvement of the mind and
human values. The radical humanist approach allows me to study "the self-laid
traps that interpretive theory shows us that humans are so adept at constructing
.... a world which they often experience as confining, and most.importantly, with
finding ways in which humans can exercise control over their own constructions
that allow them to express and

deve~op

their nature as human beings" (Hassard &

Pym, 1990, p. 20). It is a radical change that originates from within, from a
cooperative inquiry (Reason, 1999, p. 207) of (almost like-minded) individuals
who at least share a common curiosity that can bind their early efforts.

Finally, I use reflection as an aid to my own contemplation of personal growth
and task progress. My work and focus on the problem needs to be balanced with
(and moderated by) a recognition that I am bringing the information to the surface
and exposing it to the attention of others for their own consideration. I am also in
the problem space. It makes me pause, holding my gaze on the phenomenon of
me being interdependent with the object of my interest (Willis, 1999, p. 25). The
insights are personal and are juxtapositions to the main text. They are attempts to
understand my position at a particular point, to keep myself within the topic yet
aware of what this means, it is non-"adherence to the model [that] requires writers
to silence their own voices and to view themselves as contaminants" (Richardson,
1994, p. 517). These "narratives of the self seek to [maintain] coherence [of me
in the story and to] make a point without tedious documentation" (Richardson,
1994, p. 521). Although this speaks of a need to know oneself the caution comes
from Nietszche:
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We knowers are unknown to ourselves and for a good reason: how
can we ever hope to find what we have never looked for? There is
a sound adage that runs: "Where a man's treasure lies, there lies his
heart." Our treasure lies in the beehives of our knowledge. We are
perpetually on our way thither, being by nature winged insects and
honey gatherers of the mind. The only thing that lies close to our
heart is the desire to bring something home to the hive. As for the
rest of life - so called "experience" who among us is serious
enough for that? Or has time enough?
(Nietzsche, 1956, p. 149)
This action research does not qualify as spiritual practice (Reason, 2000) when
viewed solely in terms of its aims. At the level of an organisation though, it is an
inquiry "worthy of our attention" as practitioners, and therefore, can be considered
as "everyday spirituality" (Reason,' 2000, p.1) for this researcher when these
writing styles and content are blended together.

Overview of the Chapter

In this chapter I provide both the organisational and psychological origins of the
research. I provide insights into the things that needed to be done for their own
sake as part of broad human endeavour and enterprise. I describe my own role and
motivation for simultaneously recognising the need and voluntarily stepping
forward as an actor in what was to become the beginnings of a larger and swifter
current of change.

Later, I will discuss in detail the heuristic guidance I received through the writings
of Moustakas and his recognition that "when I persist in a disciplined and devoted
way I ultimately deepen my knowledge of the phenomenon. In the heuristic
process, I am personally involved. I am searching for qualities, conditions, and
relationships that underlie a fundamental question, issue, or concern" (Moustakas,
1990, p. 11). It is a process of discovery, rather than verification and
corroboration, "the result of the quest is a narrative portrayal of the experience"
(Tesch, 1990, p. 35).
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This guidance came to me slowly and (only) when I was in need of it, reinforcing
the benefits of this (self-directed) educational method as one in which learning
takes place through discoveries and experiences that result from investigations
made by the student. It became a celebration of a series of Mezirow's
"disorientating
(1990, p.

dilemmas"

13) of the self-

reflective

wherein

kind

"reflection serves a purpose,
and

purposes

serve

as

organising principles that give
coherence

and

activities"

(1991,

Without

this

order
p.

to
13).

reflection,

ordering within the mind may
become distorted or delayed,
the "incubation ... in which the
researcher retreats from the
intense, concentrated focus on
the question .... [is a vital stage
to secure deeper understanding
and] enables the inner tacit
dimension to reach its full
possibilities"

(Moustakas,

1990, p. 28).

I confess that the beginnings of
this work were characterised by
disorder,

confusion

and

bewilderment; but offer that

Throughout the thesis I will present my
thoughts and reflections in text boxes like
this one. The reader may discover that I
express a point of view that is in direct
conflict with the main body. At others I may
support or express ambivalence. At all times
though my aim is to provide a voice, a
dialogue that goes beyond the extraction of
meaning from the main text by the reader. "I
should [also] warn my readers that [these
chapters] must be read without haste, and
that I am ignorant of the art of making
myself clear to those who do not wish to
concentrate" (Rousseau, 1762, p. 91).
Furthermore, my writing style makes use of
bracketed additional text to introduce twin
(and often opposing) thoughts. Sometimes I
may even change the tense, enticing the
reader to think of the subject in the past,
present and sometimes future at the same
time. I make no apology for this, recognising
it as a necessary component of interweaving
(more than one) self with the subject. It is an
acceptable authorial style to insert material
in square brackets within quoted text to show
material by a person other than the author,
why not a second (possibly contradictory)
voice by the same author. This allows
juxtaposition of self with self. It is a critical
additional heuristic voice, as suggested by
Reason (1988, p. 80) " ... to make meaning
manifest through expression requires the use
of a creative medium through which the
meaning can take form . . . . not a conceptual
grid which divides up experience, it is rather
the creation of an empty space".

this condition lies at the heart
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of heuristic enquiry. It is a vital precursor state, a catalyst from which curiosity
begins, an intense "critical interest and area of search" that engages the self with
the topic (Moustakas, 1990, p. 27), eventually bringing order and understanding.

It is a story with two parts. One part tells of the discovery and development of a

powerful new way of thinking and evaluating the performance of an(y)
organisation, an objectively dominated field of enquiry that is process-focused
and retains an appropriate fixation on "what are we trying to make happen
through our actions". It is an attempt to build consensus, but not universality. It
maintains difference, using this to accommodate diversity, but does not attempt
total agreement as "actual consensus on at least some paradigmatic cases by a
particular community is a better starting place than the fruitless alternative of
seeking consensus about some a priori abstract principles" (Rest, Narvaez,
Bebeau & Thoma, 1999, p. 27).

The other part is an autobiographical account of my role as the principal agent;
rich in critical reflection and self-dialogue to fully expose my place in the
research topic, in order to "derive a body of scientific knowledge .... that is
guided by a conception that knowledge grows out of direct human experience and
can be discovered and explicated initially through self-enquiry" (Moustakas,
1990, p. 17). It is research that honestly records consensus and conflict, thereby
recognising the value and importance of dissent within a community of activists.
Within this community of activists it fosters moral consciousness, communicative
action and discourse (Habermas, 1990; Hersh, Paolitto & Reimer, 1979; Duska &
Whelan, 1977; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1990), ensuring that the grounds
for dissent and consent are respected and ethically pure. It must encourage
transformative and emancipatory learning, using the notion of disorientating
dilemmas as vital triggers (Mezirow, 1990b) to enable one's mind to wander
someplace new. Finally, it fuses the communities of/for change with planning
methods that seek to align with the nature of the contextual environment (Emery
& Trist, 1965), specifically the (foundational work of) identification (of) causal
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textures within environments and the subsequent need to democratise the (social)
planning process to secure success. It highlights the value of dialectical discourse
and critical hermeneutics within an inquiry dominated by people, culture and a
design purpose (Jenlink, 2001).

In this chapter I will also lay out the structure of the thesis, linking the major
phases of the research using an adaptation of the rich picture form, combined with
the seven-stage Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), (Checkland, 1972, 1980 and
1981; Checkland & Scholes, 1990).

As mentioned, the thesis reports

t~o

parallel but interwoven research projects

conducted over the five-year period of 1997-2001. The first part of the research
seeks to (objectively) answer the question "To what extent can knowledge
management systems build and reinforce consensus around initiatives for
change?" This question will be unpacked in a later section to reveal the five

subsidiary (subjectively orientated) questions that progressively demanded my
attention in order to achieve wholeness, balance and the vital component of
critical reflection, later to advance into reflexion, a dynamic response inspired by
personal discoveries of oneself.

These five subsidiary questions form the autobiographical account of my own
reflective observations as the research project steadily expanded to include
different groups, exhibiting various cultural and ideological perspectives, in
different organisational contexts, seeking different outcomes.

The research is, therefore, highly qualitative; capturing much of the diversity
embodied within the different groups and their environments. A characteristic that
has enriched my own responses and reflections resulting from interaction with
these groups; and one which shaped the knowledge management system in ways
that could not have occurred had a purely technical, rationalist approach been
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pursued throughout; an approach that would have been discourteous to the (vital)
role that people played in this research.

It is a deeply personal story of my own 'honey gathering' (referring back to the

initial quotation from Nietzsche within this chapter) against a background of
purposeful, professional practice to bring about a transformation within an
organisation. It is a story I had to tell for "what makes the story worth telling is its
presumably out of the ordinary or unique character" (VanMaanen, 1988, p. 102).
The uniqueness is not its content, nor the role of the researcher; it is the
juxtaposition of these two that provides the character and depth. We can never
separate ourselves from what interes~s us; in order to understand we must explore
our curiosity which itself governs the patterns of our enquiry. As observed by
Perry, "[we] social scientists should not be surprised to find [ourselves] as
participants in all [our] observations of human behaviour .... [and] embedded also
in the midst of our working concepts" (Perry, 1988, p. 143).

The difficulty of keeping these two research projects simultaneously anchored to
each other and separate has proven to be somewhat problematic. In a later section
within this chapter, dealing with reflective practice, I will draw a complex
analogy using the Heisenberg uncertainty principle within physics of knowing
both velocity and location at the same time using ·one of Escher's drawings. I use
this to highlight the dilemma for myself as both a researcher and (simultaneously)
a reflective practitioner interacting with a research topic.

At times the dominance of one, as my observations of the group and subsequent
self-reflection was to uncover, built the foundations for failure. Being overly
attentive to the needs of the group and their requirement for structure and order
delayed the productive effort. Pressuring for more focussed, and quicker, analysis
and discussion, a desire for ambiguity, led to breakdowns in group cohesion and
purpose.
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These two sources of failure are reported as positive outcomes. Firstly, for the
ability to deepen and enrich my autobiographical account and quality of learning.
And secondly, for the accelerated development and refinement of the database- a
device which has proven to possess considerable originality of function and
illustrates many complex relationships that convey powerful messages of
criticality and dependency for decision-makers. It is this capacity to convey new
insights into thinkers dominated by traditional perspectives that has fuelled my
own creative enthusiasm for a knowledge management system to shape
organisational change.

As the sole facilitator of many diverse groups there were many occasions of
(what I perceived as) negative behaviour. Disagreement and resistance to move
forward were common. This was overcome through an adjustment to the
vocabulary contained within the database text and its manipulation by the group
in ways that accommodated (built consensus around) their own wishes and
concerns. What I came to see as a seductive process governed by the participants
themselves who were motivated by 'ideal seeking' or self organisation and an
unconscious acknowledgement that "new strategic direction can only emerge; it
cannot be planned .... And the processes through which emergence occur are ones
of political interaction and group learning" (Stacey, 1996, p. 331) became a
powerful force to align opinion.

Indeed "the most distinctive attribute of the human ... [is the] capacity to be idealseeking and to alter goals and objectives in the service of ideals that he can never
reach" (Trist, 1978, p. 533).

This amounted to the preservation of a

communicative action orientation (Habermas, 1990) and minimisation of a purely
technical rationality. To this end the research provided a fertile plain on which to
bring forth an emergent theory of group interaction, an interaction that was selflimited by the boundaries of the knowledge management system and its
(in)capacity to accommodate the fullness of individual expression. This paradox
was something I was never fully able to reconcile to myself. The broader the
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boundaries became, the more those inside filled the space. A form of
emancipation created through (a self and group-driven) expanding schema.

The research focus was positioned over national security; principally the role and
purpose of a military organisation - Special Forces. A unique institution certainly
in defence areas, but one that also exhibits many other unusual behavioural
phenomena. My role as a planning officer within Headquarters Special Operations
provided the focus for the research effort. It legitimised the need for the futures
study to be undertaken and provided me with an opportunity to record and report
on a practitioner's experiences.

A practitioner who was an active participant; a developer of a knowledge
management system; a group facilitator and a builder of expressive languages and
vocabularies to provide for productive discourse. One who was also able to
'disconnect' and become distanced from the research/organisational context to
evaluate and reflect on my own (and others') learning, insights, emotional states
and roles in the progress of the study. In particular, the potential for my own
prejudices to pollute the purity of the participative (van Beinum, 1997) and 'idealseeking' environment that I sought to foster.
My Research Role - An Overview

In the beginning I gave myself a task to 'find the future' for the organisation. It
had a past and a present, which provided valuable reference points. Its future,
however, was uncertain, indeterminate and fluid. It would be a product of what it
tried to make of itself and what external actors and actions would conspire to
allow it to be and demand that it become. My role was to bring these together, to
synthesise a method, and elicit knowledge, to alert significant others to the
proposed reforms and above all maintain balance and composure in approach,
progress and effort. "Do what you can, where you are with what you have" was
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my subconscious companion. "Bring as many as you can along with you" was my
governing consideration.

In endeavouring to act as a reflective practitioner (Schon, 1993), I provisionally
researched my use of the knowledge management systems using journals (Clegg
& Green, 1995; Clegg, 1996; Ballantyne & Packer, 1995), writing papers and
exploring the use of heuristic inquiry (Moustakas, 1990; Tesch, 1990) and
reflective phenomenology (Moustakas, 1994; Tesch, 1990). I have kept accounts
of all group meetings, taken note of reactions and collected qualitative data and
feedback. These have been referred to frequently to secure a continuing
understanding and appreciation of the enormity of the undertaking. Although I
seek consensus, it is not at any cost. There must be an enduring recognition that
individuals are at the core of this work. Where the blurring between individual
(and therefore possessing different views) and the subconsciously shared ideas of
a mass occurred was the point of fascination.

Published military doctrine was my only stationary aid throughout the research.
Whilst it contained the architecture of national security planning, it left the
relationships betweyn major items (the strategies) and the effectiveness of
undertaking an action (the tactics) unresolved. The highest levels of strategy have
been thoroughly described elsewhere in official publications dealing with national
security, as have the numerous elements that comprise tactics, but the two have
not been fused together, allowing an alignment of organisational fitness for
purpose with the contextual environment. This is the task I set for myself - to
build and reinforce consensus through communities of professional practitioners
applying themselves to action research; creating the authority of a shared idea,
whilst remembering that "an idea is a point of departure and no more. As soon as
you elaborate it, it becomes transformed by thought" (Picasso, 1946), raising
more questions. So this journey will never be complete(d). It is the bringing
together of a stable group to explore possibilities, for others to ultimately
determine the worth of.
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The Research Approach

What does it mean to build and reinforce consensus around initiatives for change?
Given the right conditions and employing a suitable process, which may itself
have to be constructed by the participants, it should be possible to mobilise the
creative talents of selected individuals to craft a unifying vision of what is
possible within an organisation and its operating environment. This is in stark
contrast to the individually experienced memories of the past that I believe
characterise those who do not actively engage in 'building desirable futures'.

The thesis is about creating the conditions and building the processes for
collaborative, action-oriented organisational transformation within an elite
Australian military organisation - The Special Forces Group. It is my assertion
that knowledge management systems can assist in creating these conditions and
building the processes.

Creativity is a large part of the knowledge management system I devised. It was

not assembled out of existing hardware, it is not manifested within information
systems, computers, the 'communities' within the internet or the tacit-explicit
debate that often dominates the field of knowledge management. These are
quantitative orientations that are "prescriptive and formulaic" (Edwards, Braganza
& Lambert, 2000, p. 29). They are the aids, processes, procedures and devices

that were employed by the participants to secure progress.

It was not about how much knowledge the organisation has in its possession

(whatever that might mean), a preoccupation with knowledge capital, but how to
share that knowledge, requiring a "delicate marriage of technology with a keen
sense of cultural or behavioral awareness. It involves creating an environment that
supports learning, fosters social cohesion, openness and interconnectivity"
(Ruddy, 2000 pp. 37), and to what use can that knowledge that emerges be put
11
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that can advance the organisation (world?) - a qualitative orientation. "What do
we know"? "What can we know"? "What does this mean for us and others"?

Qualitative research methods have an entirely appropriate obsession with the
richness and diversity of social phenomena and will preserve the significance of
every grain of sand within a field of enquiry to avoid (over)simplification. This
richness and diversity is often lost with quantification and the transfer of textual
language into a numerical representation - an often de-individualising coding
I

exercise. This difficulty of dealing with a national security context, with its
diplomatic complexities and causal relationships that spiral off into many areas
combined with the role and purpose of an instrument of national power (possibly
in need of a new post-modem understanding of its purpose) was to raise its head
frequently, becoming a problem of isolating a suitable method(ology), informed
by the availability of specific information, within which to proceed.

My first task was to assign appropriate methods to each part of the puzzle. Is it
better to let the area under investigation be subjected to a proven methodology?
One that is informed by a clear understanding of that particular, problem space and
has set processes and procedures to be adhered to in pursuit 'Of a solution or
answer, with the researcher remaining at a distance. Or is it more appropriate (and
a more honest account of the phenomenon) whereby "the researcher must move
beyond any confined or constricted attention to the data itself and permit an
inward life on the question to grow, in such a way that a comprehensive
expression of the essences of the phenomenon investigated is realized[?]"
(Moustakas, 1990, p. 32).

Given the fluid nature of the topic and the extent of method/vocabulary
construction required to win participation, combined with the difficulty of
securing precise terms and expressions from others, I elect to be guided from
within. The purpose and goal of the research will dictate the approach(es), I will
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work with the subject, not upon it (Reason & Heron, 1995; Heron & Reason,
1977).

The Research Purpose

The purpose of the research is to locate a set of future operating characteristics for
an Australian military organisation in order to secure its rightful position as an
instrument of national policy. Its focus is to develop a set of sufficiently robust
analytical tools to order thought and provoke novel solutions, forcing a (brief)
departure from conservatism. The ability of the information to overcome dogma
will then rightfully become the

con~em

of executive decision-makers and leaders

within the organisation.

Futures thinking and futures studies remain a valuable and important endeavor,
the "scenarios [that result] are the most powerful vehicles ... for challenging our
mental models about the world" (Schwartz, 1991, p. xv) allowing the
contemplation of (complex) events that are often outside our capacity to generate
spontaneously. If executed with thoroughness and discipline, they can link the
most perplexing set of strategic dilemmas with a coherent grouping of capabilities
and responses - what has generally become known as a characteristic or attribute
of active adaptiveness (Emery, 1977a)- and what I shall call organisational poise.

Without a sufficiently rich and comprehensive understanding of what may
eventuate in the future, one is simply left struggling with one surprise after
another.
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The Research Questions

Although I began with the simple question of:

To what extent can knowledge management systems build and
reinforce consensus around initiatives for change?"

which was related primarily to the notion of organisational change and the role of
individuals and groups, it quickly became evident that my own personal quest to
reach an answer and the frequent and detailed interaction with others was a source
of distortion. This distortion continually presented me with a hybrid that was
somehow disfigured through my presence, approach, questioning and ultimately
filtered by my own world-views.

To overcome this personally sourced bias I developed four subsidiary questions
that firstly forced critical reflection and secondly demanded confession within the
thesis to secure the warrant of honesty. These questions were:

To what extent did my adaptation of the Field Anomaly Relaxation
(FAR) method assist in building and reinforcing consensus around
initiatives for change?"

and also:

To what extent did the Effects-Based Planner assist in building and
reinforcing consensus around initiatives for change?"

Having addressed the limitations resulting from what could be an overly
technicist style of information exploration in the use of these two models, I was
then concerned by the possibility that my imposition of these two models, within
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the style of meetings, may lead to an unethical corruption of the purity of intent
within the group. I had to then ask:

"How was my involvement in the creation and use of these
knowledge management systems beneficial or detrimental to the
achievement of consensus?"

combined with:

"Could my biases, assumptions and prejudices inteifere with the
employment of knowledge management systems?"

Only then would I possess the warrants for honest, purposeful endeavor in action
research.

A non-obtrusiveness observer orientation is unlikely to expose the full range of
subtleties and nuances that are present - an entanglement and confrontation with
the subject must be achieved if the researcher is to achieve the necessary depth of
enquiry. Moreover, the "situation talks back and the practitioners reframe the
situation once again. The situation comes to be understood through the attempt to
change it, and changed through the attempt to understand it" (Heiskanen &
Newman, n.d. p. 123) offering "fleeting awarenesses, but whose nature is largely
unknown" (Moustakas, 1990, p. 13).

For me there was no single event, more a growing concern that a deeper, more
penetrating analysis would offer insights that a superficial investigation would
cause to remain hidden. The statements that follow embody many of my own
perceptions are indicative of the general theme of concerns circulating within
military and strategic planners over the period of this project.
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Structure of the Thesis

In Chapter Two, I lay out the architecture and framework of the national security
strategy and national military strategy. These will serve as backdrops when I later
address the issues of 'organisational fitness for purpose'. I familiarise the reader
with the subtleties and nuances that pervade an organisation of this nature and its
purpose within defence and national security. I describe how it became evident to
me that a disciplined, systematic approach to futures thinking was vital to
establishing a solid foundation for change, redefinition and realignment and one
that would win support and ownership. My aim is to alert the reader to the appeal
of a 'post-modem' military, a military that is sensitive to the changes in the
operational and contextual environments. I will delay any detailed consideration
of how this may be achieved to later chapters.

In Chapter Three, I provide a comprehensive explanation of the use of Field
Anomaly Relaxation - the method used to achieve a comprehensive, albeit
abstracted view, of the world beyond the immediate planning and defence
procurement horizons- a period extending from five years out to 25. This chapter
also includes the use of twenty rich narratives that contained the 'stories' of future
change. The interest that these scenarios, along with the methodology employed,
attracted within the circle of more unorthodox thinkers at Australian Defence
Force Headquarters was considerable and was the source of much lively debate.
The rigor and thoroughness used to construct the scenarios will be discussed
along with the confidence and legitimacy that flowed from the approach into the
database application, the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter Four contains a detailed explanation of effects-based planning and
operations - a new and novel approach (and reversal) to thinking about strategic
planning. This chapter is about the knowledge management database, my primary
engine for change. Discussions will cover its growth into a functioning model, the
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Chapter One - Introduction

personal insights and dynamic problem-solving that was characteristic of its
development and the gradual population of the data - the expressive language and its adjustment/refinement to capture or bridge across the full continuum of
operational contexts. I also discuss its maturation into a true and comprehensive
effects-based strategic, operational and tactical planning tool that maintains its
architecture and functionality regardless of the scope or scale of issue being
addressed.

The progressive exposure of this application to various audiences, its contents and
the visualisation methods used to present organisational effectiveness and
decision-aid information will be highlighted. Indeed, the opportunity to personally
brief the Minister of Defence, Deputy Secretary Strategy and Deputy Chief of
Army on separate occasions was a career highlight and one that I found
immensely satisfying. Later developments springing from these briefings will be
discussed in the final sections of the thesis as I draw the research to its conclusion
and offer a way forward.

Also in Chapter Four I will discuss the discovery of similar, but trailing, work
being undertaken in the United States by other military and civilian personnel
confronted with an identical need to transform their approach towards national
security. Although the communication and sharing of ideas that resulted from this
discovery played no role in the continuing development of my own knowledge
management application, the ability to exchange thoughts and gain confidence
within my conclusions was vital. It was important for this thesis, recognising that
this was possibly the beginning of a paradigm shift in thinking and planning was
of immense value, bringing great personal satisfaction. It was the interaction with
these individuals that gave rise to the notion of remarkable people as a vital
ingredient in the birth of a movement for change. This chapter was where ideals
and idealists collided.
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In Chapter Five, titled 'Those Who Chose To See', I describe those who came to
believe in the approach to solving problems set out in Chapters Three and Four. I
set out the context in which they were exposed to the methods and their reactions,
comments and conclusions. The empirical data derived from this analysis will be
used to inform my creative synthesis in Chapter Seven.

In Chapter Six, titled 'And Those Who Didn't', I will provide a counterpoint to the
previous chapter, offering a contrasting set of empirical arguments gained from
the reactions of these 'non-believers'. My position throughout this exchange, as in
Chapter Five should be viewed as neutral. I endeavoured to avoid a judgmentalist
approach and hope that this has carri.ed through into my personal account of these
episodes.

Chapter Seven contains my assertions and is a synthesis of opposites. I say this
because I harbored a temptation to over-generalise and stereotype those who
participated in the research, despite my promises to the contrary. My experience
has been one of success in many instances and failure at others. There were very
few occasions that situated themselves between these two extremes. To attribute
this to others and make claims against their perspectives, schema or mental
models would be unfair, unproductive and unnecessary and in breach of the
subsidiary research questions focussed on my own involvement and behaviour.

I did not wish to deceive, only design with what was there. I reflect on my
approaches, I rejoice in the diversity. I complete what Carl Jung refers to as 'the
hero's journey'. Understanding and knowledge will be equal (Jung, 1958, p. 52).

Significance of the Research

What we need are shared visions of the future, not individually
experienced memories of the past.
The author in 1999, during an early planning workshop
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Many planners within defence are undertaking long-term studies using futures
thinking. Scenario planning, popularised by Wack (1984; 1985a; 1985b) and
practically in the work at Royal Dutch Shell during the 1970s, is probably the
most notable and referenced success story. Whether the Shell futures team got it
right or whether conditions and events conspired to deliver an outcome to them
that spontaneously coincided with their futures thinking derived recommendations
will never be known. The fact remains that futures thinking is a vital element of
strategic planning and contains many pitfalls and problems that cannot be handled
using traditional planning processes.

Defence is now recognising the worth of the (Art of the) Long View (Shwartz,
1991). Scenario planning in particular is enjoying more frequent use at senior
levels of defence strategic thinking. Indeed, there is now an organisation within
Defence called Strategic Planning and Futures Studies where unorthodox and
novel thinking is encouraged, to both inform decision-making and give an
expanded view of possibilities. It allows the value-laden consideration and
presentation of a complete set of desirable, undesirable and neutral outcomes from
the interaction of many drivers.

These drivers can then be thought of as decisive points from which events can be
coaxed into certain patterns that actively bring about desired outcomes or
passively discourage the realisation of undesired outcomes, particularly where
political sensitivity levels may be high. These drivers can also be considered as
indicators for the transition points of change, providing for an anticipatory
response from decision-makers that prevent getting 'caught short'.

In 1998, two research analysts visited from the New Zealand Ministry of Defence
Capability Development Branch. They, unknown to me, had been engaged in a
Special Forces capability review themselves and were in the early formative
stages of constructing a methodology to move forward. Having been advised of
my work they had traveled to Sydney for detailed discussions. This event and the
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value of these discussions highlighted to me the value of my work. Their second
visit in 1999, to review the functionality of the database, provided further
reinforcement of the merit and value of the research approach.

The culminating moment occurred in late 1999, whilst on a visit to Canberra
where several key functions within the database were employed by the highest
level strategic planning division within the Australian Defence Force to aid
completion of the White Paper for 2000. A later event was to eclipse this and will
be discussed in detail later in this thesis, as it occurred at a critical point in the
development of the application, and also coincided with a key stage in the
strategic discussions occurring in Canberra.

The foundation knowledge on which much of my approach has been based can be
found in the combined works of Checkland (1972); Checkland and Scholes
(1990); Emery (1977a); Emery and Emery (1997); Emery and Trist (1965). These
authors have defined the changing nature of contextual environments for
organisations, promoted the use of an active adaptive orientation to planning and
"fostered a collaborative, participative-democratic methodology" (McWhinney,
1992, p. 28). One that combines pluralism and free will, whereby "the objective
world . . . is the shared consensus among the perceptions and feelings of a
population . . . it is constructed through the interaction among individuals"
(McWhinney, 1992, p. 35).

Only through the principle of democratisation can organisational design cope with
turbulent social fields, developing and nurturing ideal-seeking individuals
(Emery, 1993b, p. 221).

These combine to make purposeful human action

effective, exciting, satisfying, rewarding and most of all (usually) successful, (at
least more frequently than other methods that do not contain these characteristics).
Although not purely ethnographic, my role as a research instrument is guided by
VanMaanen (1983, 1988).
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In my attempts to use a soft-systems methodology, embodying rich pictures, I
have been shaped by these authors and led willingly in a direction towards a
systems-based methodology for real-world problem solving (Checkland, 1972)
that secures emancipatory and transformative learning as part of the learning and
change that results (Mezirow, 1990a and 1990b). Checkland's model has had a
profound influence upon my methods, as it allows 'what is' and 'what could be' to
exist simultaneously (Steps 1, 2 and 4 in Figure 1). What I have discovered to be a
vital characteristic in any consensus building program.

······

............ ··""sy~tems thinking
about real world

Figure 1. Checkland's conventional seven stages SSM model.

This allows the accommodation of a large number of ideas (as will become
evident in Chapter Four), making progress towards consensus of ideas. The
consensus of actions from these shared ideas occurs as a result of Step 5 and the
formation of the list of feasible and desirable changes (actions) at Step 6.
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Rich Picture

Rich pictures are receiving recognition and respect as a powetful form of
imagery, a form that can blend the factual with the feel of a situation. They are
valuable devices for allowing more complete expression of events and
relationships. They stir emotions and interpretations that can be superior to
written text. They convey meaning beyond the metaphorical; they encourage
deeper and more personal levels of analysis. They encourage a qualitative analysis
and expression of ideas, "they require the drawing [of] pictures as well as taking
notes and writing prose" (Checkland & Scholes, 1990, p. 45). Where
disassociation in research is often fostered to promote rigor, they celebrate
involvement and demand subjectivity. The researcher is part of the picture, the
central character as well as the drawer. There is no escaping this engagement.

My rich picture in Figure 2 is a characterisation of the problem I was faced with.
Although it does not align totally with the original characteristic(s) of SSM, it was
valuable to me as an aid to understanding the problem I was faced with. I have
deliberately omitted the presence and influence of individuals; my problem is
about groups, opinions, their ability to see the whole picture and my (in)ability to
bring the whole picture into view. I have already said that my aim was to build
and reinforce consensus and that a knowledge management system may
contribute to this. The implication was that there was dissent, not consen(t)sus and
that this could be overcome. The origins of this dissent were not my primary
concern, it was not my wish to be drawn into countering an existing effect.

I knew there would be a difference of opinion. The planes within the diagram can
explain this. For groups occupying a single plane it is reasonable to expect that
their view of the whole vertical arrangement will be obstructed. Therefore their
capacity to accommodate a broader set of issues will be eroded. Dissent is already
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being set up. I (once) also adopted a point of view based on a narrow plane of
vision.

Figure 2. Rich picture of my research.

My primary concern relates to people and information. People occupy various
positions within organisations and these positions offer various pieces of
information for consumption, and conceal others. They operate on the surfaces.
Rarely is the entire scene available to a single individual. The lines that link the
various elements also point to information flows and relationships. My role was to
secure a methodology for bringing the people and the information together, fusing
them into a single (and hopefully) well functioning conglomerate that fosters
shared understanding and knowledge. The layered elements associated with life in
an organisation would need to be broken down and substituted with a series of
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accepted statements that could be conveyed from top to bottom to inform purpose.

My diagram indicates the difficulty of bring this information into a single
channel. Moving vertically changes the perspective, the links that are discemable,
the degree of 'fit', and the ability of various levels to see what is above or below.
Exposure of elements to the observer is always incomplete. To gain a wider view
the individual must be brought out of the layered framework and be allowed to
scan vertically up and down into areas that would remain hidden. They must be
allowed to discuss issues with those above and below, in ways that do not
constitute policy and regulation. The language and culture that applies on each of
the surfaces must be viewed and experienced if any hope of understanding and
collaboration is to be achieved.

The central argument that requires this dislocation is that everything is done in
order to contribute to something else, to make something happen, which builds
and grows vertically until it arrives at the top to bring about something which
represents 'the ultimate purpose'. In a national security context, the reality for
practitioners is that they are quite inwardly focused on their bit of the world and
cannot see what the ultimate purpose may be when expressed in meaningful
terms. I am not suggesting that people are ignorant, but at many times throughout
this research it proved difficult for practitioners to form the statements that would
normally originate at the highest levels of planning. Thes€ statements are what
inform all effort below.

Without clouding these thoughts here the next section, containing three of
Escher's drawings, also has some relevance. To a figure in Escher's landscape, the
inability of the figure to see the neighboring twisted architecture results in an
individual believing that everything is in order from where they see it. It is only
when the observer can see that the hallways and arches are impossibly linked that
an overall confusion is introduced about which way is up and which view
provides the overall reference point.
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Thoughts on Self Reflection

In hi s sketches, which are both beautiful and bizarre, Escher was able to capture
simultaneously reality and unreality (Figure 3) ...

Figure 3. Belvedere.

what something was, what it was transitioning into and what it had become
(Figure 4) ...

Figure 4. Day and night.
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These mind-torturing images embody some key aspects of self-reflection . How is
it possible to apprehend a thought, sight or some other sensory stimuli that is not
stable, and arrive at a reasonable understanding of it within a factual framework
that is fluid and ever-changing? The self-mage in the mirrored sphere held at
arm's length as Escher himself draws his reflection of himself drawing his own
reflected image (Figure 5) is a moment frozen in time that can be deconstructed to
pose a psychological conundrum - If I should pause to observe and contemplate
myself I have changed the reality of the moment, and I am not looking at myself
in the context of what I was doing, I am now considering myself in a paused state
of not doing what I was doing moments earlier, but now doing an inwardly
probing analysis of personal thoughts that had an external stimuli. The images and
electro-chemical states within the brain that the mind preserves is like the fading
optical illusion seen when one stares
at a bold pattern then quickly looks
away. The more one moves the eyes
to see the detail, the more the image
evades discovery until it

IS

lost from

the memory. Heisenberg's problem
of

velocity

physical
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implications for those who seek to
practice self-reflection.

Figure 5. Hand with reflecting sphere.

To apprehend the moment in order to judge oneself, thereby to reflect
meaningfully, is to gain a distorted view. The velocity/location dilemma is
transferred immediately from the physical world to the psychological. I am no
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longer who I just was, I am now not a practitioner, I am an observer, of myself
But the observations I am part of (now) are not the events that formed the
inspiration to look, the desire for deeper understanding. The observations are now
vacant and lacking in any meaning or context. They are a suspension of
experience that dilutes the purity and excitement of the moment before, the one in
which the mind raced with eager anticipation towards an unknown goal that
entertained a brief fascination. Moustakas (1967, p. 1) declares that "[this rich]
experience is only real when it is being lived; as soon as it is talked about or
defined, the living moment is lost.

Efforts to communicate the real self [even to oneself!] inevitably distort its reality
and violate the integral nature of life". In going to these places where the self is
fully exposed, something of the self must be left behind, but it is not left intact. It
is fractured, broken and the edges of what stayed and what was taken briefly away
can never be realigned. The subconscious is as precious as fine china. Its most
intricate forms are elusive, protective of itself.

Whilst I remain uncertain how to deal with this, it remains a concern worthy of a
reflective practitioner's attention and contemplation if one is to improve the ability
to ultimately become reflexive - what should be the ultimate purpose of personal
reflection.

The poem below from Moffitt (1971, in Moustakas, 1990, p. 12) provides a vivid
account of the elusiveness of (the) pure(est) immersion into an experience.

To look at any thing
If you would know that thing,
You must look at it long:
To look at this green and say
"I have seen spring in these
Woods," will not do -you must
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Be the thing you see:
You must be the dark snakes of
Stems and ferny plumes of leaves,
You must enter in
To the small silences between
The leaves,
You must take your time
And touch the very place
They issue from

Further guidance in how this can be achieved within a natural (uncontrived) state
of human thought is offered in Roads (1987, p. 1). He questions "How can we
write of unseen realities, hint of unheard concepts, or even demonstrate the
practicality of inner truths, without disturbing the slumbering Self within?" and
answers with his call to "Let go and fall into the river ... trust that I will guide you
with care and love into a new stream of consciousness. Can you trust me enough
to let go of the known and swim in an unknown current?" (Roads, 1987, p. 26).
These thoughts remind me of a similar thought expressed by Christopher
Colombus (circa 1472) when he stated that "man cannot hope to discover new
oceans until he has courage to lose sight of the shore".

There have been many times that I have been without a shore to provide comfort
and a navigational reference. It has been a deliberate and conscious act to locate a
new stream of consciousness. I expect it may be some time before I glimpse a
shore.

This human condition of willing acceptance and deep immersion into a subject
that has called its attention to you is not restricted to deeply personal subjects. It
can be a fruitful form of enquiry under any situation. Salk (1983, p. 7) recalled
that "later, when I became a scientist, I would picture myself as a virus, or as a
cancer cell. I would also imagine myself as an immune system engaged in
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combating a virus or cancer cell", realising that what he called an 'inverted
perspective' was capable of producing views and understanding that would be
denied when one did not become the object of interest and look outward. This
(need for) disembodiment seems to introduce a paradox into the human condition
- experience intensely on a personal level, but remain open and 'unselflike' to gain
maximum reception of (what may be) conflicting signals and disorientating
dilemmas.

I will delay declaring my thoughts here. There is a quote at the end of this chapter
that expresses the problem that I am now within. There is a need for a ubiquitous
participative democracy of purposeful social (inter)action to overcome this.
Morgan (1986, p. 176) has expressed this as (a style of) leadership, wherein the
"democratic leader's influence is far more subtle and symbolic [fostering a cooperative inquiry?]. He or she spends time listening, summarising, integrating and
guiding what is being said . . . summoning images, ideas and values". These are
actions that draw practitioners together.

An Initial Dialogue with the Self

In this section I present an early dialogue in which I sought to understand the
meaning of conflict and how my career as a professional career officer within the
nation's defence force and maturing years and outlook had altered my view on
what it was to be an instrument of national policy.
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Time for Some Resolutionary Thinking: The 21st Century, a Time
Without Conflict?

We aeronauts of the spirit! All those brave birds [that] fly out into
the distance, into the furthest distance- it is certain! Somewhere
or other they will be unable to go on and will perch down on a
mast or bare cliff-face - and they will be even thankful for this
miserable accommodation! But who could venture to infer from
that, that there was not an immense open space before them, that
they had flown as far as one could fly!

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 16
Hollingdale trans. 1969

Nietzsche's words echo with the need for some to continue the journey that others
have begun. We can only go so far. Every person's journey is, therefore, to some
extent, never complete(d), it is (only) a part of a greater journey. Others must
continue, for the way ahead is open and waiting for the brave birds that must
continue, over and beyond the horizon that block our view.

History records periods of colonisation, invasion, domination over one culture by
another and forced relocations as being the major macro-determinants of social
structure at the level of the nation-state. These nation-states of the world, their
different languages, customs, cultures, religions, systems of government; indeed,
almost every facet of life that distinguishes one group from another has likely
been the product of some form of conflict and its resolution into a position of
balance. This is changing. The major disturbances are passed, I believe we are
entering a new period.

We now find ourselves at an interesting threshold wherein what was once conflict
between nations, is now conflict within nations. Micro-determinants within

nations are creating fracture lines that are threatening the internal balance, the
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diversity is beginning to coalesce into tightly-bonded community groups, each
with needs that bring them into conflict with their neighbours. Horowitz (1985)
provides a comprehensive account of how ethnic alliances fuel conflict, also
dramatically simplified by Huntington (1996, p. 125) "Peoples and countries with
different cultures are coming apart" from the result of forces within.

Does this represent a new form of conflict, or are we simply moving (returning?)
conflict to a different scale? Are we destined to make many horrible decisions as
we learn our way forwards? Will a new vocabulary develop to allow us to express
the strangeness of it in ways that are abstracted and make it somehow 'not
something I have to concern myself ,with' (the term 'ethnic cleansing' provides a
vivid example, neatly employing two existing words to describe a new form of
orchestrated and systematic murder. The victim is somehow 'different' and
membership of this 'different from us' cultural group provides a partial
explanation for these atrocities).

Is this a collision of opposing values and one that could realistically have no end?
Must we then re-examine our own values to isolate the source of the conflict,
hopefully allowing a solution to emerge that is about change and modification
within the self?

This section aims to address these questions, but in a novel way. I contend that
we must look to resolutionary thinking (I have borrowed this term from
McWhinney (1992, p. 119) who explains that "resolutionary thinking has been
mostly the province of those who felt themselves powerful enough to make
changes in the affairs of man". I believe that this power has been now dispersed
to the masses and a collective voice is (now) able to bring about difference.
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A Need to Look Further Ahead

Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century a distinct
conception of what poets called inspiration? If not, I will describe
it. - If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one
would hardly be able to set aside that idea that one is merely
incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely medium of overwhelming
forces. The concept of revelation, in the sense that something
suddenly, with unspeakable certainty and· subtlety, becomes
visible, audible, something that shakes and overturns one to the
depths, simply describes the fact. One hears, one does not seek;
one takes, one does not ask who gives; a thought flashes up like
lightning, with necessity, unfalteringly formed - I have never had
any choice.
Nietzsche, Hollingdale trans. 1979
Ecce Homo p.102

I am writing this section in the closing days of the 2oth century. A century
in which man simultaneously advanced the powers of destruction and
creativity at a rate more rapid than ever before. From a Newtonian
perspective which viewed the world as a clockwork, deterministic system,
the giant century gear is about to grind forward one notch, the second
wheel continues to spin blindinglyfast, advancing the minutes, hours and
days. The years seem to blend together with troubling events becoming
inherited by those who have had no involvement in their beginnings, they
simply become the custodians of a problem, carrying forward a
taxonomy of superficial understandings in order to hand on - a 'Balkan
stalemate' that exists on many levels in many nations with generations of
participants (passive conspirators?).
So, as we hesitate on the brink of this new age, with many of the world's
inhabitants enjoying wealth, prosperity, security and opportunity; but
with the great majority still poor, hungry and affected by regional
conflict (over one-thousand million human beings - a fifth of the world's
population - live in absolute poverty), should we take a moment to
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consider our 'work? In doing so we must consider whether our
worldview is consistent with our inner values, for it is here that a great
potential for change lies.
The Beginnings of Observance and Self-Reflection

The first requirement for the growth of the individual self is that
the person remains in touch with his own perceptions. No matter
how different one's experience is from that of others, he must trust
in the validity of his own senses if he is to evolve as a unique being
.... he will be open to new levels of learning, to new pathways of
relatedness to others, and to a genuine respect for all life.
(Moustakas, 1967, p. 13)

As I look around and take in the world I see great happiness, a time of
gift giving and the reunion offamilies andfriendships; a time when the
youngest are brought together with the oldest. For a few brief days
bridges are built across differences and we find reason to hold others
close once again.
I also see a world that has failed to halt war in many places. The fighting
in Chechnya is renewed - a strange clash of cultures and ideologies
contained within a single nation state. Indonesia continues to fragment
with over

100

deaths in Ambon in the days surrounding Christmas.

Kashmir continues to be fought over by India and Pakistan, with artillery
exchanges occurring across one of the most remote and barren
landscapes on Earth.
Solutions will be found to all these conflicts, why must it take so long,
why do so many have to suffer and die- on all sides? How can the next
generation of leaders in these places receive any education and sense of
normality when gunfire has more place in their memories than laughter
and play?
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I

see

continuing environmental damage and disregard for the

importance of diversity, a diversity that preserves a fragile ecological
balance.
The kaleidoscope of images bound up in these events holds promise that
the world can heal itself, but only if a conscious effort is made to avoid
the downward spiral into conflict. If we can see no other avenue, then we
have failed to learn a fundamental lesson; a lesson that must begin with
the individual. From each individual communities must be formed.
A Further Dialogue with the Self

The following semi-fictional conversation is based upon an actual self-reflective
dialogue spanning about five years concerning my impressions of conflict and
the pursuit of peace. It represents a compilation of thoughts and ideas that grow
and alter the direction of discovery and can, therefore, be considered to be a
heuristic inquiry (Moustakas, 1990). To clearly signal the fictive nature of the
dialogue, I have used the names Ixion, Friedrich Nietszche and Jean-Paul Sartre.
These participants from mythology and philosophy take on roles and conflicting
views to enrich the story:
Ixion - in Greek mythology, the first man to murder one of his kinspeople. The

violent act of killing his father-in-law to avoid paying him promised bridal gifts
embodies the· ultimate in materialistic motivations. I use his voice to provide
expressions of selfishness, cruelty, and greed.

Nietszche - to provide a point of departure from rationalism, his fundamental

contention was that traditional values (represented primarily by Christianity) had
lost their power in the lives of individuals, what he called passive nihilism; the
masses, whom he termed the herd or mob, conform to tradition, whereas his ideal
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'superman' (Zarathustra) is secure, independent, and highly individualistic - an
iconoclast.

Sartre- He believed that the true, purest expression of (a creative) mankind was
in the self-determination made available to every individual and that the
acceptance of inescapable personal responsibility for their own decisions, unaided
by morality, religious faith or society was what defined us as beings and was,
therefore, the necessary condition for authentic human existence. He began to
favour Marxism as a movement representing the revolt of the masses against the
imposition of authority.

Concerning a Re-Orientation of Thought and Action

Nietszche: "So Guy, you say you have been thinking about this subject

for many years. We are now at the end of the 2oth century, a new century
is only days away. Are we to expect the emergence of a new 'man'? Andre

Reszler, when director of the Centre for European Culture, described
earlier attempts to forecast the coming of a new type of human being,
one that could lead us into the next great period of mankind (cited in
Tof.fler, 1980, p. 390). Tell us what it is that you hope for".
Guy: ''I look foremost to safety for my family. I pray for my children that

they are able to grow old with their own children in a world that respects
each individual's right to a simple life, free from the persecution of others.
I will be old when they marry, older still when their own children take on
the individual beauty, creativity and innocence that will define them and
become the source of attraction that will draw others towards them. My
last thoughts as I leave them to continue their lives will be a deep love for
them and the dreams they carry, a hope that their efforts will be
rewarded, I hope also that they may find quiet, peaceful moments to
think fondly of their mother and I and that we were part of their lives".
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Ixion: "Those are simple needs, ones that can be gained by isolating ones

selffrom society. If that is all you and others like you seek then I urge you
to move away from the towns and cities, let the rest of the world go on
without you. There is a brutality to the world that we must harden
ourselves against. Only the strong can survive. This is the way it must
be".
Sartre: ''I agree with some of what Ixion says. The strong amongst us do

have a very important role and yes the world can be a harsh place, but is
not a Darwinian process wherein the weak must die. It is the strong who
bind individuals together with a common purpose, but this common
purpose may be for good or evil. What about the need to be both strong to
provide the necessary leadership and yet live peacefully alongside
others? If we are to survive then we need to actively involve ourselves in
the building of communities, but many times this is complicated by the
need to openly disagree with the authorities or those who hold power - an
unusual (unachievable?) mix of Hobbesian compliance coupled with
Marxist revolt. This seems to be a dilemma that we cannot escape from".
Nietzsche: "Jean-Paul, you always were a Marxist, and I am glad you

have introduced the topic of class struggle into our conversation. People
may have been fooled by your existentialist beginnings, but your
statements on group revolutionary activity and rebellion against
authority are at the heart of what you have just called 'community
building'- there can be no purely isolated human being with individual
experiences, we are all shaped by those persons and events around us; as
identified by Heiskanen and Newman (n.d, p.

122),

when expanding the

work of Schon's reflective-practitioner "Through their transactions with
a situation where the practitioners shape it and make themselves part of
it" they become agents within the body of their own enquiry. Moreover,
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you have always advocated conflict and the collision and interaction of
wills, its presence is an essential ingredient in your philosophies. The
very origin of (revolutionary) change is the existence of profound
disagreement (McWhinney, 1992, p. 62) and is the natural order of
things (King, 1981, pp.13-22). A community is a gathering of individuals
who exist at the edge of disintegration, at that narrow boundary between
fragile stability and chaos. They oscillate between disagreement,
cooperation and sometimes collaboration - but only when an external
threat mobilises a collective frame of reference that unifies their values
and efforts for a brief moment.

Smith (1977, p. 446) states that

"Whatever the form of the political systems, the differing sectional values
within a plural society are a profound source of instability". Agreement is
a fragile condition wherein activists have suppressed their concerns
momentarily in the absence of any stimuli.
Guy: "You are both right. We need to .find a new democratism, on many

different levels, one that can bind together (religious) diversity
(Huntington, 1996, p. 193). Jean-Paul made a central theme of his work
that people must rely on their creative powers, rather than the imposition
of authority. Others have recognised that "the principles of democracysuch as the equality of human beings - cannot deny the immense
variability of human experience and human attributes" (Diamond, 1995,
p. 2). So democracy can certainly provide a forum for dialogue, but it
alone is not enough. A 'new', deeper, democratism is necessary- because
"the high ideals that characterise democracy are not readily transferable
into practice" (Diamond, 1995, p. 3).
"An interesting examination of 'participative democracy' can be found in
van Beinum (1990) in Trist, Emery and Murray (1997, pp. 570-588). The
article contains references to the holocaust - the darkest event in modern
history - and "how it overtook man's imagination to conceive evil. So the
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practical part must come from within, deep within us somewhere I
believe are the answers. The core of our being conceals the good, the right
thing to do; it needs to be exposed in order that we may cast aside our
superficial layers that we use to mask our identity".

Ixion: "You talk as ifthere were some kind of moral orguidingforce at
work. It doesn't know right from wrong. If my behaviours are consistent
with my moral position then I am doing what I believe to be right, what I
know to be right. If someone else is harmed because of it, then so be it.
What am I to do, change my beliefs so that my moral outlook conforms to
what somebody else expects of me? What you are really talking about
here is moral conservatism, or ethics for the masses".
Nietszche: "People may say they have ethics that guide their behaviour,

but they have deluded themselves. I created my superman (Zarathustra)
to counter this myth, he will provide the salvation - "the Superman feels
deeply, but his passions are rationally controlled. Concentrating on the
real world, rather than on the rewards of the next world promised by
religion, the superman affirms life, including the suffering and pain that
accompany human existence" (Microsoft Encarta, 1996) he is the voice of
the 'will to power', the realisation that I am that which must overcome
itself again and again. Many people look to a religion for guidance, for
spiritual direction. Our gods have failed us, we must demolish their
ancient habits of mind".
Satre: "We have always recognised that there is a vertical progression of

ideals or goals that we seek, and the satisfaction of the ingredients at
each level allow us to pursue those at the next level. Your earlier
comments of your family Guy seem to me to be firmly anchored to the
lowest set, where physiological and security concerns are the primary
focus".
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Guy: "Yes, although many philosophers have known this, it was

Abraham Maslow, a founder of humanistic psychology, who developed
and popularised a hierarchical model of human motivation, in which the
highest need, ultimately that for self-actualisation, can only be expressed
after lower needs are fulfilled. Rogers (1961, p. 35) also identified a
"growth tendency, a drive towards self-actualisation, or a forward
moving directional tendency [as] the mainspring of life".
My question is "How do we transition between these levels?" What is
happening to those around us as a result of our movement upward? In a
world fuelled by greed I contend that it is at the expense of some other
poor soul, often one who may be alongside us, family or friend; but
equally some unknown individual in a distant land who is being affected
indirectly by the combined effects of many he will never see. Their labour
or resources are the enablers of our ascent - as long as we can detect
movement upward then we are motivated to achieve, to strive further".
"Furthermore, we may view Maslow's model as a fractal structure. There
are incremental levels that we are not aware of For example, at the first
level- the 'physiological needs' level of food and shelter- there are five
internal levels: these can be thought of as the physical items at the first
level, the sustainment, or security, of these needs at the next; the sharing
and exchanging of food, warmth and shelter in a community or social
grouping at the third level; and so on. Somewhere within this more
complex model is the requirement to recognise, share and foster the.
achievements and successes of others. I think our simplified view of this
complex model is allowing greed and individualism to dominate".
Satre: "Our conversation so far seems to have bounded the notion of

good and evil and the existence of morals or ethics that allow these to be
defined within the individual or group. If the behaviour of others, guided
by their own beliefs, do not accord with ours, and we believe them to be
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sufficiently insensitive to the needs of others, then we demonise them and
call them evil if their behaviours are sufficiently extreme".
I:.xion: ''I could ask you "What is evil"? I have been accused, and

punished, for committing what others saw as an evil act. To me it was an
acceptable course of action. Who are they to judge me".
Guy: "Evil acts or evil people. People can only be considered evil if they

perform evil acts. There is no evil without a manifestation of it through
people. Adolph Hitler is considered one of the most evil individuals of the
twentieth century. His views were extremist and dictatorial, striking fear
into many, for others he was a man of great vision who held the promise
of profound change, prosperity and growth for Germany. Definitions
are always awkward. Words really mean nothing in themselves, they
simply conjure up additional meanings found in other words. If we look
for an explanation of evil, part of the understanding can be found in what
evil is not.
Good is what readily springs to mind. But good for who? Hitler and his
goals represented good for him and the like-minded supporters who
surrounded him. He saw evil in those who· didn't conform to his
worldview, they represented barriers in his path to a righteousness that
he passionately believed in. What we are really talking about here is an
intolerance of diversity. The intolerance is what gives rise to a low
threshold for action".
Ixion: ''Evil is a useless term. You get what you want and you use

whatever means you must to achieve it. You talked earlier of a
'superman' Nietzsche- your 'Zarathustra'- one who has turned his back
on Christianity. I don't understand how you can worship a god, yet
abandon all the teachings of that god".
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Nietzsche: "You twist my words Ixion. The philosophies of Zarathustra

do not seek an abandonment of Christianity. They look to a grander "selfsufficiency-in-joy"; an emancipation from the teachings of religion. We
have gone beyond religion. We have discovered new ways from within,
an examination of the self that provides us with purer ideals and morals.
A need to externalise the origin of these through orientation against a
religious or spiritual plane would pollute the very purity that derives
from their source - the human soul. Christianity is but a step to
enlightenment, it is not enlightenment itself, it is not the object".
Guy: "You have all raised interesting points. My conclusion, and the

main theme of our discussion it seems, is that there must be a deeper
dialogue between the inner and outer worlds, the conscious and the
unconscious. A lack of reflectivity, including lack of awareness (or
choosing to blind oneselffrom an unpleasant reality) of the unconscious
lies near the heart of many failures to act. If we are to change then the
•,1

realisation must originate from within. This is evident in

th~~~words

of

McNiff (1995, p. 91) who makes the accusation that "so long as people
believe it is sufficient to present their message only in conceptual forms,
there will never be critical self-reflective practice, for practice will not be
in the world, but in the imagination".
Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter I have set out the framework for the thesis, providing some
preliminary insights to my research approach and the major influences that have
shaped my particular orientation. I have called upon the need for self-reflection
throughout professional practice and explored some of the difficulties that must
be overcome if success is to be achieved. My rich picture attempts to portray
visually and symbolically the elements and relationships that bind the subject
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together in a way that allows simultaneous expression of what is, what could be
and possibly the paths that one may take.

I have concluded with an analysis of my own thoughts and the concerns I have for
the inability of the human spirit to bring about action. The world of self-reflection
and heuristic inquiry embodied within the dialogue probably seems strange to
some, as does my writing style that is necessary to preserve (and convey) the
depth and richness of the exchanges. I consider this as my pathway on the hero's
journey. and believe that it may lead us to new ways of understanding ourselves
and the roles we can play in events.

I leave the reader with a powerful quote from Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman
in his address to the Human Face of Warfare conference held in Canberra and
hosted by the Land Warfare Studies Centre in 1999. It summarises the key theme
of his address wherein a new breed of soldier must emerge - he/she is a
peacekeeper who can not only bring offensive action to bear, if that is warranted
and authorised, but primarily the role and purpose is restorative and deescalatory. It is one of constructive not destructive measures.

For the rest of your lives you are going to be faced with individuals
who are fleeing. They are fleeing drugs and crime and poverty and
violence and oppression and the fear that lurks in the heart of every
man and woman and you have the authority and the responsibility
and the mission to stand up and say "Friend, neighbour, brother,
sister, are you looking for a safe place"? And they'll tell you
"yeah", And then you tell 'em "then get behind me, because I'm a
soldier and this is as far as the bastards are gonna get!"
Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, (1999)
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CHAPTER TWO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF (AUSTRALIAN) NATIONAL SECURITY: TIME
FO.R A POST-MODERN MILITARY?

Firstly, what business are we in? Well, in a superficial sense, we
all know we are in the defence business. But what will that mean in
the 21st century?
Lieutenant General Sanderson, Chief of Army
New Era Security, 1996, p. 99)

Overview of the Chapter

In this chapter I endeavour to provide an insight into the machinery of national
security, with primary emphasis on attending to questions within the research
topic. It will become evident that the situation is growing more complex and
requires creative thought to develop options and solutions. Indeed, the sub-title
for this chapter could have been: 'From Set Piece Engagements to Hot Peace
Relationships, Where to From Here?' As will also become evident the need for the
future scenarios presented in the next chapter, which serve to provoke unorthodox
thinking and solutions, is drawn into sharp focus. It is my aim to make clear that
we have yet to come to terms with where we now find ourselves, Grossman's
earlier words of guardians protecting those who flee raises important questions.
The final part of the chapter is devoted to the organisation over which the research
is conducted - The Special Forces Group.

Security is like oxygen - you tend not to notice it until you begin to
lose it, but then once that occurs there is nothing else that you will
think about.
Joe Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, USA (n.d.)
Motivation- A Post-Modern Military

Australia, in the closing months of 1999, stood astride a defining boundary in its
military history; we witnessed the largest troop deployment since the Vietnam
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War, coupled with the nearness of that deployment and the additional
complication that Australia had no experience at leading large coalition
peacekeeping operations, as INTERFET (International Force in East Timor) was
ultimately to become. Leaping ahead almost two years to August 2001, we now
witness a national resolve to deal effectively with people smuggling, involving a
tense diplomatic situation between Australia, Indonesia and Norway and the
primary involvement of the Australian Defence Force to contain and convey the
illegal immigrants to a third country for processing.

The question we must now ask ourselves is, "Does this herald a new, more mature
Defence posture that relies upon the strategies of peacekeeping, peace
enforcement and military diplomacy (Hills, 2000) to bring about favourable
outcomes"? Outcomes which interestingly, still (and possibly will always) amount
to the imposition of one nation's will upon another (Clausewitz, 1832, Howard &
Paret trans.), but without the high casualty figures that we· seem (thankfully) to
have grown a marked intolerance for.

It is also interesting to note that at the same time as this operational deployment
occurred the Australian Government chose to subject the largest component of the
ADF - Army - to a detailed examination of its role, purpose and primarily its
suitability for peacetime, peacekeeping and war. Although this examination predates the East Timor operation by several months (the Minister of Defence
officially announced on 27 April 1999, that the Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) was to conduct this examination)
it will lay bare many of the issues that have shaped the INTERFET deployment

and hopefully expose many insights into the articulation of national security
policy through to Defence.

In addition to questions of suitability, the Committee was directed to "review the
current and proposed changes to Army to ensure that it provides viable and
credible land forces able to meet a range of contingencies" (Joint Standing

44

Chapter Two -The Philosophy of National Security: Time for a Post-Modem Military

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2000, p. xv). These
'contingencies' that form the range have not been stated explicitly and, therefore,
the range would appear to be open-ended offering little guidance for planners.
Indeed, the report makes an early admission in their report that:

the approach taken by us during the inquiry was that .peacetime,
peacekeeping and war are not distinct and separable conditions. All
armies must be able to operate within a conflict spectrum. To
successfully resolve a dispute the Army must be able to be
effective at both ends of this spectrum. In situations short of large
scale coordinated violence, the Army must be adept at what we
termed soft security measures. This includes an ability for
negotiation,
humanitarian
relief
and
information
dissemination .... [it] must [also] be able to apply physical force in
what we termed hard security measures [emphasis added].
(Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade, 2000, p. 5)
The need for these soft security measures is increasing and reflects the
observations made by Hill (2000). It is inevitable that military forces will be
placed in operational contexts in which their training is limited. This is
attributable to the single-mindedness of military leadership on war and
warfighting. It has its origins in the belief that the spectrum of conflict is narrow
and dominated by statements related to what the military uses to define itself, its
raison d'etre. This conflict spectrum has been presented in a number of formats;
all, however, resemble Figure 6 (Australian Army, 1998, p. 2-9).
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Figure 6. The spectrum of conflict.

It interesting to note that within this model, that contains the boundaries of what
must be dealt with, 'non-conflict' elements are numerous. Although these are
adequately described as 'military support operations' with the "focus on
overcomi ng a problematic environment, be it physical, social or political"
(Austral ian Army, 1998, p. 2- 10) the measures undertaken remain entangled with
those related to confl ict (warfighting). lndeed, the words 'scale' and 'tempo'
illustrated in Figure 5 have a pre-occupation (within their definitions) with the
specifics of warfighting. Scale relates to "relative geographic range and/or
political consequences of failure", whilst "tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity
relative to that of the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between
operations" (Australian Army, 1998, p. 2-9). These self-limitin g descriptions.
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containing words such as 'enemy', are unable to accommodate the complexities
and ambiguities of non-conflict situations, wherever they are located on the
spectrum or continuum. Discussions with Brunskill (1999) during a Defence
Operations Research Conference in Adelaide (at which I co-presented a paper on
scenario planning) indicated that 80% of the operational deployments over the last
ten years have been non-warlike. Whilst it is uncertain what constituted the
remaining 20%, it is clear that there is an imbalance and the ADF is being
prepared, equipped and manned for tasks that it is (more) unlikely to undertake in
the future.

A Fixation on Fighting

Given the above comments, it is uncertain whether a fixation with this paradigm,
a confidence in a 'concept-led' approach that is dominated by responses to conflict
(structured for war, adapted for peace) and waifighting postures can ever lead to
more intellectual depth and rigor. The place for this intellectual depth, as a critical
element, is illustrated in Figure 7 (Australian Army, 1998, p. 5-2) and one which
is contained within a larger framework, labeled by Army as (unfortunately it
seems to me) "The components of fighting power [emphasis added]".

FIGHTING POWER
The Capacity to Fight and Win

I
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I
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Figure 7. The components of fighting power.

It is evident then that the entire construct rests on and is reinforced by the

application of coercive power as a principal endeavour. Doctrine repeats the
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necessity for a warfighting capability to be retained, albeit with a (much more
frequent) requirement for the adaptation to employment in non-conflict situations.
We should hope that diplomacy can avoid a situation where aggression will (ever
again) be directed against us. Our role would then become one of buffering
between two opposing sides who are unable to engage effective diplomatic
measures.

Notwithstanding all the above comments, any independent examination is
warranted, indicates a healthy capacity for (national) self-evaluation and is not
unlike that which is going on in other countries. Indeed, military forces worldwide
are experiencing similar dilemmas as they are forced to recognise the importance
of peaceful resolution and the associated structural changes that are imposed upon
their primary role as instruments of national military power and policy. It is this
subject, and the discovery of similar work being undertaken in the United States,
that has confirmed the need for the development of the effects-based application
discussed in Chapter Four.

The difficulty remains for leaders and policy-makers in that the thinking must
break free of current boundaries. What we are drawn to recognise is that "part of
the problem is that we tend to think of conflict as, simply, a breakdown in a
particular system, rather than as the emergence of another alternative [and for
others legitimate] system of profit and power" (Keen, 1996, p. 14). Conflict is the
inability of a social system to accommodate 'tension' and represents a natural
escalation.

Broad Progress

Gone are the days of large military forces standing ready to protect other allied
nations through the mechanism of ironclad defence agreements - a policy of
deterrence. We are now firmly in an era of engagement and transparency, but one
that remains troubled by the need to implement, more frequently it is becoming
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apparent, United Nations mandated coalition actions to impose the will of the
international community upon rogue states that would otherwise upset the fragile
balance of peacetime competition.

Furthermore, trade imperatives and the rapid expansion of the free market enabled
through advances in communications technology have juxtaposed diplomacy and
national prosperity as awkward bedfellows. This has introduced dilemmas in the

provision of aid and infrastructure support to restore a working government and
social framework as rapidly as possible following the withdrawal of
peacekeepers. We can expect that the transitional phases in East Timor will be
troubling for Indonesia, its major Asian partners and our Defence Force as we see
and experience our way forward.

The test to our diplomacy and strategic posture in the region is under immense
pressure. How we fare will depend largely on our military and its ability to act
with tact, sensitivity and above all an enduring de-escalatory influence.

This chapter further addresses the core purpose of the Australian Defence Force
as it is enshrined within the National Military Strategy, it further examines the
difficulties arising from political and societal demands upon it to be a 'nonviolent' military instrument of national policy. This oxymoron is one that
continues to bother defence planners as they confront the (changing) core purpose
of the ADF and observe similar trends in other countries. Indeed the "Strategic
Defence Review of July 1998 proposes that one of the ways in which Britain
should contribute to the maintenance of international stability is through the
creation of a new core military mission, defence diplomacy" (Hills, 2000, p. 46).
For developed Western nations this may prove to be their most effective (and
productive) use and could be considered post-modernist, an ideological departure
from the use of destructive, coercive means.
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The moral imperative of purposeful (post-modern military) action has taken root
and is expressed in the following quote:
Defending the New World Order will demand the collective use of
military force, particularly to deal with some of the more violent
convulsions of self-determination claims. This will require the
political will to use military force for novel purposes: to defend
democracy from violent overthrow, to protect the human rights of
large groups of people (notably minorities) from egregious
violations, to end humanitarian nightmares or to stop a devastating
civil war.
Halperin, Sheffer and Small, (1992, p.6)
Self Determination in the New World Order

My use of the term 'military post-modernism' aligns with the explanation given by
Hodge (1995, p. 38) in the "sense it gives of an open-ended receptivity to the
unpredictably new, in particular its responsiveness to new themes and new ways
of thinking, writing and producing knowledge". We need a military that can avert
conflict through deeper levels of cooperation with the elements of national power,
combined with an effects-based national security strategy.

National Security Strategy

From this point forward it is necessary to occupy the reader's mind with
descriptions of strategy. The subject is confused and multi-faceted, with a large
intellectual divide between the government and military. Without oversimplifying what is an enormously complex area I offer a quote from the Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade that spells out quite
crisply what (the role of) strategy is and for my purposes here it links strongly
with language I will use later in Chapter Four. "Traditionally the role of strategy
is to decide how military means can be used to achieve political ends [emphasis
added]" (Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2000,
p. 14). The reader may wish to return briefly to the glossary as these terms should
start to clarify from this point forward.
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In any consideration of Australia's military and its purpose it is necessary to
understand the framework that positions the Defence effort - our National
Military Strategy, which is distilled from a National Security Architecture. This is
depicted in Figure 8 and clearly illustrates that Defence is but a single player in a
complicated game.

National
Security
Architecture
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_,,

I
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Figure 8. Australia's National security strategy.

The National Military Strategy

The ADF has a framework of military strategies, or endeavors, that set out ways
that Government might employ the ADF to achieve national security objectives.
The framework, which supports Australia's National Security Strategy, consists of
Australia's National Military Strategy (NMS) and subsidiary strategies, which
describe the military contribution to dealing with a wide range of threats in peace
and war. This military strategy has five components, each with their own set of
operational and tactical elements. These are set out in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. The National military strategy framework.
The mission of the Australian Defence Force is to Prevent or defeat the use of
armed force against Australia and its interests. This mission involves, therefore,
two key dimensions:

•

the development and maintenance of the capacity to defeat any use or threat of
armed force against Australia and its interests; and

•

the promotion of a regional and global security environment which enhances
Australia's security by reducing the likelihood of armed attack against
Australia and its interests. Policy direction is embodied within the White
Paper.

The focus of the White Paper (2000), which this chapter pre-dates the release of,
will be on the development of military capabilities to meet the range of missions
the Government wants Defence to perform at a given level of spending. In a
Defence Portfolio document (Department of Defence 2000, p. 4) this was
expressed whereby:

The aim is to expose, in as stark a way as possible, the relationship
between the strategic outlook, the essential roles and missions the
ADF must perform, the Defence capability implications and
money. The White Paper will demonstrate much more clearly than
in the past the relationship between specific potential missions and
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the cost of being able to develop and maintain the capabilities
Defence needs to perform each mission.
(Department of Defence- Portfolio, Defence intranet, p. 4)
Having had several insights into the processes used to construct these
relationships it is my belief that fundamental flaws prevented the discovery of
new conclusions, therefore not offering decision-makers the starkness (of
exposure) mentioned in the quote above. These flaws are beyond the scope of this
thesis to address fully, but relate primarily to the inclusion of phraseology that
denies the possibility of unconventional and asymmetric responses or measures.
These unconventional and asymmetric measures will be explored in more detail
within Chapter Four. In the meantime, the National Military Strategy will be laid
out fully to provide a foundation on which to (strategically) analyse future
capabilities.

The five elements of the National Military Strategy are:

•

Defeating Attacks Against Australia.

•

Defending Australia's Regional Interests.

•

Defending Global Interests.

•

Protecting National Interests.

•

Shaping the Strategic Environment.

Each of these are discussed in detail.

Defeating Attacks on Australia - DAA

DAA is the ADF' s primary task and, therefore, its primary force structure
determinant (Department of Defence, 1997, pp. 29-31 ). The training, equipment,
personnel and doctrine are bound up in the need to defeat attacks against Australia
and thereby protect territory, population, resources, infrastructure or institutions
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against a regional power. It is the essential foundation of Australia's wider
defence posture and informs and shapes our major alliances. Defeating attacks
against Australia is by definition a role that calls upon the full application of
combat power to defeat an aggressor.

Any moves towards a defence posture characterised by peace operations would
necessarily alter the balance and makeup of the ADF. The notion of 'structured for
war, adapted for peace' as a recently introduced construct to reconcile this
imbalance and limit its damaging effects will be introduced later.

Defending Australia's Regional Interests - DRI

Australia's security from armed attack depends on the security situation in its
immediate neighbourhood and in the wider Asia-Pacific region (Department of
Defence, pp. 31-32). Australia's defence posture, therefore, must include the
means to influence strategic affairs in the region and the willingness to contribute
to regional efforts to promote regional security.

Alongside these diplomatic

measures at securing stability Australia must maintain a credible capability to
engage in any conflict within the region that threatens our security.

Defending Global Interests- DGI

Notwithstanding its strong focus on the Asia-Pacific region, Australia also has
clear strategic interests at the global level (Department of Defence, 2000a, pp. 3
and Department of Defence, 2000b ). The foremost of these is Australia's
responsibility to support the United Nations. Australia also has strong interests in
supporting its major allies in resisting aggression, where the United Nations is
unable to achieve this outcome - multi-national operations and operations other
than war, also referred to as military support operations (These are operations
other than combat operations. The Army further divides military support
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operations into peace and support operations. Examples of military support
operations include disaster relief, humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations).

Protecting National Interests - PNI

This covers a broad range of peacetime activities that may be directed by
government as being in the national interest. These include ADF participation in
international peacekeeping, humanitarian,

and disaster relief operations;

evacuation of Australian citizens abroad; counter-terrorist operations; and
maritime surveillance and response operations. Examples of this component of
the NMS have, for simplicity, been bundled into the broader subjects of Defence
Force Aid to the Civil Power (DFACP), Defence Aid to the Civil Community
(DFACC) and Counter-Terrorism (CT).

Shaping the Strategic Environment -SSE

This strategy has as its aim the building of Australia's relationships with its
alliance partners and neighbours in the region, so that the chances of conflict are
reduced or, if conflict does occur, the chances of Australian and allied success are
increased. This strategy requires military credibility based on a combination of
relevant professional attributes and reputation as an effective fighting force.
Education and training of foreign military personnel, ship visits, and exercises and
exchanges are examples of activities conducted under this strategy.

A review of the suitability of the Australian Army to provide viable and credible
land forces able to meet a range of contingencies is timely in the light of
Australia's present circumstances. The Army presently provides the ADF with a
modest array of capabilities able to meet immediate needs. These capabilities are
adequate for immediate peace and peace support operations, albeit with a
constrained ability to sustain a commitment over time.
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National Security Interests and Objectives

It was stated earlier that the National Military Strategy was a supporting

component of the National Security Strategy. It is important to remember that the
protection of Australia's national security interests is a matter of national policy,
not just defence policy, and requires the application of a whole-of-nation and
whole-of-government approach. It is equally important to appreciate that this
national policy is embodied within broader democratic ideals of tolerance and the
pursuit of peaceful resolutions to tension. Nevertheless, it remains a fundamental
role of government to ensure the protection of Australia's:

•

territory, airspace, territorial seas, and maritime resource zones;

•

citizens; and

•

national and international political and economic interests.

From the three points above it can be deduced that the over-riding security
interests are to safeguard physical security, to preserve Australia's capacity for
independent decision-making as a sovereign State, and to sustain the existence of
a democratic system of government - a government that is actively engaged in
regional and international affairs in order to win (its own) prosperity and growth.

This role requires protection against both military and non-military threats to
national security.

•

Military threats are those that might be posed by the military forces of other
nation-states. These threats may be direct, for example, the threat or use of
armed force on Australian shipping, aircraft, territory or population centres.
Military threats may also be indirect, for example, the committing of military
acts of aggression in other parts of the world that put global security, or
Australia's regional security environment at risk.

56

Chapter Two -The Philosophy of National Security: Time for a Post-Modem Military

•

Non-military threats are those that might be posed by other than the military
forces of other nation-states.

These threats cover a very broad range of

possible occurrences, including deliberate disruption of Australia's economic
activity, especially of its international trade; illegal immigration; influx of
refugees and externally-induced environmental degradation.

Other threats

include pandemics; threats to primary industries from imported animal and
plant diseases; illegal fishing; international sabotage of the national
information infrastructure and transnational crime.

Collectively these encompass a broad spectrum of situations involving both
conflict and non-conflict- a question of risk, coupled with a level of likelihood or 'probability of occurrence'. These two inter-related issues have been displayed
at Figure 10 (Adapted from Engelbrecht, Bivins, Condray, Fecteau, Geiss, &
Smith, 1996).
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Figure 10. Conflict probability-risk functions.
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1. High end global competitor
2. Low end global competitor
3. High end regional competitor
4. Low end regional competitor

5. Counterinsurgency
6. Peace enforcement
7. Dangerous nuclear/ industrial activities
8. Large-scale nuclear, biological and/or chemical proliferation
9. Non:-state terrorism

If Figure 10 is an accurate representation on these two dimensions then positions
6, 7, 9, 8 and 5 on the horizontal axis contain the largest area under the
intersecting lines and, therefore, should focus defence planners' thoughts on the
force structures necessary to succeed in these types of operations. Clearly, the
ADF's present posture is aligned against position 3 -high-end regional competitor
and a combination of positions 1 and 2 as part of alliances with the United States
and others.

It is uncertain whether any examination of the suitability of the Army for
peacekeeping, peacemaking and war will consider the veracity and usefulness of a
simple diagram such as this. The message is quite clear; the imbalance leads to an
awkward organisational configuration that somehow is never able to match itself
with the situations it finds itself in. This topic will be addressed in more detail
within Chapter Four with several references to marketing orientation as a strategic
organisational input.

Before dealing with how decision-makers cope with this complexity it would be
useful to point out that the National Military Strategy is under review, is likely to
change to accommodate other issues and will change again in the future. Indeed,
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the Military Response Options (MRO are subject to the Official Secrets Act) that
are a detailed account of actions and assigned force elements is also under review.

The unknowability of all this adds legitimacy to the 'structured for war, adapted
for peace' theme that now demands our consideration. The source, level and
complexity of threat will always pose considerable problems, if we position our
approach firmly around conflict then we should not be surprised by events that
confirm our lack of preparedness.

Structured for War, Adapted for Peace

The Chief of Army, in his address to the National Press Club on 14 April 1999,
stated:

There should be no doubt about this: the Australian Army's focus
is- and must remain- the delivery of warfighting capabilities that
are world's best practice. To aim for anything less would be an
insult to our people in uniform; and a betrayal of the nation. I have
seen the results of a peacekeeping culture in several armies in
recent years. Those are not the kind of Army that this country
needs. They are not the kind of Army that will earn the respect
that is the foundation of successful peacekeeping.
Lieutenant General F.J. Hickling, (1999) Chief of Army
Address to the National Press Club, Canberra.

Although Major General Hickling's words carry several messages, the key
message is clearly that Army's posture and preparedness will remain one of
warfighting and not peace keeping or peace-enforcement. To support this view an
approach known as 'structured for war, adapted for peace' has been crafted by
Army Headquarters staff that aims to secure confidence in our ability to adapt
when warfighting skills are not called for. This is rather optimistic and fails to
recognise that the skills are markedly different, as will be demonstrated in
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Chapter Four where I present an effects-based analysis of defence capability
planning.

In peace operations it is possible for a young, relatively inexperienced commander
to make the right tactical decision in the field, but the result, in the fullness of
time, is found to be politically disastrous and inappropriate. It is my view that the
premise of 'structured for war, adapted for peace' will receive critical review
during the Senate inquiry and be exposed as flawed and unachievable. This view
is reinforced by a senior Department of Defence official who declared:

I do not think that we have yet got to the point of providing the
Army with a really clear statement of what it is meant to be doing
. . . To my mind at least, one of the key objectives of the present
process is to make sure that we do that.
Mr H. White, Deputy Secretary Strategy.
This statement has particular relevance to the layered model presented in Figure 2
whereby information flows are interfered with.

Some Thoughts from Kosovo

Briefly departing from the Australian context allows us to consider the confused
events in other parts of the world. This perspective can enable us to better
understand our themes. The former Yugoslavia is one area that cries out for a
solution to relieve the suffering and endless political bickering that has crippled
the country and destroyed the spirit of the people, although many would consider
their resolve to have hardened it in ways that will inevitably lead to more violence
- a spirit of anger and hatred. This example is also valuable in drawing attention to
the complexity of the East Timor situation, illustrating that what one side values
as being a favourable outcome may be totally inconsistent with what the other
side perceives.
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As a brief reminder, the conflict in Kosovo was:
•

Not a major theater war like Desert Storm.

•

Not like Korea, Iran or Iraq in terms of the operational planning guidance
scenarios.

•

Not supporting U.S. vital interests, but 'humanitarian' concerns.

•

A return to Vietnam's 'gradual escalation' rather than Desert Storm's
'overwhelming force'.

•

Not a fair fight: Major Power NATO vs. Third World Serbs.
•

NATO: 775 million people & 57% of world GDP.

•

Serbs: 11 million people & 0% of world GDP in a nation half the size of
Victoria.

•

NATO: Essentially a live-fire military exercise (30,000+ air sorties were
flown).

•

Serbs: No offensive or defensive weapons comparable to NATO.

But STILL it:
•

took 1,100 aircraft and 70+ days to force Milosevic to concede (reinforcing

the Clausewitzian doctrine that war is a clash of wills, the imposition of one
nation's will upon another, or a search for asymmetry- a topic I will deal with
more completely in Chapter Four).
•

allowed the Serb Army to withdraw from the conflict with most tanks,

artillery and intermediate air defence weapons intact.
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~~l'~?i(f
Maintain a peaceful, prosperous ~ ~lliei
US-led Europe
~ • pulsion~,

European Strategy
Maintain a peaceful,
prosperous & Independent
Europe

.C

Convince NATO to transition
~
from old Cold War common
~
defense against external threats
to new Continental security
coalition

~

Prevent~ Into Albania &

~acedonia,thence to Greece &
Turkey

~

Maintain NATO relationship with
Russia and give it a role In helping
end the crisis

Persuade NATO to acquire
means and will to conduct "our
of area" military operations

Demonstrate European .l!llilll

Figure 11. A common effort concealing widely differing objectives.

Portrayed above (Figure 11, source unknown and circulated freely on the Defence
intranet amongst planners) is a diagram that illustrates the divergence of opinion
that can surround a single theatre. In this example, an internal conflict that is
characterised by 'war' (an accurate definition has continued to trouble policy
makers since the end of World War Two), is superimposed with a peaceenforcement operation by a multi-national force operating under United Nations
authority. I propose that a similar confused arrangement could exist when
examining the roles and objectives of the participant nations in INTERFET.

Staying with Kosovo for one further example, we can make several illustrative
judgements about how the United States' effort has looked to allies and foes in
other regions:

•

Many observers believed that the US and NATO applied power recklessly
against civilians for less than 'vital interests'.

•

A reluctance to accept casualties and 'Poll as you fight' made the USA an
unpredictable ally.

•

There are clear limits to US global surge capability and 'numbers' still count,
Kosovo was an example of insufficient numbers being mobilised.

•

High-tech or not, the US can be fooled by good operational decisions.

•

Easier to bomb the civilian infrastructure first - get the military targets when
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you can as they will generally be well hidden and difficult to engage.

It is clear that many misunderstandings and misjudgments have occurred during
the two peace enforcement operations highlighted in this section (Yugoslavia and
East Timor). These are likely to increase in both frequency and consequence. The
message for Australia and the focus of our attention here - the Australian Army is whether we can begin to think through these complex situations, develop plans
and responses that are alert to all possible perspectives and transform the
organisation to one that is 'restorative' in goals and objectives, rather than
destructive.

The Messages for Australia

The shift towards a peace enforcement/peacekeeping posture for the Australian
Defence Force is undeniable, it is part of a larger international movement. How
rapidly this shift occurs and how successful it ultimately proves to be is dependent
upon many things, not least of which is the ability of the Defence Organisation to
recognise that we have departed from an age of 'set piece engagements' to arrive
in one of 'hot peace relationships'. The ends of the continuum that these points
define are far apart and the zone between is complex, ill-defined, overlapping and
problematic for diplomatic and military strategies. Different structures and
postures are called for. I assert that these demand tact, diplomacy and the
involvement of the warrior diplomat in winning a secure region.

Where to From Here

We should look carefully to the experiences of our larger partner nations as they
deal with the same issues. There is grave danger in not remaining prepared for
periods of increasing tension, there is also grave danger in inappropriate responses
or misreading indicators. Clearly a balance must be struck between an ADF that is
optimised for war and one that does not possess the capabilities to respond to
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situations that involve skills more aligned with peace enforcement or
peacekeeping.

The report of the Joint Standing Committee and the Defence White Paper 2000
may herald a new role that can span the gulf from peace operations to war,
hopefully preparing us for more peaceful resolutions to conflict.

Here we will learn that each of us bears responsibility for our
actions and our failure to act. Here we will learn that we must
intervene when we see evil arise. Here we will learn more about
the moral compass by which we navigate our lives and by which
countries will navigate the future.
President George Bush, 15 February, 1991
Inscribed on the wall of the Holocaust Museum in Washington.

In considering the realignments that may deliver a 'post-modem' military, we
must now look to the organisation that may offer a place for these changes - the
Special Forces Group.

The Special Forces Group

The Special Forces Group is an organisation comprising 1200 personnel, spread
over five Australian States and Territories in seven separate locations. It has the
role within the Australian Defence Force of conducting operations beyond the
range and capability of other force elements. This definition (essentially a
definition by exclusion) has become less useful as world events continue to
surprise security planners; with operational deployments becoming more
complex, less defined militarily - with a warrior diplomat, humanitarian,
peacekeeper, rescuer, coalition participant and possibly UN sponsored action
becoming more commonplace.

The place for these developments to occur is within an unconventional
organisation, where novelty is fostered. The novelty then must emerge on
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multiple levels. It is not only about the behaviour of the people, it is also about the
supporting training, doctrine, organisational structures and purpose. I have
discovered that many of the business and institutional aspects contained within
the broader field of organisational behaviour do not transfer to a military
institution; there are cultural and ideological complexities that exist on many
dimensions. These will also have to be discovered.

The views expressed here are derived from a consideration of domestic, regional
and global trends, characteristics and policies. The points made are intentionally
simple and direct, and represent core opinions of complex issues, which can be
analytically sustained. Considered in total they provide a clear direction for the
strategic development of the organisation.

It would be valuable for the reader to become familiar with the cultural subtleties

and nuances that pervade an organisation of this nature, although not essential as
they are mirrored in many unorthodox institutions (Rich, 1994). There is a
growing fascination with these organisations, fuelled by the large number of
published non-fiction books by ex-members containing amazing stories of
operations and training (Connor, 1998; Homer, 1991). The purpose of Special
Forces within defence and national security and how it became evident to me that
a disciplined, systematic approach to futures thinking was vital to establishing a
solid foundation for change and redefinition and one that would win support and
ownership.

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter I have prepared the reader's mind for the next two chapters with an
understanding of national security strategy and national military strategy. It was
not meant to be burdened with messages of messiness and institutional
.f

inadequacy (although I fear that some of these may have been conveyed). If this
has occurred then I would like to emphasise that inter-departmental levels of
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cooperation are (usually) high and genuine attempts are made to bring order to
what is an extremely difficult area of policy with reasonable levels of success and
effectiveness. As will be pointed out later there is a complexity and non-linearity
that permeates this entire area of human (inter)action, almost defying any
reasonable attempts to bring about desired effects (Alberts & Czerwinski, 1997).

I have contrasted Australian policy with some examples of international efforts to
control conflict, showing that perspectives differ dramatically and what may seem
to be an appropriate course of action can be hopelessly inadequate.

I have also outlined the nature and purpose of Special Forces and the important
place it occupies with Defence bringing the discussion back to the context of this
research. This outline will be used to foster acceptance of the need for forward,
scenario-based thinking, the subject of Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONSTRUCTING PLAUSIBLE FUTURES

The past is of no importance. The present is of no importance. It is
with the future that we have to deal. For the past is what man
should not have been. The present is what man ought not to be.
The future is what artists are.
Oscar Wilde
Overview of the Chapter

This chapter explains the use of Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR), a systems
approach to futures planning that guides the construction of scenarios in a more
structured way than many other methods, particularly those that demand high(er
than normal) levels of imagination and creativity throughout. The aim of scenario
planning, within the context of this research, was to provide a relatively
unbounded forum for novel thoughts and ideas regarding organisational renewal.
These unusual concepts and imperatives, that would be present within the minds
of the organisation's members, must be expressed within a broadened perspective
of the future. It would therefore, draw forth the collective knowledge (to be
populated into the database in Chapter Four) that would otherwise remain
unrevealed and untested.

Its aim was not to attack conservatism or orthodoxy, but to provide an
environment in which present beliefs could remain unchallenged, whilst
simultaneously exploring other possibilities. This was achieved through the use of
Checkland's (1972, 1980 and 1981) and Checkland and Scholes (1990) SoftSystems Methodology and the possibilities of accommodating individual and
group concerns through adherence to the stages of SSM: an unstructured problem
situation (SSM stage 1), a problem situation expressed (stage 2), a conceptual
model (stage 4) and a comparison between stages 2 and 4, with all having a
legitimate place as a repository of knowledge and information to enable
purposeful activity and minimise 'rice bowl' discussions (stage 5). How I used the
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full seven steps of SSM to preserve present beliefs, explore the new (stage 6) and
then bring the two into juxtaposition (stage 7) will be set out in this chapter.

The FAR methodology was selected as it provided for the manipulation into
scenarios of a diverse range of change drivers. These drivers may be derived
through various means in many futures planning, forecasting and predicting
methodologies (Schwartz, 1991; Taylor, 1993; McRae, 1995; Builder, 1987;
Digby, 1988; Loescher, Schroeder & Thomas, 2000), which in turn provide a
macro framework from which to consider how events may unfold. I conclude,
however, that the FAR approach exhibited a superior ability to rapidly distil a
massively unworkable list of possible permutations into a reduced set of possible
co-existent elements. In the final section of this chapter I also include some
insights into the automated version of FAR that I developed.

A novel approach was also taken to encapsulate the end-states that emerged from
the construction of the Faustian tree, an integral part of the FAR process, allowing
a re-examination of the drivers and their dominance in developing themes. As will
be demonstrated this further extends and tests the FAR process.

Seven drivers, major influences that cannot be changed, act to provide the
boundaries for five future world situations arrayed on a Faustian tree, a map of
interconnected scenarios. These future worlds are further developed into rich
narratives that describe 20 individual scenarios. The product of the futures work is
linked back to the organisation to provoke creative thought and unconfined
dialogue designed to contribute to initiatives for fruitful change. This paper
presents an account of the use of FAR to build scenarios for the Special Forces
Group faced with an increasing rate of change in its operational environment.

68

Chapter Three - Constructing Plausible Futures

(Organisational) Change as a Constant (Improvement)

Before discussing in detail the use of FAR and the processes that led to the
construction of the 20 scenarios I need to explain a model (see Figure 12) I
developed at the beginning of the research that conveyed a sense of the dynamic
nature of change and progress and the important place that the Special Forces
Group occupies within this continuum of change. This model will be expanded
upon briefly in Chapter 4 when fully exploring the nature of effects-based
operations and what form(at) the organisational transformations need to take to
accommodate the conclusions of the research. The model's use here illustrates that
current paradigms are fragile and transitory and future events are already
beginning to shape the change, indeed everything is in the state of becoming
something else.

Superseded

A

8

The model can be viewed
stationary, with events
moving past from right to left
- progress; or as
movement towards the right
past stationary periods.

Figure 12. The nature of change and progress.
Special Operations (see Glossary) should exist at the forward or leading edge of
military capability (within the rectangle labeled 'Special' in Figure 12) and remain
the primary domain of Special Forces (see Glossary). They are the practitioners of
these operations and have been screened, selected, equipped and trained to
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perform them. Although I have not provided additional contextual information in
these rectangles - Future what?, Special what?, Elite Conventional what?,
Conventional what? and/or Superseded what? It is a simple matter to add
'operations',

'administration', 'logistics', 'personnel', 'training', 'recruitment' or

other descriptor. The operations, for example, conducted on the 'edge' must by
definition be novel, unorthodox and surprising. It follows that the supporting
administration, logistics, personnel management procedures and otherfactors, that
support them must also be somewhat different . from the mainstream to
accommodate that novelty. There must, therefore, be a movement of the boundary
from 'A' to 'B'. This striving for difference has not (routinely) occurred and can be
attributed not only to phenomena within the organisation, but also to a military
and political leadership that is characterised by conservatism towards the very
organisation that is expected to be doing different things (not the same things
differently) in order to discover the newness that eventually others will benefit

from the practise of. These are the qualities that Stacey (1996b, p. 314) regards as
essential to thrive at the boundary between stability and instability because
"systems are capable of novelty and variety (creativity and innovation in
organisational terms) only when they

I used this model on every occasion
that I brought the subject of
organisational change to a new
audience. Its simple yet powerful
messages have proved to be
unassailable. There is an underlying
logic that demands acceptance.
Once this logic is acknowledged
then
every
subordinate
organisational
issue
somehow
becomes swept up in the collective
opinions that result. The model has
become so central to the idea of
orchestrated change that I intend to
integrate its key features into the
strategic plan. It is suggestive of a
course of action that seems to
provide an effective method of
satisfying perceived needs. It is
seductive.
Personal reflections, 16 June 1998.

are pushed far from equilibrium to the
edge

of

disintegration".

If

'ordinariness' is preserved or imposed
then 'difference' can never emerge.

The model indicates, in an ideal
setting, the requirement to reach
forward

and

hand

back

military

capabilities simultaneously. It is the
only way by which progress can be
made. Handing back is possibly more
critical as it creates the organisational
slack

necessary

for

creativity,
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experimentation and innovation (Nohria & Gulati, 1997), in any event this slack is
necessary to achieve the three interwoven roles of undertaking core operations,
enabling attention towards the new and emergent and the formal handing back to
elite-conventionals and conventionals whose own capacity must be developed as a
cooperative effort, allowing the necessary movement from the boundary at 'A' to a
new boundary at 'B'. A fascinating account of an organisation's success in the area
of experimentation and innovation can also be gained from Rich (1994) and
Rogers (1995).

This model was accepted quite readily and proved to be a valuable tool for
building consensus around (at least the conceptual) initiatives for change. Its logic
could not be disputed by senior decision-makers, but having accepted the
powerful messages it conveyed they proved unable to adjust their behaviour,
despite the existence of powerful indicators for change produced by the database
application discussed in Chapter 4.

I have confirmed many of the capability development, modernisation and
operational analysis projects (many of which are subject to the Official Secrets
Act) are advancing methods within the Elite Conventional domain. The discovery
of new capability (doing different things), with an associated handing back of
capabilities to secure the necessary slack has not been attended to with enough
vigor and the organisation is essentially doing the same things differently.

It is inevitable that over time many of the techniques, practices and procedures
will be adopted by mainstream military organisations (those occupying the
rectangle labeled 'Elite Conventional' and 'Conventional').

The message this

model seeks to convey is that well forward of what is considered 'the way things
are done' is a large part of 'the way things will be done'. There are new, more
advanced methods that eventually will become mainstream (routinely performed
within the conventional domain). They must become the focus of experimentation

71

Chapter Three - Constructing Plausible Futures

and innovation now and become an area of interest and curiosity for Special
Forces as part of a managed plan for change.
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Figure 13. Scenario and effects-based planning mapped over Checkland's SSM.

At Figure 1 I used Checkland's seven stage SSM model to introduce the ideas of
'what is?', 'what could be?' and the possibility that these could be asked
simultaneously to a group. As I have already stated I believe that scenario
planning and effects-based planning constitute knowledge management systems
and are valuable aids to the building and reinforcement of consensus. Figure 13
shows how these processes can be mapped over the SSM model to secure the
active involvement (and consensus) of planners.
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To better (more efficiently) develop and maintain an appropriate (more effective)
Australian Defence Force (ADF) its elements must be continually alert to the
strategic environment (a subject dealt with at length in the previous chapter) and
the shifts and adjustments that occur. These two factors combine to produce a
military operations research focus that can inform decision-making on the three
levels of: tactical, operational and strategic. On the strategic level an evaluation of
overall operational capability may be undertaken as a means of securing national
security, but as will be shown this falls well short of bringing forward the totality
of change demanded through those shifts within the strategic environment.

A military operations research approach can aid in answering three key questions
related to national security (Nicholson & Duczynski, 1999):

•

What is it the capability seeks to do?

•

What performance measures should be used to judge capability?

•

What sort of analysis is required?

One consequence of this questioning process is the requirement to balance the
present capability needs with those required in the future, a need to maintain and
develop/build simultaneously. The need for these to fuse together confirms the
logic of an effects-based approach (the first and third questions) that is linked to
current and future scenarios (the first question), coupled with the addition of
ratings (the second question). The performance measures used to evaluate
capability are discussed in Chapter Four (the second question).

Considering issues of future capability expectations for the Special Forces Group,
falls within the bounds of the definition of the term 'capability development'. One
accepted definition is the function 'performance gap closing' in terms of force
structure and preparedness (both are in the Glossary), where preparedness is a
function of equipment stock holding, equipment condition, manpower and
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training and preparedness relates to the time allocated to achieve operational
deployability - an expression of poise.

However, this definition is only accepted with the caveat that capability is not
independent of external factors, nor is it a constant. It depends on the
circumstances (the contextual environment) in which the forces would be
employed. Special Forces conduct Special Operations, being outside the scope of
conventional ADF elements in form, purpose and function. Adaptability is,
therefore, a critical characteristic.

Thus, the emphasis of this chapter is the conceptualisation and study of external
factors and circumstances and then what role, if any, Special Forces may have in
them as a contributor to a resolution. These can be derived by the formulation of
scenarios to achieve the necessary dislocation from the present.

Scenarios

Scenario planning, and numerous other, albeit somewhat lesser known, methods
have become increasingly popularised through the proliferation of management
books dealing with futures thinking, coupled with a widening acknowledgement
that systems thinking and practice may provide answers to many of the
unstructured problems that plague organisations. For scenario planning to be
effective, a useful set of scenarios must be constructed against which the
organisation or area of interest can be tested.

This useful set of scenarios must encompass a sufficiently broad range of
conditional ingredients that offer enough possibilities for variation and
divergence. Without this possibility for divergence a single path into the future is
formed which, despite the boldest imagination, cannot accommodate more than a
single scenario or a narrow collection of qualitatively similar (and therefore, not
useful) scenarios.
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The importance of isolating these multiple pathways into the future can be seen in
Figure 14 below. It illustrates the variety of trajectories that are plausible, but of
course only one will eventuate. It is likely though that this single future history
will be a combination of those already foreseen as a result of thorough scenario
planning.

Furthermore, "In the analysis, as a prelude to finding ways to compensate for
uncertainty, an effort can be made to forecast or map the many possible futures,
rather than to predict a future environment in the sense of specifying a single
sequence of events" (Quade, 1964, p .. 172).

The model enables the positioning of different worlds out in the future, the
pathways that can be conceptually followed through narratives have many twists
and turns that must be explained. The directional changes must be attributable to
something. These scenarios are the history of the future.
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Now

Figure 14. The importance of multiple pathways for ensuring diversity.

These differing pathways are necessary to provoke decision-makers to consider
variety. "In choosing organisational designs, people do not confront an infinite
range of choice .... If their organisations are to be purposive, they have to be
adaptive over a wide range of evolving circumstances" (Emery, 1993b, p. 214 );
providing further reinforcement for an adaptable organisation.

The Context and Purpose of Scenario Planning

Many emergency response organisations: Jaw enforcement, military, fire fighters,
paramedics and disaster relief, to name just a few, use scenarios on almost a daily
basis to sharpen their capacity to deal with the unexpected. Through a
comprehensive set of 'what if statements and structured events they are able to
rapidly cycle themselves through a bewildering array of problem situations. The
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result of this focussed training and the associated flexibility of mind it demands is
a highly agile team that can rapidly adapt structures, techniques and procedures to
overcome situations in which indecision and hesitancy are not options. Pilots
undergo multiple repetitions of emergency situations in simulators to create this
necessary rapidity of response and action such that problem-solving is reduced to
an instinctive sequence of behaviours, in effect allowing the mind to remain clear
and unencumbered to deal with those few contextual aspects.

The same signals and noise that invoke this stimulus-response mechanism are
present in areas where a slower rate of adaptation (evolution?) can be appropriate.
Nevertheless, the perceived equilibrium can be punctuated by rapidly changing
events that accelerate quicker than policy making can contend with (the escalation
in violence following the East Timor independence elections provides a vivid
recent example). As stated by Schwartz (1991, p. 3) "not having tried to foresee
surprising events, they are at a loss for ways to act when upheaval continues".

These (shocking) realisations are made even more confronting when it became
"evident from the public's response to this crisis [in East Timor] that the
community's expectations of the Defence Force are greater than those perceived
by the Department of Defence" (Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade, 2000, p. 45). The key lesson presented is that policy makers
are often institutionally blind(ed) to the array of surprising events that may occur
at short warning, with significant benefits attached to the exploration of scenarios
as a means of overcoming this.

Stacey's (1996b, p. 37) explanation of complex adaptive systems operating at the
boundary between order and disorder (chaos) provides a means of coping and an
environment in which mutations occur spontaneously and much more rapidly,
because "in open-ended change situations ... [managers] do not know how their
actions may be related in a cause-and-effect sense to the outcomes of those
actions". It is not easier to do nothing.
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Various methods have been devised to cope with this, with scenario planning
being just one. Additional and equally valuable insights can be gained from an
entirely discipline. The diagram below (Figure 15) is borrowed from the work of
Wickens (1992, p. 20) and Signal Detection Theory. It has relevance to decisionmaking and certainly is an important device for this research, as "perfect
performance is that in which no misses or false alarms occur" (Wickens, 1992, p.
20). An important ability for policy makers involved in national security.

State of the World
Noise
Signal

Yes

Hit

False alarm

++

+-

Miss

Correct rejection

Response

No

--

-+

Figure 15. The (only) four states of the world.

The model can be summarised as:

•

There was a signal and it was detected- Hit.

•

There was no signal but one was created out of the noise - False Alarm.

•

There was no signal detected and no response was made - Correct Rejection.

•

There was a signal but it remained undetected- Miss.

Scenarios can aid in the development of this ability as they can sensitise the
observer to signals and noise, providing for more precise discrimination. A
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diagram, known as a Faustian Tree, presented later indicates how these signals
can be detected.

The scenarios, and more importantly the use of them for long-term planning, are
certainly not predictors of events, nor are they attempting to forecast the
likelihood of particular situations. They simply aid in the provocation of new
ideas. Before proceeding, these terms of forecast and predict require clarification
as they are often used interchangeably in practice and within the futures literature.
Borrowing Coyle's (1997, p. 78) explanations to distinguish between them he
states that "prediction [gives] a sense of telling beforehand, whereas forecast has a
sense of general assessment of a likely course of events. Thus, forecasting means
to think systematically about the unknowable future in such a way as to generate
understanding to support effective intervention in, or protection against, events
yet to occur". Projection is another term that has become synonymous with
scenarios, but its use should remain restricted to those methods that employ
mathematical or statistical data to extrapolate trend lines into the future where
some degree of reliability and validity offer the necessary (technical) confidence.

These methods do not tax the imagination whatsoever, a recent example being
that "Japan, the land of the planet's longest-lived people, now has more of its
citizens aged 65 or older, than under 15. While records for the rest of human
history can't tell us, it's unlikely any other society has ever been so old" (Cornell,
2001, p. 7). The economic aftershocks and other destabilising influences
(conspiracies of events) are what the futurist must contend with. I am not
interested in projections. Communication with Coyle, one of the more prominent
authors on the use of FAR and a visiting lecturer to the Australian Defence Force
Academy in Canberra, has confirmed the need for this type of (systems thinking)
work and its applicability for planners.
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E-mail from Geoff Coyle
·27 July 1999
Guy,
I didn't get to see the paper you have written on Field Anomaly Relaxation but, if you want
to send it to me I will be happy to comment. In the meantime, well done and good luck with
your further work.
I had a long talk with Charles Newton and he is hoping to get me out again to repeat my
courses. If I do, I am sure that you would be most welcome to sit in on the effort.
Keep in touch.
Regards,
Geoff

The explanation of 'forecast' is more useful than projection for my purposes here
and is certainly an ample descriptor for those personnel involved in the
emergency, short-term situations mentioned earlier. What then for organisations
seeking to adapt to changing events that may span many years and involve
complex inter-relationships that conspire in ways that are not immediately
evident?

As a practitioner in need of a systematic and disciplined approach to developing a
useful set of futures, the FAR methodology has proven to be highly valuable.

Field Anomaly Relaxation

FAR is one example of a structured judgement approach that allows the user to
think systematically about the world and its unknown future. It allows multiple
scenarios to be developed that are subsequently displayed in a Faustian Tree. The
tree maps out the transitions and pathways that are plausible. It affords a
transparent and traceable account of how the future scenarios are derived. The
tree also provides for an aggregation of individual beliefs regarding the
interaction of the drivers, ensuring a holistic and unbiased approach is taken when
trying to derive likely future world scenarios.
I
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Russell Rhyne, the original architect of the Field Anomaly Relaxation technique,
advocates adherence to a four-step process to projecting futures (Rhyne, 1974, pp.
132-166;

1981, pp. 331-360; 1995; 1998). The process has been further

developed by Coyle and a series of co-authors undertaking studies at the Defence
Institute at Shrivenham in the United Kingdom (Coyle, 1984; 1985 and 1987;
Coyle, Crayshaw & Sutton, 1994; Coyle & McGlone, 1995, pp. 65-79; Coyle &
Yong, 1996, pp. 269-283; Coyle, 1997, pp. 77-93; Wood & Christakas, 1984).

FAR's use here concerns an elite Australian military organisation - The Special
Forces Group - and its attempts to secure a rightful place within Australia's
(rapidly changing) national security infrastructure, with the associated recognition
that this place may involve significantly altered capability sets and organisational
structures from what has proven successful in the past. The study was prompted
by a need to re-establish the organisation's unconventionality and heralds a move
into areas that can only be illuminated by futures studies and the timely
anticipation of changing circumstances.

Little evidence is available of the use of Field Anomaly Relaxation outside those
publications by Rhyne, Coyle, Coyle et al. and Duczynski (2000, pp 19-33). It is
surprising that a method of such appeal and wide applicability has remained
almost unknown, at least it has not been widely published in the management
literature. Its one single drawback is possibly the tediousness associated with a
thorough analysis of all judgements, a problem that has now been corrected with a
fully automated version running within a Microsoft® application.

The process steps for visualising futures using FAR are:

Step 1: Form an initial view of the alternative futures that could unfold within the
area of interest.
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Step 2: Construct a language using Sectors that will become the dimensions of
describing the area of interest; and Factors, which become the alternative states
within each Sector and array these on a matrix to form whole field descriptors of
all possible configurations.

Step 3: Eliminate those Factor pairs that are illogical or cannot co-exist, forming
a reduced set of whole field (full sector range) configurations.

Step 4: Position the surviving whole field configurations on a 'tree' whose
branches represent possible future states and transitions from one configuration to
the next.

A Brief Example of Scenarios

If we take the four-step process just outlined and apply it to, say, a university
setting in order to develop a reasonable understanding of these ideas at work, we
may develop the following lines of thought:

•

The futures that could unfold are the manifestations of thousands of
interactions within a university, between a university and its operating
environment and the 2"d, 3rd and nth order effects of interactions that occur
within the external environment. A sense of the totality of all this must be
gained. The stable, but cyclical nature and the violent and unexpected shifts
all must be appreciated.

•

Step 2 allows a language to be constructed around this expanded
understanding. Level of government funding, student performance, staffing
levels and capacity for change may be some of the macro determinants of
performance. Each of these has a 'most favourable' and a 'least favourable'
condition across a range: capacity for change may be expressed as habitual
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inclination or delayed. Government funding may be surplus to planned
requirements or fight for every dollar.

•

Combining these in Step 3 allows discrete 'snapshots' of the environmental
state to be explored. A bold and decisive university leadership condition
combined with rapidly rising student levels and a fight for every dollar
funding condition gives rise to a particular scenario that will be qualitatively
different from one that retains two of these conditions but has for example:
stable student numbers.

•

Step 4 allows these individual snapshots to be strung together to form a range
of trajectories out from the present, with branches and transitions providing
for the movement up and down on the most favourable/least favourable axis.

A Hybrid Method

I have found the four-step Rhyne process to be somewhat limiting at Step 1 in this
current work. If the initial view is constrained then the work can be flawed from
the beginning. Indeed, Rhyne makes the suggestion that narratives and stories can
be written to explore different themes (1974, 1981 and 1995). These could
quickly take hold of the mind and form the basis for all considerations of the
topic. Indeed, scenario planning done well has been described as providing a
"fact-based, research-intensive, comprehensive picture of the future" (Rubenstein,
2000, 14).

A different approach was used that involved: group generation of a large list of
drivers, with the criteria being that they must be beyond the organisation's ability
to influence; compressing this list of drivers into broadened 'themes' that
embodied the main thought being presented as the driver; and then entering Step
2. Step 4 was followed by the construction of a strategic planning space that was
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bounded by the axes of a cube using three primary drivers outwards from a point
of origin at one comer.

These modifications have been necessary due to the need to link this futures work
into a larger study of organisational transformation using a technique that I have
chosen to call effects-based planning. Rhyne has identified the importance of
doing something useful with the results that engages a wider body of thought
about change "... the payoff from projections of this kind [FAR] usually erodes
unless solid uses for them are visualised from the start and pursued" (1981, p.
349). The fusion of these two processes: futures planning and strategy/policy
making has corrected what has been identified as a main failure of existing
planning.

An Open Systems Orientation

The slightly modified step 1 allowed an integration of the ideas of complexity and
systems behaviour as set out by Emery and Trist in their foundational work on
organisational environments, wherein "a main problem with organisational
change is that the environmental contexts in which organisations exist are
themselves changing, at an increasing rate and towards increasing complexity"
(Emery & Trist, 1965, p. 21). Furthermore, the central premise was an
acknowledgement that "a comprehensive understanding of organisational
behaviour requires some knowledge of the lawful interdependencies" that flow
unceasingly within, through and across environmental and contextual boundaries.
These were expressed as:
L 11 - the processes at work within the organisation.
L 12 - the transactions and exchanges that penetrate the organisation/environment
boundary flowing outwards.
~1 -

those transactions and exchanges that flow inwards.
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~2 -

the processes through which parts of the environment become entangled and
inter-related.

These lawful interdependencies have been discussed in great detail in a series of
articles focussing on the theoretical foundations (Trist, Emery & Murray, 1997;
Emery 1977b; Emery, 1996; Emery, 1999). These relationships, which
accommodate the organisational behaviour and its origin, are illustrated in Figure
16. Bringing this subject out of the theoretical and abstract briefly we find that
Australia exists within, and is affected by, the international system; therefore,
these systemic interactions must be mapped to gain an holistic appreciation.
The Contextual Environment

Figure 16. Environmental interdependencies.

Indeed, "the significant drivers of change (actors) within the international system
which influence modern land warfare are: globalisation, ethnic strife, non-state
actors, population growth, environmental degradation and media presence"
(Australian Army, 1998, p. 4-2).
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These drivers of change, and the reality of their influence, must be viewed as a
constant and ubiquitous condition. Primarily because "The failure to appreciate
the fact that the behaviour of the actors is in part responsible for the environment
which then impinges on them can lead observers - and actors as well - to
underestimate actors' influence" (Jervis, 1998, p. 271). Emery (1977) has
provided

further

explanation

of

this

through

comparison

with

a

volatility/instability equation drawn from the work of Ashby, Gardner and May,
wherein:

Where

n
C
a.

= number of components
= probability of a pair of elements interacting
= average strength of interactions

These interdependencies and "instabilities in large complex systems"

(Emery

(1977, p. 11) can lead to self-organising behaviour wherein "the components of a
system in effect spontaneously communicate with each other and abruptly
cooperate in coordinated a1,1d concerted common behaviour" (Stacey, 1996, p.
330). It is a fundamental behaviour of complex systems that they adaptively selforganise. The biological origins of this phenomenon inform us that "contrary to
our deepest intuitions, massively disordered systems can spontaneously crystalise
a very high degree of order" (Kaufmann, 1993, p. 173).

Or they can behave destructively and deliver many unintended consequences that
often run counter to our goals. As stated by Jervis "we cannot develop or find a
highly specific agent which will do only one thing ... we can never merely do
one thing" (Jervis, 1998, p. 261). Furthermore, "the apparent randomness ... can
be shown to contain repeating patterns and the theory is valuable because it
enables the search for "order within chaos" (Wing, 1999, p. 18).
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The paradox of this has been neatly described by Rosenau (1997, p. 73) as
'fragmegration' in order "to summarily capture the tensions between the
[simultaneous] fragmenting and integrating forces that sustain world affairs";
furthermore "The parts or agents of a complex adaptive system, being related to
each sufficiently to form recurrent patterns, do in fact self-organise their patterned
behaviour into an orderly whole" (p. 84). The ongoing dilemma for systems
practitioners is that the orderly whole may not be of our design and may continue
to adopt structures and emergent behaviour that defies deliberate organisational
adaptation. Indeed, "human social forces are created in the same manner as the
forces of nature .... Neither can be visibly touched, although their effects can be
felt" (Pentland, 1998, p. 295).

So it was armed with knowledge of systems behaviour and its phenomena that the
focus group began the task of crafting futures.

Identifying the Drivers

Recognising that a conspiracy of events and interactions prescribes responses and
adaptation it then becomes necessary to form a useful view of these and of how
they manifest themselves.

Visualising the Future

The first step of a Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) analysis is to define variables
and their range which, when combined, allow likely scenarios to be built and
described within a timeframe. To initiate the process, I facilitated a group
consisting of several members of the Special Forces Group over a weekend in
November 1998, with the express purpose of isolating the drivers of change.
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A salient point was the justification of the need for the existence of an
unconventional ADF element in an otherwise predominantly conventional
defence force, especially where the prefix 'un-' also attached itself to terms such
as 'liked'. Nevertheless, whenever threats to Australian security arise it is deemed
essential to maintain the unconventional or special element. Such threats can span
the full spectrum of psychological, economic, political, criminal and terrorism
with operations ranging from offensive to defensive, recovery to reconnaissance.
From this, two physical areas of operation were identified: the international and
the archipelago/South East Asian region north of Australia which will generically
be referred to as regional and domestic, giving three usefuland distinct zones.

Causes of unrest or faction in each of these areas were envisaged to arise from
any political, military or socioeconomic instability with environmental conditions
playing a strong role as well. Due to their close economic ties it was thought that
the relative economy of Australia to that of the region was a unique indicator of
both domestic and regional (in)stability and the interplay between the two.
However, the required response to deal with each combination of threat in each
area demands a force that can operate as a single Service department (Army,
Navy or Air Force) through to a multifunction, multifaceted corporation. At either
end of this scale it must be capable of a high degree of interoperability with other
defence force elements whilst maintaining its own identity. It is widely
acknowledged that access to leading edge technology is imperative if Special
Forces is, at best, to maintain their specialist capability. It is envisaged that the
'procurement' of such technology might in the future involve renting, buying,
recovering or procuring through what could be loosely classified as nonconventional means.

This leads to further discussion regarding the governance of the Special Forces
Group and whether the adoption of a self governing corporate structure may best
serve the Special Forces Group's interest. With such a structure, funding and
profit-making responsibilities would fall at the Special Forces Group's own door.
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Such financial autonomy would lead to increased access and certainly accelerated
delivery of technology. Other issues such as correct force mixture and skill base,
self-selection processes and contract work should also be discussed. How close to
reality such ideas ever get would be dependent upon future scenarios and the
political will of those in a position to make such decisions.

Definition of FAR Matrix Parameters

From this consideration the parameters political will, technology, domestic,
regional and international stability, economic situation and environmental
conditions are extracted. With some·careful manipulation, the first letter of each
of these parameters form the acronym PREDICT which is adopted as the metasyntactic variable from which to construct the Faustian tree. The parameters and
their meaning are summarised in a table (developed by Dr Nicholson, of the early
project members) I will present soon. Also included are the sectors that describe
the best to worst case for each parameter. The scale of the sectors is self evident,
with the language of the adjectives perhaps reflecting the desirability of each
state.

Brief descriptions for each parameter will also be set out in the table. However,
some discussion is given to explain the meaning of the parameters further as well
as the limitations of the scale imposed on some of the parameters. Limitations are
set to ensure that a manageable framework is constructed, rather than one that is
allowed to extrapolate to enormous dimensions because the sector definitions are
too narrow. The converse is also true - definitions should not be so broad as to
make transition from one sector to the next inconceivable and thus render the
analysis ineffectual.

The first step was to identify the drivers that would be most influential in shaping
events. As stated earlier these drivers need to be beyond the planner's ability to

89

Chapter Three - Constructing Plausible Futures

influence, the only acceptable response being adaptation. Over 60 candidate
drivers were identified at this first stage.

These 60 drivers were then collapsed using affinity diagrams to reveal the major
forces at work. The list that was taken to the next stage comprised seven key
drivers, which is consistent with Rhyne's recommendations (1974, p. 139; 1981,
p. 339); there is also a mathematically imposed limitation wherein the 'whole
field' possibilities grow exponentially. Reducing the list to seven in this way does
carry a risk that a driver (Sector) may become more dominant than others,
embodying too many dissimilar items. This can be avoided at a later step in the
process. It does, however, offer the advantage that reducing the numbers of
drivers forces participants in the process " ... to reach past several trends to find the
unifying themes behind them" (Engelbrecht et al, 1996, Chap 2, p. 7).

The drivers selected were:

•

Political Will

•

Regional Stability

•

Economic Situation

•

Domestic Stability

•

International Stability

•

Condition of the Environment

•

Technology

Political Will

As the focus of this exercise restricts itself to the possible future operating
environments of the Australian Special Forces, the Political Will we speak of here
is the propensity of government to authorise special operations in support of the
National Military Strategy. The employment of this component of military
capability by governments is problematic, affected by a combination of the ill-
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defined boundary between military and non-military actions and the need for
these actions to span the continuum of conflict.

Economic Situation

In an environment where peacetime competition endures, normal trade, business
and investment exchanges will continue with resultant economic growth and
prosperity. Australia's aim internally as the economic situation fluctuates
externally is to protect against the damaging effects of chaotic global markets.
Geographic considerations, amongst other reasons have forced Australia to pursue
close ties with countries within the Region and as such developments in these
countries do impact upon Australia and its economic position.

Domestic Stability

The domestic stability dimension is measured against the ability of government to
match the expectations of the community in the delivery of goods and services
and the level, duration and intensity of industrial action or civil unrest and
discontent. It is an expression of social cohesiveness. The rise in violence
witnessed in Great Britain throughout 2001, as (usually) unprovoked clashes
between ethnic groups escalated into widespread property damage is a valuable
case in point. This also provides an example of conflict within nations.

Regional Stability

Australia has a respected role in promoting and maintaining a stable region, one
that is characterised by engagement through tolerance, dialogue and transparency.
If any of these dimensions become affected, giving rise to mistrust, doubt and

apprehension then stability within and between nations of the region may become
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affected. Regional stability is characterised by an ongoing peacetime competition
where government intervention is minimal and is limited to preserving diplomatic
relations.

For the domestic and regional areas cohesion was thought to be the best term to
describe a state where, conservatively, there may be a high degree of adherence to
law and integration of all members of society, through to the extreme definition of
solidarity or union state (for example grounded in anti-social or violent unrest).

International Stability

For the parameter international conflicts, it was considered that there would
always be some altercation, albeit minor or trivial, somewhere in the world, even
a peace march may be considered a 'conflict situation'. Australia's participation
in international conflicts has, in the past, primarily been in a peacekeeping or
peace support role. However preparedness levels should be maintained so that
transition to a more offensive role is straightforward.

Condition of the Environment

Environmental issues have become steadfast in the political agenda with the
general population now openly voicing their concern of the effects of holes in the
ozone layer, increased pollution with increasingly mobile populations, El Nino,
mining of uranium, etc. Australia enjoys a comfortable position in terms of area
and resources per head of population and as such environmental stability.
However it would be foolhardy not to remain vigilant of environmental problems
that are arising in some of its neighbours primarily because of booming
populations. Also, the procurement of nuclear and biological weapons by
countries that are politically volatile is of particular concern not merely from the
environmental impact of detonation.
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Technology

Although technology is frequently avoided as a key driver in many futures
studies, its use here was seen as important as advances in technology put a
premium on the skills of people and in this area Australia has enjoyed a great
advantage.

In the case of technology the most undesirable state may be perceived as one
where technology starts to retard. However, this was determined as being
extremely unlikely. Even given a scenario of complete, worldwide obliteration,
relatively speaking it would be a backward step from the present day. Even given
that context, development of technology would, at worst, stand still; that is, it
would be conditions external to the development of technology not the
'mechanics' that would retard the process.

Building the Sector/Factor Array

When positioned as headings on a table (Table 1) these became the Sectors,
incorporating the meta-syntactic language - PREDICT - to be used later (as a
pronounceable word) when referring to different settings. The columns under
each heading were then expanded to form a possible range of Factors or states in
which that particular Sector could exist. These expressions range from the most
favourable at the top to the least favourable. The final row in the table provides a
brief descriptor of the factors' foci.

93

Chapter Three - Constructing Plausible Futures

Table 1. Sector-Factor array
Political Will

Regional Stability

Economic
Situation

Domestic
Stability

International
Stability

Condition of the
Environ-ment

Technology

p

R

E

D

I

c

T

1

Adventurous bold

Cohesion

Booming
Superior

Cohesion

Minor conflicts

Improving

2

Fencesitting,
procrastinat-ion,
cautious
Avoidance,
extreme
reluctance
Paralysis,
catatonia

Generally stable

Parity
Competitive

Generally stable

Regional conflicts

Manageable/
fixable

Localised unrest,
discontent

Inferior, declining

Localised unrest,
discontent

Major theatre
wars,
multinational
Mass destruction

Continuing
degradation

Scale ol military
conflict
elsewhere in the
world

Effects on and of
the physical
environment

3

4

5

Propensity to
take risks

Widespread
unrest, public
uprisings
Anarchy
Political, military,
socio -economic
stability of region

Widespread
unrest, public
uprisings
Anarchy
State of
Australian
economy relative
to that of the
re ion

Socio-political
stability

Slowed
development

Meltdown,
catastrophe

From this was produced a total of 14 400 possible whole field configurations
(4x5x3 ... ). Clearly there are many illogical pairs that need to be discarded
through a process of relaxation (hence the name FARelaxation). As stated earlier,
and which can now be seen, the exponential growth to unmanageable numbers of
permutations can be similarly collapsed through a process of pair-wise
comparison which, as well as defining pairs that cannot coexist, removes entire
whole fields that contain a single illogical pair.

Pair-wise Comparison

This pair-wise comparison process can take a number of forms, all are judgmental
and involve reaching some measure of consensus using a Yes/No decision,
numbered scale or some other means to determine the degree of 'fit', or extent to
which pairs can co-exist. The process involves a sequential (and somewhat
tedious) pairing of all possible configurations (See Table 2). Participants soon
realised that those pairs that were both high, mid-range or low in the table could
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generally co-exist. Pairs with one in the high end and one in the low end generally
could not co-exist, although there were exceptions and arbitrarily applying this to
speed the process is fraught with danger. Pairs with one in the mid-range and one
high or low involved the greatest discussion and accounted for the majority of
time spent at this stage. I was also very careful at this stage to capture the nuances
that resulted during these debates of whether one factor, or driver condition could
go with another. It provided the raw material for writing the scenarios and brought
forth a rich discussion of driver interactions.

Given that the Sector/Factor array was reasonably compact (two columns of five,
three columns of four and two columns of three) and the Factor descriptors are
precise the pairwise comparison was completed fairly quickly. Too many Factors
without clear distinguishing characteristics that neatly delineate vertically
adjacent Factors can lead to a painfully slow and confusing pairwise exercise.
Frequent questioning such as - "What are we actually trying to say here?" proved to be extremely valuable. It deepened the somewhat abstract ideas being
dealt with and forced participants to consider the actual interactions using real
examples (consensus building).
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Table 2. Results of pairwise comparison
PI
P2
PJ
P4
Rl
R2
RJ
R4
R5
El
E2
EJ
D!
D2
DJ
04
D5

Rl

R2

RJ

R4

R5

El

E2

EJ

D1

D2

DJ

D4

D5

y
y
y

y
y
y

y
y

y
y
y

y
y

y
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The table above allowed a relaxation down to 403 whole field configurations from
14 400. Not nearly as many as indicated by Rhyne (1998, p. 7) "the first filter
[pairwise comparison] ... normally filters out about 999 out of 1000; the second
[whole field overall coherence] gets rid of about half those passed by the first".
Nevertheless, the reduction was significant and achieved the aim of this step in
the process- a reduction to a nearly manageable set of surviving configurations.

In a further deviation from the method outlined by Rhyne (1974; 1991; 1998), but
provided for in the improvements suggested by Coyle (1984; 1985; 1994; 1995;
1996; 1997); and Coyle & Yong (1996) the surviving whole field configurations
were clustered together, reducing the 403 to 46, a number now approaching
manageability for further analysis. The clustering was based on the conclusion
that if an individual PREDICT configuration changed by one Factor up or down
across no more than four of the seven Sectors then the underlying themes would
be preserved (See Table 3). A number of logic rules were imposed to ensure that
vertically adjacent Factors with descriptors that could not be combined were not
clustered. The result of this clustering, which was achieved using formula
functions within Microsoft™ Excel, is illustrated in the table below. The grey
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shaded rectangles represent, in this example, those Sector columns that were
allowed to adjust up or down by one Factor. Any possible configuration that
remains within this grey zone is regarded as belonging to the cluster and retains
the qualitative 'feel '.

Table 3. Clustering within the Sector-Factor array
Political Will

Regional Stability

p

Economic
Situation

A

E

Domes lie
Stability
D

International
Stability
I

Condition of the
Env1ron-ment

c

I

Adventurous bold

Cohesion

Booming
Superior

Cohesion

Minor conflicts

Improving

1

Fencesftling,
procrastination,
cautious
Avoidance.
extreme
reluctance
Paralysis,
catatonia

Generally stable

Parity
Competitive

Generally stable

Regional con!Ucts

Manageable/
fixable

Locaftsed unrest.
discontent

Inferior. declining

Localised unrest.
discontent

Major theatre
wars,
multinational
Mass destruction

Continuing
degradeffon

Propensity to
lake risks

Pollticel, military,
socio ·economic
stability of region

3

.$

5

Widespread
unrest. public
uprisings
Anarchy

Widespread
unrest, public
uprisings
Anarchy

State of
Australian
economy relative
to that of the
re ion

Soclo-pollllcal
stability

Scale of military
conflict
elsewhere In the
world

T
Overwhelming
rate of change or
development
Continuing rate

Slowed
development

Meltdown,
catastrophe

Effects on and of
the physical
environment

Cluster 25 for example, indicated by the shaded cells, contains numerous whole
field configurations that are sufficiently alike that they can be clustered into a
single set, with minimal (and agreed by those undertaking this stage of the
analysis - another opportunity to build consensus) dilution of the individual
elements. If the Factors do not possess enough depth within their expressions
and/or verti cally adjacent descriptions are almost opposites then tules must be
imposed to prevent inappropriate clustering, for example a Decision-making
Sector may have 'deci sive', 'hesitant' and 'indecisive' as the sole descriptors, these
mutually exclusive terms could not be clustered and any other whole field
configurations that include these must also be kept distinct.

I acknowledge that there was a significant ri sk of dilutjng the purity of the
exercise up to this point. It was accepted, however, that in order to achjeve the
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necessary further reduction this 'bundling' of configurations was no more
significant than the logic used to group together the full list of drivers using the
affinity diagram in the opening stage. The PREDICT settings which carry a
qualitatively similar setting are set out in the table below. The further breakdown
into 'a', 'b', 'c' and 'd' sub categories was forced through the need to not violate the
'one up or down' rule mentioned earlier. These sub-groups were treated as a single
entity in the later stages of Faustian tree construction and the generation of
scenarios. The full set is presented in Table 4.
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Table 4. Results of clustering
No

1a
1b
1c

1d
2a
2b
3

4
4a
5
6
7

Sa
8b
9
10-13

11
12
14

15
16

17a
17b
18

19a
19b
20
21
22
23

PREDICT Configuration
P1-2 R1
E1
D1
D1
P1-2 R1-2 E2
P1-2 R2
E1
D1-2
P1-2 R1-2 E1
D2
P1-2 R1
E2
D1-2
P1-2 R1
E1
D1-2
E1
D3
P1-2 R1
P1-2 R1
E1-2 D3-4
P1-2 R2
E1-2 D2-3
P1-2 R1
E3
D1
P1
R1
E3
D1
P1
R1
E3
D1
P1
R1
E3
D2-3
P2
R1
E3
D2-3
P1-2 R1
E3
D3
P1
R1
E3
D3-4
P1-2 R1
E3
D4
P1-2 R1
E3
D4
P1
R1
E3
Ds
P1
R1
E3
Ds
R1
E3
Ds
R2
E2-3 D1-2
R2
E2-3 D1-2
R2-3 E2-3 D2-3
R3
E1-2 D1-2
R3
E1-2 D1-2
R2
E3
D2-3
P1-2 R3
E1-2 D2-3
P1-2 R3-4 E1
D3
P2
R3
E2-3 D3-4

h-2

h
h
h-2
l1-2
h-2
l2-3
h-2
h
li-2
h-2
14
h-2
h-2
12-3
l4
h-2
b-4
h-2

b
14
h

h
h
l1-2
h-2
h
l1-2

b
h-2

C2-3
c2
C2-3
C3
C2-3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C2-3
c4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C2-3
C2-3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3

T1-2
T2
T1-2
T1-2
T2
T2
T2
T2
T2
T1-2
T1-2
T2
T1-2
T1-2
T2
T2-3
T1-2
T1-2
T1
T1
T3
T1-2
T1-2
T1-2
T1-2
T1-2
T1-2
T2
T2
T1-2

No
24
24b-25a
25
26
26a
26ab
26b-27a
28
29a
29b
30

31a
31b
32

33
34

35a
35b
36

37
38

39
40

42
43

44
45
46

PREDICT Configuration
P1-2 R3
E3
D1-2
P1-2 R3
E3
D3-4
P1
R3
E2-3 D3-4
P2
R3-4 E2-3 D4
P1
R4-s E1
D1-2
P1
R4
E2
D1-2
P2
R4
E1-2 D1-2
P1-2 R4
E1-2 D3-4
P1
R4
E3
D1-2
P2
R4
E3
D1-2
P1
R4
E3
D3
P1
R4
E3
D4-5
P2
R4
E3
D4
P1-2 R4
E3
D4-s
P1
R4-s E1-2 D3-4
P1
Rs
E2-3 D1-2
P1
Rs
E3
D3-4
P1
Rs
E3
D4
P1
Rs
E3
D1
P1
Rs
E3
Ds
P1
Rs
E3
D4-s
P1
Rs
E3
D2-3
P3
R1
E1-2 D1
R1-2
R3-4
R4
R3-4
Rs

E1-2
E1-2
E1-2
E3
E3

D3-4
D3-4
D1
D4-s
D4-s

l1-2
12-3
h-2
12-3
h-2
h-2
h-2
h-2
h-2
h-2
h-2
h-2
h-2
b
12-3
l2
b-4
12
14
12-3
l4
l2

h
l1
h

h
h-2
l2

C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3
C3-4
C3
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3-4
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3

Constructing the Faustian Tree

To make the future believable it is necessary to string the transitions into a
plausible history that marks out how a future world could evolve from the present.
These transitions track outwards from a present PREDICT configuration and
branch according to shaping triggers that underlie the Factors and vertical
movement. For instance, a movement of one level along the Political Will sector
coupled with a multiplier in the Economic Situation can deliver dramatic changes
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T2
T1-2
T1-2
T1-2
T2
T1
T2-3
T1-2
T1-2
T1-2
T2
T2
T1-2
T1
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in the direction of the lines and branches, in effect becoming an intermediate, but
vital, point on the path to other transitions.

To maximise creative thought and discussion Coyle's recommendations (1996, p.
275) on the methods employed to build the tree should be followed. A series of
Post-It Notes™ covering all surviving configurations could be positioned on a
wall and arranged and re-arranged as discussion continues around the workability
of this or that transition and the events surrounding it. After several discussion
and evaluation sessions the positions of these notes should stabilise and
agreement can be reached that what is portrayed is a reasonably complete and
plausible account of a future history. This point of stabilisation can also be
evident in the fact that discussion points surrounding various surviving settings
and transitions will become exhausted. There are several research opportunities to
develop this stage further.

An abbreviated view of the Faustian tree is set out in Figure 17 below. The bold
initial number refers to the cluster number. No attempt is made at this point to
establish times to the diagram.

The transitions, with their associated PREDICT settings are illustrated in the
figure below. A possible explanation for the transition from cluster 17 to cluster 6,
which is characterised by a worsening envirgnmental condition C2_3 moving to C4
and a lowering of economic performance E2_3 moving to E3 , may be found in the
continuing massive environmental damage resulting from forest burning in
Malaysia and Indonesia with its effect on economic prosperity.
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Figure 17. Simplified view of the Faustian Tree.

Narratives of the Future

Having constructed the Faustian tree and, thereby, creating a series of pathways
through which the (ultimately) single future trajectory may travel, a set of rich
narratives are called for. These narratives link the present to the future in a
manner that adds substance, depth and most importantly breadth, effectively
putting 'flesh on the bones' of the earlier, more structured thinking stages.

The named worlds provide "a reference point that helps intemalise the world's
implications" (Engelbrecht et al, 1996, Chapter 1, p. 3). Set out in Table 5 are the
eight named worlds in the current study (these were derived by Dr Joanne
Nicholson, one of the project members at a number of workshops in 1998).
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Table 5. Named worlds
Description

Named Worlds

Global love, peace and harmony

Utopia

2

Australia dominated by domestic strife

Home Brew

3

Australia and allies okay, region finding it tough

ArgyBharji

4

Australia and region in trouble, rest of international arena okay

Cast Adrift

5

Australia and region okay, strife elsewhere

Trouble Elsewhere

6

Australia leading the rest of the world

Great Southern Cross

7

Austrp.lia and allies faced with a booming region

King Khan

8

Everybody's brawling

WW/11

An example narrative, entitled Ebola Outbreak, selected from the full list of 20
from the current study is set out below. Country names have been reduced to a
single letter.

2003, February
Escalation of rebellion in the former B and G results in significant
conflict embroiling U, K, T and Z military forces. Ecological crisis
arises as Z forces employ defoliation by chemical and fire tactics
to route rebel H and renegade T in and around R. U, T and K are
swamped with refugees;

collectively there

is a call for

international rescue of displaced populations. U additionally alerts
the international community to the dire threats to gorilla and other
primate populations forced to move also displaced.

The sight of monkeys scavenging in the refugee camps becomes
commonplace. Indian, European and US aid is forthcoming.
Expatriate countries, Belgium, France, Germany and the United
States offer a sponsored migration program to relieve an otherwise
overwhelming refugee problem. International wildlife rescue bids
relocate endangered gorillas and other primates to a variety of
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international zoos and refuges set up specifically to handle the
scale of the problem. Displaced peoples are given an option under
a quota for emigration to these same sponsor nations.

2003,May
Illness besets refugee camps in Africa and those quarantined in
several host nations of USA, France, Germany, Belgium and India.
Symptoms are variably a flu-like condition, progressing to febrile
delirium or alternately dysentery with violent abdominal cramps
progressing to unconsciousness. Morbidity and mortality rise to
alarming proportions within eight days.

2003, September
Simultaneously, a world-wide 'Zookeepers Syndrome' is reported
through toxicology web sites of similar symptomology. World
Health Organisation (WHO) subsequently identifies the pathogen
as Ebola Virus. Global quarantine measures are immediately
effected; however, secondary cases outside refugee concentrations
are reported in the next week.

Panic arises in areas around reported Ebola spot fires, in Florida.
A military mobilisation is necessitated to contain fleeing
populations. In Europe, similar containment measures are also
enforced. In India panicking mobs overcome police lines meant to
confine them in villages and areas of outbreak. In a plethora of
nations the so called 'Zookeeper Syndrome' results in such a
scattered pattern of outbreaks that police with military assistance
cannot move fast enough to contain those in contact.
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2003, November
Throughout the western world a pin cushion pattern of outbreaks
is generated as secondary Ebola cases propagate to tertiary
contact patients. In most countries outbreaks are contained but in
the near tropics of Florida, Southern India and in central Africa
itself the outbreaks threaten anarchy as police and other security
agents, hospital staff and medical workers also begin to be
affected.

2004, January
Fragmentation of national .administrations can only just be
managed by police and military resources. In this month, however,
some patients begin to recover, particularly in the temperate areas
of Europe and northern United States of America.

As scenarios are really only useful when taken as a full set I have included a
second one here that contains a more socio-economic angle. It is titled A New
Hegemon and was drawn from the same work.

After almost two decades of failed leadership within the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), economies dominated
by spiralling foreign debt, corruption within government and
business, cronyism and the withdrawal of major investment
interests in the region the promises of democracy and capitalism
are as dim and distant as ever.

Student action groups in non-violent protests express new demands
for a stronger, more cohesive leadership across the CIS. In this
climate of growing unrest a new figure - Nikita Chenakowski rises rapidly through the political ranks, emerging as a key
individual; one who possesses a striking resemblance to a young
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Stalin, bringing with him a sound business mind and an ability to
remain focussed on the ingredients of a problem at a national
level.

Upon selection into the Economic Office his initiative for, and
ability to make immediately successful, an Economic Forum for
Cooperative

National

Development (EFCND)

witnesses

a

dramatic reversal in the GB towards further aid and debt relief
Under his strengthening leadership corruption is swept aside,
confidence levels soar and the mood of the people changes
dramatically. Foreign investment flows in and unemployment
levels plummet as a prosperous market economy takes root,
government spending strategies are supported and education,
housing and health programs rapidly affect the plight of the
disadvantaged. A wave of optimism sweeps across the region.

On the other side of the globe relations between China and the
United States remain strained following the UN enforced famine
relief and aid programs into North Korea following the deaths of
up to 3 000 000 elderly and young in the country's worst
agricultural production result for almost a century. China's
accusations of strategic·. opportunism come at a time of growing
discontent, distrust of America's motives and a belief that
capitalism is polarising attention towards consumerism and away
from socialist values, a trend already evident in the CIS.

Under threat of war between China and the United States over the
sustained lodgement of large numbers of NGO 's, ·aid workers and
unarmed military the United States is forced to withdraw
prematurely,

leaving the country in a fragile

state and

economically non-viable. China enters North Korea under
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bilateral arrangements with ineffectual measures designed more to
undermine the achievements of the United States than provide
tangible assistance. Further failures result.

Against this backdrop of international events Australia witnesses a
rapid and marked adjustment in raw materials markets from those
predominantly in SE Asia to N Europe. Demand levels plummet
and export costs triple to capitalise on the expanding markets in
Europe.

Readers should be aware at this point that any number of fanciful stories could be
utilised to portray disturbing series of events. The actual value is not in the
geographic or situational detail of what is being described, but the ability to
develop effective responses and national policies for coping.

Building the Faustian Tree

The next step entailed constructing the Faustian Tree, whereby starting from the
current position and moving to possible futures is mapped out in both sequence
(one transition after another down a single path) and parallel (multiple paths
radiating out with tangled transitions and joins) to various termination points.

Taking the former example, if starting from the current position one was to
identify transitions from this position using the meta-language then the step from
the identification of parameters or sectors to construction of the Faustian Tree
could be shortened substantially. This method would allow a broad identification
of the most likely (and unlikely) fields, however, the method may not be as
readily traceable and possibilities may be missed or dismissed without being
thoroughly considered.
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A convention for constructing the tree could include solid lines to represent most
likely progressions and broken lines for less likely progressions. Spiral symbols
could be included to illustrate the transitions involving wild cards - events that
require an extreme event or set of circumstances. The emphasis in this study was
an holistic approach, therefore, all transitions were considered equally likely,
although pessimism still prevailed when the option of reaching 'Utopia' was
accelerated. While in the first instance this may not be the most pragmatic of
approaches, particularly when the reality of operating within a budget is
considered, it is the best approach to ensure that the broadest set of scenarios and
possibilities are identified. The broader the set of scenarios and circumstances, the
larger the dataset for application within the area of interest.

The final full tree (developed from an earlier version by Nicholson), depicted in
Figure 18, represents a picture of future possible scenarios ranging from the most
pessimistic on the left to most optimistic on the right. This pessimism/optimism
separation is achieved through a movement downwards in the Sector/Factor array
table shown earlier. It is possible to express progressively more grim/favourable
pictures using these descriptions and allow the transitions to account for this
movement, a technique that has proven to be an extremely powerful visualisation
aid for planners. An additional feature is that the named worlds can be located
along the paths, providing a useful time step for scenario writers.

It should be noted that while the FAR analysis allows the development of these

scenarios within a rough 10-year timeframe, the exact difference between each of
the scenarios is not necessarily linear. For example, it would be incorrect to draw
conclusions that things only have to get a bit better for Utopia and things a lot
worse for WW3. Further analysis is required to examine how 'far' we potentially
are from each scenario and as such the Faustian Tree is considered to be an
evolving document or 'work in progress' as more information and further
developments on the world stage occur. It must be remembered that the aim is to
forecast futures to assist planners, NOT define them. Schwartz (1996, p. 9) offers
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that "the purpose of scenarios is to help yourself change your view of reality ....
The end result, however, is not an accurate picture of the future, but better
decisions about the future''. For organisational practitioners there is another
opportuni ty lO reach consensus about the appropriateness of actions or policies.

19/~1

Figure 18. Faustian Tree of national security futures.

For planners each of the numbers represents a single whole field configuration.
The transitions repre ent movement up or down within the Sectors, allowing
conditions to be expressed as improving, remai ning fairly stable or deteriorating.
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A Strategic Planning Space for Locating the Principal Drivers

From the Faustian tree the main story-lines and themes to arise were dependent on
either one or more of the three principal drivers: domestic stability, regional
stability and international stability. The emergence of these three drivers
coincides directly with current Australian strategic policy where defeating attacks
on Australia holds the highest priority, defending regional interests second,
followed by defending global interests. This provides strong testament to the
usefulness and validity of the FAR method and the importance in gathering the
subject matter experts with the necessary knowledge and expertise in a specific
area. Such coincidences, particularly the national security relevance, increase the
level of confidence in the conclusions drawn from the FAR analysis and
strengthens the commitment to guiding strategic policy if individuals can come to
the same conclusions themselves.

The remaining parameters of economic situation and environmental conditions
are mainly seen as contributors to the causes of instability while technology and
political will dictate how, and if, action is taken to regain stability. The economic
situation, condition of the environment and technology are also regarded as
variables over which little or no control can be placed, although it is deemed
important to closely align our understanding of the changes occurring in such
forces.
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Figure 19. Strategic planning space.

As stated earlier a further deviation from the FAR process was made at this point
by positioning the three principal drivers as the axes on a cube (Figure 19) to form
a strategic pl anning space. The drivers selected were International , Reg10nal and
Domestic Stability. Using thi s planning space it became possible to position the
eight named worlds within the eight sub-cubes. Developing this theoretical model
one further level reveals that all possible configurations, transitions and
movements in the three dimensions illustrated in the cone at Figure 13 must be
accommodated within this cube.

The low end on each axis is where levels of instability are high. The high ends, or
tips of (one, two or all of) the three axes, allow an expression of low levels of
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instability across international, regional and domestic domains. The numbers
correspond to the eight named worlds in Table 5.

Improvements Resulting from this Research
The original process devised by Rhyne remains very e ffective. lts major drawback
is its efficiency. Dealing w1th large amotmts of information and frequent
judgements to aid analysis is tedious to complete manually. Tbe pai1wise
comparison in particular is very time consuming even w ith the aid of spreadsheet
formulae. A fu lly automated process (© Guy Duczynski 2000) has been
developed that captures every key stroke, minimises repetitive actions and stores
the information for reporting . Figure 20 shows a single form taken from the
application.
'
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Figure 20. Screen shot of pairwise comparison form.

The tabs at the top of tbe screen give an indication of the features and functions
that have been automated. At the time of writing this negotiations are underway to
introduce this application to several university programs, management education
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and Defence senior planning institutions. Whether this or some other model is
employed detailed planning and policy making should not proceed unless
decision-makers have taken stock of the present situation in all its detail or crafted
a set of scenarios that illustrate the plausible futures.

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter, I have provided a detailed explanation of the use of Field
Anomaly Relaxation (FAR)- the method used to achieve a comprehensive, albeit
abstracted, view of the world beyond the immediate planning and defence
procurement horizons. This chapter has also included the use of twenty rich
stories that contained the narratives of change- the future history.

Field Anomaly Relaxation has proved to be a useful method for crafting futures. It
offers a systematic and disciplined approach to the formulation and manipulation
of data and ideas. As can be seen from this research, however, there is a
considerable amount of additional work that must be incorporated into the overall
study to derive value. Scenarios themselves are useful and can lead decisionmakers towards insights that they would having difficulty at unaided by these
devices. As a device for aiding in the building of consensus it was very valuable
and built the foundations for following work.

The creativity demanded of participants during this stage was often extreme. The
disciplined and systematic approach offered by Rhyne's method was found to be
superior to other scenario/futures techniques.

Scenario planning is a fascinating and creative endeavour to explore possibilities
for the world or parts of it. Often the future is too frightening to contemplate. It
captures interactions in the contextual environment that people would much rather
ignore, letting events take their course as an escape from engaging in purposeful
behaviour. I will not dwell on why the scenarios cannot be retained, except to
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declare that the advice I have received has indicated that they are extremely
sensitive and should not be available as open source. I do not agree with this
conclusion, but am bound to abide by the judgements of others.

In any event, I hope that the production of the scenarios has proven to be an
interesting and engaging account of my attempts to find a future. It has aided in
the building of consensus, at least around the need for change. The task now is to
put these scenarios to work and see how well the organisation performs. The
information gained must now be held adjacent to the organisation to enable a
determination on what these new futures mean and what responses they should
inspire - the shape of change. These responses and the database application in
which to express and evaluate them are the subject of Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EFFECTS-BASED PLANNING

In the process of change there must first be a conceptual notion of
what has to be done to fight successfully in the battle environments
of today and tomorrow. This kind of sound conceptual thinking
can only result from the close, reflective study of a wide spectrum
of history, world setting, threats, technology, and of the trends in
all those areas - and the projection of those trends into the future.
Only imaginative people- officers who have been trained to think
clearly about tough problems - can do this kind of thinking
[emphasis added].
General Donn A. Starry
Changing the Army: The Roles of Doctrine,
Development and Training
(Evans, 2000, Ed. p.l49)
Overview of the Chapter

This chapter is devoted to the progressive development of the database
application - my knowledge management system - that provided for the capture,
storage, evaluation and ultimately the (sometimes limited) acceptance of various
themes pointing towards (inevitable) change. The entire approach earned the title
of effects-based planning early in 1998, the reason for this will become evident
within this chapter.

I offer the caveats of sometimes limited acceptance and inevitable change in the
preceding paragraph for two reasons.

Firstly, although the method has proven itself to be a powerful aid to decisionmaking and strategic planning, it is the concept (hence the quote above), more
than the findings of this particular research project, that has attracted interest. Not
everyone has the time or inclination for close, reflective study in order to reach
sound conceptual knowledge of their own design. All, however, can make time to
critically consider the theoretical models and concepts that others develop in order
to determine overall validity (this is central to the double loop learning I will
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discuss in Chapter Five wherein two, often contradictory, thoughts must be held
simultaneously).

Unless this conceptual validity is nurtured resistance will grow, enthusiasm will
diminish, confidence will evaporate, dissatisfaction will set in and a group that is
in pursuit of consensus will divide. As identified by Field Marshall Slim "there is
only one thing more difficult than getting a new idea [concept] into a military
mind and that is getting the old idea [concept] out!" Iwill further emphasise the
importance of the acceptance of (this) concept later in the chapter as it is directly
related to the quote that opens this chapter and has profound relevance for
initiating change.

It is a simple concept that recognises that we can achieve the same

en~s

through

doing different things, not doing the same things differently. But it relies upon the
construction, by practitioners, of a sufficiently complex vocabulary and
phraseology to describe what we seek, a provocation (de Bono, 1977, 1986 and
1987) that triggers creativity, dialogue and novelty. This construction is enabled
because "a creative person may have a way of looking at the world which is
different from the way other people see the world ... if that person is successful in
expressing and communicating his own special perception, then we call him or
her creative and value the contribution that takes some of us to see the world
through a new perspective" (de Bono, 1984, p. 59).

Indeed, (many of) the organisational practitioners who took part in the population
of the database with information, language and knowledge of their own design
(appear to me to) remain skeptical of the results that doing different things
produced, a phenomenon I will address in Chapter Six when presenting an
account of those who chose to not see. The totality of adjustment necessary to
make the correction in organisational purpose was culturally threatening. These
were responses not unlike Kuhn's (1970) paradigm paralysis displayed by
scientists and others when the factually rich data gathered through their own
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efforts is disbelieved in order to preserve a chosen frame of reference, a
psychological allegiance. Kuhn's insights add further definition with his
observation that "political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often
restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing institutions have
ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment that they have
in part created" (Kuhn, 1962).

As stated, I describe the development of the database tool, its maturation into a
fully functioning knowledge management system and extensive use of group
thinking, whilst avoiding 'groupthink' (Janis, 1972), to enable judgement and the
assignment of values to various linked elements within the database. Data
population is also described along with the creation of a vocabulary or metalanguage in which to express and highlight key areas. I will also begin to
introduce the ideas that caused me concern in relation to facilitating meetings.
These began with subtle indicators but quickly took on profound meaning that
drove me to alter my approach entirely. In addressing these I will also partly
answer my second subordinate research question: "To what extent did the effects-

based planner assist in building and reinforcing consensus around initiatives for
change?".

It is also within this chapter that I provide additional answers to the primary

research question: "To what extent can knowledge management systems build and

reinforce consensus around initiatives for change"? In doing so I will also
address the question of what (I believe) knowledge management is, and what it is
not. I will leave the detailed explanations for the variety of responses, which gave
rise to the extent of consensus, discussed here, for Chapters Five and Six.

Furthermore, these individuals and groups, having (only partly) accepted the data
and results, were often hostile towards the transformations necessary to achieve
'fitness for purpose' (a term I will expand upon later when discussing
'effectiveness'). The concept was sound and they willingly participated, but the
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conclusions that were an aggregation of thousands of decision points, each quite
innocuous, were more than many could accept. That they had played a role in the
construction of these conclusions seemed to matter little, a phenomenon I will
discuss later in this chapter when outlining the changes necessary to achieve
alignment against the definitions used to position the organisation as set out in
ADFP 45 Special Operations (mentioned briefly in Chapter Two).

Secondly, I have maintained close contact with several operations and capability
planners within the United States military who are making remarkably similar
discoveries as they address identical capability development issues. There is a
'movement', it has the 'authority of .a shared idea', a community of opinion that
will pick up like-minded individuals and alter their perceptions. It is highly
probable that the doctrine surrounding this will migrate to Australia through the
more official channels of formal visits and exchanges of personnel. It is doubtful
that I, one iconoclastic individual, will be visible (or rewarded) as an actor in this.
These concerns are addressed in the reflective text boxes.

In order to be successful at the task I have set for myself within this chapter it is
necessary for me to spend some time on the subjects of strategic planning and
policy, the determination of objectives and the isolation of the ends and means
used to bring these objectives to reality. I make no excuse for this and declare two
reasons for doing so. Firstly, to minimise any possibility of misunderstandings
due to definition, concepts or understandings about how these subjects are
entangled; and secondly to provide space for my own detailed examination of this
topic within Defence planning and within the wider subject of management. I will
deal with these subjects firstly from a conceptual, theoretical perspective and then
provide specific examples from the research.

What I present in these two sections provides a vivid indication (which I will
leave mostly to the reader to discover) of why consensus can be so difficult to
achieve. Particularly in the context of this research wherein a sound theoretical
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model (a number of illustrations will be shown) relies upon enormous levels of
cooperation and collaboration through and across departments to have any chance
of being successfully applied in real life.

I will outline the difficulties that occurred as new information was progressively
developed within group settings, new functionalities created within the database
to allow storage and integration and analysis/charting processes devised to ensure
that each new segment was influencing, to an appropriate level, the entire package
of information.

The words within the database, but not its functionality, were the result of
extensive workshops, discussions, interviews and strategic analysis sessions with
changing groups of people,- so essentially this was a collaborative effort. The
functionality, its most powerful feature, was the work of a core team of three
individuals - myself as the project leader, an additional long-term member of
Special Operations and a Visual Basic programmer.

The methods employed are novel, original, allow the exploitation of key ideas and
statements through a linked analysis and provide for a fair and balanced
representation of sub-group contributions. I have personally briefed this method
to the Minister for Defence, Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Deputy Secretary of
Strategy, Deputy Chief of Army and the Director General of Policy and Plans Air Force. Although there were several others whose appointments cannot be
mentioned for security reasons, the four above represent the highest levels of
Defence leadership, national military strategy and capability planning. All
expressed a genuine interest in the depth and complexity of the analysis and were
quite taken by the ability of the approach to rapidly segregate (and aggregate) key
elements and thereby isolate strengths and weaknesses within an organisation.
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A Brief Literature Review

I have elected to depart from thesis convention and include my (brief) literature
review in the early part of this chapter, the section of the thesis that most
completely concerns the product of the research. Enough has been written on the
subject of scenario planning and it will serve no benefit for me to discuss this
further. In any event the literature concerning futures studies of the military and
national security is limited. Often it is subject to the highest security clearances
and can be very specific and region-centred. These speak more about a
preoccupation with technical superiority than is acceptable for divergent thinking
such as that which futures studies call for (demand is the term that more honestly
expresses this requirement). I will limit my comments here to a few articles that
are important to this topic of effects.

When I began this doctoral research, effects-based planning and effects-based
operations were merely shapes in the fog. I had a suspicion that something
interesting was beginning to take form. Elements were beginning to combine in
ways that heralded uniqueness. I could find no direct comparisons in the literature
of planning and decision-making. At least a method that seemed to so
comprehensively bundle together ideas and concerns across such a vast domain,
diagonally across the operational continuum (Figure 6) and vertically from
national security strategy down to tactics (Figures 8 and 9).

I must confess my surprise when articles appeared from a variety of sources. I am
not sure whether this is a serendipitous phenomenon associated with heuristic
inquiry, wherein questions posed by the topic or the researcher are satisfied by the
isolation of information that seems to provide the answer. For me this did happen
on many occasions. There were many others where an idle browse through a
library on a defence establishment (and not really looking for anything in
particular) would see me feverishly copying a number of articles of direct
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relevance to the research, particularly that related to the concept of effects-based
operations.

Articles on Effect-Based Operations
These are speci fi c, highly focused articles on effects-based operations. They
represent the well-developed thoughts that are emerging on this subject.
Conceptually they are embryonic, a useful definition is yet to be framed, although
I have created an e-mai l chat group of enthusiasts around the world and
interesting ideas are beginn ing to take shape, practically they have made little
progress against dogmati sm. Although my instincts tell me that this will change,
when I am not sure, possibly only a few years, but the totality of change will be
immense.

The Five Rings. Air Force Colonel John Warden (retired) was the architect of the
1991 Gulf War air campaign. He designed the strategies that led to the
capitulation of Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War air campaign was built around a
five rings concept (Figure 21).
Leadership

System Essentials

Population
Fielded Forces

Figure 21. Warden's five rings model.
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Although not dealing specifically with effects-based operations Warden's model
uses similar terms to describe how to reach the adversary's mind (back to
Clausewitz and the 'imposition of our will') His approach recognises that an
adversary functions as a system and, therefore, has systemic strengths and
weaknesses that can be located and interfered with, in both a constructive and
destructive way.

The system can be attacked in one cataclysmic blow, or through the 'death of a
thousand cuts'. Either way the outcome is the same. Central to the approach is a
fixation on the leadership, not the fielded military forces.

An additional feature that can be overlooked is that Warden's model is a fractal
structure. The fielded forces ring has its own five rings embedded within it that
allows a more precise description of vulnerabilities.

Models such as this derive significant value from their ability to focus the mind.
For example Warden's highlights the inadequacy of targeting the fielded forces of
the adversary. That is what they are designed to do, strength is in collision with
strength. He proposes that actions must be directed at the leadership for there to
be any hope of success. The further one moves actions away from the centre the
more difficult it is to bring about desired results through

2nd, 3rd

and n1h order

effects. A good introductory article on the five rings model can be gained from
Warden, J. (1995) The Enemy as a System.

Firing for Effects appeared in the April 2001 edition of Air Force Magazine
(Deptula, 2001, p. 46-53). Whilst dealing mostly with the Five Rings model
developed by Warden and the distinctions between parallel and serial operations
he does make some important points that relate directly to the topic of effectsbased thinking. For example, "planning for effects raises complex issues.
Planners, working with intelligence officers, must determine which effects on
each enemy system [reference to Warden] will contribute most to the attainment
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of military and political objectives" (Deptula, 2001, p. 50). He continues with
"strategy means matching means and ends" (Deptula, 2001, p. 50) and "the advent
of EBO [Effects Based Operations] calls for a basic realignment in war planning"
(Deptula, 2001, p. 52). The key terms here are the political orientation, matching
of ends and means and realignment. These are all central to the model I have
designed with political issues being accompanied by psychological and economic
issues. Underlying this is the theme of movement away from a destruction-based
to an effects-based model that specifically orients towards the national strategic
end-state(s).

Readers interested in pursuing this topjc are urged to search the World Wide Web
under effects-based planning or effects-based operations, with the Air University
at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama providing a rich source of information in
papers by graduating officers.
(

Effects-Based Operations

In Chapter Two I discussed National Security and the need for a post-modernist
approach. This approach is grounded in the existence of an embryonic concept
called effects-based operations, an orientation to operations that is mindful of
what the actions are in pursuit of. Chapter Three uses the scenario planning
technique of Field Anomaly Relaxation to provoke thought away from the
conventional and to seek these effects as aids and devices to planning. In
providing some preliminary definitions of what effects-based operations might be
I am cautious of the need to not pre-empt the ideas that will be presented (and
formed within the reader's mind) within this chapter.

It is my intention here to unpack the subject gradually and I am fearful that a
prescriptive definition at the outset (which may not be as crisp and concise as I
would like) may prove to be a hindrance. The (purist's) idea of effects-based
operations is still new, it has yet to be accurately and completely defined,
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although there is an accepted body of opinion around the idea that it constitutes
planning downwards from the grand strategic objective to the methods employed,
with the judicious execution delivering effects that achieve the desired (and
stated) objective.

It is very easy to get into a debate here about targeting as a principal military
planning activity, which would account for most of the current difficulties.
Targeting is aimed at destruction, which then becomes the primary measure of
effectiveness. Effects, on the other hand, are total disrespectors of the mechanisms
to bring them about; provided the outcome is delivered then other criteria will
gauge the efficacy. Effects-based .operations must, however, emerge from
engaging in effects-based planning and this is much easier to define. If we are to
take these initial steps towards a definition then: effects-based planning is an
approach that retains a fixation on what it is that we are trying to make happen
through our actions.

In the words of Clausewitz (1832) we will always be trying to "impose our will on
our adversary" and our will must take different forms. It is these forms, and I
believe seduction is a far more powerful form than coercion, that is the
embodiment of these things that (are made to) happen. The actions or instruments
that deliver this capitulation are unimportant in the initial stages of decisionmaking. Effects-based operations, therefore, must be the actions that emerge as
appropriate from this rigorous and thorough planning that use the desired effects
as the point of origin for all conclusions on actions.

I have merely introduced these thoughts here. I leave the subject for the time
being and return in more detail throughout the chapter.
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Strategy and Policy

Although strategy and policy have been dealt with in Chapter Two, I need to
revisit this subject to further clarify my (mis)understanding.

I remain somewhat confused as to the place of this (strategy) subject after having
reviewed Emery's (1993, p. 492) analysis of policy and strategy very late in the
writing of this thesis. I had believed that my work was focussed upon the strategic
plan "[as it] typically depicts a strategic objective, to be achieved within a
specified period, and a hierarchy of sub-goals whose collective achievement will
secure the achievement of the objective". My work contains elements and my
reading of the literature within (at least) military strategic planning support this
conclusion.

I now discover that "a policy, however, is typically one step removed from direct
pursuit of an objective; a policy typically seeks to produce a change in the social
environment such that certain kinds of ends are more or less easier to achieve"
(Emery, 1993, p. 492). Finally, Emery makes the point, which further clouds my
thinking that "the distinction between strategy and policy appears to be the same
distinction as that we make in military affairs between strategy and doctrine"
(Emery, 1993, p. 493). Unfortunately, Emery does not go on to explain in detail
how this distinction takes shape, although I believe that my attempts to fully
explore this will reveal the meanings implied in her words and secure a deeper
understanding of ends and means.

Further confusion (for me) is introduced by Nicholson (2000, p. 22) who states
"in the Australian context, strategic policy represents what a government wants
and hopes to achieve to secure national security". He then goes on to say in the
following paragraph that "military strategy . . . is a course of action planned or
pursued by military professionals at the behest of a government. ... [with the aim

124

Chapter Four- 'Effects-Based' Planning

being to] give effect to strategic policy [emphasis added]" (Nicholson, 2000, p.
23). All very sound statements so far. Nicholson then offers that " ... military
doctrine provides a body of thought on the conduct of war that informs the
development of both security and strategic policy, as well as that of military
strategy".

If I have followed the logic of these statements correctly, then national strategic
policy is shaped by doctrine, not the reverse. This seems to me to be an
outrageous assertion and one that must be rejected. The horse has now been led
(quite willingly it would seem) into a position directly behind the cart,
furthermore its bearing and outlook indicate no interest in the cart as on object to
which its role could somehow be related. A contradiction to this is outlined later
(Nicholson, 2000, p. 26-27) under the heading "Strategy and Doctrine- The Case
of Australia".. wherein a four step ideal relationship is described. He begins with
the "identification and articulation [the current major weakness and one I have set
out to address] of Australian interests and objectives in a national security policy".
This is followed sequentially by a thorough analysis until plans, actions and
standard operating procedures are developed.

The information flows and is interpreted downward, actions combine and flow
upward to produce results. This seems to me to be a far more accurate account of
the real world and acceptance of this is more sound (based on underpinning
conceptual models that support it) than the earlier statements on military doctrine
informing strategy.

A further return to Clausewitz reveals that "one must be clear what he intends to
achieve ... and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose;
the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will ...
prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and makes its influence
felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail" (Clausewitz, 1832,
Howard & Paret trans, p. 579).
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Clarke ( 1999, p. 18) usefully divides the Grand Strategic, Military Strategic.
Operational and Tactical Levels. assigns an actions profile alongside each and
neatly accounts for policies and strategies at each level. l have reproduced his
model below (Figure 22) as it will allow me to make several additional points not
mentioned by Clarke.

.,_ Objectives .,_ Strategy .,_ Plans .,_Tools

.,_ Objectives .,_ Strategy .,_ Plans .,_Tools

Operational Level

.,_ Objectives.,.Strategy .,_ Plans .,_Tools

t

Tactical Level

Figure 22. National

~ecurity

.,_ Objectives .,_ Strategy .,_ Plans .,_Tools

management architecture.

For my purposes. Clarke's ( 1999, p. 20) critical observation is that "every
strategy-making effort or consequent action, no matter how far down the
structure, should have some traceable relevance to the service of grand strategic
level policy objectives" and "[the] plans ... devised ... amount to more specific
descriptions of 'what' will be done in accordance with strategy to achieve a given
objective" (Clarke. 1999, p. 19). My only criticism with the model is that it fails
to make a reasonable claim against the geo-political strategic environment into
which the next (and absent) vertically pointing arrow should penetrate. This is the
point of origin for my research and informs the efficacy. effectiveness and
efficiency of all subordinate policies and strategies. There is sti ll no expression of
the effects. It continues to lack a 'whole-of-govemmentness'.

Furthermore, "effects-based operations are most effective as a top-down process.
The higher up it begins, the more far-reaching [and focussed) its supporting
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effects can be .... [it] begins with the [national leadership] providing clear,
coherent national objectives against which those decision-makers wielding the
various instruments of national power adopt supporting or supported roles as
appropriate" Beagle, 2000, p. 110).

From

the

many

discussions

I

had

throughout the period 1997-1999, with
senior Defence planners and capability
development project teams it has now (at
the moment of writing this) become
evident that there is an intellectual divide
between strategy (at the National Security
Committee of Cabinet level) and Defence,
whose task it is to stand ready with the
means to deliver outcomes for the nation.

"I have been staggered by the
enormity of this institutional
resistance. There appears to be
reluctance on the part of
government to provide precise
guidance to the Defence force on
what is sought through their
actions, which is mirrored, by an
identical reluctance within the
military to engage in a productive
dialogue of what it should be
doing".
(Personal reflection, 14 June
1999)

This intellectual silence appears to have
situated itself at the boundary of (grand strategic) policy and (grand) strategy.
This topic is addressed in Chapter 2.

Enough has been said here. The matter remains (for me) unresolved. I believe that
one cannot be done without the other and that the activities associated with
strategy and policy overlap in both context and content. Furthermore, the ends,
means, effects, strategy, policy and doctrine domains must be considered in their
totality if we are to approach precision in our thinking. A new doctrinal construct
'-----

of effects-based planning is needed.

The Role of Doctrine

Doctrine is central to (military) thought. It sets the boundaries for thought and
action. It guides the actions of an enormous array of practitioners and fuses their
efforts. It is sometimes described as dogma and has earned this title a number of
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times for some unbelievable acts of stupidity and incompetence (Dixon, 1976,
provides entertaining but quite tragic reading on this subject). The authorised
definition for doctrine within the ADF is:

the fundamental principles by which military forces or elements
thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is
authoritative but requires judgement in its application.
ADFP 101- Glossary, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1994
So we need a new fundamental principle. One that is alert to how actions couple
together to deliver results.

Ends, Means and Ways

In this section I wish to thoroughly establish the concept (firstly from a military
perspective) of ends, means and ways as enduring elements of all planning. A
rudimentary framework I will build on later is shown at Figure 23.

Ends

Ways

Means

Figure 23. The ends-means linkages that form the ways.

It illustrates the actions that are entangled with results and how a new level of

purity must be brought to the examination of cause and effect relationships if
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(military) strategic (and now policy due to my earlier observation) planning is to
(ever) produce the outcomes we are in pursuit of. It is not my intention to
investigate in great detail how this may relate to other (non-military)
organisations.

Having said this, however, my research has indicated that there is almost a direct
qualitative correlation within the architecture of analysis for Police, Customs,
Immigration and other quasi-military institutions. The inputs are behaviorally
dominant and the outcomes are (in the purest form this model demands) also
behavioral, things are done by people in order to bring about changes in other
people that deliver the outcomes or objectives that are sought.

The Ends-Means Construct

All planners and decision-makers would recognise the enduring truth of the
phrase 'begin with the end in mind'. The clearly stated end, objective or effect then
stands as a clear beacon that all actions must be in pursuit of if success is to be
achieved. Bartlett (1985, p. 39) offers that "there are several advantages to a topdown approach. First, it helps force planners to concentrate on ends", my central
argument remains that without knowing what you are trying to make happen any
activity will give some measure of satisfaction - the ends must have primacy.
"Second, it provides a systematic way to think through force planning starting
from the broad or macro perspective", giving a sense of the contextual
environment (Emery & Trist, 1965). "Third, ... a balance [can be achieved] for
expectations about the short and long term", a fusing together of scenario
planning and strategy/policy as I have done in the current research. "Fourth, ...
useful criteria [is introduced] for evaluating, judging and choosing among
alternative force choices", this is where my ratings of means-effects pairs is
achieved. It is my conclusion that the ends have been reduced to a somewhat
secondary position in the grand order of shaping national responses.
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Although I would now need to return to chapter two to fully develop these ideas
and position them within a national security context, the fundamental arguments
can be located in the strategic marketing literature. For my comments here the
terms operational environment and market should be considered as identical.
Research has indicated a strong causal link between market orientation and
organisational performance (Narver & Slater, 1990; Reukert, 1992), with "the
ultimate objective of corporate decisions [being] marketplace success" (Berman,
Wicks, Kotha & Jones, p. 91).

Organisational learning with key elements of culture, structure and practice has
also been strongly linked to market orientation (Day, 1994); with the importance
of a values base, knowledge flows and resulting market strategies being used
centrally on a behavioral construct (Sinkula, Baker & Nordeweir, 1997).
Deshpande and Rohit (1983) identify the need for increased qualitative research
through subjective interpretation of data as an aid to theory development, with a
de-emphasis on hypothesis testing - making the behaviour rich in involvement
and consultation - solving the problem progressively as groups and organisations
learn together.

Berthon, Hulbert and Pitt (1999) synthesise all these issues as a central
management question related to innovation or response, with Duncan (1996)
outlining the basic contradiction between an organisation that is configured for
rapid change and adaptation in a turbulent environment, against that configuration
needed for satisfactory implementation. Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck (1976)
and Hubert (1984) offer insights into the 'experimenting' organisation that
constantly mutates, fostering internal flexibility as a vital characteristic for
success.

Deshpande, Farley and Webster (1993) concerned themselves with the primacy of
market orientation or innovation, suggesting that innovation success can re-orient
a market. Han, Kim and Srivastava (1998) explore, from within a set of
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hypotheses, whether market orientation and innovation and organisational
performance are all pieces of the same inter-related management puzzle with
further distinctions drawn from Daft (1978), Dalton (1968) and Damanpour
(1991); wherein "technical innovations pertain to products, services and
production process technology - they are related to work activities . . .. [and]
administrative innovations involve organisational structure and administrative
process - they are indirectly related to the basic work activities" (Damanpour,
1991, p. 560)

The central premise at work here is that indicators for change (within the context
of this research) come from outside, in the environment and are a strategic
necessity (Day, 1999, p. 13).

Given the nature of Special Forces, and its primary purpose to conduct Special
Operations, the conclusion must be that a combination of precise market
orientation (this term is abandoned now in favour of the more appropriate
[understanding of the] 'operational environment'), constant innovation and
structural mutation as a stable organisation condition must become the norm. I set
out how these are addressed later in this chapter, for now it is time to return to the
ends, ways and means.

This construct of ends, ways and means shown earlier in Figure 23 attains
primacy as a core framework, but it must be approached in a particular way if the
results are to prove useful. Before proceeding though I am cautioned by the words
of Vendler (in Emmet, 1984, p. 67) who, when dealing with the relationships
between cause and effect, states that "causes are facts, which are proposition-like,
whereas effects are actual changes and processes in the world ... .'causes' should
be paired with 'results' or 'consequences', which, like causes, can be limited, ...
whereas effects can go on indefinitely". These concerns I think have already been
accommodated in the recognition of n1h order effects, cascading effects and the
belief that we can never only do one thing.
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An interesting black box 'unknowability' cause-effect relationship (Figure 24) has
been discussed by Sakulich (2001, p. 13-14).

Realm of
correctness

Strategic Result:
discriminate effect

Transformation
Process
("Meehan ism")
Tactical Action:
precise application
of aerospace power

Realm of
exactness

Figure 24. Black box linking of cause and effect.
He offers that "it does not make sense to talk about discriminate effects unless
those effects are clearly defined in advance; if for no other reason, the decisionmaker must communicate the discriminate outcome to planners who must develop
the means to achieve it" (Sakulich, 2001, p. 14). As I soon demonstrate, getting
this information from senior policy-makers can be difficult. Practitioners
inquiring co-operatively towards this information can offer an empowering
alternative.
Maxfield (1999, p. 202) was able to advance a simple task within decision
analysis to "determine the set of possible strategies, assess the outcomes of each
and their probabilities, evaluate the relative value of each outcome, and
[therefore] calculate the optimum strategy". Harrison uses similar language to
confirm that "once the search yields a sufficient amount of information to fashion
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a set of alternatives, the next function in the decision-making process. is to
compare and evaluate these alternatives .... The decision-maker must focus on
anticipated outcomes that will probably meet the objectives ... " (Harrison, 1987,
p. 48). It is (the profit) maximising behaviour of the economic person, "the
merchant pictured by Adam Smith" (Harrison, 1987, p. 111). But the context of
my discussion is not the marketplace, it is the social milieu where alternatives are
endlessly complex. Furthermore, the black box in the Sakulich model possesses
an enormous array of interactions.

I gain some measure of comfort from Emmet (1984, p. 69) in her philosophical
analysis of these dilemmas for decision-makers in recognising that "causes and
effects are alike in being multiple, and this makes them more difficult to
diagnose". It is not helpful to attempt to isolate individual cause-effect
relationships, instead "why should we not have a [many to many relationship
acknowledgement] where there are a number of actual causal factors playing on a
situation producing a number of actual effects" (Emmet, 1984, p. 68).

These then spiral off into a "hopelessly large number of possible outcomes",
indeed "the very structure of the world in which the agent exists is undergoing
change". This is the nature of the turbulent field of Emery and Trist ( 1965)
discussed in Chapter Three.

I will develop this simple model (Figure 24) into a complex array later in this
chapter, showing what is happening inside Sakulich's black box, an array that
incorporates an identical arrangement of linkages, but one that assigns values and
forms patterns that can be analysed. Despite its simplicity there remains much
confusion and disagreement (grounded in a lack of doctrine), as evidenced in the
quote below:
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End-state is reached by achieving objectives (military and nonmilitary), objectives are reached by achieving the expressed intent
(statement of what the force must do to succeed with respect to the
enemy, terrain and desired end-state) -what you want to achievethe 'effect'. Where is the 'newness' in this other than the word? The
newness is in the focus of the staff planning elements. We need to
drive commander's intent to lower echelons. But the lower
echelons focus on 'destroy this' and don't focus on 'in order to .... '.
By using a new name for an old process (given new Information
Technology tools), perhaps we can develop a culture and process
change that does not disregard the 'in order to ... ' part of mission
orders.
Participant comment from EBO workshop
in United States 26 October 2000
Without getting into the specifics, they will come later, there were countless
occasions during the workshops I conducted that a reminder had to be spelled out
on the framing of the statements: do something in order to make something

happen is critical if a consistent and useful phraseology is to be developed. The
quote above carries a powerful message for me in that the effect that is sought
should be conveyed throughout all levels of thinking and must not be turned into a
'destroy' this or that action that is not anchored to an effect. That a(nother) system
is at work seems to have primacy once again.

In reading Crombie (1972, p. 120) I note an interesting quote from Angyal that
has relevance here, wherein "every system implies some kind of dimensional
domain which makes the multiplicity of parts possible and at the same time serves
as a matrix for the arrangement of parts into definite patterns". This domain is
then expanded into depth or the vertical dimension, a progressive dimension and a
breadth dimension. All have attracted my attention and demand further detailed
examination to illuminate my own work; however, it is the second of these that
informs this particular section as "the dimension of progression is the dimension
along which particular actions and behaviours become linked into means-ends
chains, the structured sequences of more or less planned, purposeful activity"
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(Crombie, 1972, p. 121). The language of ends and means is very dominant and
the idea of end-states, effects and actions need to become integrated.

Nevertheless, caution is warranted when building these structures (as I will
outline later) as "There seems to be an obsessive concern with the means at
almost complete expense to the ends, so much so that stalemated social systems
come as close to being purposeless as can be expected from a social system which
is purposeful by definition" (Baburoglu, 1988, p. 217). I have found the
sequencing of this integration to be critical.

The reality of these facts, from a mi,litary doctrine perspective, is evident in the
quote below:

A nation will have a political aim or objectives and depending both
on the nature of the conflict and the identity of the enemy, there
will be a means by which the armed forces can best contribute to
its achievement. To establish that means, the appropriate military
aim should be selected and must be simple, direct, within the
capabilities of the force available, and defined without any
possibility of ambiguity. Each operation will itself have an aim
that, while more limited, must also be simple, direct and clearly
stated.
Army Doctrine Electronic Library, 2000
I believe that we are still waiting to witness any noticeable behavioural shifts that
align with this thinking. Furthermore, the aim is limited by (and subordinated to)
the capabilities of the available force. As identified by Jablonsky (1989, p. 53) in
"the proper blending of these interdependent [ends, ways and means] elements,
however, has always been a difficult process, made even more so in the modem
era where limited objectives and diffusion of military power are the norms".
Jablonsky then offers a quote from Henry Kissinger who recognised that strategy
was not about superior strength, rather "to discipline the available power [means?]
into some relationship to the objectives likely to be in dispute" (Jablonsky, 1989,
p. 53). This feedback in thought and practice remains unchallenged.
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What we see forming then is "a cascading means-ends chain of organised, loosely
coupled, interconnected systems moving from generality to specificity" (Allen,
2000, p 38). Allen's concern was that if "these elements could be more logically
expressed then it should be possible to express the means by which management
achieves ends .... Map[ping] what goes on ... in an organisation from top to
bottom" (Allen, 2000, p 38). This is precisely what I have set out to do.

Taking this Thinking to National Security

This mapping of means and effects can be a hugely complex task to achieve in an
international security context. Given the SE Asian region's current (in)security
situation Clausewitz could now be considered only partially correct when he
identified that "there is only one means in war: combat" (Clausewitz, 1832,
Howard & Paret trans. 1976, p. 96); for war has taken on new meanings that have
little to do with declared conflict between States.

Furthermore, his recognition that "the multiplicity of forms that combat assumes
leads us in as many different directions as are created by the multiplicity of aims,
so that our analysis does not seem to have made any progress" (Clausewitz,
Howard & Paret trans. 1976, p. 96) restores some contemporary relevance, as it
gives us the freedom to broaden our view to that of imposing our will within all
contexts that may not necessarily involve conflict.

Our basic problem remains, however, and it brings us back to the words in
Checkand's seven-stage model that "as the complexity of a system increases, our
ability to make precise and significant statements about its behaviour diminishes
until a threshold is reached beyond which precision and significance (or
relevance) become almost mutually exclusive characteristics". A corollary
principle may be stated succinctly as, "the closer one looks at a real-world
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problem, the fuzzier becomes the solution" (Kosko, 1994, p. 148, quoting the
work of Zadeh and his principle of incompatability).

The fixation on warfighting mentioned in Chapter 2 is diminished further. The
necessity for this has been highlighted by Shine (1998, pp. 5-18) when discussing
the need for "using every means at the nation's disposal" which, in an effectsbased model, can integrate all possible contributors; a whole-of-government
approach, the need for which has been mentioned in many different contexts, not
only those that are related to national security.

The doctrine at the

op~rational

level is sound and points to these issues, as can be

seen in Figure 25 taken from an Australian Defence Force publication. The
greyed text boxes on the right are Australian Government, Australian Defence
Force Headquarters, Headquarters Australian Theatre, Joint Task Forces and
Australian Defence Force Units.
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Figure 25. Defence doctrine model of ends, ways and means.

My primary criticism is that there is (always) a premature fixation on the means,
rather than the ends. "What we do", not "What are we trying to make happen".
This is certainly true for the military and is also evident within many other
disciplines and organisations. I feel so strongly about this that I will repeat here
the words of the Deputy Secretary - Strategy from a quote in Chapter 2 "/ do not

think that we [who?] have yet got to the point of providing the Army with a really
clear statement of what it is meant to be doing ... To my mind at least, one of the
key objectives of the present process is to make sure that we do that''. In order for
this to be successful it must be informed by a comprehensive understanding of
what the ADF is trying to make happen (strategically for the nation). This loop of
irresolution is closed when we acknowledge that we do not know what it is that
we are trying to make happen. It is Government "who wills an end [and therefore]
wills the means to that end" (Rousseau, 1762. Betts trans. p. 70). The various
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elements of the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy as set
out in Chapter 2 which attempt to explicitly set these out remain lacking in both
quantity and quality of expression.

In his analysis of strategy and crisis, Brigadier Wallace, when the Director
General of Land Development, identified that:

By constantly focusing on the desired end state, the circumstances
we wish to prevail at the end of the crisis, the successful strategist
shapes the near and mid-term situation to his own advantage.
Taking a long view causes him to anticipate developments and
drives his information requirements, naturally assisting him to
build on the most valuable commodity for the strategist,
foreknowledge.
Wallace, (1999, p. 17)
Having crafted an intent from the end-states Wallace then sets out a model for the
thought processes springing from this, with a principal output being the "selection
of the most effective combinations of effects" (1999, p. 19). It follows that an
analysis of the contextually appropriate means to deliver these effects would be a
natural extension of this 'top down' approach. Herein lies a practitioner's
recognition that there are elements missing and the only way to determine what
they may be and how they may be expressed is to formulate a coherent model that
drives the mind away from actions (what we do) to outcomes (what we make
happen). Having determined these then it is entirely appropriate to examine the
possible actions (and what should be more accurately described as decisionmaker's options).

Warden (1998) elaborates on this theme of knowing what each individual action
contributes to the outcome when stating that:

. . . as a planner or commander, you ought to be able to tell what
each bomb has got to do with the peace that you want to follow the
war. If you can't tell how a given bomb relates to the peace that's
going to follow, then you probably haven't done your homework
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well and you probably shouldn't drop that particular bomb.
Warden (1998, p. 84-85)
From these insights it is possible to deduce that the channeling of actions (or
energy) to bring about stated ends must be informed by a clear vision and one that
is not distorted by a particular orientation, preoccupation or ideological
imperfection or inconsistency. A useful example of this is offered by Clarke who
noted that:

Alexander the Great who, while having very strong land forces,
was very much weaker than his Persian adversaries at sea. Rather
than challenge the Persian navy on the water for control of the
Mediterranean, he identified their centre of gravity as the ports and
decided that attacks on these would be the best way to overcome
Persian sea power . . . . a simple expression of 'how' a particular
manipulation of affairs might indirectly secure the desired
objective [emphasis added].
Clarke (1999, p. 19)
Alexander, acknowledged as one of the finest strategists, recognised the
inaccessibility of his adversary's navy (his strength was land based), but

recognised that he could reach his objective (located further upstream) through
means that exploited his strengths. The importance of this indirectedness is further
elaborated, (Clarke, 1999, p. 14) wherein "control of accessible upstream states or
events can produce a measure of control over less accessible downstream states or
events. Establishing this link between cause and effect, between means and ends,
is at the very heart of the art of strategy". Alluding to these themes, students of

systems thinking will recognise the truth(ful fantasy) in the following poem in
Francis Thompson's The Mistress of Vision:

All things by immortal power
Near or far
Hiddenly
To each other linked are
That thou canst not stir a flower
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Without troubling a star.

The Primacy of Effects

Theory investigates all these ends and means according to the
nature of their effects and their mutual relations [emphasis added].
(Clausewitz, 1832, Rapoport trans, p. 195)
Effects are central to this chapter. I have already demonstrated that knowing what
you want to have happen must be given primacy in planning. Without remaining

mindful of the effects we are seeking, every action that is not securely anchored to
an outcome can not only prove wast.eful, it can also run counter to other actions
that are being undertaken simultaneously. This fact calls for a coordinated and
thoughtful approach that will eventually become a campaign of orchestrated
actions at the National level using all elements of national power.

One of the greatest military theorists - Carl von Clausewitz offers several
important insights to lay the foundation for a modern application of this thinking.
"In the analysis of the means we encounter the same multiplicity as our viewpoint
becomes more comprehensive. The higher the ends [or effects], the greater the
number of means by which they may be reached". Furthermore "we can see that
this may sometimes lead to a broad and complex field of enquiry in which we
may easily get lost" (Clausewitz, 1832, Howard & Paret trans. 1976, p. 159). I can
admit to becoming lost on many occasions, as the vocabulary used to describe
national security issues becomes more complex, so too did the linkages that bind
the construct together. Hope is available though in the slightly different
translation of this section by Rapoport,

who offers that as our knowledge

deepens:

The infinite variety of paths in which it [the means in battle] may
be applied, leads us into all the different ways which the
multiplicity of objects allows of, so that we seemed to have gained
nothing; but that is not the case, for from this unity of means

141

\

Chapter Four- 'Effects-Based' Planning

proceeds a thread which assists the study of the subject, as it runs
through the whole web of military activity and holds it together
[emphasis added].
(Clausewitz, 1832, Rapoport trans, p. 133)
From another interpretation comes an assertion that "the ends-means relationship
clearly does not work on a linear fashion [as implied in the quote above]. The
constant interplay is an interactive feedback process" and "the conduct [the means
employed] of any conflict affects the character and [the altered] character feeds
back into the political ends" (Bayerchen, 1998, p. 174). The set of effects then (a
list that is both generic and context-specific) must sit atop the ends, means and
ways framework. The (almost limitless) variety in which these can be coupled
together broadens (and complicates) the scope of planning, but also builds in
flexibility, novelty and agility for dealing (imaginatively and creatively) with
current events.

Ayling (2000, p. 6) also recognised that the ends, ways and means framework was
equally useful at provoking a consideration of future force concepts within
defence to shape the ideological positions before they become a damaging
interference. Indeed, the disrespect that this construct shows for Service (Navy,
Army and Air Force) identities is one of its greatest strengths. This disrespect is
evident in transcript extracts from a workshop on effects-based operations held in
the United States that I have included as Appendix 1 that I will make specific
reference to and make comparisons with my own observations on similar
workshops in Australia.

This single Service (Navy, Army or Air Force) orientation can be attributed to the
early fixation (on the means) that is allowed to occur on the tactical and
operational levels, rather than (the ends) at the national strategic level. Indeed,
Warden (in Clarke, 1998, p 78) in a search for useful definitions of" ... 'winning',
'to win' or 'victory' [discovered that] there was whole lot of things in there about
how to do tactical things, but almost nothing about the final end states that were
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supposed to be the result of this action". It is evident from these observations that
very little consideration is given to 'that which is sought'. Rather 'that which is
done' dominates the thinking. It would appear to be the case in any endeavour, as
illustrated by Albert Einstein (1950, chap 14) who wrote "perfection of means and
confusion of goals seem-in my opinion-to characterize our age" and also by
Hoffer (1973, p. xx) "We have perhaps a natural fear of ends. We would rather be
always on the way than arrive. Given the means, we hang on to them and often
forget the ends". In an organisation such as the military, which by its nature must
have an action ori(1ntation, the means are certainly blocking out a clear sight of
the ends they are in pursuit of.

Furthermore, also from Warden (1995, p. 2) comes the statement that "we cannot
think strategically if we start our thought processes with individual aircraft,
sorties, weapons, or even with the enemy's entire military forces. Instead, we must
focus on the totality of our enemy .... [only after doing this thoroughly] can we
begin to think about how we are going to produce the desired effect on the enemy,
the weapons, the delivery systems, and other means [emphasis added] we will
use". The very intent of this research, indeed it goes beyond to the contextual
environment.

Only when these elements of ends and means are bound together can a useful,
purposeful understanding of the roles that are played by each of the 'ways' be
arrived at. It may be the only way to bring a new synthesis to our understanding.

I promised earlier that I would demonstrate the presence of patterns in these
linkages and how these patterns could be interpreted. Figure 26 represents my
initial attempts to formulate a deeper understanding of what I was only just
beginning to construct. It seemed to me that there was something akin to a strange
attractor at work and the various ideas that were presented by a large number of
practitioners within the organisation would build a visual representation of actions
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at work. The random arrangement of lines in Figure 23 sparked my curiosity to
develop these ideas further to isolate the patterns and determine their meaning.

Effects

Capacities or
Competencies

Means

Pattern A

Pattern B

Pattern C

Figure 26. Patterns formed within the ends, means and ways model.

Note that I have substituted the words of ends, ways and means with the language
that I was beginning to develop of effects, means and capacities or competencies.
I was criticised by many for this departure from convention. My discussion on the
ends, means and ways model to this point confirms that the ideas were already
present. My intention was to force a new perspective. To preserve the purity of
the process throughout it was suggested that I abandon the term effects and return
to objectives and end-states. In my view effects are an expression of objectives.
End-states are located in a position off to the left of this diagram and are delivered
through achievement of the effects.

The patterns are evident within the figure, heralding the possibility of strange
attractors entering the model (and they did). A fact I will demonstrate shortly.
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•

Pattern A describes a pair of effects that are anchored to the same set of three
capacities or competencies through a single means. If this means is tightly
bound from both sides it possesses considerable criticality as an action.

•

Pattern B describes a single effect anchored to multiple means, each of which
has a supporting set of capacities. Looking sequentially at several effects and
determining whether the same set of means and capacities are bound together
raises issues of undertaking that means in separate locations simultaneously a question of concurrency.

•

Pattern C provides for the pairing of a single effect and a single capacity and a
count of the number of means that bridge between these two (a chart will be
illustrated later that performs this action).

The information gained from this exercise is reduced to a numerical set of
possible paths that can be traced either from the sides (single effects to a single
capacity) or from the centre outwards (single means to multiple effects and
capacities). These results will be displayed as charts later in this chapter.

On 3 August 2000, a slide (Figure 27) was presented to senior Defence capability
managers as part of a methodology formulation project. It represents a quite
honest attempt to link the ends, ways and means together and apply some
criticality and importance metrics to the lines that bind the model together. As
will be seen later in this chapter it is a highly simplified (and copied) version of a
more sophisticated model that arose from my research. Notwithstanding this, the
concept has gained a foothold and attention is now beginning to be directed at
(what I consider to be) the right areas; although the institutional resistance
remains high despite the 'concept-led' declaration by Army discussed in Chapter
Two.
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Mapp1ng Functional
Requirements
(Under research)

What array ol
eflects and
strategic demands
is this ability
supporting?

How cnticai is
this ability In the
overall m1x of
. abilities?
Is Ita
'sliver bullet'
or a potential
trade-oil?

Figure 27. Conceptual linking of elements.

I have discussed the theoretical foundations of this for too long, but as I confessed
in the beginning of this chapter it was a necessary thing for me to do. Armed with
this extensive knowledge and the importance of putting what is a comprehensive
and thorough theory to some useful purpose that can inform the efforrs of a vast
number of people, I now move on to a discussion of how (I was able) to make this
(begin to) happen in the Australian Defence Force.

The e-mail below and personal reflection provide some closing thoughts to this
section on my (a~ yet unrecognised) work and the (undeclared) interest of others.
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E-mail received on 19 March 2001
Guy
Tony Forestier, Air Power Studies Centre, provided me with your e-mail address, advising me that
you had a database that was able to prioritise capability.
I would be keen to speak to you about this issue, as the Directorate of Current Capability
Guidance is coordinating the development of the Defence Capability Planning Guidance (DCPG) a guidance document to prioritise capability at all levels.
Could you please call me before Thursday, (if possible as I will be on leave from Thursday
22/3/01) to discuss what you have done, and to make arrangements to visit us the next time you
are in Canberra.
Thanks and Regards
John C. Guthrie
Deputy Director - Capability Planning Integration
Directorate of Current Capability Guidance
Capability Systems Staff
Department of Defence
Russell Offices
Canberra AUSTRALIA 2601

"The linking of lines and attachment of values to prescribe
additional meaning was my design. I shared it openly so I
should be thankful that it has found its way to a good use
(Defence White Paper - Defence 2000 Our Future Defence
Force). I still feel anger though that supposedly clever people
doing extremely important work cannot attribute clever ideas
to those who originated them. Furthermore, I believe the
purity of the approach has been polluted by the inclusion of
inappropriate (platform-centric) statements to describe the
'abilities'. The likelihood of gaining credit in what is
(unfortunately) an ego-centric environment is greatly
diminished".
I am reminded of the work of Liddell Hart (1943) who
recognised that "the destruction of the enemy's armed forces is
but a means - and not necessarily an inevitable or infallible
one - to the attainment of our goal. It is not, despite the
assertion of the military pundits, the sole, true objective in
war" (Hart, 1943, p. 151).
(Personal observation, 10 September, 2000)
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Defence thinking is progressing quite rapidly towards acceptance of these
concepts. It is uncertain when institutionalisation (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978)
will occur, if ever. Of equal doubt is whether the purity in the approach can be
maintained, it is too easy to revert back to a means-dominant paradigm.

Getting an Effects Orientation Started

Throughout 1998-99, I participated in a series of Concept Initiation Teams (CIT)
under Project Sphinx. These were structured workshops conducted by the
Directorate of Future Warfare at the Defence Science and Technology
Organisation (DSTO) facility at Fern Hill in Canberra. The workshops employed
a group decision support system, whereby each participant (up to 40) had his or
her own keyboard and could review their own individual comments and respond
to the ideas of others as they appeared on the group area projected onto a large
screen. This proved to be a very powerful way to elicit information. Assertive
ideas prevailed, not assertive people. My earlier comment of the 'authority of a
shared idea' would be given the greatest chance of success in this collaborationrich environment.

There were five separate two-day sessions conducted. The subjects dealt with
were:

•

Concept 1 - Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

•

Concept 2 - Command and Control

•

Concept 3 - Tailored Lethality

•

Concept 4 - Force Projection and Protection

•

Concept 5 - Force Sustainment

Without knowing the significance of my actions (then) I was able to convince the
workshop leader that Concept 3 - Tailored Lethality should be altered to Tailored
Effects, producing a more appropriate (and useful) title and, most importantly, it
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would dramatically enlarge the problem and solution spaces. The title Tailored
Lethality, although not challenged at all by the group, embodied a fixation on
conflict and the military measures to resolve conflict - locate the defeat
mechanisrnls and apply military (and lethal due to the preoccupation commanded
by the title) force. Tailored effects, on the other hand, did not possess this
imbalance and therefore did not produce this single-mindedness. I believe now
that this may prove to be the most significant event in getting the concept of
effects-based planning impregnated into the military mind. Military force still has
its place, but it (eventually) will stand adjacent to the other means available to a
nation to resolve a situation.

A document released later that reported on the workshops contained the following
statement:

Tailored effects shift the emphasis from the application of force to
the delivery of effects tailored to a specific circumstance or
mission. It has equal utility across the spectrum of conflict [see
Figure 6] particularly where earlier; 'softer' interventions may yield
reductions in tension [an unfortunate reversal in thinking back to
conflict]. The concept involves greater mixing of traditional force
projection and unconventional information operations.
With the circulation and endorsement of this document Defence now have a
doctrinal beginning that fosters discussion, exploration and examination of these
issues. I do not hesitate in claiming this as my achievement, what level of
penetrati,on this achieves will be determined by others.

This concept has since proven central to the development of future approaches
and, along with the other four concepts, has yielded 25 embryonic sub-concepts.
Nine of these 25 have become key concepts ('tailored effects' was one), six have
become enabling concepts (tailored effects was one) and ten have become
supporting concepts (tailored effects was in three). Whilst this cannot be
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considered a dominating result a 25% penetration of an idea into a new concept is
certainly promising and could herald a departure from traditional thinking.

Final Thoughts on Ends, Ways and Means

At the heart of all planning then, regardless of its purpose, scope or urgency is the
need to balance these ends and means. To achieve effective planning a
straightforward linear process is normally adopted that specifies objectives and
the various arrangements of means that can be coupled together in different ways
to accommodate risk, cost and other factors that are important to decision-makers.
Emerging from this process should be, a range of options, each possessing the
common characteristic of being able to deliver the desired outcome, but at the
same time presenting the decision-maker with the capacity for phased or
escalating application combined with appropriate adjustments in risk and other
factors.

My extensive use of other authors' thoughts on this subject now allows me to
focus on the construction of my own knowledge management model that brought
these ideas to an audience, allowed their thoughts to range free, developed a
language in which to express the effects, distilled these into the subordinate
means and other elements.

Before doing this, however, I would like to spend some time addressing the
subject of knowledge management in general.
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Knowledge Management

Knowledge Management caters to the critical issues of
organizational adaptation, survival and competence in face of
increasingly discontinuous environmental change .... Essentially, it
embodies organizational processes that seek synergistic
combination of data and information processing capacity of
information technologies, and the creative and innovative capacity
of human beings.
(http://www.brint.com/km/whatis.htm on 19 Apr 2001)

The term 'knowledge management' has yet to receive a stable definition, mainly
due to the phraseology used to express what it is. Essentially it is an (as yet
incomplete) extension into a new field or domain for the general term
'management'. It therefore sits (uncomfortably) adjacent to 'quality management',
'information management', 'risk management', 'people management', 'data
management' and all the other forms of something management. In hindsight, it
would have been more helpful to present this subject under the broader heading of
knowledge sharing, an idea I gained from discussions with another doctoral
student.

Furthermore, the domination of the noun form of the word 'manage(ment)' has
caused a distancing between what is being described and what is actually
occurring. From the quote above we can see that it is more a fusion of patterns of
information that can be extracted from noise with the creative ability of the
human mind to derive meaning. Knowledge sharing uses a verb in the passive
voice and lends more action to the term, more appropriately describing the object
of the action. Further information on the ability to see signals out of noise can be
gained from Wickens (1992).

Finally, the knowledge (that is being managed) is often described as both tacit and
explicit. The tacit form being the memories and thoughts of members of the
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organisation and the explicit being how these (tacit forms) are manifested within
the workplace or organisation. Discussions I have had with individuals studying
knowledge management have been interesting and fruitful; reinforcing my belief
that much confusion continues to surround the subject. I contend that explicit
knowledge is behaviour. If we talk of (the manifestation of) explicit knowledge
then what we can observe and measure must be the behavioral basis or
foundations upon which the knowledge rests.

My description of a knowledge management system simplifies this confusion
somewhat as I choose to employ the Hall and Fagan (1956) definition of a "set of
objects, conceptual or material, with their interrelations". My Microsoft®
Access™ database is constructed of objects with material expressions that
illustrate interrelations.

Effects-Based Planning - Making it Work

Effects based is not a concept, strategy, operation, warfare, or
targeting. It is a mindset! It is a mindset that planners and
operators need to ·get a better grip on. That better grip can be
gained as a result of technology and utilization of other new assets
or processes.
Participant comment from EBO workshop
in the United States 26 October 2000
Effects-based planning is not a new term. It is an extension of the very simple
idea of 'begin with the end in mind'. Without knowing what is ultimately sought,
in very precise terms, and what therefore shapes all organisational effort decisionmakers are unable to build the organisational elements that can deliver those ends
or objectives. Without a clear understanding of effectiveness there will not only
be inefficiency but a failure to achieve objectives. Effects-based planning uses the
objectives (or effects) that are sought as the point of origin from which all
analysis proceeds. It forces decision-makers to consider the primary purpose for
which their organisation exists. The results gained from the process give powerful
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insights into the 'fitness for purpose' and directions where high pay-off gains can
be achieved. Although I have mentioned the term fitness for purpose several times
up to this point I need now to anchor it to a precise and simple definition of a
system by Coyle (1996, p. 4), he says it is a "collection of parts organised for a
purpose". This suits my own purpose as the collection of parts is the vertical
arrangement of environment, grand strategy, policy, national security, national
military strategy, ways and means.

This neatly binds together Checkland's purposeful activity- goal focused, which
is mindful of Coyle's system orientation - a collection of (organised) parts. Correll
(2001, p. 2) adds emphasis to this in. his article on the purpose of war wherein he
states that "the idea of effects-based operations is that success in armed conflict
should be measured by results, not by destruction. Did the operation compel a
political outcome[?]". Embodied within the question is the need to have a
purposeful objective.

It is now time to put these ideas to work.

Demonstrating the Concept

It took many months before the database features illustrated in Figure 28 took

shape and actually began to work as designed. The three main functions of
linking, rating and charting are now presented as steps. Additional features within
the database are also presented.
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Figure 28. The main functional components of the database.

Steps to Effects-Based Planning

There are six steps to the process of effects-based planning:

•

Step I End-States. Using either a future-focused/scenario-based view or one
aligned with the present (or what the organisation is trying to bring about in a
current setting) firstly develop a comprehensive list of end-states that captu re
the characteri stics of the contextual environment (see the Glossary for a
definition).

•

Step 2 Effects. Determine the effects that can be imposed that satisfy the endstates. Effects, ends and objectives are used interchangeably here. Effects suit
my purpose better as it more accurately describes (and can accommodate) a
situation that remains fluid. Ends and objectives have a sense of finality to
them that is inconsistent with the strategic and enduring perspectives that are
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sought. This step can involve the introduction of scenarios if a long-term and
future focused view is required, or it may simply be a detailed examination.
•

Step 3 Means. Consider, in the broadest terms, what actions, or means, can
bring about or make a contribution towards the achievement of these effects,
establishing links between them.

•

Step 4. Capacities or Competencies. Determine what competencies or
capacities must be utilised for the means to succeed.

•

Step 5 Ratings. Rate each of the linked pairs using appropriate criteria to
establish additional meaning.

•

Step 6 Assess Strengths and Weaknesses. Review the results to gauge 'fitness
for purpose' using the graphing techniques built into the application.

The Steps Explained

Step 1 - Determine the End-States

The research was future focussed and relied upon an examination of the scenarios
to determine end-states. The twenty scenarios set out in detail in Chapter Two
have been reproduced in heading only below with their associated end-states:
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Table 6. Scenarios and derived end-states
Scenario
Indigenous Crisis
Drug Crime
Syndicates
Sponsored
Offshore
Eco-cyber
Terrorists
White Supremacy
Movements
SE Asian Anarchy

Multinational Piracy

China Sea
Scramble

Antarctic Challenge

Transmigration

Consolidated
Forces of Islam

Climactic Chaos in
Oceania

Australia the Pariah

Middle East

End-State
Stability is restored within Australia whilst preserving the States'
primacy for law and order, employing measures acceptable to the
majority within Australia, minimising economic disruption and
international disapproval and without major legislative
amendment.

Stability, trading relationships and peaceful competition are
restored in the region, employing measures acceptable to the
majority within Australia whilst avoiding:
•
domination by any non-allied major power,
•
significant international disapproval,
•
displaying bias contrary to trading interests and major or
high profile ADF involvement.
Corporations operate within the climate of national sovereignty,
trade and shipping in the region is unimpeded. Australia has
good relations with neighboring governments and avoids
significant international disapproval.
Stability is restored to the South China Sea with exploration
continuing, whilst avoiding non-allied superpower domination of
the region. Australian national support to ASEAN is
demonstr1;1.ted.
Sovereignty is restored to the Australian Antarctic Territory
without breach of international agreements, retaining international
support for actions and with minimum use of force.
Refugee flows into Australia cease. Humanitarian crisis is
relieved. Pressures causing refugee movement are mitigated.
The majority of refugees have been returned to home countries.
Australia's actions area accepted internationally.
Stability is restored within the region, whilst avoiding direct
conflict with governments. Domestically State authorities are able
to cope. Australia has successfully contributed to coalition
peacekeeping operations.
Stability is restored in the region. Non-allied major power
involvement is reduced to a minor level and the threat of
domination is ended. Evacuation and resettlement programs are
well advanced.
Stability is restored within the region and pressures causing
refugee movement are mitigated. Australia gains international
approval for its contribution. Within Australia the States are able
to cope with law and order, employing measures acceptable to
the majority whilst minimising economic disruption and
international disapproval and without major legislative
amendments.
Stability is preserved within the region and within Australia. The
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Scenario
Meltdown
Ebola Outbreak
United States
Stumbles and Falls
Gene Warfare
There Can Be Only
One
Information Warfare

WMDs to Order

End-State
pandemic is contained well beyond Australian shores. Adequate
markets are retained.
Biological disaster is averted. Economic capacity for selfsustainment is achieved.
Strategic opportunism is prevented. A rogue or hostile hegemon
or coalition does not fill the void left by the United States. Stability
is preserved.
Quarantine of Australian crops is maintained. The spread of crop
viruses is contained.
Domestic stability and structure are restored.
International alliances are maintained. Domestic stability is
maintained and regional stability supported. Russia has not acted
against Australia or the region.
Domestic stability is maintained and regional stability is
supported.

Note that many of these end-states sweep up a broad range of issues that sit well
above the achievement of purely military objectives.

Although I made attempts to consult Government (Department of Prime Minister
and Cabinet, National Security Committee of Cabinet and various parliamentary
secretaries) on what might be the(ir) end-states and associated effects, the
information was not forthcoming. Indeed it was often implied, I certainly inferred
it from the non-cooperative (I have deliberately avoided the term hostile)
responses, that this type of information would not be shared and that discussions
along these lines was considered totally inappropriate, although a reasonable
explanation for this position could not be given. As will be seen later there is a
requirement for this dialogue and others have identified the need for it to occur.

Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the end-states are sufficiently comprehensive and
expressive that most of the Government concerns have been captured. Wallace
(1999, p. 18) uses similar language in crafting an intent (not dramatically different
from my end-states) for a renegade group of hostage takers in a foreign country,
wherein "The Government's intention is to achieve the safe release of the
hostages, while reinforcing the authority and sovereignty of the Seeland
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[fictitious] government and without heightening the residual threat to Australian
nationals and expatriates after resolution of the incident". The clear message is
that the end-states must be comprehensive.
Step 2 - Develop the Effects List

The effects list was completed as a workshop involving key practitioners from
within the organisation. Facilitation and knowledge elicitation skills on my part
proved to be vital. Without the ability to prompt the group for the right
information, and recognise it when it is revealed, the purity of the process would
be destroyed and individual prejudices and biases could be introduced, with a
high probability of groupthink becoming dominant.

The effect list should be sufficiently expressive and comprehensive. It is
important that all areas of interest are captured. Consider Australia's aerial
surveillance operation Coastwatch, it exists to satisfy a purpose. All of its actions
are in pursuit of something, however, I believe that it is unlikely this organisation
has ever fully explored its role within the national security framework and
thoroughly and forthrightly expressed what these 'somethings' are. An effectsbased orientation ensures that this is done before any actions are considered. It
would ensure that every action is securely anchored to an effect and, therefore
they are purposeful.

Step 3 - Develop the Means List

Each effect is taken in tum with the group asked what actions can bring about this
effect. No evaluation or discussion should take place at this point. The usefulness
of each mean will be dealt with at a later stage. It is difficult in the early stages,
but as these steps progress it is usually found that previous means can also make a
contribution to a later effect. A second linking process occurs.
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If an organisation is interested in innovation and competitive advantage then a
fairly unorthodox approach should be adopted during this stage. This is where
creative thought becomes important and must be fostered within the group.

Step 4 - Determine the Competencies or Capacities

This step is similar to the previous two. Again each means is examined to
determine the elements that combine to make the means possible. Again links are
built to continue the construction of a cascading effects-means-capacities
framework.

Step 5 - Examine Each Pair of Effects-Means Pairs.

The pairs are rated on a numerical scale against criteria that are developed by the
group. These criteria can be 'financial exposure' or 'risk'; 'immediacy' of the effect
if time is an important consideration; 'level of community endorsement' to build in
concerns for environmental considerations; and 'totality' or 'potency' for an
indication of how much contribution a particular means makes.

It is important to recognise that a means cannot be rated unless it is anchored to an

effect. If I hold a spoon in one hand and a shovel in the other then one is no better
than the other, they are both implements. I have no way of determining which is
more suitable. If I receive information that a hole in the ground is required then
the shovel would appear to be more useful. However, there is still no context. If
the hole is at an archeological site then I could consider that both of these
implements are too clumsy and a brush may be the preferred implement to
complete the work.
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Step 6 - Review the Results

Using the automated database a series of reports can be generated that indicate
'fitness (or unfitness) for purpose' across a number of dimensions.

An example of the reports that were produced to alert decision-makers is shown
in Figure 29. Note, due to security requirements, this chart has been taken from a
generic effects-based operations demonstrator and all words that are displayed on
the two axes have been altered to numbered effects and means. The ratings on a
scale of 1 to 4 have also been randomised. The colours, however, are an accurate
portrayal of the ratings that have been awarded to each means-effect pair, in this
case against 'Political Exposure'.
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Figure 29. Two-dimensional display ofPolitical Exposure.
The coloured rectangles in the
figure above indicate that a link has
been established between an effect
(on the vet1ical axis) and a means
(the horizonta l axis). A blank
means that no relationship has been
assigned. The colour inilicates the
rating that has been determined by
the workshop participants on a

Researchers ta lk of experiencing a
"sudden,
striking
realisation"
(Moustakas, 1990, p. 9)
the
phenomenon of breakthrough. My first
came upon the single 'mouse click' to
produce the graph in FiglLre 29. It was
the moment of illumination. Not the
warm glow offered by a Jjt candle in a
darkened room, but the intense, almost
painful incandescence of a thousand
beams.
Personal reflection. 17 Febmarv. L999

single criterion. The means have been automaticaUy arrayed horizontally at the
top of the chart, the means with the most links with the effects list is positioned in
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the first column, giving valuable insights into utility - the more links the more
valuable or critical that means becomes. Likewise the capacities that are anchored
to each of the means become equally important, with the same value assigned if
links are high in number. The results of this can be seen in Figure 30.

Me:cns- Capadties

.

1.1 eans:
~~~~~~··...,.:II,.HP~

Capacities:
I Jo J • "So" T. :t 1.. 111J'1J I•IS.I"ITI.ItJi.JorJ'JoJoJ1-Ji..M-JoT.HJtJ6JIJJ'JJJ•

Figure 30. Relationships between Means and Capacities.

In this figure the means have now been transferred from the horizontal axis to the
vertical. The order has remained the same

(larg~st

number of linked effects at the

top) with priorities or importance now being evident on two dimensions, as the
capacities have taken on the utility ranking of the means for the previous Figure.
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Revisiting Scenarios

As outlined earlier in this thesis a scenario planning method was employed to
achieve sufficient dislocation from the present. The 20 scenarios (included as
Appendix 2), with the contextual ingredients contained within their individual
narratives, allowed critical thought to flow forth, unburdened with prejudice,
preconception or limiting paradigm. This is an important area to revisit as it is
possibly the only source of a sufficiently broad list of strategic effects.

The Importance of Effects

Effects-based strategic thinking and planning will (I believe I have demonstrated
this sufficiently to make this claim) become the primary analysis tool whereby
military strategic, operational, tactical and capability development planning is
undertaken. I can say this with reasonable confidence because there is a
simultaneous and spontaneous convergence of beliefs and approaches that has
recognised the futility of platform-centric thinking. This convergence is evident in
many Western nations and whilst still in an embryonic stage carries with it
powerful messages.

The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
(JSCFADT) inquiry into the suitability of the Australian Army for peacetime,
peacekeeping and war was forced to manufacture useful definitions in order for
the analysis to proceed. Indeed, the very notion of suitability had to be defined.
What do we mean when we describe something as suitable? Against what criteria
is the judgement made? Although I will refer repeatedly to my own chosen
definition of 'fitness for purpose' I will be forced at various times to depart from
this in order to adequately describe and accommodate the contributions of other
work.
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An examination of the Parliamentary Report From Phantom to Force, which
followed the inquiry, reveals:

The suitability of the Army could be assessed against a number of
criteria. Its effectiveness at satisfying defence strategy objectives is
one criterion [this matches well with the National Military/Security
Strategy discussed in Chapter 2]. Another criterion could be how
well it has performed in operations that are not a priority within
current defence strategy, such as East Timor [I have addressed this
in Chapter Three under a broader context of scenarios].
(Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, p. 7)
Additional detail from the report

tha~

prepares for an understanding of an effects-

based orientation to capability planning is the statement that "no capability should
be critically dependent on only a single means or technology" (Joint Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, p. 8). This assertion is central
to the architecture of the database.

The work and central functionality of the database relies upon a sound
understanding of effects-based thinking as the means are all anchored to an
outcome and each outcome may require different capability sets.

Planning Backwards from Scenarios

The twenty scenarios set out in Appendix 2 paint a vivid picture of disturbing
events in the future. They were crafted· through adherence to a disciplined,
systematic analysis of drivers and represent a relatively comprehensive account of
degraded states of domestic, regional and/or international stability. It would be
valuable to paint a more favourable picture of States cooperating, but the aim is to
'stress' the organisation and subject policy to extreme forces to determine its
robustness.
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Deriving End-states

Politicians and military strategists look to end-states to provide an expression of
the outcomes of an intervention. Stated simply, we have undertaken a number of
actions (although any consideration of what these may be at this early stage would
be premature and predispose our thinking) in pursuit of objectives, to ask "what
does the picture look like now?" and describe it in useful ways. Although I do not
wish to dwell on end-states in this section, some examples from the National
Security study are:

•

Refugee flows into Australia cease. Humanitarian crisis is relieved .. Pressures
causing refugee movement are mitigated. The majority of refugees have been
returned to home countries. Australia's actions are accepted internationally.

•

Corporations operate within a climate of stable national sovereignty. Trade
and shipping in the region is unimpeded. Australia has good relations with
neighboring governments and avoids significant international disapproval.

•

Stability is restored within Australia whilst preserving the States' primacy for
law and order, employing measures acceptable to the majority within
Australia, minimising economic disruption and international disappproval and
without major legislative amendment.

These end-states should effectively 'set the conditions' for (a return to) peace. The
text used should be drawn from an understanding of desired movement vertically
within the columns at Table x, remembering that the most favourable conditions
lie at the top with characteristics deteriorating towards the bottom of the table.

From these end-states it is then possible to derive a set of effects that are
appropriate for delivering that end-state. These effects must be viewed in a
particular way that has relevance to military contexts, it will then be possible to
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extend that line of thinking into other contexts. In the military an ideal known as
'imposing our will' on our adversary is used. It is a useful expression that captures
the full meaning behind engaging in a chosen set of strategies. It is not limited to
the use of force, violence or offensive action to achieve objectives. Indeed the
idea of coercion that underpins an offensive posture is very limiting. Seduction
has frequently been used to describe a far more powerful means of achieving ends
and opens the possibility of achieving objectives without having to resort to
violence. Indications of a move away from conflict can be gained from the quote
below:

Effects Based Aerospace . Operations & Dynamic Battle
Management.
These concepts leverage the asymmetric advantages of aerospace
power to create the desired effects at the right place at the right
time. This initiative will develop information management and
decision support technologies to facilitate battle management
beyond the first-level, attrition-based strategies that hinge on
massed, force on force operational concepts. Instead, this
methodology seeks 2nd and higher-order effects and prompts
commanders at all levels to determine what effects will best
achieve operational objectives [emphasis added]. The JFACC then
can weave these effects into his theater-wide scheme of maneuver,
directed through dynamic, real-time command and control.
(Air Force Research Laboratory, 2001)

The Effects List

The effects that I was able to derive from a detailed consideration of the endstates and scenarios are set out below:

Broaden range of influence.
Coerce individuals and groups.
Conform to domestic/friendly community expectation.
Counter instability/restore a working community.
Deny freedom of action/dominate an area.
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Deter specific behaviour (actions/involvement).
Discourage strategic opportunism and adventurism.
Disrupt/destabilise operations and business markets.
Establish and preserve dialogue.
Generate/foment instability.
Increase risk/cost to opponent.
Induce/compel deployments.
Influence/support dissident group.
Inform decision-making.
Minimise a vulnerability.
Relieve humanitarian disaster.
Shape (prevent/inhibit/interdict/channel /encourage) movement and supply.
Shape public (world/domestic/opponent) opinion.
Undermine general trust/morale

The Means List

Considering each of the effects in tum built the following list of means:

Accompany other forces.
Attack by close action.
Attack by stand off.
Attack leader moral/financial integrity/authority.
Close reconnaissance/monitor specific target/named area: of interest.
Collect human intelligence.
Collect technical information/items.
Conduct wide surveillance.
Create false business or inject super-competitive products.
Cue precision weapons.
Damage product or brand.
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Deceive physically/electronically.
Deny resources/render key infrastructure ineffective.
Disrupt shipping and facilities.
Disseminate physical/electronic psychological operations material.
Empower local functionaries and support local organisations.
Enable infrastructure.
Engage with neutral/hostile groups through intermediaries.
Escort specialists.
Establish haven.
Foster and exploit relationships with key individuals.
Gather evidence.
Gather information from stand-off (technical/cueing).
Generate/train forces.
Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate NGO effort.
Interfere with aircraft movement and facilities.
Manipulate financial holdings/stocks.
Manipulate/damage business functions.
Materiel/financial/intelligence assistance to dissident movements (onshore also).
Orchestrate 3rd party attack.
Penetrate/ threaten leader physical security.
Penetrate/infiltrate groups/networks.
Provide close protection.
Provide communications.
Provide vital services and/or resources.
Recover detainees/friendly forces/authorised personnel.
Release selected information.
Seize and recover individuals or groups.
Sponsor relocation.
Strike individuals or groups.
Tap-hack electronic information systems.
Threaten/damage leader personal wealth.
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The Capacities List

Each of the means relies upon the possession of certain capacities, as set out
below:

Administer business
Analyse information
Assess and respond to threats
Breach information systems
Broadcast information
Build personal profile
Communicate electronically
Communicate using foreign languages
Defeat security systems
Deliver training
Elicit information
Employ destructive materials
Employ small arms
Employ support weapons
Employ target acquisition and cueing devices
Establish and maintain cover/legend/appropriate norms
Establish rapport/win trust
Evade capture
Evade surveillance and access control measures
Handle and preserve evidence
Handle and secure personnel
Identify networks of contacts
Implement psychological operations
Interfere with electronic/manual information systems
Interfere with production and services
Manage distribution of resources
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Manoeuvre on and over land
Manoeuvre on and under the water
Move with stealth
Observe, record/photograph, collate and report information
Observe/monitor using surveillance/intercept devices
Operate in a civilian environment
Place surveillance/intercept devices
Provide funds
Provide medical/health support
Provide shelters and basic living facilities
Recreate events
Seal an area
Secure an area
Seize an area
Track financial dealings and assets exchanges
Utilise service and civilian aircraft, watercraft and vehicles

After having, up to this point, completed the entire language of effects, means and
capacities in a series of workshops, and knowing of my earlier attempt at forming
a more advanced framework of linkages I returned to see what this new
information, now fully linked, would reveal. My early designs were crude and
clumsy. Figure 31 shows an actual Powerpoint™ slide produced to enable
analysis of these ideas and further discussion in workshops. It can be seen that a
range of possible relationships was becoming evident, but there was a clumsiness
to this visualisation that did not accommodate the hidden order that binds together
the strategic situation with the actions that can deliver an outcome.

This model was critical to the formulation of later ideas and led to the many-tomany relationship building within the database, with assigned ratings then
becoming possible across linked pairs.
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This was a knowledge breakthrough and led the accelerated understanding of
other supporting concepts. The different patterns were already becoming evident
although the presence of a 'strange attractor' was still some months away.

Scenarios (End-states) Effects
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Figure 31. Initial diagram to enhance linkages and relationships.

As can be seen from the first tentative lines that were drawn, relationships were
established to provoke deeper thought on what could be revealed through a model
such as this. The groupings were fairly stable, although the text that formed the
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numbered elements had not yet been written. It also became evident around this
time that some form of ratings would need to be devised between the adjacent
effects and means columns.

Assigning Ratings

In order to determine the values of the various pairs each was subjected to a
ratings judgement. A four-dimension, four-point scale was used that assessed each
individual pair, with its associated set of Capacities. The four dimensions were:

•

Political Exposure,

•

Totality of Effect,

•

Immediacy of Effect, and

•

Capability to Undertake.

Political Exposure

This dimension makes a judgement as to the political appeal associated with a
course of action. It is measured in terms of the potential for embarrassment, which
provides a useful metric against which to assess the likelihood that an operation
will be authorised.

The following four-point scale was used:

Political Exposure

1. Extreme - Failure is likely to lead to condemnation at the international level
with long-term personal consequences
2. Severe - Failure is likely to lead to widespread political fallout
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3. Moderate - Failure may result in significant political embarrassment and
possibility of career consequence

4. Minimal- Failure may result in minor and short-term political embarrassment

Totality of Effect

Totality of effect was measured using:

1. Minor - The effect is negligible or uncertain in scope
2. Moderate - A useful proportion of the desired effects is expected
3. Extensive - A high proportion of the desired effects is expected
4. Absolute - The desired effect is delivered

Immediacy of Effect

Immediacy of effect made useful distinctions on the ability to bring about change.
The four measures were:

1. Deferred - Delay is sufficient for cause-effects relationships to not be evident
2. Delayed - Changes are set in motion, but some time will elapse before effects
are evident

3. Timely/Prompt - Events occur within a small fraction of the relevant
timeframe

4. Immediate- Attributable changes are instantly evident
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Capability to Undertake

Capability to undertake forced a judgement against our ability to use the set of
capacities, within the various means to bring about the desired effect. The scale
was:

1. Unable - Insufficient elements of capability preclude consideration
2. Under Developed - Latent capability only
3. Constrained- Capability exists with limiting factors
4. Proficient - All elements of capability are present and practised

This approach is immediately adaptable to any situation. Model verification work
undertaken in other subject areas has utilised rating dimensions of: level of

community acceptance, permanency, cost, physical risk and environmental
sensitivity. All have proven to be equally revealing as supporting devices to
strategic planning.

I mentioned earlier of effects-based operations work being conducted within the
United States military so some similarities are worth noting before proceeding
with this line of discussion on my particular approach. The slide below (Figure
32) was presented at an effects-based operations workshop in Norfolk Virginia
during the period 22-27 October 2000. It illustrates the emergent definitions and
the need (that others are also experiencing) to quantify in some way the effects
that are delivered. These are strikingly similar (no information sharing occurred
prior to this) to my definitions of totality of effect used to rate various effectmeans pairs within the database. I provide other examples later.
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• Direct Effect (AFDD 2-1):

"Result of actions with no intervening effect or
mechanism between act and outcome. Direct effects are usually immediate and easily
recognizable."

• Indirect Effect (AFDD 2-1):

"Result created through an intermediate effect or
mechanism to produce the :final outcome,which may be physical or psychological in nature.

Indirect effects tend to be delayed,andmay be difficult to recognize."

• Total Effect: All effects acting on a target/set/system/COG
• Complex Effect: Effect resulting from

direct+ n-order effects

-

"The effects of dislocation, destruction and diversion create delays." (AFDD 2-22, emphasis added);

-

"Through the combination of destruction, disruption, diversion, delay, and deception, aerospace
power is capable of denying an enemy the ability to offensively employ his forces. • (Id)

• Cascading Effect:

effect that ripples through an enemy system, often influencing other

systems as well
-

Typically the result of influencing nodes that are critical to multiple systems

-

Typically flows from higher to lower levels of war

~~-~~Vicious & virtuous spirals

7

Figure 32. Attempts at defining levels of effects.

It is encouraging to note that the same information is being formulated at opposite

ends of the globe, at almost the same time and with (until recently) no sharing of
information. I will discuss the results of this collaboration in Chapter Seven.

Subjecting each of the means-effects pairs to a rating framework was recognised
within the workshops that I facilitated as an extremely powerful way of
determining value and utility. For example, totality of effect is an elusive metric
and "it is bound to be easy if one restricts oneself to the most immediate aims and
effects" (Beyerchen, 1998, p.194). But all of the parts are interconnected and all
(of the) effects influence subsequent actions which then change the purpose
slightly.

In expanding upon this subject (possibly beyond the point at which I should have
stopped) I may have entangled myself (and the subject) even further.
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I now need to return to the workshops and the continuing process of taking the
linked items towards individual ratings to provide for the comparison.
Ratings Continued

There were up to twenty separate rating teams involved, that totaled over 100
people, with each team generating its own discussion and judgements about what
a paired means-effect meant. However, it soon became evident that there was
general agreement from across the Special Forces Group on the capability to
undertake dimension (beginning to build consensus). There was only minor

divergence on the other three rating dimensions. Subsequent research with
detailed statistical analysis using the knowledge management and knowledge
elicitation methods devised here may reveal valuable quantitative data. This
research has a qualitative interest only, the statistical analysis and determination
of statistical significance is the subject of a later project.

The associated Capacities list for each group of Means is displayed in the bottom
right of the form. Scrolling down through the Means-Effect pairs (there are 306 of
these) out of Accompany other forces and into Attack by close action will bring
up a different set of Capacities. These Capacities remain the same regardless of
whether the overt or covert button is selected, however, these operational types
generally produce different ratings as they will draw upon the application of
different Capacities within the relevant set.

Charting the Results

The intersection point (indicated by a coloured rectangle) indicates that a
relationship has been established between a means and an effect. The colour
indicates the averaged ratings awarded by the teams and illustrates the relative
Political Exposure associated with the application of a particular means to bring
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about a desired effect. Non-coloured rectangles are where no relationship exists.
Similar charts can be produced from the data to indicate Overt, Covert and
Clandestine operation types against Immediacy of Effect, Totality of Effect,

Capability to Undertake and an averaged Political-Totality-Immediacy set
(although this has some limitations as a blurring effect results from mixing
factors), producing a total of 15 charts. Any changes made to the ratings will alter
the colours at the intersection points provided the averaged number moves from
one colour band to another.

The Importance of Relationships, Dependencies and Criticalities

I have spoken elsewhere of strange attractors. Anyone who has even a superficial
knowledge of these would admit to their beauty, elegance and grace as a rich
visual representation of the phenomenon of self-organising and emergent
behaviour. More importantly, phenomenon that is (usually) untouched by the
direct hand of man (insect populations, the behaviour of weather, predator-prey
interactions, waves on a beach and simple numbers such as the Fibonacci
sequence). My initial reaction to the charts produced was that an unusual
underlying arrangement of order had been revealed.

The diagram below (Figure 33) is a report produced by the database. At a greater
magnification the attraction towards various elements is self-evident. The leftmost column contains five (selected from the eight) named worlds. The next
column is the twenty scenarios produced by the Field Anomaly Relaxation
method (the subject of Chapter Three). The third column is the 19 effects.
Columns four and five are partial views of the 42 means and 42 capacities. I
describe this as a mod 1 of strange attraction without hesitation as the elements
that are displayed were each considered in isolation.
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Relationships were derived progressively and no attention was paid to existing
linkages. The report was produced by a single mouse click within the database
and represents a compilation of thousands of individual decisions, each unrelated.

Figure 33. Report from the database highlighting relationships.

This Figure highlights the ability of an effects-based orientation to quickly arrive
at judgements on the importance of possessing various capacities and how these
link back to effects through means. It illustrates the growth rightwards of the
many-to-many relationships. The column indicating the POSTED (People,
Organisation, Support and facilities, Training, Equipment and Doctrine) has been
omitted as the work here is still incomplete and my departure has stalled the
progress somewhat, although indications are that valuable information is within
this 'Cantor dust'.
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I have also spoken of 'the authority of a shared idea' and believe this to provide
another example of assertive ideas dominating, not assertive people. The
consequences of this as further reinforcement of a knowledge management system
building and reinforcing consensus is quite potent. If any individual is
uncomfortable with what is displayed then it is necessary to review the entire set
of data in an attempt to force new relationships and cause a new pattern of lines to
emerge. This would be dishonest, manipulative and would not offer success as the
microscopic detail cannot be readily rearranged to form a new whole.

More Powerful Images of (an} Organisation

I have borrowed the heading for this section from the book by Gareth Morgan. I
believe it is appropriate as this is where the optimum configuration can be
illustrated in a visual format. The previous Figure highlighted the density of lines
that bind the elements together. The Figure below (Figure 34) displays the
number of links that tie together the People statements in POSTED with the
effects. The ability to trace the number of lines across each of the six physical
elements of capability demonstrates the characteristics and attrributes of the
people who get the job done.

I have already stated that this work is incomplete and even finding the preciseness
to actually express this information will itself pose a significant problem to be
overcome. It needs to be done though. As these links are more fully developed the
blue colours will invade the chart from the left and push rightwards the warmer
colours. Looking at each of the six charts for POSTED will reveal the full story
on the organisation and how it should be configured. This forms another powerful
visual indicator for change, as the language has been devised by practitioners and
they have confirmed the relationships - a consensus expanding approach.
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Covert Relationship Paths
Perscnnel

Effects

Perscnnel
.:~

......

Jf:,...,ulw

Jtc,..,..r.eu

Figure 34. Count of the links between People and Effects.
I wish now to close this section as I believe that the method, which I have
thoroughly

expl aine~

demonstrates enormous potential to inform decision-

making. As this was the work of a limited nwnber of individuals it was necessary
to verify the data against the results of an organisational poll.
The Five Key Challenges

In 1998, under the authority of Commander Special Forces (the actual

correspondence I drafted for his signature and sent out to every member is
included at Appendix 3), I initiated a study to gauge the level of tacit consensus
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towards change. Not change in any particular area or change for any particular
reason, but the general mood within the population and what appears to be
directionally right as each individual sees it from their own perspective.

The question posed was:

"What do you consider to be the five issues that the Special
Forces Group needs to confront in order to propel us into the
future?"

I am hopeful that this provoked some deep(er) thinking as:

To ask a provocative question is a creative act in itself. The
formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution
which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental
skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old
questions from a new angle, requires a creative imagination and
makes real advances in [social] science.
Einstein, in Einstein and Infeld (1938)
The response was very encouraging, with several key themes emerging. A total of
603 ideas, comments and suggestions were received, loaded into a database and
broadly categorised. The full set of responses is set out at Appendix 4, including
categorisations and links to findings of the effects-based planning database.

Format and Content of Responses

Format styles ranged from brief thoughts and hastily scribbled entries on a scrap
of paper, through to well researched, thoughtful and comprehensive arguments
spanning several pages. Several examples are shown in Figures 35 - 38 below.
Many groups submitted the results of discussions and workshops, combining their
ideas and strengthening their thoughts and concerns through their own consensus.
Others elected to submit individual ideas. Some of the ideas may have been
spontaneous thoughts surfaced through just asking the question, others may have
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been the result of years of experience and the culmination of many ideas and
thoughts.

It was not my intention to analyse these to any depth, my aim was to gain the

information, develop themes and common issues, superimpose these over the
results and conclusions of my own database and locate the common ground. It
was an attempt to corroborate that the scenarios and effects-based approach were
directionally right for the organisation.
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Figure 35. Response examples- Hastily written notes.
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21-ll!.i-98 Ill 16:16

I !AI (Cll

Fli HO.

61296002279

f.

SF GROUP· ISSUES

'
1.
Development of a corporate plan - ioduding a mulceting plan. $ A.
"' 2.
Development ofa loq term (or lengthy) PR plan.
... l.
Dovelopment of weu proarwion plans for both Officers and NCO's in Ihe group
».. 4. Dcvdopmenl ora cunnins plan to ensure SF Officus aro infiltrated into key, impo1 tanl
and influential positions at aU JeveJs throughout bolh the Army and the ADF.
e. S.
Pro1ctive mark a ins I selling of the Comm1ndo capability at IJIIevelJ -need to push
our requirements I Development at ADHQ, Army office, AST and LHQ. Dietate progrw on
'out ttmls.
"
6.
MIMing of the SF Oroup • particularlyHQSO anci4RAR(Cdo).
7.
Provision of more visibility I communication from the top down •that is HQSO to the
Units.
- \., 8.
Co-ordinate of and «:quity of. SP convnitmmts to the COAl> I PMSA I AOP's.
9.
DCJVelopmcnt/ Word of an SF group Development I Doelrine I Eqliipmcnl plan.
lO.
Special Foree• Allowancea lo include aU members ofSpcclal Forces (including
Officera).

Figure 36. Response examples - Faxed bullet point notes.
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·,·

HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL OPERATIONS

MINUTE
SOJI/4
DEFlNING THE FIVE KEY CHALLENGES
References!

A.

HQSO 569/98 dated 13 Mar 98.

I.
Tile ProcuRmt•l J'ro«U.
The belt moasun~ orlrost in 1 buruuctaey is lhc n:spomibility
to expending fUnds. 1bc curRnl procumnent prooeu i1 cwnbelwmo. Trthe SF Group Is to uploit
new tochnoCoSY 1nd develop new, potentially clandeJtine, e:apabilities. it needs its OWJ1 disctete
funding, wilh the 11ppropritlc conlrOt mechlnisrns built in. A guannteed regular level offundln&o
even or relatively sm1ll amounts (uy SIMI year) would .allow the SF Group. to aehievc 1 "lead. ina

edge" po'ition wilhin Defence.. Wo would have to accept however that 1001c oflhe projects would
fail. This funding would auist in lhc dcvdopmcnl p-occu.
2.
The DevtfopmentProCftl.
SF Group should be at the kadingcdgeofteclmological
innowtion will! it Dcfcn~ We should be providing those short notice letding edge (pan.) miliwy
eapabllllles thltare requiml by Government. We do not n:ally know wflallhey m:l There should bo
atratcgk auidancc that moulds our effoft. In absence of this we should be developlnJ our own. Being
lfle leading edgo. thero should bo II\OR l•titude in our procwet.thatallow for development padls to
end in options thlt an other than succ:ess.MI

3.
Focu oa Eq•lpmeal. We arc very focussed ou equipment We should concentrate our erlon
on future cap~bllil)' and theref01e deYCiop cqanisations, .sttvc:tures, doWine. tactlca, procedures AND
£HEN wb1t equipmenl is needed ua WHOLE SYSTEM.

-4.

l•plolrTec••olou.
TherelsmuchTALKaboutcxploitJn&technoiOI)'. SoonlheSF
Group will have secure coonectlvity throuahOUI. We will be In po1itioo 1o be the lud in lhe
developmcotorpcoceuc.~ and procedures from an Army and ADF pmpeclive. A l)?lem like Lotus
Notes for example would &ivc w the potential to streamline our processes (as long as we know wf\llt
tfleyarcl).

5. Rnpoaaibiliry, We should be p1BhiqresJXX1sibility down lO tfae lowest Jevel. Individual•
who own, or CGnJider themaelvu to 1 part or, 1 proce11 will work hatder and b)' and imptove it. We
should encourage innov.uion, new Ideas and nor be ahid ofmd.lna mislikes.

(02)9SJS9266J

27-Mar-91

Figure 37. Response examples- Formal and structured letter.

.S KF.Y CHAT.JFN(;Ji.~~
J.Orie.JJtntion toA.oiil /P.u:i11c,,
2.llecTuiting o[botlz.~·,~...r..~,
.'I. Per.~on ma.1mgemen t .~kills,

.f.Ad;Jpt.ltitm of" the 11r.H;
Su4cccpta1JC(' ofcl:mJ.IgC.

Figure 38. Response examples - Powerpoint slide.

The responses provided hours of interesting reading and certainly deserve a more
thorough analysis. My aim was satisfied, however, in that the results of this
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organisational poll and the workshops I facilitated with the gradual construction
of the database indicated common themes.

Initial Exploration

My preliminary analysis of these responses involved detailed reading, reflection
and openness to the ideas. My approach was deliberately non-judgmental. No
attempt was made at initial categorisation or coding .. A second and third reading
several days later saw the formation of themes, heralding the beginning of a broad
appreciation of the content and context. What was first pure data now took form
and meaning.

To aid in deciphering I turned once again to the methods of heuristic inquiry. I
was faced with a similar problem to Clarke's (1988) analysis of the
psychologically androgynous male, which led to the formation of a "viewable
panorama of over 200 components" (Moustakas, 1990, p. 50), each of which
gradually located itself within a colour-coded quadrant as understanding matured.
Clarke reports that "The process of watching these quadrants take shape was
fascinating" Clarke, 1988, p. 94).

I have already presented my algorithm-based coloured representation of similar
processes. My task was now to superimpose the 603 responses over this earlier
work to gauge the degree of 'fit'. Stated another way, "was the outcome of my
research completed within the effects-based application supported by the results
gained from a sample of the organisation's members after prompting with a
simple question"? Initial analysis and categorisation (into 19 subject areas)
revealed the graphical information displayed in Figure 39. The aim of this was to
determine around what broad topic areas are opinions attaching themselves to,
and thereby, where could consensus be isolated to mobilise action for change. The
areas in which change should occur (the what, with the why having been
thoroughly accounted for through the involvement of scenarios and end-states)
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had been identified through the effects-based application. T his step sought to
determine ways in which these changes may be realised (the how).

Personnel
Training

I

I

-j

I

Leadership

1

I

60
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I

Capability
Operations
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Managerrent

I

I

Selection
Equiprrent

I

I

Technology
I
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Comrunication
Marketing
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Pay
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Figure 39. Initial categorisation of responses.

It was encouraging to note that the greatest area for high payoff organisational
adjustment was located around personnel, with training formal a vital mechani sm
whereby this could be achieved and leadership setting the inspiration and goal
orientation. Capability, operations and management provide the bedrock against
which these could be realised.
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Deeper Analysis

To further concentrate the effort and locate the high payoff areas I subjected the
categories to a Pareto analysis. The 80% line was located between the 81h and 9th
categories. The Personnel, Organisation, Support and facilities, Training,
Equipment and Doctrine construct for expressing the physical elements of
capability relationships to the reduced set of categories is set out in Table 7.

Table 7. Category-POSTED relationships.
p

s

0

E

T

D

2

3

13

2

22

4

Selection

32

5

2

9

1

5

Management

11

34

15

3

6

5

Operations

32

26

9

15

3

26

Capability

24

33

23

16

9

22

Leadership

47

35

10

10

4

23

Training

50

15

6

68

9

24

Personnel

78

37

11

15

3

4

Equipment

It can be seen from the sample responses (Figures 35-38) that they were script

based and no attempt was made (when posing the question) to anchor them to any
particular area of the organisation or its performance.

Plotted on a chart these results can be seen at Figure 40. The four tallest columns,
representing paired P - Personnel, T - Training, P - Training, 0 - Personnel and 0
- Leadership point very clearly to the correlation between the results of the
workshops and database construction and the Five Key Challenges project.
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Figure 40. Responses arrayed against POSTED and Categories.

The responses, though in many cases quite specific, in totality contained themes
that pointed towards more detailed indicators of direction. For this reason protocol
analysis seemed to offer a preservation of the 'qualitativeness' of these
submissions, yet provide for a cross-match with the output of the effects-based
planning database.

Protocol Analysis

It should be evident by now that there bas been a mu lti-faceted new construct

developed out of the active involvement, discussion and debate of individuals
learning within groups. These groups aided the development of a plam1ing model
and also submitted (previously) their thoughts on the futw·e of the organisation.
Whilst I cannot claim to be skilled in Protocol Analysis, it was a discipline I
turned to quite early on in order to bring some order to the enormous range of
experiences that I was able to draw together. My reading was quite superficial
(Ericsson & Simon,

1 984~

Fonteyn, Kuipers & Grobe, I 993) and tJ1e knowledge I

gained seemed to be applied in what I could only describe as an enthusiastic
amateur. Despite this the ability to explore topics and problems and search
towards solutions was effective (if not efficient) and brought forth the reasoning
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that makes problem-solving possible.

The ability to 'mentalise' in language was also a great aid to building consensus
and encouraged a more probing analysis of the topic. ft was not enough to just
think about something in a certain way, it became necessary to verbalise the
thoughts so that others were more able to fu lly appreciate the mental concepts that
shaped opinions.

Finding the Realignments
As thi s research is about locating the areas for change (bui lding and reinforcing
consensus around initiatives for change) it is time now to discuss the mechanisms
by which this was achieved.

Scenarios

Effects

Means

POSTED
Elements

Capacities

~·
_:=:

Analysis
driven
realignment
within
POSTED
leads
to
benefits
flowing
between
these
two
columns

Figure 4 1. Finding the realignments.
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The Figure above (Figure 41) illustrates the model's architecture and how the
realignments that have resulted from a comprehensive and thorough appreciation
of the organisation's purpose can be used in a meaningful way, gaining additional
means by associations that exist within the relationships is just one. Remembering
that POSTED stands for People, Organisation, Support and facilities, Training,
Equipment and Doctrine, each of which must be configured in different ways to
generate capacities, that enable various means to be undertaken in pursuit of
effects, which satisfy strategic outcomes within an immediate, near future or far
future orientation. I discuss this in more detail later in this chapter.

What has occurred up to this point of the analysis is that practitioners within the
organisation have been removed (intellectually) from their current world. They
have been provoked into thinking about plausible futures. They have used these
futures to explore and discover new conditions for the organisation (albeit
grounded within the definition that provides its raisons d'etre- see Glossary). And
finally they have discussed what realignments may be necessary to win success.

This analysis has worked progressively rightwards and is now at the instant of
reflecting back to the left, up and through the organisation to reach the effects and
scenarios that provided the point of origin for the work. Greatly simplified it has
asked "What does right look like?" "How well does this organisation fare against
our (new) image of rightness?" "What reconfigurations and realignments are
necessary to achieve higher levels of 'fitness for purpose'?"

What Do I Mean by •Fitness for Purpose•?
Several times I have mentioned the term 'fitness for purpose'. It is time now to
make myself clear on this subject. Casting back to 1946, and the work of the
brilliant Herbert Simon, we find in a subject unfortunately mostly unrelated, that a
"purpose is a collection of activities whose orienting value or aim is at a high
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level in the ends-means hierarchy" (Simon, 1996, p. 119). An appropriate
definition and one that incorporates useful support phrases that I ave dealt with at
length. It was fortuitous to stumble upon this brief reference as it combines these
other words central to my topic - means and ends.

For more explanation we must search in a broader domain, one that touches on
organisation and systems theory. Specifically the work of Mintzberg (1979); Scott
(1961, p. 264) "the only meaningful way to study an organisation is to study it as
a system"; also Katz and Khan (1966, p. 274) "the social scientist wishes ... to
predict their effectiveness" and "all social systems, including organisations,
consist of the patterned activities of a number of individuals. Moreover these
patterned activities are complementary and interdependent with respect to some
common output or outcome" (Katz & Khan, 1966, p. 276); yet we must also
recognise that "social behaviour ... is the action of differences" and cooperative
behaviour leading to consensus may not occur.

I would now like to return to Simon's detailed explanation and his preceding
paragraphs, in which he uses the analogy of typing to make further distinctions of
purpose, but his point was to distinguish it from process, and mine is not so there

may be little to be gained. As I have endeavored several times within this thesis to
position the mind at a higher level of consideration within the subject of strategy I
consider it acceptable to continue with "typing is a skill which brings about a
means-ends coordination of muscular movements, but a very low level in the
means-ends hierarchy" (Simon, 1996, p. 118). The letter 't' has value only insofar
as it is necessary that it be typed. Metaphorically, my letter 't' performs a much
more significant role. I need to know which word it is part of and how that word
combines with sentences, paragraphs and chapters to produce a story. The
significance of the 't' emerges at the highest level of analysis.

Figure 42 also gives an example of the discoveries that have been made. Working
from right to left, if a certain POSTED configuration provides for certain set of
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means, then a slight (informed through analysis) adjustment to this configuration
wi ll yield a new means for minimum investment. The solid lines indicate an
existing set of capacities linked to a single means, the dotted lines highlight that
another set can be completed by the simple addition of two additional capacities
(until this time not recognised as linked and contributing to other means). The
lines that link up all these lists can be tracked left and right to determine
dependencies and criticalities. The pre-existing set of capacities li nked to a means
(the lower of the two patterned rectangles), which are supported by a stabilised
POSTED configuration have been utilised to enable a different (and possibly
new) means (the higher patterned rectangle) to be undertaken.
Scenarios

Effects

Means

Capacities

POSTED
Elements

Additional Means
gained
Analysis
driven
realignment
within
POSTED
leads
to
benefits
flowing
between
these
two
columns

Figure 42. Finding high pay-off realignments.
The Figure on the next page (Figure 43) presents a global view of the model.
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Working from the left-hand side of this model is Rhyne's (1974, 1981, 1995,
1998) future scenarios construct; combined with Emery and Trist's (1965)
contextual environment-organization lawful transactional interdependencies
model. The five large (and linked) spheres represent Rhyne's 'Sectors' (I have
called them Drivers: D 1, D2,

... ),

whilst the smaller spheres (that would

surround each of the Drivers) represent Rhyne's 'Factors' (I have chosen to call
them Conditions:
L11, L 12 ,

~~

and k

C~o
2

C2,

... ).

The interaction of these within Emery and Trist's

framework provide for (troubling, neutral or opportunity rich

interactions) a two-sided perspective, which can then be re-expressed as
favourable or improved scenarios - "we have done something to get ourselves out
of this fix, although we have no idea just yet what that might be, but this is what
'good' looks like; it is where our actions are going to take us" -the desired Endstate/s. My reasons for the re-naming mentioned earlier is simple; the scenario
planning vocabulary has settled on 'drivers' and that convention suits the current
work whilst 'conditions' are mentioned in national security/defence doctrine in a
quite specific way and that also suits:

End-state will be identified at the national and military levels as
follows: The national end-state is the set of desired conditions,
incorporating the elements of national power that will achieve the
national objectives; the military strategic end-state is the set of
desired conditions beyond which the use of military force is no
longer required to achieve national objectives [emphasis added].
ADFP 9 Joint Planning, p. 4-3

I have already spoken of the 'strategising' that aims to shift the conditions
upwards in the Driver/Conditions table to deliver more favourable states, this
topic will not be revisited here.

The next section of the global model at Figure 43 then enters the organisation at
the point where effects must be matched to a scenario. The margins between the
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management/development domains are illustrated towards the base of the
diagram. Having arrived at this point I have now fused scenario planning with
strategy and strategy (through operations) with the organisational 'fitness for
purpose' characteristics to enable the (most appropriate) strategy to be imposed
and be successful.

The task remains to identify a stable state to enable operations to proceed, with
flexibility designed in to provide for active adaptation. The (configuration of this)
stable state is arrived at through a stepped series of decisions that are informed
through the frequency and utility of various arrangements of means-effects pairs
with their associated capacities. The process for achieving this is set out in
Appendix 5.

Have I Built and Reinforced Consensus?

In 1983, General Donn Starry described seven requirements to transform a
modem army. The third and fourth have profound importance for me and the
work I have undertaken. These were: there must be a spokesman for change (the
third), and that spokesman must build consensus and expose new ideas to a wide
audience, for a reformer must have followers (the fourth). Certainly we have
enough spokesmen for incremental change. But what I am talking about is not
incremental change. I am talking about realignment, what Senge described as
metanoia - a shift of mind (Senge, 1990, p. 13) and what (he describes) "is the

most accurate word in Western culture to describe what happens in a learning
organisation [and is one] that hasn't had much currency for the last several
hundred years .... [a] special meaning of awakening shared intuition and direct
knowing of the highest, of God" (Senge, 1990, p. 13). He reinforces this later with
the assertion that "real learning gets to the heart of what it means to be human"
(Senge, 1990, p. 13).
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There was no inspirational spokesman who could rally minds and opinion within
this research. There are many, however, who seek to build consensus through
their active and forthright participation. These are the (imaginative, iconoclastic)
people described in the opening quote to this chapter who remain alert to events
beyond their immediate professional focus. General Starry restated the importance
of these people in 1998 (Starry, 2000) in his assertion that the task of intellectual
consensus building remains the single biggest obstacle to be overcome if change
is to be effected.

I have delayed answering the question long enough. I have set myself a
monumental task. I have designed and built an extremely powerful application. I
have, with the involvement and assistance of hundreds of people, populated the
database and reported compelling information. I have exposed this information to
a wide audience, including the Minister for Defence and several other highly
placed Defence personnel. I am a reformer yet the followers are few.
Organisational realignment has not occurred, yet the people within the
organisation have been confronted with a view of themselves that has proven to
be unsettling and it is grounded in robust methods of their own design. 1 am
confident that the conceptual validity has been established. More work is now
required in different contexts to test the concept fully.

A rich research path has opened. There are more than enough social and
institutional problems around 'fitness for purpose' to be explored using the
framework I have designed.

It would be unethical now to distort my goals to claim success. Have I, therefore,

failed? I do not believe so. Others may judge differently. In judging I urge the
reader to now quickly read the quote at the beginning of Chapter Seven before
returning to this point.
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Summary and Conclusions

This is the largest chapter and the most difficult to summarise, although the
conclusions are very straightforward. It has covered the full development of the
effects-based planning application and presented the results in simple graphical
format. It has mapped over Checkland's seven stage model of SSM and
accompanies the scenario planning phase set out in Chapter Three. There is no
doubt that this represents, in its totality, an original and powerful way to anchor
an organisation to its environment and subject it to a series of criteria to determine
its fitness for purpose. The ability of this application to inspire change efforts and
spur internal realignments to accommodate the imbalances presented in the
various graphs remains uncertain. There are many issues of culture and leadership
that must be coupled to this effort to win success. If I were to include a 'where to
now' section it would reinforce the need for these factors to become more strongly
represented (consensus forming?) than I have allowed for.

It has been an enormously satisfying undertaking and involved a great amount of
personal learning.

The Mis-guidedness of Inappropriate Ends and Means Matching

In closing this chapter I would like to relate a personal story that concerns the
imposition of a totally inappropriate set of means (in pursuit of Western ends, not
culturally appropriate effects) upon a small African nation. It occurred from 1976
to 1978. My father was the project leader. Australian foreign aid officials had
determined that the quality of life for African villagers could be improved if they
were not forced to undertake the long, daily walks to the nearest river and back
carrying water for drinking, cooking and washing.

The decision was made, with the cooperation of the African State's national
government, to complete a project to locate nearby underground water, construct
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wind-powered pumps and train locals in their maintenance and repair to ensure
that the equipment remained operational after the project team had departed.

The project proceeded with much fascination and excitement displayed by the
children; adults appeared ambivalent. For the villagers, life continued as normal,
with the herding of cattle, preparation of meals and the performance of the many
daily domestic duties that characterises life in a small African village.

After some weeks the first flows of clear, cool water into a trough in the centre of
the village occurred. On some occasions, the first time this happened in each
village it was met with a small ceremony to mark the achievement, more for the
technical marvel than to identify with the value of flowing, freely available water.

The women, whose job it was to fetch the water each day from the river now had
more time on their hands, more than they knew what to do with. What used to be
a long walk and a social event that provided them with the opportunity to interact
with other women, engage in small talk and watch their children play had now
become a superficial task, a brief and lonely affair that lacked the contact, social
banter and deep cultural significance. The symbolism had been stripped away.

Within six to nine months all of the wells had fallen into disrepair, maintenance
programs had failed and the water had stopped flowing. Much of this decay had
been accelerated by the removal of brass fittings to be worn as jewelry, a visible
measure of a person's societal status and wealth and viewed as more desirable and
socially important than water.

What had been seen as an admirable project and one that would enhance the
quality of life was misguided, culturally and socially disrespectful and at odds
with the value system in place.
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To use the framework of effects-based planning developed within this chapter, the
question of "What are we trying to make happen?" (within a culturally appropriate
boundary) had never been asked of the African villagers. The means, therefore,
were flawed and doomed to failure. They were contextually inappropriate.

Similar concerns have been raised by Rogers (1995). He questions "what rate of
change will allow a system to achieve the benefits of an innovation, and yet not
produce disequilibrium in the social system?" (Rogers, 1995, p. 424). It is a
search for optimality of form and pace.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THOSE WHO LISTENED (AND EVENTUALLV SAW)

All men dream, but not equally, those who dream by night in the
dusty recesses of their minds awake to find it was vanity. But the
dreamers of the day are dangerous men, that they may act their
dreams with open eyes to make it possible.
T.E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom
Overview of the Chapter

This chapter describes the impressions and reactions of those individuals and
groups that were able to consider the benefits and advantages of an effects-based
orientation over the conventional force-on-force model, identify applications for it
in their work and actively broaden their knowledge in this emerging field of
professional practice. Before proceeding and dealing with actual dialogues that
took place, I need to qualify these statements with my observation that I did not
expect an abandonment of individuals' current beliefs.

Indeed, the ability to sustain two conflicting ideas in the mind simultaneously is a
rare ability (the foundations of which are discussed more fully in a later section
within this chapter) and one that I witnessed on many occasions in undertaking
this research, particularly those who are the subject of this chapter. That they were
able to suspend their prejudices and entertain the idea that an alternate approach
may herald a new method for solving problems was instrumental in securing their
support and willingness to participate.

There are four separate groups that I discuss:

•

The actual participants who took part in the workshops.

•

The leaders and decision-makers who I reported to regularly on my progress
as an action researcher.
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•

Other senior Defence and government personnel to whom I had a professional
duty to inform of the work.

•

Overseas based groups I have maintained contact with throughout, who are
undertaking strikingly similar (albeit conceptual) work.

Although I can claim some credit for having changed behaviour in the manner of
Mackay (1994) and to some degree the underlying attitudes, it was only through
the careful and considered use of (successful) communications techniques of
knowledge elicitation and reflection of information that this resulted. These
techniques stem from the use of:

•

information which is, to the audience, credible truth;

•

formats for presentation which will attract and excite the audience;

•

measures designed to exploit psychological or physiological needs; and

•

conclusions that are suggestive of a course of action which seems to provide
an effective method of satisfying those needs.

I was conscious of these throughout the research and will make specific
comments about them as counter-points in the next chapter when dealing with
those who were unable to, or chose not to see.

I also note the widely used quote that a prophet is rarely welcomed in his own
land. I can attest from first hand experience that this is probably the case. Whilst I
do not claim to be a prophet, the greatest interest in the methodology developed
out of this research has come from overseas, particularly the United States and
New Zealand, and to a lesser degree Malaysia and Norway. In offering an
explanation for this interest I attribute it to military creativity (see the Glossary for
a definition) and a person's ability to cope (or thrive) in an unstructured
environment. One thought I have retained throughout in order to sustain my
enthusiasm is that there can be an enormously "long period between the
conception and the reality and the many hazards that attend pregnancy and birth"
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(Wohlstetter, 1964, p. 132). (I believe that) It is inevitable that this model will
succeed as a planning aid, I have witnessed too much analytical effort and
expenditure of resources (mostly within the United States) to doubt it.

There is, however, the requirement for creative people. Discussions with
colleagues in the United States have revealed that the same polarity in thinking is
evident. On one hand there is a group who are actively fostering the exploration
of new ideas in relation to planning, and there is an equally active group who,
despite making profound statements about the need for a new concept for
planning, continue to revert back to established patterns of thinking.

I have mentioned the need for creativity, which can be combined with a deeper

understanding of the context. This combination sets a fertile environment for the
mind of the practitioner to look for new mental models.

The Context/Process Quadrants

The ability to cope or thrive mentioned earlier has its origins in creativity and the
capacity to deal with ambiguity, a subject I will address briefly with the aid of the
model at Figure 43. The model recognises the existence of a context (the situation
or environment that one is surrounded by) and a process (the actions one may
employ to deal with events as they emerge from the situation or environment).
The context and process lines have known and unknown at their extremes,
allowing for the expression of four different states of knowing and acting.

This forms the boundary offered by Stacey (1996a; 1996b) between certainty and
uncertainty and the behaviours of (groups of) people as they attempt to learn their
way (cooperatively) forward. "The key point is that when they have to operate far
from certainty, members of organisations are also likely to find themselves far
from agreement with each other" (Stacey, 1996b, p. 27). This tension allows the
generation of new modes of action as "managers have no option but to change the
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way they make decisions as the level of uncertainty, ambiguity and anxiety is
tuned up" (Stacey, 1996b, p. 27).

Unknown

Quest for novelty

Known

Process

Unknown

,,j"

.I"

Jr..

/

High need for structure

Context

Known
Figure 44. The process-context matrix.

A capacity for coping with high levels of ambiguity is now, more than ever, an
essential pre-requisite for creativity. There is a place at the edge of mental
disintegration where "we are able to hold the ambiguities and paradoxes of life
and contain the anxiety they generate" (Stacey, 1996, p. 14). The pace of change
can be so rapid that the retention within the mind of an out-dated idea can be
devastating in terms of delaying the recognition of the new (at the limits of
detection) and more importantly, integrating it readily into the thinking that is
underway (Dixon, 1976).

This is an important distinction as it implies that not only does a creative
individual tolerate the unexpected, he or she actually enjoys the novelty of it and
feels liberated in the space offered by the lack of immediate solutions.
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In summary, individuals operating in a known process/known context quadrant
rely on clearly defined behaviours for their responses to situations and, therefore,
are not called upon to demonstrate unusual or unconventional solutions. This is
contrasted by those (creative) individuals who operate comfortably within the
opposite quadrant, wherein new processes have to be derived for frequently
changing contexts.

It is accepted that creative individuals enjoy operating at the boundaries. "Why is
this the space for creativity?" "Why is the unstructured, open-ended and
ambiguous the zone where (great) minds do their greatest work?". Perkins (in

Sternberg, Ed, 1988, p. 373) identified that they have been driven there by the
lack or "exhaustion of opportunities [solutions] within the boundaries". This
notion is certainly supported by Kuhn's (1962) observations of science (and
scientists) being driven across boundaries that were believed to be etched in stone
(profound historical examples can be gained from readings of Copernicus, Bacon
and Gallileo to name just three who endured years of dogmatism and institutional
resistance).

There is also the realisation that creative individuals are rarely able to rely on
others (especially those less creative) for assistance. The creative process "is a
way of being informed, a way of knowing ... what shows itself as itself, casts a
light that enables one to know more fully what something is and means"
(Moustakas, 1990, p. 10). This is an individual journey. Furthermore, "the
learning that results is self-directed, self-motivated, and open to spontaneous
shift" (Douglass & Moustakas, 1985, p. 44). Although Senge (1990, p. 13) spoke
of metanoia, or a collective mind shift to a new paradigm, it is extremely rare in
real life and each person must undergo their own (discomforting) reconstruction
of their beliefs.

Researchers need an ample dose of this ability as "by the

principle of the interdependence of opposites, [their knowledge will] become the
seedbed for the emergence of some new, useful and illuminating bit of order"
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(Heron, 1988, p. 53). The "essence ... is an aware and self-critical movement
between experience and reflection" (Reason, 1988, p. 6).

I believe that the people who are the subject of this chapter exhibited a quest for
novelty, a tolerance of ambiguity and a desire to fully explore possibilities within
their professional practice.

The table below (source unknown) illustrates the dichotomy of states that are
possible; illustrating that markedly different behaviours are important if creative
problem-solving is to occur.
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Table 8. Capability development orientations

Conventional Frame
(Low Capacity for Creativity)
Long term future is predictable to some
extent.
Visions and long-term plans are central
to convergent thought.

New Frame
(High Capacity for Creativity)
Long term future is unknowable.

Dynamic and fluid agendas of everchanging creative, innovative issues
are central to the organisation.
Vision: Single shared organisation-wide Challenge: Multiple aspirations,
intention. A picture of a future state.
stretching and ambiguous. Arising out
of current ill-structured and conflicting
issues with long term consequences.
Strongly shared cultures.
Contradictory counter-cultures.
Cohesive teams of organisational .
Learning groups of organisational
actors operating in a state of
members, surfacing conflict, engaged
consensus. Discourse scarce.
in dialogue, publicly testing assertions.
Discourse rich.
Decision making as a purely logical,
Decision making as exploratory,
analytical process.
experimental process based on
intuition and reasoning by analogy.
Long term control and development as Control and development in openthe monitoring of progress against plan ended situations as a political process.
milestones. Constraints provided by
Constraints provided by need to build
rules, systems and rational argument.
and sustain support. Control as selfmonitoring learning.
All change is the realisation of prior
Creativity spontaneously emerges from
intent.
the chaos of challenge and
contradiction, through a process of
real-time learning.
Top management drives and controls
Top management creates favourable
creative innovation and inventiveness.
conditions for complex learning and
invention.
General mental models and
New mental models required for each
prescriptions for many specific
new strategic situation (double loop
situations (single loop learning).
learning).
Adaptive equilibrium within the
Non-equilibrium, unstable, creative
environment.
interaction with the environment.
Those who are able to shape an organisational (and cultural) environment
characterised by the right-hand side of the table will be rewarded with
considerably more creativity.
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Organisations and their Environment

The model below (Figure 44) from Stacey (1996, p. 64) illustrates the constant
oscillations that occur across the boundary (the shaded line) between the
organisation (the setting for creative behaviour) and the environment. This is the
JHaG.f{)-fJl'Ocess that

connects the actions-of individuals within an organisation with

the responses of those outside it. The important message that should be taken
from this model is the operation of the feedback systems that provide new inputs
from which the receiver can grow. There is little philosophically to separate the
notions of single and double-loop learning from Piaget's emphasis that learning
occurs through the incorporation of lower-level skills into higher-level skills,
itself a process that results from exposure to progressively more complex issues as
a function of maturing.
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Figure 45. The endless cycle of creative interaction.
The research participants confronted many discovery phases as the project
unfolded. This occurred on a personal level and on a technical level as the
complexity of the models (FAR and EBO) increased. As this environmental
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volatility increases the velocity of the cycles is accelerated, eventually reaching
Emery and Trist's turbulent field (1965), the place for greatest creativity.

This model of organisational learning highlights the dynamic nature of the
creative process, including the consequences of choices and actions. It also makes
proYision for uncertainty and complexity and the essential processes of learning,
providing a valuable explanation for the interactions that occur between an
organisation and the environment in which it operates. It is a quasi-double loop
learning system that carries within it the discoveries gained elsewhere.

In dealing with the subject of creativity we could throw up as many leadership
models as are available to compare and contrast the elements that provide for, or
inhibit, creativity. However, it is not that simple. Exploring the literature uncovers
a blurring between leadership and creativity that indicates the two have become
more closely interdependent than previously thought.

Although dealing mainly with the subject of genius, Simonton (1984) makes an
interesting observation on leadership and creativity that is useful for my
discussion here; offering that there is no distinction between creativity and
leadership and "when the most famous creators and leaders are under scrutiny the
distinction between creativity and leadership vanishes, because creativity
becomes a variety of leadership". A somewhat cliched, but still glaringly relevant,
statement is that from Machiavelli's The Prince- ''There is nothing more difficult
to plan, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage than the
creation of a new order of things ... "; certainly one of the primary responsibilities
of a creative leader.

It is axiomatic that leadership establishes the environment which tolerates (at the

minimum) or energises (at the maximum) creative endeavour. Approaching the
subject of leadership in this way has a particular appeal, as it allows us to isolate it
from its more orthodox, industrial origins - that of controlling labour.
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True Double Loop (Creative) Learning

Although there is a degree of linearity within the model, a magnification of each
discovery, choice and action cycle uncovers the possibility for creative
discoveries to be made. This further level of complexity is illustrated below
(Figure 45) as an additional loop that exists to the side of each discover phase.
Previous Mental
Model

New Mental Model

Figure 46. The space for creativity as a function of new learning.

As those engaged in some kind of productive effort or learning cycle through the
discovery, choice and act process, they will confront situations that bring about a

pause, preventing immediate movement from discovery to a subsequent choice.
At this point they are 'thrown out' into an examination of whether this represents
the formation of a new mental model. For me this occurred on a number of levels
simultaneously: in my interactions with project team members, observing the
interactions amongst team members, guiding the development of the automated
FAR and EBO applications and the self reflection that accompanied me
throughout the research.
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This self-examination questions the issues at all levels, deconstructs them and reassembles them in order to make a sound judgement on whether this set of issues
constitutes a new order of things. If it does, then a comparison is made against the
previous mental model to determine the extent of divergence.

If it is sufficiently great then a 'different' discovery condition is returned to, one

that has replaced the old with the new or integrated or synthesized the new
information. If the differences are subtle, then it may be possible to retain the old
mental model intact, albeit with recognition that some new ingredients are now
present, but the order of things has been preserved - for this single cycle anyway.
Regardless of the outcome of this self-examination, a more informed choice can
now be made towards closing with the next act stage.

Stacey (1996, p. 130) concluded "the space for novelty in the human mind, as
with all other complex adaptive systems, is one in which paradox is held and
endlessly rearranged rather than resolved". The propensity to accept the new
mental model then will accelerate the cycles and therefore the tempo of creativity,
giving life to the characteristics required to operate in the unknown context,
unknown process quadrant discussed earlier in this chapter.

From this it can be concluded that those who are able to hold themselves in this
zone of tension, where the new and the old are in conflict, will display higher
levels of tolerance towards ambiguity. They should be comfortable in the cycles
of discover, choose and act and the pauses whereby the possible existence of new
mental models are considered.

A Conspiracy of Coincidences

As I look back upon four years of intensive research, involving almost continuous
development, frequent discussions and numerous presentations, I see that there
has been a conspiracy of coincidences that has (partly) secured the acceptance of
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this idea, I believe it has taken root. The moment of truth occurred in Sydney on
the evening of 19 February 2001. It was by pure chance that I picked up the
Australian Defence Magazine (Cotterill, 2001, p. 70) and read of an interview
with Air Marshall McCormack, the Chief of Air Force, by Daniel Cotterill. He
asks:
"Do you see the RAAF's future strike capabilities being driven by
weapon or platform considerations, or will there be a shift to
defining such capability via effects-based methodology [emphasis
added]?"
To which Chief of Air Force replied:

"Air 6000 is going into effects-based methodology as I described.
We are really talking about the effects and then what is required to
get those effects. The replacement syndrome is dead as far as I am
concerned. The headquarters is now looking at effects-based
methodology as the way to go."
Although I plan to monitor developments very closely following these statements,
my fear is that a less than absolute understanding of the conceptual purity of this
approach will elude those involved and the work may become polluted with the
approach discredited shortly thereafter. Indeed, the statements made by Chief of
Air Force may have their origin in an earlier presentation I gave to Air
Commodore John Blackburn (the Director General of Policy and Planning- Air
Force) and his principal staff in Canberra during 1999, where I gave a detailed
explanation of effects-based thinking within strategic and operational planning
contexts.

It came as some surprise to learn that the work I had completed to that point and

the methodology devised formed the entire solution to Phase Two of their futures
project; interestingly, whilst they would have been still devising a way forward
they were able to immediately recognise that the solution I had devised was
equally appropriate to Air Force.
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Interest from the United States

Towards the end of 1999, I made contact with a fellow military operations
researcher at the Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) at Newport,
Rhode Island. After several e-mail exchanges it became evident that we were on
parallel paths and had come to the same, and startling, .conclusions about strategic
and operational planning within an effects-based orientation. His team and many
large workshops he had hosted appeared to be still grappling with many
conceptual issues I had already overcome. Appendix 1 includes several accounts
of discussions surrounding the concept and practice of effects-based operations in
the United States. Their clear advantage was that they were able to marshall
together a much larger team of analysts and consider larger issues.

Many graduate papers are also published out of the Air University dealing with
effects-based operations (Beagle, 2000; Kreighbaum, 1998; Stehlin, 1997;
Sakulich, 2001) and the Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, New York
(McCrabb, 2001) and United States Joint Forces Command in Washington D.C.
(2001).

Although I believe I had progressed well beyond their early conceptual debates, to
a working database fully populated with organisational information, there were
many areas in which we were able to share our thoughts and ideas. Indeed, after
finally reaching a level of frustration with so few others to discuss this topic with
I phoned the Naval Warfare Development Command (on 28 April 2001) and
spoke with Commander Mike Waldhauser. He indicated that the only way to
accelerate the process was to get together in person, suggesting that a visit
sometime in August to October by several of his team appeared to be the best
option. Several weeks later I secured an invitation to participate in the largest
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national gathering of effects-based operations analysts in the United States during
the period 17-27 July 2001.

During my two weeks at Newport, Rhode Island in July I was able to present my
work to over 50 individuals from a range of military, civilian and government
or~anisations.

With Global Wargame 2001 being conducted, with its focus on

effects-based orientation, it proved to be a valuable and timely visit, particularly
in light of the large amount of analysis being conducted to explore the concept of
effects-based operations. Indeed this formed the second round of detailed analysis
around effects-based operations and also formed a large part of Global Wargame
2000, with a well-developed understanding that their "purpose ... is to deemphasise preoccupation with massive physical destruction of the adversary"
(Watman, 2001, p. 77).

Despite this it remains an elusive idea that has remained in the shadow of the
targeting/physical destruction paradigm and "it would be hard to claim that
effects-based operations look appreciably different from current US military
practice" (Watman, 2001, p. 79). The names of the individuals that I spoke with
are not important, but some of the organisations included the Joint Warfare
Analysis Centre in Virginia, the National Nuclear Security Administration in
Washington, Boeing in Seattle and Virginia, Training and Doctrine Analysis
Centre - Future Concepts Directorate in Kansas and the United States Army
Special Warfare Centre and School in North Carolina.

Responses from all these people were very favourable and, although it was not my
intention to build consensus around my particular model and methodology, I
expanded their understanding of effects-based operations.
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Interest from the New Zealand Defence Force

I have maintained e-mail and telephone contact since 1998 with a member of the
New Zealand Ministry of Defence, who has been undertaking a similar project for
the New Zealand Special Forces. They are struck by the same vexing questions of
"What does good like?" and "What adjustments or transformations in capability
are required to maximise fitness for purpose?"

In early 2001, I was advised that the New Zealand defence science organisation
had adopted my model and were making minor modifications to accommodate
issues unique to their strategic circumstances.

Their use of the model is evident in the e-mail below (permission to reproduce
granted):

[The New Zealand Ministry of Defence] MOD is conducting a capability
review of NZDF Special Operations. The review has adopted an effectsbased planning methodology. This methodology uses a scenario based
planning approach. Effects based planning analyses the scenarios by
focussing on the overarching outcome required by defence and security
policy (and the effects required to achieve the outcome) rather than on the
tools that may be employed. In so doing effects based planning allows for
a 'green fields' approach to planning by emphasising the policy effects that
should be achieved and the means (or broad responses) that may deliver
these effects before military capabilities are addressed.

MOD's use of the effects based planning has been guided by the ADFs
Special Operations futures work. The Defence Technology Agency is
developing the structure for a database that will present the linkages
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between the scenarios developed for employment of NZDF Special
Operations Force with:

National security objectives
Effects required within the scenarios
The means required to bring about these objectives
Broad responses required of NZDF SOF
Special Operations Forces required

The intention of the database is to illustrate the criticality of effects to be
achieved under each scenario. The effects will be accorded a rating and
these values will then affect the capabilities selected automatically by the
database. They will show the policy effectiveness of maintaining and
developing specific capabilities. We are also planning on developing other
conditions, such as the manner in which an SO is to be undertaken (overt,
covert or low visibility) which will also drive Special Operations
capabilities. Once these capability requirements are determined and
attending costs have been identified a transition plan will be developed.
The plan will establish a path to develop Special Operation capabilities
from those currently maintained by the NZDF to those recommended by
the review.

Interest from the Norwegian Defence Force

In 1999, I presented two papers at the 181h International System Dynamics
Conference in Bergen on the West coast of Norway (one each on FAR and EBO).
After delivering my paper on effects-based planning I was approached by a
civilian member of the Norwegian Defence Force, who expressed a genuine
interest in the model. He explained that they were undertaking analysis work that
could benefit from the use of these techniques and would like to discuss in more
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detail how this could occur. My almost immediate return to Australia and the
distance between us combined with a lack of funds for a return trip has prevented
any close cooperative work in this area.

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter I have attempted to provide explanations for those who were able
to accept unconditionally the logic of this planning approach. I recognise them as
being creative and possessing leadership for the new and unorthodox. They thrive
in an unstructured environment and look to ambiguity as a source of excitement
and interest in their professional practice. There is a sub-culture of intolerance of
mediocrity. The assumptions held by many have been surfaced through the Five
Key Challenges organisational poll. Similarities of view are evident.

There is much work to be done. I remain in frequent contact with many
individuals and groups who believe that this approach is sound, holds the promise
of superior performance, binds strategy, operations and tactic and secures the
optimum organisational configuration.

In the double loop learning model displayed earlier we are probably towards the
end of the 'discover' phase, 'choice' will come soon once the truth becomes
inescapable (the comparison between the new and old mental models), that will
involve serious leadership issues within the requirement to 'act', before entering
the new 'discovery' that comes with reorientation.

After arriving at this point and attempting to reach an understanding of why a
group could see the logic for such an approach, be culturally open to new ideas,
recognise leadership towards a new paradigm that they themselves had
participated in, I now look for a single explanation. The word that springs to mind
is inspirationalism. They have fashioned scenarios, constructed a complex
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language that explores all facets of organisational life and purpose, used these two
in a way that aids decision-making and formed (shared?) opinions about change.
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CHAPTER SIX
AND THOSE WHO DIDN•T

There is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success,
nor more dangerous to manage then the creation of a new order of
things .....
Machiavelli, The Prince
In this chapter I provide perspectives on that set of individuals and groups that
consistently were at odds with my attempt to build consensus. They were
dissenters, a term I favour as it simply offers that they held a different opinion,
neither a good thing nor a bad thing, just different. I need their difference as it
helps me answer the questions I have posed to myself. I have a curiosity for the
origins of their dissent:

"Was it me?"

"Was it something I said, or allowed to be said by others in one of the many
workshops?"

"Was it an aspect of the workshops, the structure or process used?"

"Was it the dynamics within the group that gave rise to their dissent?"

In exploring these questions it remains necessary for me to search for the
positives (as well as the negatives), I am still learning and reflecting at this stage
and there are defining moments still to be experienced and disorientation
dilemmas to be felt (Merriam, Mott & Lee, 1996; Edwards & Usher, 1998).

"Why am I even asking myself these questions?"

For those who were the subject of the previous chapter I explained their readiness
to accept new ideas as being a function of their creativity and tolerance of
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ambiguity - characteristics from within. With the non-acceptors I (cannot help
but) look for explanations outside of the participants.

My aim throughout has always been to allow powerful ideas to dominate, rather
than powerful people. I believe I have been successful at this. "Could it have been
that they possessed an idea or thought that alone was not sufficiently powerful

enough?" "Did not attract enough consensus and, therefore, allowed a negativity
to pollute the rest of their involvement?"

I am conscious of the need to not judge their views, or criticise their position in
any way. They adopted the point of view that was most comfortable and their
steadfast opposition to achieving a strategic reorientation provides valuable
insight into the behavioural phenomena at work within organisations.

It would be easy for me to explain this position as being contained within the

opposite quadrant from the quest for novelty. This would be unfair.

Research Role

My approach throughout the workshops was mindful of the need to draw out
individual thoughts and perceptions, mix them with others, and guide the
discussions to arrive at an agreed understanding or conceptual position then load
that into the body of work. As the information and shared knowledge grew it
would demand a new feature or function to allow its integration. Again there was
the possibility that my role had interfered with the formation of the overall result.
I believe that somewhere in all of this were the points that gave rise to
disagreement.

I did not set out to build a new order of things. I set out to discover how a shared,
loosely arranged order of existing things could be arranged more precisely and
completely to produce a more accurate picture. One that all those involved could
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agree with and declare that "yes that is an accurate picture of the product of our
lengthy discussions, there is enough of the existing body of knowledge to give a
foundation and the new information is sufficiently moderated by group consensus
that it has passed the test of eligibility". Yet the group that assisted and actively
participated in this process can still decide to disagree with the overall work.

In considering whether people accepted or rejected these methods I was conscious
of my role and behaviour because:

•

my interactions with the individuals that I interviewed for the studies were
shaped by the group memberships that each of us brought to these
interpersonal interactions.

•

my formulation of the research problem and my interpretation of the data was
shaped by my membership in a particular age, gender and organisational
group. This theoretical orientation shapes the research process (Kram, 1988, p.
247).

This allows my attention to be (re)drawn to the research questions:

Question - "To what extent did my adaptation of the Field Anomaly Relaxation
method assist in building and reinforcing consensus around initiatives
for change?"
Answer - The scenarios were very successful as a tool to provoke thought. The
adaptation become insignificant, the product delivered was sound and
workable. The 20 scenarios were able to be loaded into the front end of
the effects-based planning application without problem.

Question - "To what extent did the effects-based planner assist in building and
reinforcing consensus around initiatives for change?"
Answer- The effects-based planner was valuable in two ways: firstly, it enabled
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the detailed examination of organisational purpose with practitioner
involvement and secondly, it allowed the linking of ends, ways and
means in a more complex model that drew into sharp focus the
strengths and weaknesses within the organisation. That the model was
able to be completed with 19 effects, 42 means and 42 capacities was a
strong indicator of consensus. The indicators for change resulting from
this were the result of each person's efforts.

Question - "How was my involvement in the creation and use of these knowledge
management systems beneficial or detrimental to the achievement of
consensus?"
Answer- My aim was always to guide the development of these models. There
were occasions where it was necessary to prescribe specific elements
or functions, however these were minimal. At times progress was
slow, which meant the loading of data was delayed, which meant
participants became distracted. I saw my role during these times as a
decision-maker and someone who could maintain momentum. This
role may have been harshly judged at times. My response to that
would be "I did my best under the conditions".

Question - "Could my biases, assumptions and prejudices interfere with the
employment of these knowledge management systems?"
Answer - I was conscious of my personal actions throughout. At times they may
have been too forceful. At others I may have let the research groups
find their own direction. I believe that I had little idea how the project
would unfold so any attempt to subvert the project into a specific
outcome would have no basis.

Researcher Behaviour

Kram (1988, p. 248) identifies the need to ask several important diagnostic
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questions related to perceptions, behaviour and reactions of the researcher during
the research process; the reactions (and authenticity of response) of others to the
researcher's probes and how the interactions determine the nature and quality of
the data. I recall my comments on self-reflection made in Chapter 1, wherein I
identified the difficulty of pausing to critically view the moment to gain a deeper
understanding of the dynamics - the moment of self-reflection. If the signals one
receives (from those involved or supporting the research) are distorted or mixed
then no amount of reflection will uncover the true data, only that there is
distortion and what the possible explanations for it might be.

"So where does that leave me?"

"Was something not said by these individuals that would have allowed their
dissenting positions to be surfaced?"

"My personal opinion is - yes."

"What might the explanations for this be?"

"Could it have been my approach or manner?"

"Possibly."

"Could it have been an underlying unwillingness to openly share information that
manifested itself in the particular group assembled for that workshop?"

"Possibly."

"I can already detect that is a fruitless search for meaning and disappointment lies
at its end."
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Maybe it would be a more simple process to expose my own condition. Finding
out who I am "... is not an easy task . . . It requires inquiry into one's past to
discover how identity [and group memberships] have shaped current values"
Kram, 1988, p. 262).

While admittedly in the beginning, there was no overall method to be applied, I
acknowledge that this was to be progressively constructed through the
involvement of others. This has been successful, insofar as those that actively
contributed and participated.

The Research Assistants

This was a research project that demanded the involvement of many others, my
(mostly) cooperative co-inquirers. As well as the information that was elicited and
integrated into the database their personal ·involvement (and level of
cooperativeness) was also empirically examined. Reason and Torbert state that
"participation is a political as well as an epistemological imperative which affirms
the basic human right of persons to contribute to [a] decision which affects them
and to knowledge which concerns them and purports to be about them" (Reason
& Torbert, 2001, p. 8). I have also discovered that people will exercise the basic

human right to withhold information from a moment of inquiry or decision,
electing to retain, rather than volunteer, knowledge that could prove critical to
overall understanding. To continue these authors' comparisons of scientific
positivism versus the participative linguistic tum this withholding could be
described as 'neutralism' with its effects identical to data not obtained through the
scientific approach.

If I believe that information was withheld (and I do) then where does that leave
the validity of the research? Are the planning models still valid? Or are there large
sections of functionality that (will always) remain absent. But, "the primary
purpose of research/practice is to enhance human flourishing. To do this it must
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generate valid information within action situations so that those involved can
understand them more thoroughly and act in them more effectively" (Reason &
Torbert, 2001, p. 19). The models must be valid, the data may need to undergo
refinement to more accurately express the various elements, however the action
situations fostered active involvement, understanding was enhanced, consensus
was built and participant effectiveness grew dramatically.

This is the goal of cooperative action research. Yet, "the group cannot achieve its
goals and fulfil its mission unless there is clear consensus on the means by which
goals will be met; the means to be used have to do with day-to-day behaviour and,
therefore, require a higher level of consensus" (Schein, 1992, p. 58). This
consensus is built by the leader.

A paradox of culture change leadership is that the leader must be able to not only
lead but also to listen, to emotionally involve the group in achieving its own
insights into its cultural dilemmas, and to be genuinely participative in his or her
approach to learning and change (Schein, 1992, p. 389) and "the field of strategic
management addresses the problems of managing dynamic changes in the
relationship between a firm's action and its environment" (Argyris & Schon, 1996,
p. 251).

Schein offers that as this volatility between the organization and its environment
increases the adaptive survivalist imperative becomes more pronounced whereby
"analysts concerned about planning and adapting to an uncertain and
uncontrollable future would argue that as environments become more turbulent,
the ability to tolerate uncertainty becomes more necessary for survival and
learning, suggesting that organisational and national cultures that can embrace
uncertainty more easily will be inherently more adaptive" (Schein, p. 103, p. 11).

They also speak of a first, second and third person dimension of inquiry. To me
the imagery that conveys this best is Escher's reflective sphere. This metaphor of
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self in action with others and for others is represented in several ways. Firstly, in
the first person I am an observer of myself, the background, that remains visible
around my reflected image in the sphere, provides the context and the moment,
but it has little relevance to my image, it blurs as I attempt to see myself clearly. I
am distanced from the influence of this background as I scan inwardly. Changes
in the background, or context, will not have an effect on me immediately. Even as
I indirectly adjust to these changes I am unable to precisely link my responses to
the shifts in the contextual. In the second person I am fixated on the context, the
reflected image is blurred.

Changing an organisation's structures and processes is therefore difficult because
it involves not only consideration of efficiency and effectiveness vis-a-vis the
external tasks but also the reallocation of internal 'property'. Similarly, changing
rewards systems and status allocation systems in the internal workings of the
organisation may be difficult because such changes will affect how work is done
and how well goals are achieved. In summary, as cultural assumptions form
around the means by which goals are to be accomplished, they will inevitably
involve the internal issues of status and identity. Thus highlighting the complexity
of both the analyses of means and the issues surrounding efforts to change the
way an organisation accomplishes it goals. (Schein, 1992, p. 61).

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter I have attempted to understand why some elected to dissent. I may
have unintentionally labeled them uncreative, as I stated that this was a
characteristic that was evident in those who did agree, not only with the method,
but with my approach and the content. I see that this is wrong. I have also spent
some time on research group behaviour, my behaviour and the implications of
these for the models that sought to build consensus.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CREATIVE SYNTHESIS

This is what I have done, what I have thought, what I was. I have
told the good and the bad with equal frankness. I have neither
omitted anything bad nor interpolated anything good ..... I have
shown myself as I was: mean and contemptible, good, highminded and sublime, according as I was one or the other. Gather
round me ... my fellow men; let them hear my confessions, lament
for my unworthiness, and blush for my imperfections. Then let
each of them in tum reveal, with the same frankness, the secrets of
his heart at the foot of the Throne, and say, if he dare, "/ was better
than that man!"
Rousseau, (1782) Confessions, p. I
Overview of the Chapter

In this chapter I reflect on the research path, the changes that have occurred in my

professional practice, the effects I have had on others whose involvement I have
sought and the significance of the entire experience upon myself. It will form the
explication phase and aims to "fully examine what has been awakened in
consciousness, in order to understand its various layers of meaning" (Moustakas,
1990, p. 31 ). It is within this chapter that I will attempt to validate the research,
securing the warrants of truth and honesty that I sought at the outset and
throughout.

So How to Validate This?

This research has been of the qualitative form. It has celebrated the role of
individuals and sought to approach them as humans, not subjects. Yes, there was a
purpose to the research; a purpose that commanded my attention and
contemplation for five years; a purpose that filled my mind with thoughts, dreams,
and visions of success and failure; a purpose that saw knowledge elicitation and
co-operative inquiry as being central to the formation of consensus around
initiatives for change.
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How can I look back now and gaze over the path I have trodden to satisfy those
who must rate my performance. They were not with me. It has been a solitary
journey. Only I have struggled through the development of solutions, stood in
front of (sometimes hostile) groups for seemingly endless presentations, urged the
i-nvelvement of others and rejoiced in the ready acceptance by the believers. The
themes (that were there from the beginning, invisible but close) have steadily
revealed themselves to me, they have rewarded me for my efforts; although, I can
recall many times when the way ahead was denied to me, amplifying my
disorientation.

I recognise that I have been engaged in cooperative inquiry, it had a purpose, the
methods devised were participative, as was the progressive development of the
product. If I was to isolate the reason for non-implementation I could only suggest
that it was a combination of lack of senior executive support and commitment
coupled with a lack of broad-based support. These two are related and need some
further explanation to highlight their relationships.

Broad-based support (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978, p. 15) would create a critical
mass of mood and expectation that a reorientation of management opinion would
be achieved. This would be reflected in a heightened awareness of the need to do
something (strategically) with the organisation as a result of this disquiet (this has
often been described as 'precipitating a crisis'). These messages would then be
reinterpreted by the organisation's members and seen as a focused intent. The selfreinforcing nature of these information reflections was absent. Once the
information was presented that clearly highlighted a direction and pace of change
it was the management's responsibility to clearly articulate an opinion.

This did not occur, devalued the quality of the analysis, legitimised the status quo
and undermined the prospects for more thorough analysis linked more strongly to
change efforts.
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Is this a cultural phenomenon? I do not believe so. Rather it was a manifestation
of intellectual rigidity and a preoccupation with the events of the day. Doing what
is urgent and avoiding what is important.

As an exercise in achieving change this project has proven to be unsuccessful. As
an aid to building and reinforcing consensus within practitioners I believe it has
been a success.

The (integration of) knowledge that has arrived with me at the end is extensive. I
have deepened as a person. I have entered into all facets of the subject and
emerged intact. I can communicate with others and myself with greater freedom. I
can engage with a subject that is not familiar to me and entertain thoughts and
emotions that once eluded me or were embarrassing. I can confess my
shortcomings. I am able to reflect more completely and meaningfully on a wider
range of subjects. I am more open, more encouraging of dissent. I am one who
appreciates the absurdity of life.

I am who I always was.

I am (back) at the place I never left.

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets, 1971
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In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas (1972), expounds the idea of
'validity claims' arising from the process that he terms 'ideal speech situations',
during which people can communicate freely and honestly and openly with no
coercion or distortion, he emphasises the importance of self-reflection. For
Habermas, the overall goal of discourse is "an inter-subjective mutuality of
reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one
another" (Held, 1980, p. 333). This can only be
achieved by each participant reflecting on his or
her words and practice. As Escher does in the
figure to the right when holding the reflective
sphere aloft to view the disembodied image of
himself drawing himself drawing himself ....
Some interesting observations and comparisons
can be made with Reason and Torbett's (2001)
call for a 'tum to action' and their consideration
of first, second and third person level of social
involvement.

Escher is painting, he is engaged in artistic recreation, it is an activity rooted in
the first person, there is no other purpose than to create an image of viewed
reality. But the image he creates gives a sense of looking back at 'the other' (self)
as in the second person. If this were a landscape it would be that landscape's
awareness and recognition of the artist and easel in its presence for the purpose of
capturing the viewed panorama in some medium. The third person orientation
forces the viewer of Escher's work to analyse the effect upon oneself, like I am
doing now, and like I am doing to you as you read these words and contemplate
their effect on you. We are Escher's eyes, looking at Escher in his studio, the hand
is mine.

This fusion of perspectives sets up a powerful emotion of our place as an
individual, a person among many others and as a member of a single community.
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Communication with the deepest self is made possible, communication that is
honest, forthright and explicit; it is a realisation of the self. As expressed by
Jacobi in her presentation of Jung's psychology "it leads the individual to know
himself for what he would like to be - and probably nothing is more difficult for a
human being"_ {Jacobi, 1973, p. 132).

But human communication can be distorted by communicative incompetence, by
domination or by unbalanced instrumental action (strategic (inter)action) of
indoctrination and propaganda. Ideally, agreement should be reached by an
acceptance of the position that has the better argument (Held, 1980, chapter 12),
but what does better mean? This discussion brings me back to the
acknowledgement of 'dissent' as a necessary characteristic of cooperative inquiry.
With dissent there can be no better, only different. Difference leaves the path
clear for cooperation and deeper inquiry as underlying assumptions are explored
and surfaced. Heron (1988, p. 44) offers that "validity is enhanced by a diversity
of views that overlap. It is not found simply in the common properties of the
different views, but rather in the unity-in-variety of these views".

In terms of writing styles, John Van Maanen in his book Tales of the Field: On
Writing Ethnography (1988), encourages the research writer to tell striking stories
with interest (does it attract?), coherence (does it hang together?), and fidelity
(does it seem true?). He advises the researcher to recall in the present tense, to
avoid giving away the ending to help build a degree of tension, and to use
condensed but rich contextual descriptions, artistic nerve, unusual phrasings, fresh
allusions, rich Janguage, cognitive and emotional stimulation, puns, and quick
jolts to the imagination. This idea of 'fragmented knowledge' is furthered by using
a novelistic style which unfolds event by event, conveying uncertain meanings for
an audience unsure of where it is being taken and why, and with characterisation
for individual voices: "characters ... must be given names, faces, motives, and
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things to do ... lines to speak" (p. 104). I hope that I have woven a captivating
thread that commands the attention of the curious.

This is in agreement with Zald, who contends that rhetoric and artistry are crucial
and that "the scientific and technical model emphasizes logic, clarity and data
representation in its rhetorical stance, to the exclusion of intuition, allusiveness,
imagery" (Zeld, 1993, p. 521). He goes on to mention that confessional or
impressionistic modes of writing may take us closer to the truth.

I look at this simultaneous development of self, others, self with others and the
purpose of and product of the actions undertaken through participative inquiry as
the "quality of attention", discussed by Reason and Goodwin (1999, p. 10) when
commenting on the work of Torbett. These authors offered that attention must be
given to "intuitive knowing of purposes, intellectual knowing of strategy and
embodies knowledge of one's behaviour and an empirical knowing of the outside
world" (Reason & Goodwin, 1999, p. 10). One can not only do, one must also be
alert to the actions that the self is engaged in as the doing is done.

Have I been self-reflective throughout? Segal has identified that "before we can
either reflect on or defend our practices, our practices must have become explicit
as a theme for concern" (Segal, 1999, p. 74). My practice has certainly been
explicit, to me and others. This explicitness must come as a rupturing moment, or
to use Mezirow's language, a disorientating dilemma. We are back now
considering Escher drawing his reflection. This ability to (vividly) see oneself (as
others do) is given great clarity in Sartre's Being and Nothingness (in Segal, 1999,
p. 79) wherein a man looking through a keyhole is preoccupied by the subject of
his attention, he is interrupted by footsteps and "turns his gaze from the room [to]
see a man looking at him" he now sees himself being looked at as a voyeur.
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The Final Metaphorical Form

Continuing with my metaphor of a gathering storm, which I introduced in Chapter
Two, I now sense an anti-climactic moment of unrewarded effort and a
dissipation of the gather(ed)ing forces of change. The culmination has not
occurred. The flood of life-giving water to promote new growth has not

eventuated, there is a barrenness of apathy, lethargy and rigidity that was there
before. The soil remains unproductive. I must confess. at this point that physical
reward and visible evidence of acceptance of my approaches was not the
motivation. Although I genuinely felt that the journey was honorable and sincere,
I am left with a sense of loneliness and pessimism and through to the visible
changes in the system I was an occupant within can provide few perspectives on
that set of individuals and groups that consistently were at odds with attempts to
build consensus. I have attempted to rationalise their motives, described their
worldview as it came into conflict with mine. I am also conscious of the need to
not judge their views, or criticise their position in any way, a positive I reinforced
in the previous chapter. They adopted the point of view that was most comfortable
and their steadfast opposition to achieving a strategic reorientation provides
valuable insights into the behavioural phenomena at work within this
organisation.

I looked for something (different and changed) outside of myself. The change has
(only) occurred within. I believe I have set things in motion. There are ripples but
they have yet to touch a shore and be reflected.

In expressing this discontent I find salvation in the fact that although the local
conditions may have remained stable, the season is altering. It is part of a larger
cycle and my storm was dissipated through a need to preserve its energy for a
larger gathering that will exert its influence later.
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Where to Now?

The method works (but it didn't this time). It has potential to inform policy and
strategy across an enormous field of industry and endeavour.

What are we trying to make happen? - this question as a point of origin for all
analysis and consideration is extremely powerful and secures a purity that other
approaches may not deliver. I have spoken to practitioners involved in developing
policies for minimising drug use, discouraging graffiti, altering driver behaviour
in speed-controlled areas such as outside schools and reducing the adoption of
smoking in youths. All have commented favorably on the utility of the model and
its ability to isolate consensus around key high-payoff areas. The effect that one is
in pursuit of concentrates the mind and all consideration about what actions are
appropriate.

Further research may extend the model and develop new insights into the
formulation of policy and consensus building. Whatever additional research
springs from this work the enduring ends, ways and means construct remains
central.

Summary and Conclusions

In this final section I set out four brief points:

1. Purposeful thinking and acting is an important part of organisational renewal
and growth and deserves attention to derive more successful methods for
planning and policy making that engage groups in cooperative inquiry.

2. There is a multiplicity of contradictions that demand divergent thought. If a
way forward to satisfactory solutions or progress is to be made then
contradictions and divergence must be accommodated and accepted as the
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natural order of things. Consensus can only be approached as an ideal. Indeed
dissent is a vital quality to be preserved and accommodated within
cooperative inquiry.

3. National security organisations are in a transition period between two raisons
d'~re,

providing a brief opportunity to speculate and dislocate thinking from

the conventional, constraints originating from dogma and a narrow field of
vision. A futures orientation can achieve this necessary dislocation of
thinking.

4. Comprehensive knowledge management systems can assist in the crafting of
organisational futures. Field Anomaly Relaxation and effects-based planning
coupled with facilitated teamwork qualifies as a comprehensive knowledge
management system and has potential to build consensus and communities of
change. It can create a microworld in which cooperative inquiry can occur.

Epilogue

I wish to close with some thoughts that are inspired by Mezirow and his critique
that "in traditional societies learning focuses on acquiring the outlook and skills
necessary to perform according to well established rules and customs" (Mezirow,
1990, p. xiii). I have chosen to break free, to seek new meanings from my own
discoveries, creative wanderings and self-reflexion, what Freire has described as
conscientization. A reflective engagement with the totality and enormity of a

subject, or what Shor calls "extraordinarily reexperiencing the ordinary" (Shor,
1987, p. 3). These themes are central and prevent mediocrity in qualitative,
heuristic research.

In my research I have sought to construct a non-traditional society of learners who
perform outside the established rules and customs, who can explore together. But,
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at the same time, their approach is disciplined, forthright and accommodates the
(presence of) dissenters, without damaging their ability to express different views,
or have these views folded into the thoughts and ideas of others. The way is open
for others to develop the approach.
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APPENDIX 1
EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS WORKSHOPS

The information set out here is a compilation of discussions and debates
surrounding the topic of effects-based operations. Most comments were from
structured

~workshop

settings designed to achieve specific outcomes for this

research. Others were the thoughts of interested individuals and groups shared
when the information was relayed throughout the organisation. I refer to
comments as either coming from the facilitator - me, or an anonymous participant.

Participant
"I just don't get what all the fuss is about with being so precise, framing
everything inside an 'effect' like this. Everything we do as a military organisation
is to achieve our objectives. This has been going on ever since man picked up a
rock or spear".

Facilitator
"That may be so. There is always a purpose to our actions. My only concern is
that we begin our planning too low down. Our aim here is use the desired effect as
the point of origin for our analysis and consideration of what will deliver that
effect. Typically we start with what are we able to do, and then we look around
trying to find a way to fit that to the problem. What I am suggesting is that we
forget about the things that we do for the time being and focus on what are we
trying to make happen. I think this would be more productive".

Participant
"We've spent all this time getting the scenarios together, we have our end-states,
let's keep the top-down approach going and see what we come up with".

Facilitator
"Okay, we need to keep a military mind throughout all of this. Clausewitz wrote
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about imposing our will on our adversary. This is a very important concept and
one that must guide us through this next stage. When we talk about effects, we
should recognise that they will be imposed. The language must be reasonably
forceful and active. I need statements that speak directly about what we want to
make happen through our actions, and remember we haven't determined what
those aetions are yet. That is the next step, these will be anchored to the effects so

the planning hierarchy continues downwards".

Participant
"What we need are a few politicians in the room. This sort of information needs to
come from Government".

Facilitator
"You're exactly right. But we don't have them so we need to give this our best
shot. I'm sure with the expertise and experience we have in the room we can get
this right and that will give us some really interesting information to work though
with. Remember that most of what we do has been devised from the bottom up, so
in the middle somewhere we should experience some difficulty as we draw these
two domains together".

"We don't have a definition yet for effects-based operations. We know that we are
beginning at the top and working our analysis downwards. Let's assume for the
time being that the model I presented earlier is fairly complete. I has scenarios on
the left, with a single end-state for each derived from that, then the effects that can
be imposed within that scenario, with the means next, capacities or competencies
further to the right and the finally physical elements of capability forming the
right-most column. In an effects-based orientation it is the effects that provide the
beacon for our efforts, everything must be directed towards these."

Participant
"Surely it's not up to us to define the national strategic end-states. I would have
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thought that was a job for government. The National Security Committee for
Cabinet meets every time there is a crisis to develop a course of action. Why can't
we find out what they think our end-states are, and also our national effects. From
those we should have a reasonable chance of getting the military effects".

Facilitator
"You're right, it is a job for government, it's really a collaborative effort between
government and al the instruments of national power, of which Defence is just
one. The National Security Committee bases the devlopment of their alternatives
on the strategic threat scenario they are faced with. We could construct a whole
series of scenarios that contain a rich narrative of events, actors, geography,
politics, society, and economic ingredients. These would form a problem space.
As they plan their way out they would determine which ingredient and its
associated condition offers a point of leverage, a weakness that they can apply
strength to. The aim is to change that condition in a way that is more favourable
to us".

"If we look at Kosovo, there is a leadership with a specific intent and a whole
package of ingredients that make a contribution towards instability in that region,
a system. Our role is to determine what effects can be imposed on the system to
force it to change, to trip it into another set of behaviours. In crafting these we
must look beyond destructive measures or the use of military force alone as the
means. We should really be thinking about synthesising our efforts with those of
other government departments, particularly those that have representation at the
National Security Committee.

The end-states that are reached after we have been successful are really an
expression of this now changed scenario. The scenarios in front of you that we
have been working from have been written using a very sound future forecasting
method, they are situated well into the future, but they are reasonably expressive
of events that could happen in a only a few months".
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"I am convinced that is why our approach here is so powerful. We have the
scenarios that describe drivers and the various conditions that they can exist in.
the end-states allow us to describe the vertical movement up the table in the
columns of those drivers that offer solutions. The effects help us explore what it is
that we want to have happen as a result of our actions, although we haven't
determined just what that might be. The means are the actions we can undertake,
so the whole model cascades downwards. It is not so simple to build this from the
bottom up, in fact I think it would be impossible to gain any meaningful
structure".

"There is another aspect to Special Operations undertaking this anlysis and that is
our definition: Measures and activities designed to achieve military, political,
psychological and economic objectives (or effects). Remember we are trying to
shift our fixation away from military objectives, not because they are
unimportant, but because they do not give rise to any creative or lateral thought
on this subject. It is the political, psychological and economic effects that offer
interesting ideas and the possibility that we can take the organisation ad its
capabilities in a new direction. No simply because we think it is a good idea, but
because these are informed by a more startegic orientation in our thinking".

Participant

"It makes sense to me. Let's give it a try and see what we come up with".

Participant

"I agree, I am sure something like this must be going on somewhere in the
planning process but this approach seems to link everything together very neatly."
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APPENDIX 2
SCENARIOS

Not the New World We Ordered

These scenarios were derived from the futures planning workshops using Field
Anomaly Relaxation. Although the full futures tree diagram has been presented in
Chapter Three it is repeated at the beginning of each of the five major named
worlds developed with the paths to that world highlighted. A Reserve officer Captain Richard Taylor - and a veterinarian by profession wrote them, in a
different format. They have been modified slightly to fit this thesis.

Home Brew
•

Indigenous Crisis

•

Drug-Crime Syndicates Sponsored Offshore

•

Eco-Cyber Terrorists

•

White Supremacy Movements

Argy Bharji
•

SE Asia Anarchy

•

Multinational Piracy

•

China Sea Scramble

•

Antarctic Challenge

Cast Adrift
•

Transmigration

•

Consolidated Forces of Islam

•

Climatic Chaos in Oceania

•

Australia the Pariah

Trouble Elsewhere
•

Middle East Meltdown

•

Ebola Outbreak

•

United States Stumbles and Falls
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•

Gene Warfare

WWlTI Everybody's Fighting
•

There Can Be Only One- Fighlto Become World Power

•

Millenmum Bug

•

Information Warfare

•

WMDs to Order

Home Brew
Indigenous Crisis

2000 June
Australian aboriginal elders express disappointment at no formal expression of
reconciliation resulting m a widespread call for a treaty.

2000 October
After failure of aboriginal activists to secure any significant media coverage of
protests during Sydney Olympic Games a new leader emerges, Jack Wangebari,
calling on "The Koori People to bring their cause lo the world spotl ight" .

March 2001
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Impatience at resolution of land rights leads to sizeable demonstrations in Sydney,
Melbourne, Canberra and Perth. Jack Wangebari calls for formation of 'Koori
Assembly of Tribesmen' (KAT) to unite their cause. Several Aboriginal Elders
denounce the new activists' movement but win wide support from urban
indigenous people. Unsanctioned development, particularly in mining and
logging, of lands over which aboriginal claims are pending becomes a central
issue of protest in the opening volleys of rhetoric of the KAT organisation.

August 2003
Under political pressure over mounting deficit budgets and national debt and
resentment of KAT protest disruptions; the 'All Australians Equal' Bill
I

effectively eliminates special consideration for aboriginals in social security.

April2005
The PM calls a 'Congress of Aboriginal Elders' to assure continued community
support for their reserves.
Conference in Noumea of 'Pacific Indigenous Peoples' attended by Pacific
islanders; Papua New Guineans; Polynesians including April 2005Maoris,
Melanesians, Australian Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islanders and Kanakas call for
an international charter recognising indigenous rights. June 2005This wins
r

general international support but not regional or domestic acceptance.

February 2007
Armed aboriginal groups and unofficial white militia clash in Charleville.
Fighting continues for three days until riot police reinforcements suppress
hostilities with army assistance to pacify the hinterland. Jack Wangebari is
arrested. Guerrilla campaign in New Caledonia commences to attempt to oust
French rule.

April2007
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French New Caledonian counter-terrorist military forces conduct a successful raid
on defended positions outside of Noumea. A large cache of small arms,
explosives and, worryingly, several small canisters of chemical weapons are
recovered.

September 2008
New Caledonian Intsum is released linking Pacific Islander terrorist organisation
in Noumea with other radical groups, including Maori and Koori terrorist cells.
Chemical weapons are of Iraqi origin.

May 2009
New Zealand police recover explosives and chemical weapon canisters in a Maori
urban fortress after a raid in Hamilton. Origin again is Iraqi, believed to have been
supplied through associated terrorist cells in Noumea.

April2010
KAT groups embark on widespread bombing campaigns initially on mining
infrastructure at sensitive sites, two months later Parliament House in Canberra is
targeted simultaneously with state parliament houses of each capital.
Simultaneous outbreak of riots in rural towns and centres of larger cities by
radical aboriginal groups to March the 51h anniversary of the Charleville uprisings
and incarceration of Jack Wangebari. Several towns including Charleville,
Wilcannia, Ceduna and Kunanurra fall under the control of radical indigenous
cells. In the town of Mt Isa nerve gas is unleashed on non-indigenous population
in response to armed civilian opposition to a KAT assault on the town

Drug Crime Syndicates Sponsored Offshore

June 1999
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Conference on heroin production and trafficking held in Myanmar boycotted
because of human rights issues by all but Australia and New Zealand. Myanmar
government agrees in co-operation with the two target countries to assist in
interdiction of heroin production and trafficking.

October 2000
The first free elections are held in Myanmar in over fifty years. Elected
government announces the opening up of Myanmar borders to allow increased
trade with the world.

February 2001
Conglomerate of Thai-based multinational corporations start acquiring properties
in northern WA and NT after acquiring estates in newly independent East Timor
(notably all properties have airfields). Stated purpose is for high-value tropical
hydroponics network.

April2002
After extended debate Federal Government sponsors 'safe heroin administering
havens' in all capitals and a number of regional centres to take heroin usage out of
the streets. Cantonese Chinese in China Towns of Brisbane, Sydney and
Melbourne take further the initiative in establishing illicit "heroin dens"
reminiscent of opium dens of the 19th century.

September 2002
Japan, Malaysia and Korea lead Asian recovery and open a free trade zone to
allow easy access to cheap labour Markets in Indonesia, the Philippines and
Myanmar.

Augtist 2003
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Reserve Bank of Australia announces GDP for 2002/2003 financial year is in
sharp Decline from 4.2% for 1999/2000 record growth to present exponential
Decline into negative growth.

June 2004
Property Markets in Australia slump leaving vast numbers of property owners
with negative equity. As emergency sell-offs follow values continue in a
downward spiral and a patchwork of urban Decay develops in larger cities. Gangs
of youths displaced from broken family homes acquire inexpensive properties
collectively and fortify them against rival gangs.

December 2004
Government concern is expressed at the rising use of opiate drugs, principally
heroin and designer drugs, by increasing populations of displaced youths.
Cantonese drug trafficking syndicates are taking advantage of the rising Market
but recently additional supply is arriving from Thai/Myanmar sources. Massive
oversupply of opiates cause prices to drop dramatically with large quantity
purchases (and hoarding) becomes common. Some murderous clashes occur
between rival Cantonese and Thai-based suppliers in urban centres.

July 2005
Covert battles in Brisbane, Sydney, and Melbourne effectively shut down large
components of the Cantonese drug supply network. Curtailment of supply results
in sharp price rises of opiate-based drugs. Domestic crime skyrockets as gangs
raze their urban environments to fund ongoing drug use. Large areas of cities and
regional centres become unsafe at any time of day as gangs target the innocent for
thefts and muggings. Rival gangs engage in territorial skirmishes.

February 2006
Thai intelligence sources expose the major supply route from jungle bases around
its border with Myanmar, staging through light aircraft bases in Borneo, East
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Timor and Northern Australia under the fronts of multinational corporate
structures. The Australian Government gives a firm resolve to interdict the supply
route and forms an agreement with Thai and Myanmar governments to defeat
drug syndicates at their source.

Eco-Cyber Terrorists

January 2001
The world survives the much heralded "Year 2000 Bug" (Y2K) with minor
disruption of services and industry in non-government and non-fiscal areas. Small
and medium capital intensive businesses are the most disrupted forcing many to
rebuild and restructure. Mining companies are typically affected the most
severely. Just as in the 1980's "Young Urban Professionals" (YUPpies) of the
financial world principally came to the fore; a new breed of technologically
trained professionals, made wealthy by a boom in demand for their services
emerge. In Asia economic recovery favours the educated and the gulf between
rich and poor widens. An undercurrent of popular dissent remains fermenting.

June 2003
Non-government Environment Summit held in Darwin attracts widespread
interest from young educated people of Asian and western nations. Discussions
focus on industrial pollution, nuclear waste proliferation, agricultural practices
and pollution of waterways and food chains, forest clearing and atmosphere
quality and developed nation environment attitudes and global warming. A firm
but ambiguous resolve is reached to lobby governments and industrial leaders to
adopt globally sustainable practices for "A New World for the New Millennium".
A sophisticated campaign to market these ideas is launched across the internet. As
technological professionals add their weight into a progressively fashionable
movement marketing becomes intrusive, hacking into web sites of industries and
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government departments considered to be endorsing environmentally unfriendly
practices.

September 2004
The campaign metamorphoses subtly into one of Information Technology
propaganda as information web sites and data files are corrupted by 'Ecology
Technos' (ETs).

November 2004
Economic indicators, having wavered after a boom in year 2000, now have
definitely started to slide as small and middle sized businesses that failed to
restructure efficiently after Y2K disruption begin to fold and the multiplier effect
of lost employment impacts on the rest of the economy. The media spotlight is
focussed on the roles of Australian and multinational company involvement in
mining in Papua New Guinea. Their actions in Borneo and Sumatra, involving
forest clearing and burning, have left deep scars on the landscape and rendered the
land unusable for many Decades.

February 2005
Secondary effects are that attention has also been brought onto mining and
forestry activities within Australia. Environmental groups rumble with outrage.
Some commentators liken the support for environmental protection now to the
fervor of the Vietnam Moratorium movement of the early 1970's. The
'Environmental Technos' take up the call for punitive action.

March 2005
There is a wave of protests outside offices of Mining and Resources Government
department offices in Canberra, Forestry departments in State capitals and the
offices of Australian and multinational companies thought to be involved in
environmentally degrading activities in Sydney and Perth. The moral
righteousness of the movement inspires and attracts growing support from
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students and the increasing numbers of the young jobless. Over a three week
period protests become more intense until the firebombing of a corporate office
block in Sydney and the mass invasion of offices in Perth lead to a State and
Federal police crackdown.

April2005
Riot police are used to break up subsequent attempts at staging environmentalist
demonstrations.

June 2005
Attention is turned to sites of environ~ental degradation; a campaign of domestic
sabotage on mining and forestry plant and equipment in remote areas and fertiliser
factories and chemical plants in industrial areas begins. Increased security and
police presence at target sites identified by HUMINT informants largely counters
this trend.

August 2005
In smaller regional coastal centres heavily reliant on forestry and in towns in WA,
QLD and NSW workers and community members protest at the threat to their
livelihoods made by the environmentalists, claiming them as predominantly city
dwellers ignorant of the necessities of their endeavours.

March 2006
Within the environmentalist movement there arises major dissent. One faction is
appalled at the use of escalatory activities such as sabotage and bombing, with
genuine concern for human casualties and property damage, reverting to
individual affiliations such as to the respected institution of Greenpeace. An
alternate faction is headed by 'Technos', gradually having accumulated the power
of wealth as a group they now see the opportunity to bring the less educated and
pro-action elements under their control as 'environmental soldiers'. As a splinter
group they identify a new modus operandi of harnessing their technological edge

262

-Appendix 2

to counter activities they identify as environmentally damaging by Decisive
means.

11 April 2006
Employing a media campaign that exploits information technology the new group
attracts these 'environmental soldiers' in the hundreds. With a headquarter quorum
of an estimated 28 technos they pool some of their considerable wealth and begin
acquiring logistics support including small merchant· vessels; aircraft; including
helicopters and all terrain vehicles. An arsenal of arms and munitions from
international dealers is also built up and concealed.

16 April 2006
After drought affects most of Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South
~

Australia through an El Nino summer large numbers of waterways begin choking
with blue-green algae. The resultant ecological impact on fish and waterfowl and
the necessity to import potable water to inland regional centres attracts wide
media coverage. The heavy use of phosphate based fertiliser is implicated and the
effects of phosphate leaching into waterways is highlighted by environmentalists
groups. Technos mount a campaign challenging the credibility of environmental
protection agencies.

28 April 2006
Superphosphate manufacturers around Australia and CSIRO soil analysis
laboratories simultaneously find their data files and processing computer
programs have been corrupted with viruses introduced by hackers. Environmental
technos claim responsibility, boasting that they have the capability to disrupt any
environmentally damaging industry by accessing computer networks by satellite
up-links from their Maritime fleet. Public reactions are mixed from resounding
support to protest from graziers and farmers to demonstrations by process workers
laid off while fertiliser plants are forced to shut down temporarily. A report is
published detailing how Jabiluka yellowcake, after processing, has found its way
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to supplying plutonium-generating nuclear power plants in Pakistan with the
product then on-sold to Arabic countries and used in a nuclear armaments
program. Renewed protests erupt from environmentalists in Darwin as yellow
cake is trucked into port for shipping.

A surprise raid on phosphate mines on Christmas Island by armed 'environmental
soldiers' results in several casualties and destruction of the mining plant.
Subsequent investigations reveal the mines were subjected to an assault planned
in detail and executed by ship-based helicopter insertions. Three days later
underwater explosions sink a merchant vessel in the Arafura Sea transporting
Jabiluka yellow cake from Ranger mines. The Australian Government announces
its resolve to bring the environmental terrorist movement to justice.

White Supremacy Movement

February 2000
The new millennia gives rise to unusual beliefs and cults; characteristically based
on prophecies with a biblical bias.

August 2000
As all short-term (millennium changeover) prophecies fail to eventuate most of
the zeal dissipates. Some cult members disassociate from the failures then
gravitate to surviving millennia cults. One cult attracting a growing following
within Australia, and with affiliations overseas in Europe, Canada, New Zealand
and USA is the Phineous Priesthood. Based on the Book of Revelations the belief
is that they are 'Soldiers of Christ' called up 'at this chosen time of Armageddon'.
In Australia a charismatic, if not Rasputian leader, 'Seth Avatar' advises that the
new millennia commences in September of 2010; based on the Phineous
theological interpretation exactly 2000 years since Christ's crucifixion. Avatar
adheres to interpretations of biblical passages, particularly in attaching spiritual
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dimension to the stated mission of the Phineous Priesthood: "To make ready the
world for Armageddon by preparing for purging of the mud people and the
unworthy".

Declining economic stability domestically combined with rising unemployment
and wholesale failure of other cultist ideologies creates an increasingly rich
harvest for recruitment of new members. International
convention in Austria of
I
'Aryan Nations' includes the Phineous Priesthood as part of the synonymous
'Christian Identity' movement.

March2003
Consensus is drawn of an impending Armageddon that "we have gone to sleep
since WWII but this is going to be the awakening"; and that a new order of
humanity will be the final result. To achieve this necessitates atonement of our
'Brothers of Other Followings', (presumably the Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and
Taoists;) the subjugation of those identified as 'God's Failures' and the 'Mud
People' (identified as the coloured races and Jews.)

February 2004
Attention is brought on a base camp at Mt Tambourine, Queensland after police
trace a gang of skinheads suspected of involvement in a street brawl resulting in
the deaths of four aboriginals in Brisbane. The police contingent of eight officers
are ambushed as they approach, withdrawing with three casualties and reporting
close to one hundred armed defenders occupying the Mt Tambourine fortified
base. A siege by tactical response police teams ensues reminiscent of that of
Waco, Texas. After 10 days a police assault results in a mass suicide apparently
prepared as a contingency by Seth Avatar and including tens of women and
children as well as the mass of defenders. The event is the subject of intense
media scrutiny.

July 2004
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The Phineous Priesthood is shown to have a larger than ever membership
following claims for responsibility for the bombing of gay bars in Melbourne and
Sydney, desecration of synagogues in several cities and the execution style
murders of small groups of aboriginal men in regional towns and city centres.
Similar events unfold in other western countries concurrently. International law
enforcers target and follow known members of white supremacists movements
affiliated with the Phineous Priesthood. Frequent entries to Australia through
Cairns Airport are noted and visits to an apparent Phineous stronghold in the
Atherton Tablelands are confirmed.

February 2005
A charter bus explodes in a crowded school playground in suburban Perth. 46
children are killed and 82 injured in a horror reminiscent of Omagh, Ireland in
1998. Later the Phineous Priesthood admits a mistake was made. The bus had
been chartered for a Jewish school but a driver's absenteeism led to a last minute
rescheduling. Public opinion is one of outrage with angry demands for decisive
retribution. International media focuses on the global network of white supremacy
movements. The Australian government declares the Phineous Priesthood
outlawed and promises military action. With memories of the police failures at Mt
Tambourine overseas media reports view Australia as a nation at flash point with
political credibility at stake.
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Argy Bharji
South East Asian Anarchy

January 2000
Indonesia

withdraw!i

from

East Timor,

Australian

troop~

deployed

a~

peacekeepers in resultant power vacuum. Social infrast11.1cture becomes very
fragile.

February-November 2000
Clashes between combined PNG/Indonesian patrols and anti-separatists guerillas
in West Irian/PNG borderlands, both coastal and highlands.

December 2000
South East Asia monsoons fail, region is thrown into drought Crop failures fuel
dissent actions in some areas. Indonesia withdraws from West Irian. PNG calls on
Australia for assistance in quelling violent dissents, in response to an absence of
Indonesian rule between indigenous and Melanesian groups.

June 2002
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Commitment to Bougainville continues. Serious rioting in Jakarta spreading to
Surabaya and Bandung as protests at the Indonesian government's failure to
address the dire economic situation deteriorate into venting of frustrations by
large sections of the population.

January 2004
After nearly two weeks of violence spreading into other provinces of Indonesia
the government steps down, declaring martial law. New elections are announced
for April the following year.

June 2004
A Kuala Lumpur government corruption scandal precipitates widespread
demonstrations in Malaysia eventuating in partial suppression by riot police in the
capital but necessitating full military action in other areas.

November 2004
Indonesian elections result in a questionable overwhelming majority for the head
of military forces as president. Singapore raises in the UN forum the issue of a
growing refugee problem as both Indonesians and Malaysians flee to Singapore.

March 2005
Recurrence of civil unrest in Kuala Lumpur as government orders a crackdown on
dissidents. The Malaysian Army is used to assist civil authorities. Thailand
expresses concern at a potential meltdown to civil war on its border as internal
rifts emerge within the Malaysian military.

December 2006
Thailand sends troops across its southern border into Malaysia to create a buffer
against unrest and refugee influx. Singapore likewise responds by sending troops
into the Malay peninsula and into Sumatra in an attempt to interdict the growing
refugee problem.
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March 2008
Australian humanitarian effort is expanded in Indonesia as it still faces
widespread famine and starvation. Humanitarian workers request the assistance of
Australian military escorts as it becomes apparent that large armed mobs are
beyond the control of the Indonesian military in the more remote areas where aid
distribution networks are stretched.

June 2008
China announces serious concern at what it views as a scramble for territories
brought on by power vacuums as .successive governments fail in SE Asia.
Included in the rhetoric is reference to 'Australian New Imperialism'. Vietnam
enters the situation by publicly backing Chinese initiatives for naval exercises in
the South China Sea. Others view this as a treacherous and shallow means to
secure continued aid following successive poor crop yields. Thailand and the
Philippines call for support from Australia and Japan in deterring the exercising of
Chinese military forces in SE Asia. Peaceful protests are held in Australian
capitals against embroiling Australian Military Forces any further in what to be an
(inevitable) escalating conflict in SE Asia.

Multinational Piracy

June 2003
Indonesia experiences further internal turmoil after the 1999 elections. Modest
economic recovery has been made by attracting some multinational corporations
through offers of a 'tax haven' status.

October 2004
A world market downturn in metal prices with declining demand following
recession of steel, aluminum and alloy manufacturing nations jars Australia's
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economy.

Rationalisation

follows

in

Australian

mining

industry

with

fragmentation and takeovers leading to consolidation of the domestic ore mining
industry being restricted to several conglomerates only. One notable multinational
group, 'The Firm', also buys interests in SE Indonesia, attracted by tax
concessions and cheap labor as well as accessibility to shipping. Security
eencerns lead to raising of corporate paramilitary forces of both maritime and
land forces ostensibly to protect their commercial interests. Most recruitment
comes from former Indonesian militia disenchanted by poor pay and conditions
from their own government

March 2005
Indonesia relaxes its control over Moluccas and Lombok-Makassar Straits in
favour of tacit contracts to commercial paramilitary forces to escort their mining
product north. There are widespread rebel threats of Maritime piracy made from
pro-integrationist groups on Timor as well as separatists of the Ceram and Lesser
Sunda Islands.

May2005
'The Firm' declares key shipping channels as their 'Zones of Economic Control'.
In order to offset costs of providing security they impose 'Safe Transit Fees'.
Shipping through these waters are imposed a variable scale of fees on the spot. In
the UN this raises loud international protests and is regarded as protection
reminiscent of the Chicago gangster era.

June 2005
'The Firm' procures a small fleet of destroyers apparently purchased through
brokers after Decommissioning from the Russian Navy. The stated use is for safe
escort of commercial shipping, however, they are instrumental in imposing a
board and search procedure on shipping from rival multinational conglomerates
carrying Australian escorts. At the end of the month small arms exchanges on
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boarded ships are reported before the impounding of three ships transporting ores
from Australia to Korea and Japan.

July 2005
Australian government diplomatic approaches to Indonesia to resolve this
.interruption to domestic exports are met with polite apologies but an expression of
an inability to intervene. While UN argument continues over legality of 'The
"

Firm's' actions, supported by a collection of countries benefiting significantly
from revenue raised from 'The Firms' activities, no sanction is forthcoming for

~

Australian naval action. Domestically opinions favour action.

China Sea Scramble

June 2003
Definition of national economies in the new millennia is becoming increasingly
blurred as large multinational conglomerates acquire corporations and resources
throughout the Region. Depreciation in Asian corporate empires through the
economic crisis of the late 201h century has facilitated the process.

March2005
Environmental concerns regarding the fire-clearing of jungles, ocean outfalls of
industrial effluent, over-fishing and land degradation leads to ASEAN Nations
agreeing to a joint program for the preservation of the region's resources for the
future.

August 2005
After many years of lobbying, Australia is finally invited to join ASEAN.
Cheap production costs lure multinational conglomerates to establish heavy
industry interests in Southern Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan,
including petrochemical industries such as plastics and oil refineries.
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February 2006
Multinational sponsored exploration of the Northern Australian Basin begins in
agreement with Indonesian interests.

August 2007
Failure to produce adequate oil reserves from the Northern Australian Basin
coupled with OPEC upward pressures on oil prices leads commercial interests to
look to the South China Sea. Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and
Malaysia reach a consensus to exploit Spratley and in principle, the Paracel
Islands for their oil potential.

January 2008
Corporate occupation of Spratley Islands begins. China voices its objections and
moves a maritime taskforce to claim the Paracel Islands. A naval encounter with
Vietnamese naval forces south of Hai Nan secures a Chinese victory and firms
their posture in the South China Sea.

February 2008
Naval approaches to the Philippines 300 nautical miles from the coast of Manila
is headed off by a strong presentation of naval and air force by the Philippines.
Singaporean, Malaysian and Vietnamese military forces are mobilised, Japan
supports a US carrier group movement into the Taiwan Strait. ASEAN calls on its
allies, including Australia for naval and specialist support in confirming their
international rights for exploitation of the South China Sea.

Antarctic Challenge

November 2004
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After a three and a half year period of conflict involving tribal rebellions in the
Congo and Angolan areas of southern Africa peace is restored by cooperative
military counter insurgency between South African, Zimbabwe, Tanzanian,
Mozambique, Ugandan and Kenyan military coalition. To all participants it is
evident that stability in their region will depend on mature governments
cooperating.

January 2005
OPEC raises oil prices by 18% by restricting supply, precipitated by diminishing
yields from existing oil wells and mostly poor results from new exploratory
drillings. India, with an accelerating domestic industrial development, steps up its
exploratory ventures around its own continental shelf and further south into the
Indian Ocean in a joint venture with Indonesia.

May2005
The African Union, loosely modelled on the success of the European Union, is
formed. Immediately Mozambique raises concern about increasing Indian naval
presence off its coastal waters and around those of Madagascar. Common defence
and developing domestic industrial base toward maturing economies are the first
stated aims of the African Union.

June 2006
Inflationary effects of increased oil prices adversely affect the European,
Canadian and United States economies. Renewed exploration in the North and
Irish Seas and within the Scandinavian Arctic Circle for oil is not promising.
Britain and European partnerships venture into the South Atlantic, staged out of
the Falkland Islands, for new oil fields. The United States explores southwards
into the Pacific and Southern Oceans likewise in searches.

January 2008
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Australian Antarctic overflights locate an unidentified expedition with heavy
tracked vehicles in western Australian Antarctic Territory. An investigative team
is despatched by helicopter from Mawson Antarctic Base. After landing nearby,
the team discovers that the expedition belongs to a South African group exploring
for oil fields to supply to the developing African Union nations.

February 2008
Reports of the African intrusion into Australian Antarctic Territory results in
Australian diplomatic protests reinforced by the remainder of the Southern
Hemisphere international community, particularly New Zealand. Protests levelled
at the African Union are stone-walleq, with representatives of the member nations
insisting that the African expedition are of a multinational oil company, without
knowledge or consent from The African Union member nations.

Australia's Mawson Base sends a representative lobby group to the African
Union's Antarctic Expeditionary base camp, now stationary and drilling for core
samples. The Australian contingent orders the Africans to cease drilling and make
arrangements for their departure from Australian Antarctic territory. After several
days of non-compliance the Australians become increasingly agitated by the
apparent arrogance of the drilling team and sustained non-compliance with
conveyed Australian government demands to cease their explorations and
withdraw from Australian Antarctic Territory immediately before the winter seals
them in. A heated argument ensues and the March 2008Africans produce small
arms sub-machineguns. A young African worker, in an attempt to fire shots over
the heads of the Australians, fails to control his weapon and unintentionally kills
one Australian delegate and wounds another. Australia resolves under popular
public consensus, to issue a final ultimatum for withdrawal. African oil drilling
activities continue in Antarctica. The Australian Government orders a military
land force strike on the African Party
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Cast Adrift
Transmigration

July 2000
Economic crisis in Asia concertinas inro developing regional countries in a
'second wave' as long-term impact of defaults by creditors and the collapse of
infrastructure generating industries is fully fe lt. Where possible governments try
to attempt public led recoveries by tryi ng to bolster infrastructure projects and by
increased defence related industry spending.

Febntary 2004
Drought brings about widespread failure in the rice crops across the Indian subcontinent. southern China and SE Asia. Japan is moderately affected by failu re of
mon oonal rains. Regional trade s lumps further as trade barriers are raised and
Australian agricultural and mineral exports consequently decline. Australia is
inexorably drawn into the regional recession. European and American economies
are successfully insulated by measures implemented against the earlier Asian
economic crisis of l997 .

August 2005
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Asia has slid into an economic and social abyss and Australia, now reliant on
regional trade, follows the downward spiral. As Australian unemployment rises
above 18%, social unrest is marked by escalating crime and violence. Negative
returns on rural endeavour bring record farm foreclosures and much productive
land lies fallow while nearby Asia face famine.

March 2006
Asian waterways are becoming animated, as people faced with starvation
following the fourth year of famine become desperate to find a better existence by
emigration. India announces a plan to lead the world in merchant marine industry
by government sponsored radical enlargement of the ship building industry. In an
effort to tap into the wealthier economies of the rest of the world India begins
marketing mass maritime transport. New shipyards are commenced in Madras and
Bombay.

August 2006
Sri Lanka falls under Indian caretaker government after escalated civil conflict
renders the previous government incapable of managing its internal affairs. SE
Asia, Japan, Australia and New Zealand remain in economic doldrums as the
inertia to restart their economies fails with loss of faith from the thriving
economies of the rest of the world. French and British peacekeeping forces are
deployed into Fiji following a failed military coup after a pro-Indian government
is seated in power. Indian migration into SE Asia is markedly increased with
maritime fares slashed as new ships begin to come onto line.

October 2006-November 2007
Deserted farms and paddy fields attract masses of Indian peasants. Dislocated
Malays, Melanesians and Indonesians continue to relocate from their home
countries, now often on Indian passenger ships, in a general south east direction in
search of a better life.
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January 2008
Unmanageable waves of illegal immigrants begin to arrive at Port Headland,
Broome, Derby, Wyndham and Darwin. In the first six months of the year an
estimated two and a half million illegal immigrants arrive in Australia's
northwest. Indian maritime is operating apparently with the tacit consent of its
government. Australia's protests are lost in the mass trend of transmigration being
experienced by all SE Asian countries. The UN, inundated with grievances from
affected countries, fails to develop a plan of action.

Consolidated Forces of Islam

January 2001
Saddam Hussein dies of a coronary heart attack. A brief struggle takes place to
establish the Minister for Internal Affairs as his successor over Saddam Hussein's
nephew. Saddam Hussein's relatives quickly escape into self-imposed exile.
Religious motivated violence repeatedly flares in regions of Indonesia; Local
dissent takes on a religious fervour and spreads collaterally into Borneo, Sulawesi
and eastern Malaysia. Dissent in Myanmar begins to flare as Muslim sections of
the population hear of a renewal of their faith in other nations and try to assert
their own religious freedoms.

March2003
A summit of Arabic nations held in Cairo forms a new and deep alliance, made
possible by the rise of a new generation of national leaders. Its aim is to bind the
member nations under a common constitution. The alliance is initially comprised
of ten nations: Egypt, Libya, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Kuwait,
Iraq and Iran bond under a common zeal to promote the Muslim faith to world
power status politically in order to spread the message of Allah as the dominant
world faith.
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February 2005
""

'l

After several conferences the new constitution has been drafted and ratified
between the member states, which have now increased to 15, including Algiers,
Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Nations of Allah have
agreed to be governed overall by representation in a congress located in Mecca.
the world is astonished at the rapidity and magnitude of this consolidation. The
new national leaders have their people largely excited in playing an historic part
in the promulgation of their faith. Based on peace by consensus, old conflicts
have apparently been put aside.

The first sitting of the Congress of the Nations of Allah takes place in Mecca with
religious leaders appointed from each member nation. The message to all the
faithful is to spread the word of Mohamed further around the globe. In Malaysia,
Myanmar, Indonesia and other countries with a critical mass of Muslims these
direction is transmuted to become known as 'The Crusade of Jihad'. Whilst the
formation of the 'Nations of Allah' has brought stability and peace to the Middle
East the opposite effect is taking place in SE Asia. Australia is, in a lesser way,
embroiled in religious motivated violence as youth gangs from some Arabic
countries interpret the movement to be a calling to inflict retribution on other
ethnic groups such as the Turkish and Indian ethnic communities and the Jewish
faith.

December 2005
Religious fervour has continued to increase intensity of conflict between
Christians and Muslims in Indonesia, Muslims and Hindus in Myanmar and
Muslims, Buddhists and Taoists in Malaysia and the Philippines. It is as if the
former conflicts of the Middle East have simply been transferred to the Far East.

February 2006
An undeclared state of civil war has developed in Indonesia and parts of Malaysia
and the Philippines. Religious terrorism by way of bombings and armed clashes
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occur in urban Australia. Christian groups in Indonesia, with little or no
government control over the violence, call on friendly nations to help pacify their
regions.

Climactic Chaos in Oceania

March 2005
After a three-year stunted recovery SE Asia is again left behind by the western
economies. This time around Australia, with its trade and financial ties further
developed with its neighbours, is not so insulated from the Asian economic
decline.

May 2005
A United Nations environmental report reveals that ocean temperatures have risen
by almost two degrees Celsius over the last 100 years. Ocean levels are
unmistakably rising by over one metre in this period. Polar ice caps are
diminishing in size and icebergs in the Arctic and Southern Oceans are a more
frequent occurrence as they detach and begin drifting. Whale migration patterns
are changing as available ocean nutrients diminish. Penguin and sea lion
populations are also being affected as repercussions are felt through the food
chains.

September 2005
Record neap tides begin to be experienced with flooding of sea front settlements
and towns becoming commonplace globally. Tropical monsoons and hurricanes in
the mid-Pacific and Atlantic oceans have caused much damage during the
Northern Hemisphere seasons.
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March 2006
Emergency aid and rescue programs have been mobilised in the Caribbean and
northern Pacific islands.

Extremely violent cyclones ravage the south Pacific. Indonesia, Papua New
Guinea and Northern Australia each declare emergencies after receiving a
battering from devastating storms. Evacuation of numerous coastal towns creates
a policing problem in the affected countries, both from refugees and from looting
within deserted settlements.

April2006
The direst emergencies of the season occur through the south Pacific Islands as
smaller atolls are all but submerged and islands are flooded. The emergency takes
on an international dimension as the small nations of Solomon Islands, Fiji,
Tonga, Tuvalu and French Polynesia call for assistance in evacuating many of
their islands. An international response first from the nearest developed and able
countries rescues

thousands of displaced islanders. French, Malaysian,

Singaporean, Australian, New Zealand, French and British naval and air assets are
the first to assist. Japan offers assistance once it has attended to lesser
emergencies closer to it in the Marinas and Marshall Islands in cooperation with
the United States.

May2007
India surprises the international effort by arriving six days after the emergency
effort commences with a relatively large naval fleet, first at the Solomon Islands
and then at Fiji and Tonga.

June 2007
Tongan and Fijian governments are dismayed at the numbers of Indian Marines
left in their countries ostensibly as assistance to civil security and as
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reconstruction parties. Indian fleet command procrastinates in replying to Fiji's
query as to when the Indian military will withdraw. Fiji loses its patience when an
ultimatum for commencement of withdrawal by Indian troops is ignored and it
becomes evident that presence is subtly being built up in the Solomon Islands,
Fiji, Tonga and Tuvalu Islands. Fiji speaks collectively for its neighbours and asks
for Australian, British and New Zealand military presence to help intimidate the
Indian forces to withdraw.

Australia the Pariah

November 1999
The right of appeal to immigration courts is abolished in Australia. Suspect
visitors have a bond imposed before being allowed entry.

February 2001
Australia, with memories of disclosure of the full scale of atrocities discovered
recently in East Timor, leads renewed criticism of abuses of human rights in
Indonesia, Myanmar and China. USA tries to soften the strength of attack on its
most favoured trading partner but Australia maintains its stance.

August 2001
Australia again comes under international criticism, particularly from European
nations, for its refusal to adhere to targets to reduce green house emissions on the
grounds that geographical and socio-structural differences for Australia make
these targets unattainable without severe compromises to the economy.

November 2001
The USA, having bought emission permits from less developed South American
countries, joins in the condemnation of Australian intransigence on the issue.
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March 2002
Australia, with a change of government, reduces immigration quotas significantly
as unemployment rises. Renewed religious motivated violence and moves for
autonomy in Indonesian islands and Timor escalate.

July 2002
Internal conflict in Indonesia and East Timor results in increased migration into
northern Australia. A Red Cross report slams living conditions in internment
camps in northern Australia. Legal rights of internees under Australian law are
branded as unacceptable.

October 2002
Australia implores neighbouring countries to impose restraints on their
emigration.

December 2002
Unable to create additional detention holding facilities for illegal immigrants and
pressured by international condemnation of treatment of detainees, capped by
domestic outcries to curb immigration; Australia tasks the navy to drive ships
arriving with illegal immigrants back out to sea. Whilst an Australian Navy
destroyer is attempting to tow a merchant freighter overcrowded with
Melanesians intent on illegal immigration a disaster predictably occurs.

January 2003
The merchant freighter lists and sinks in heavy swells in the Timor Sea.
Melanesian casualties are in the hundreds. Global censure follows. USA and
European media vilifies Australian hypocrisy over human rights and Australian
policies.
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February 2003
In East Timor pro-integrationists Timorese Popular Democratic Association
(Apodeti) seize the opportunity to denounce Australia's part in participation in
peacekeeping duties there.

March 2003
A campaign by pro-integrationists to escalate violence in East Timor targets
Australian military bases in East Timor. Other Indonesian islands follow suit,
particularly in Ambon. Protests arise from ethnic groups within Australia,
particularly Asians in inner cities, over immigration restrictions. Many examples
of the government refusing family unification by disallowing immigration of
extended family relatives are brought to the attention of the international media
now focussed on the issue.

Counter protests by Australians feeling estranged by large areas of the urban
landscape being dominated by imported cultures and resentful of the poor
economic situation support the government actions on immigration. To counter
the escalation of violence perpetrated by pro-integrationists in East Timor an
increased counter-insurgency style operation is stepped up by large Australian
Army fighting patrols.

In the hills near Manatutu an Australian Army company stumbles on to large
Apodeti militia base. After a brief but bitter battle 67 Australian soldiers, mostly
wounded, are taken prisoner.

Apodeti forces announce demands for disarmament of independence fighters and
withdrawal of Australians from East Timor. After a week of failed dialogue
between Australians and Apodeti military leaders the Apodeti threaten to begin
executing the prisoners, referring to them as 'hostages'. In Australia loud outcries
convince the government to take decisive action.
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Trouble Elsewhere
Middle East Meltdown

October 200 I
After surviving the meltdown of neighboring Asian economies Australia
succumbs to long term reduction in regional trade and slips into recession.

January 2002
Iraq renews a loose alliance with Egypt. Syria and Jordan as intermediaries in
trade after relaxation of the ten-year-old trade sanctions.

March 2002
Israel elects a right-wing hard-line government.

June 2002
A renewed escalation of Kurdish uprisings in eastern Turkey. northern Iraq and
Syria induces coalition forces to split focus of enforcement of no-fly zones over
both the northern and southern Iraqi border air corridors.
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August 2002
A diplomatic dispute escalates between Israel and Palestine, as agreements are
reneged upon under new Israeli intransigence. Palestine receives the backing of
Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Iraq joins with renewed rhetoric against Israel. Syrian
forces clash in limited armoured skirmishes during Israeli military exercises on
their mutual borders.

February 2003
Iraq launches a conventional ground offensive to route Kurdish guerrillas in the
north. USA fails to convince coalition partners to intervene by launching military
air strikes.

September 2003
Israel raises alarm in the UN of renewed WMD in Iraq's arsenals.

After months of frustration in trying to rally support to force Iraq again to
relinquish its WMDs, Israel launches its own air offensive against suspected Iraqi
stockpiles of chemical/biological weapons. Iraq retaliates with SCUD strikes onto
Israeli cities. Syria and October 2003 Jordan mobilise their military forces and
sanction passage of Iraqi forces through their countries. Iraq poises on three axes
of advance near the Israeli borders. Iraq precedes conventional invasion into
Israel with chemical attacks on Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Two days later Israel
replies with limited yield nuclear strikes on Iraqi conventional forces in Syria and
Jordan. Iraq succeeds the following night in delivering a high yield nuclear bomb
onto Tel Aviv.

December 2003
A five day war with exchange of repeated nuclear strikes as well as deployment of
chemical and biological weaponry from Iraq ensues before military commands of
both sides, now without government, sue for peace brokered by Coalition forces
from their stand off positions for intervention. A dust cloud of fallout
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circumnavigates the globe forming an annulus north of the Tropic of Cancer, the
bulk of which initially precipitates onto the Indian sub-continent and far east Asia,
however some reaches over to Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean.

February 2004
Outbreaks of a myriad of deadly illnesses in populations and stock in the lower
Northern Hemisphere follow. Pakistan, India and Bangladesh are the worst
affected although serious epidemics also occur in Southern China, Myanmar,
Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. World economic markets are thrown into
turmoil with uncertainty of the full implications. Australia's recession is
exacerbated. Some Jewish, Palestinian, Kurdish and Arabic terrorist cells continue
to fight domestically in Europe.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) unravels several viral and bacterial
strains from the NBC Middle East War fallout but are stretching their resources to
address the pandemic problems. In affected countries lawlessness and armed
banditry is also becoming rife as civil and military personnel are affected with
illness alongside the rest of their populations. The UN appeals for special aid
teams from all countries able to provide assistance in mass vaccination programs.

Ebola Outbreak

April2006
Escalation of rebellion in the former Belgian and German Congos results in
significant conflict embroiling Ugandan, Kenyan, Tanzanian and Zairian military
forces. Ecological crisis arises as Zaire forces employ defoliation by chemical and
fire tactics to route rebel Hutus and renegade Tutsis in and around Rwanda.
Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya are swamped with refugees; collectively there is a
call for international rescue of displaced populations. Uganda additionally alerts
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the international community to the dire threats to gorilla and other primate
populations forced to move also displaced.

The sight of monkeys scavenging in the refugee camps becomes commonplace.
Indian, European and US aid is forthcoming. Expatriate countries, Belgium,
France, Germany and the United States offer a sponsored migration program to
relieve an otherwise overwhelming refugee problem. International wildlife rescue
bids relocate endangered gorillas and other primates to a variety of international
zoos and refuges set up specifically to handle the scale of the problem. Displaced
peoples are given an option under a quota for emigration to these same sponsor
nations.

June 2006
Illness besets refugee camps in Africa and those quarantined in host nations;
USA, France, Germany, Belgium and India. Symptoms are variably flu like
condition, progressing to febrile delirium or alternately dysentery with violent
abdominal cramps progressing to unconsciousness. Morbidity and mortality rise
to alarming proportions within eight days. Simultaneously, a world-wide
'Zookeepers Syndrome' is reported through toxicology web sites of similar
symptomology.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) subsequently identifies the pathogen as
Ebola Virus. Global quarantine measures are immediately effected; however,
secondary cases outside refugee concentrations are reported in the next week.
Panic arises in areas around reported Ebola spot fires. In Florida a military
mobilisation is necessitated to contain fleeing populations. In Europe, similar
containment measures are also enforced. In India panicking mobs overcome
police lines meant to confine them in villages and areas of outbreak. In a plethora
of nations the so called 'Zookeeper Syndrome' results in such a scattered pattern
of outbreaks that police with military assistance cannot move fast enough to
contain those in contact.
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July 2006
Throughout the western world a pin cushion pattern of outbreaks is generated as
secondary Ebola cases propagate to tertiary contact patients. In most countries
outbreaks are contained but in the near tropics of Florida, Southern India and in
central Africa itself the outbreaks threaten anarchy as police and other security
agents, hospital staff and medical workers also begin to affected.

August 2006
Police and military resources can only just manage fragmentation of national
administrations. In this month, however, some patients begin to recover,
particularly in the temperate areas of Europe, northern United States

United States Stumbles and Falls

August 2008
United States continues to experience internal agitation. Economic disruption
partly created by Y2K effects on production and services fuels the disquiet. In
Washington D.C. A gathering of blacks as a show of solidarity if not force, is held
again, organised by Louis Farrakhan to mark five years since the first uprising.
Again over a million people participate. The Muslim intonation set by this leader
is identified by right-wing whites as Arabic and therefore deplorable.

September 2008
A counter demonstration of force is played out in Washington D.C. involving
right-wing white supremacist groups joined by factions of the National Firearms
Association. The burning of effigies before The White House ignites fervour in
the melee. A black counter protest at the racially inspired show of hatred brings
about a violent clash. Attempts by police and security forces to quell the

288

Appendix 2

hostilities spreads violence further into the city's streets. Destruction of property
and looting continues into the night.

October 2008
The President calls out National Guard. Tear gas and baton rounds are used
against armed and angry mobs. Small arms fired, there are some injuries and
many arrests but the uprising is quelled in the short term. Public regard for the
government deteriorates, winter sets in, the poor and· disadvantaged feel colder,
poorer and increasingly disadvantaged as the Executive claims to be fixing all
economic ills for the people. In reality only the working middle and upper classes
are benefiting from new government strategies. Class resentment is now added to
the still seething racial unrest of a few weeks before. Employment security is at an
all time low and fear of losing what security they have sends America's working
poor onto the streets to highlight their plight.

December 2008
North America is largely non-unionised and non-militant. Union membership
increases and waves of rolling stoppages start to damage essential services such as
power, mail, transport and hygiene services.

March2009
As problems develop and increasing numbers of 'uninvolved' Americans are
affected by shortage resentment grows, random violence escalates with shootings,
robberies and murders. There are numerous violent demonstrations all across the
US, far too many for the National Guard to deal with adequately. Rationalism is at
an all time high. At an understaffed military biological warfare installation in the
Nevada desert, there is an accident.

The prevailing winds are blowing the wrong way and instead of dissipating
harmlessly over the desert, the pathogen spreads westward into populous
California, killing hundreds and infecting thousands. In spite of Governmental
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denials, the high profile media coverage, rumours about bungled containment
programs and the coverage of struggling, overfilled hospitals are too much for the
people.

April2009
Fear explodes across the nation, people panic and try to escape the west coast
where all is chaotic, Traffic accidents, riots, murders and looting ensue ... racial
and class resentments rise again in the panic. The anny is called in but is itself
fragmented with sick and disaffected soldiers.

August 2009
Internationally among the globally spread US military bases morale plummets for
fear of the plight of family and friends at home. Military strength is thinned out as
units are recalled to assist in restoring domestic stability.

October 2009
The global finance world is thrown into a spiral as loss of confidence depreciates
the $US dragging linked currencies with it.

December 2009
US Federal Government announces reluctant downscaling of foreign aid. Third
world countries look for new friends in the world.

January 2010
US forces in the Balkans are reduced by over 80% as military personnel are
recalled. Air bases in Turkey and the Gulf are likewise thinned out. United States
carrier groups and submarines are recalled to Hawaii and the Western seaboard
leaving an all time low presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

290

Appendix 2

May 2010
Violent clashes in the Balkans again flare between ethnic groups. Iraq and Turkey
renew their persecution of their Kurdish populations.

June 2010
NATO and Russian forces are taxed to contain renewed fighting. Renewed
fighting in Panama and Nicaragua erupts forcing the remaining US military to
withdraw. Australia again seeks membership of ASEAN and is accepted this time
as nations realise the increased need to maintain stability in the region with a
diminishing US influence.

November 2010
~

The US calls on its coalition partners to increase their commitments in
maintaining global stability. Britain, France, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
agree to deploy greater military strength to key areas to help avoid potential chaos
as the 'Global Policeman' retires. India volunteers to assist policing the Indian
Ocean, Japan seeks to change its Constitution through the Diet to patrol the
Marchianas, Marchtial Islands, Micronesia, Sea of Japan and East China Sea to
the Taiwan Strait.

ASEAN nations meet to renew a more vigilant strategy of poise in Southeast
Asia. Australia and New Zealand reach agreement on new responsibilities for
policing the South Pacific Ocean. A surprise amphibious attack on the under
manned Diego Garcia, succeeds in establishing an Iranian presence on the
formerly strong US base. Both the US and the UK do not have significant naval
assets in the region and call on their traditional allies in the region for immediate
assistance to reassert control. The tacit implication is their desire to not see India
seize the opportunity to assert control.
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Gene Warfare

November 1989
A new disease is documented in the United Kingdom affecting the national cattle
herd - Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis. (BSE) - as a viron apparently mutated
from that affecting sheep, causing the 'slow virus' disease Scrapie. Attention and
research is directed toward this new evidence of nucleic acids able to cross
species barriers.

September 1995
'Accidental' release of an experimental calicivirus from a CSIRO research station
on Kangaroo Island off the coast South Australia - Haemorrhagic Viral Disease
(HVD) -results in the death of 95% of rabbits in that state within six weeks. The
model is of extreme concern for epidemiologists; particularly those involved in
biological/counter-biological warfare studies, but also those purely concerned
with public health worldwide.

November 1997
Anxiety over public health is amplified with the announcement of a suspected link
between BSE and Croitszfeldts-Jakobs disease in humans, evident in its onset
within the brain's cerebral medulla with delayed symptoms of several years.
Epidemiological studies in the United Kingdom are inconclusive, as is the ability
to trace the presence of viron nucleic acids.

April1998
Concern over the use of genetic engineering in monoculture of foods mounts,
with fears of long-term integrity of individual human DNA as well as that of
uncontrolled propagation of dominance enhanced genomes and their potential to
ascend food chains with unpredictable consequences.
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August 2001
Pleas by Iraq for a lift of trade sanctions after ten years of hardships imposed after
their defeat by coalition forces in The Gulf War are rejected by a UN Council

-

after reports that Iraq's continued research and development in WMD's cannot be
ruled out. After a period of halcyonic development, even leading the world in
economic growth, Australia begins a period of down turn. Trade August 2003with
Asian neighbours has deteriorated in mineral and manufactured commodities but
new agreements on trade in agricultural goods has restored investor confidence,
particularly Trans-Pacific trade in agricultural goods. With the economic down
turn Australia uses quarantine as an argument for enhanced barriers to agricultural
imports.

September 2003
An outbreak in South East Asia of a new disease in rice - Rice Rot Diseases
(RRD) - causing husks to deteriorate prematurely results in general crop failure.
China and Japan, although mostly self sufficient, have no rice surplus to offer.
With the threat of famine alternatives are sought to the rice staple. This includes
cereals and processed cereal products. Spoilt rice is silaged and fed to livestock.

October 2003
Cereal crops across Canada, United States, Western Europe and Russia result in a
disastrous failure in wheat, sorghum, rye and barley harvests as they ubiquitously
succumb to various fungal and viral disease as they approach maturity.
Commodity prices for cereals and cereal by-products skyrocket as a result.
Australian, New Zealand and South African producers receive enormous
incidental benefits. In Canada, Europe and the United States spoilt crops are,
where possible, processed and used as stock foods.
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February 2004
Northern Hemisphere prevalence of crop failures leads to urgent agricultural
science investigations commissioned by various countries around the globe. The
only areas not apparently affected in the Northern Hemisphere appear to be
northern Africa where a diet of cous-cous, taken from immature wheat husks and
semolina from millet continues to be consumed as a staple. Almost
simultaneously British, Canadian and German researches discover a common and
apparently new genome in wheat varieties collected from around the Northern
Hemisphere.

This genetic research, which would have taken over a decade only twenty years
before, has been assisted by nucleic acid mapping databases developed and
recorded by genetic research laboratories. The new genome, masking several
believed responsible for plant resistance to diseases as well as some affecting
metabolisable protein contents and thus well mapped from research, has appeared
inexplicably in multiple wheat varieties. Within several days an almost identical
nucleic acid sequence is demonstrated in other cereal types. The next week the
same disease is discovered, although fragmented into several loci, in rice samples
from India and Southeast China.

March 2004
Testing of samples from the Southern Hemisphere prove negative except for some
cereals from Brazil, Venezuela and Chile. Speculation is that quarantine has been
effective in protecting Australia and New Zealand. Explanation is not found for
samples from the African countries to be free of the offending genomes, however
an additional genome is found prevalent in these African samples subsequently
shown to code traits known to dominate those found at the loci of the 'alien'
nucleic acid sites.
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Catastrophe strikes the livestock industries of the Northern Hemisphere as feedlot
animals succumb to a peculiar cerebral storage disease. Typically affected
animals rapidly become dumb and stand catatonically with no motivation to move
at all being evident. After several days, particularly on being coerced to move,
drink or graze, these animals will suddenly fall, sometimes seizure, scream and
die. Post-mortem consistently show an increased fluid accumulation, sometimes
with blood present, in the white matter of the brain cerebrum around the brain
stem. Microscopy and culture do not reveal any bacterial presence and affected
animals are seronegative to any known pathogen for such an encephalitis.

May2004
After a number of months a breakthrough is made by Canadian researchers
discovering the presence in the nucleic acids of affected animals of an alien DNA
sequence resembling that in Rice Rot Disease and in the offending genome
causing maturing cereal crops around the northern hemisphere to fail.
Repercussions of combined staple crop failure and evidence of a vicious viron
ascending food chains pandemic throughout Asia, Europe and Northern America
are of fear and panic.

In Auckland an Algerian posing as a representative of an agricultural business is
apprehended for suspicion of the authenticity of his passport and identity. Several
canisters are discovered in his personal luggage containing vacuum-sealed dust.
Forensic examination proceeds as the man's explanations of his identity and
purpose for visiting the country continue to arouse suspicion. The canister
contents are identified as modified wheat, barley, rye and sorghum pollens with
modified genetic content. The altered nucleic acid sequences are flagged as
identical to those found in failing Northern Hemisphere cereal crops.

Two weeks later a Tunisian woman is likewise apprehended for possession of
several identical canisters in her possession in Rio de Janeiro. Later in the same
week a Libyan woman claiming to be reuniting with her immigrant uncle is
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detained in Melbourne, several of the offending canisters are found to be in her
possession. Specialised interrogation of the detainee two days later discloses that
she has been coerced into the task of relayjng the canisters on behalf of an
organi ation she know to be dispersed across northern Africa calling themselves
the Phoenicians. She is aware of the prevailing terror the pollution of the gene
pools of the world's staple crops has caused and finally proclaims that "The
Phoenicians will continue to bdng the world to its knees".

WWIII
There can be Only One - Fight to Become World Power

June 200 I
European, US, Australian and other economies can finally no longer ward off the
effects of the Asian economic stagnation. A world-wide recession is developing.
Cruna and India lead the world in economic growth with their large domestic
market and maturing economies. In Australia unemployment rises alarmingly
and the $A follows the $US in depreciation.

296

Appendix 2

September 2001
Congo and Uganda, escalate in tribal based rebellion. British, French and German
UN forces are sent to intervene.

February 2002
Australia joins ASEAN after recognition of its success in restoring order in East
Timor after the Indonesian withdrawal.

March2002
South African forces advance into Uganda to assist Ugandan army attempts to
quash Hutu rebels. Fighting extends into Kenya as rebel forces travel covertly
within a refugee exodus from the Congo.

May2004
The Indonesian government capitulates as it fails to manage widespread civil
unrest. A military government replaces the old to try to restore order. Malaysian
and Singaporean governments begin to fragment under pressures of opposing
factions within their failing economies. Singapore especially finds itself
susceptible to world-wide depressed Marchkets. The European Union is tested as
member states dispute the relative effects of varying depressed GDP's on the
declining Euro. In Australia a growing trend of armed gang warfare by
disenchanted jobless youths follows the example of urban America and stretches
police resources.

July 2004
Protests at factory closures are becoming commonplace and increasingly violent.
Angola erupts in renewed civil war and combined South African, Ugandan,
forces, fresh from conflict in the Congo, move to pacify the warring factions.

297

Appendix 2

February 2005
Indonesia collapses into civil war as rival factions within the military rule grab for
territorial holdings.

April2005
Fighting spreads into Borneo and Sumatra. Sri Lanka suffers a major Tamil
guerrilla offensive and India intervenes by occupation. African Summit proposes
formation of 'The Free States of Africa', with constitutional unity between nation
states within the southern half of the continent, a single currency and a single
military service.

January 2006
Concurrence is reached with the new 'rainbow super nation' to be inaugurated.

January 2008
An international summit of world-wide fishing industries reveals a 60% decline in
fish stocks over the previous 50 years. This is attributed to over-fishing, effects of
changing ocean currents with global warming and most recently a marked decline
in piscine fertility attributed to accumulated ocean outfalls of heavy metals and
sewerage residues in continental shelves.

May2006
Europe, USA, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand accuse Russia, India
and China for the latter while India and China argue that the September
2007western world is responsible for global warming. The effect on the small
island economies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans combined with severe declines
in tourism have pushed them to breaking point. Later in the year India occupies
the Maldives 'to assist them in the distribution of aid'.
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November 2007
After three and a half years of civil war with failed intervention at the periphery
by Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, China sends peacekeepers into Jakarta at
the invitation of a Chinese-Indonesian backed military faction.

July 2008
China sends assistance with military escorts to collapsed economies of Micronesia
and India responds by sending expeditionary forces into Sumatra. ASEAN forces
are put on heightened alert.

September 2008
Arabic countries unite under a renewed Islamic movement. In response to Arabic
expansionist rhetoric there is general unrest in Khazakstan, Armenia, Central
Independent states and from the Kurds to the north. Russia leads its new NATO
allies into Central Independent States, and Khazakstan to intervene in border
outbreaks of armed skirmishes and to secure its oil fields. Pakistan declares
alliance with Islamic Nation. India increases its military presence on its western
border with Pakistan. And its naval fleets muster into the northern Indian Ocean
and near the mouth of the Arabian Gulf.

January 2009
NATO forces, having suppressed Serbian aggression, cross into Albania to route
guerrilla bases mounting retaliation raids on Serbian occupied villages. An
Albanian strike on a chemical processing plants near Kosovo releases a toxic
cloud killing hundreds of Serbs. NATO is forced to increase their presence as
Serbs try to rearm underground militia groups.

February 2009
China simultaneously strikes air and naval bases in northern Vietnam and mounts
a seaborne attack on Taiwan. Chinese marine forces seize Paracel islands and the
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northern Spratley Islands. US and British carrier fleets move to counter sudden
Chinese aggression but cannot manoeuvre to effective range before the surprise
invasion of Taiwan by PRC forces is made successful.

As US and allies engage in escalating naval combat in the South China Sea India
initiates surprise air and sea attacks on Diego Garcia in an attempt to prepare for
amphibious assault. India's aim is to force US forces out of the Indian Ocean and
take over as sentinel against Islamic expansion in its direction. The US responds
strongly with the single carrier group remaining in the Indian Ocean against
Indian fleets but cannot manoeuvre additional carrier groups otherwise committed
in the Pacific. After several days with heavy losses US forces withdraw south-east
from the Indian Ocean towards Australia.

March 2009
One Australian submarine is lost and another damaged in naval combat with
Chinese naval elements in the Malacca Straits as they attempt to clear the route
for an ANZAC naval contingent movement to the South China Sea.

May2009
The Chinese President delivers a speech stating that while Europe expands its
influence into Asia Minor, The Islamic Nation looks to expand beyond Egypt into
northern Africa. United Free African States annex c<?untries northward through
their continent and India grabs at the Indian Ocean and SE Asia, China will assert
its rightful claims in Asia to restore world balance of power. Chinese naval forces
extend south into the Arafura Sea. Combined US/Australian naval fleets move to
halt this south-east advance.

June 2009
Chinese amphibious assaults seize islands in the Timorese and Arafura Seas.
The Australian population becomes increasingly restless with regional instability;
northern populations begin to migrate to southern states anticipating conflict
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within Australia. Police and military resources are taxed controlling the domestic
instability. India invades Mauritius by unopposed amphibious landings. Their
apparent aim is to secure complete dominance over the Indian Ocean given the
mounting strength of the military forces of the new United African Free States in
the south and the Islamic Nation in the north.

United Free African States calls for allies in condemnation of Indian expansionist
aggression. The Indian navy experiences limited clashes with Islamic States'
naval forces in the Arabic Gulf and with PRC naval forces off the western Malay
peninsula and Free African States' navy in the south-west and is in a stand off
position with US/Australian naval fleets in the south east Indian ocean. China
aggressively defends air space over its new acquisitions of Taiwan and the Paracel
and Spratley Islands in the South China Sea, the islands annexed in the Arafura
Sea and over Java, Sumatra and Borneo in SE Asia.

Millennium Bug (Y2K)

In the two years prior to January 2000, there was a high profile media campaign
highlighting the Millennium Bug, an anticipated problem based on computer
inability to handle a four-digit date/time configuration. Computers with the
original configuration would be unable to process the date 01101/2000, instead
processing 01101100, meaning that any computerised date/time inventory system
could not distinguish it from the year 1900, therefore any information arising
from these systems was liable to be compromised.

As debate about the exact nature of the Millennium Bug heats up, increasing
numbers of information technology experts came forward to say that nothing or
anything could go wrong, from shops having ordering difficulties through to
planes falling out of the sky and missiles exploding in their silos, essentially the
entire fabric of society breaking down.
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By the end of 1999, many experts were advocating withdrawing enough money
from the bank to survive a few weeks, stockpiling food and fresh water, then
heading to the hills to wait the thing out, for better or\ worse. This declaration by
so many experts led to a panic rush on banks and stores. Some of the smaller
building societies collapsed and food shortages were rife. Chillingly, weapon
sales increase with the revival of a survivalist ideology.

June 2001
With the much touted arrival of Year 2000 (Y2K) initial problems are not quite as
severe as had been prophesised by the pessimistic. Most basic services had made
ready to convert the computer based operational systems and databases. In Asia
markets, and banks in some instances, are unprepared and are forced to cease
trading for a period of weeks. Financial markets although superficially prepared
for Y2K changeover, experience repeated system crashes and temporary market
closures as glitches are encountered in the networks.

September 2001
Realisation comes that on a basic level some people and organisations have failed
to understand the depth of the problem. Whilst most enterprises and services cross
over to the date/time configuration seamlessly it becomes evident that smaller
organisations right down to farm or raw material level have been ill prepared.
Insidiously problems of supply of component products, spares and disposables
and distribution systems mount.

February 2002
In a myriad of small failures progressively building toward major system
miscarriages. Hospitals running electronic therapy management systems are
generally able to changeover. Most common problems are with accessing records
that had not more recently been drawn on. The real problems arise when stocks of
medicines and surgical disposables faltered almost a year later as manufacturers
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were having difficulty with replenishing their depleting stocks due to the failure in
supply of some key raw materials.

May2003
Essential services experience increasing failures. Power, water, gas and fuel
supplies, although initially able to operate intact, subsequently falter as
maintenance on facilities fail. Perishable spares become unavailable, as their
manufacturers are unable to acquire raw materials to produce them.

July 2004
Insidious sequential erosion of business confidence and social fabric is initiated
and fuelled by the frustration of progressive failures in supplies and systems.

December 2004
Protests directed at governments and qangos commonly escalate through violent
demonstrations to riots as suppressed frustrations are vented. The Government
announces a far-sighted plan to correct the economy by restructuring and
investment but fails to secure credibility. Resurgence of 'survivalists' mentality in
anticipation of anarchy is seen. Radical movements of diverse ideologies find the
recruiting fields bountiful. Some scramble internationally for resources by
militant governments to secure a reliable supply of raw materials.

February 2005
South Africa makes a grab for Angola, Russia enters Kazakstan to extend its
access to oilfields. Police and military forces in non-aggressor countries are thinly
spread attempting to restore stability domestically before being tasked with the
control of incursions by aggressor states.

With conventional forces largely committed to containment of domestic
aggression and limiting the extent of foreign raider incursions they are unable to
mount effective deterrence or counter strikes. Moreover, lawlessness begins to
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erode the social fabric of developed nations. In the United States groups of
survivalists emerge from wilderness areas to pillage small communities for
supplies.

May2006
In towns and cities throughout Europe, the Americas and developed African
States panic buying increases, as demand for food begins to outstrip supply,
leaving people without basic necessities. People leave the cities to wait out
anticipated trouble, thereby avoiding being near any military installations ... in
case of a nuclear malfunction or accidental missile strike. They leave behind
many empty houses as prime targets {or looters and other opportunists.

Largely the global common view is that renewing former socio-economic
structures will restore order, either or, particularly for ideologically motivated
groups, a new script for humanity will emerge. In the mean-time survival and
posturing for the best status for recovery motivates populations.

The Information War

September 2000
Announcement that an estimated 1 billion people are now interconnected on the
internet, in the previous three years the greatest growth has surprisingly not been
in countries of greatest technological development but in those developing. These
principally were Argentina, Iran, Peru, Egypt, China, the Philippines, the Russian
Federation, Ukraine, and Slovenia in that order. International investment favours
the developing nations with the ability to utilise technological input, some
intrinsic resources and infrastructure, yet prepared to maintain inexpensive labour
markets.
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Regions, rather than nations, are left behind most represented by Asia and
Oceania. A gradual change in perception of other regions as being those of
opportunity conversely is evolving. Such regions are represented by southern
South America, Southern Africa and north-eastern Europe. Asia in general
remains stunted as she tries to restructure from the economic collapse of 1998.
The relative rate of acquiring internet literacy reflects this. Australia's hectic leap
in economic growth of 1998-1999, has apparently peaked and economic
indicators show a relaxation of the economy.

February 2003
Commercial release of inexpensive microwave Satellite Uplink Communications
(SUC) initially rivals digital microwave communications (hand held phones) but
is destined to replace the older technology. This is accelerated by incorporation
into numerous appliances of everyday personal use. Of paramount significance is
the wireless connection of personal computers of a variety of formats inter-linking
them with increasing numbers and increasingly varied and remoted peripheral
applications.

The personal computer notebook evolves into a complete personal office,
constantly interconnected with the invisible whirring web of world wide
microwave communications. Individuals go about daily affairs with initially
'hands free' interconnectivity comprising a ·minute behind the ear, on the throat
speaker and microphone arrays inputting to a pocket or belt mounted

sue

personal computer.

Other applications range through car GPS navigational systems becoming
standard to industrial applications to the point that componentry is even re-routed
during transit to sites where it is best utilised through market fluctuations in
commodity or consumption markets.

November 2004
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Three results of the hyper revolution in interconnectivity is heavy reliance on
satellite relays, concentration of information management power on software
developers and a new social unrest in third world countries made newly aware of
how disadvantaged they are within a global info-sphere.

March 2005
Need for increased satellite communication capacity is eased by the growing
viability of commercial low to medium orbit payload business first pioneered by
Virgin Airways with trans-atmospheric transporters, or commercial space shuttles.
Other multinational corporations are quick to emulate the new technology.

A multinational Space Control Centre is necessitated to coordinate the boom in
space traffic. Microsoft Corporation, after an eight-year wrangle in the US courts,
wins a landmark case for using its market dominance to expand its software
utilisation to service and control customer access to the internet. As the uptake of
communications booms, however, some others, particularly those with a
technological niche in hardware configurations, especially in satellite relays,
emerge to rival Microsoft.

June 2005
Those with the means to best utilise new technologies pace ahead of those who do
not. Third world countries are better off but are more aware of their disadvantaged
status. Their resentment is made louder by their new ability with limited
technology to make themselves heard. Third World disgruntlement and the
vulnerability of the intemetted world is first demonstrated by a surprise attack on
the city financial exchanges in London by a High Energy Radio Frequency
(HERF) burst. This attack erases all electronic transactions of the day's trading
and much that has not been down-loaded to remote data banks.

July 2005
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The repercussions on world markets are significant. The source is traced to a
heavy electronic apparatus installed within a vacant building in the Moregate area
identified by Ministry of Defence technical experts as being a powerful, but
relatively unsophisticated, multidirectional HERF gun.

August2005
An, until now, little heard of terrorist group networked across northern Africa,
'The Moorish Fighters', claim responsibility. The motivation is unclear apart from
a demonstration of their ability in what is realised to be the first employment of a
Weapon of Mass Disruption (WMD). Evidence is published in The New Yorker
of the results of a 'black' operation incursion into a clandestine base of 'The
Moorish Fighters' that they have received technical assistance and funding from
Russia.

Large parts of the internet are rendered dysfunctional by a virus attacking the
servers. Whereas a volley of viruses in the previous few years have transferred
across internet connections attacking data bases with increasing sophistication and
specificity, this new virus is not so discerning. Although apparently seeking out
internet address suffixes denoting nationalities, the web of communications does
not recognise sovereign borders. At the same time a subtler virus is launched
through the net targeting power, water, gas and chemical processing heavy
industries in Asia, Northern America, Western Europe, Australia and New
Zealand. As a result, in Basel, Switzerland a pharmaceutical plant accidentally
releases a massive toxic plume spreading from Europe through South East Asia
and into Australia.

In northern England a nuclear power plant disperses radioactive water into the
Tyne River. Rapidly the situation worsens as disruption spreads into the control
mechanisms of essential service providers forcing key facilities either to shut
down or malfunction with disastrous consequences. Power blackouts spread
across the globe.
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The intentional nature of the attack on global information systems becomes
evident as Russia begins systematically to target military and communications
satellites with HERF weapons directed from their own satellites in orbit rendering
them

un-programmed

and

inoperative.

The degree

of frailty

of the

interdependance of the world on computerised interconnectivity is realised in
absolute terms as world communication goes off line. Orders cannot reach US
military facilities and fleets.

News correspondents, viewing the Red Army rolling into the Ukraine and the
Central Independent States of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan
and seizing oilfields in Mongolia are unable to inform the rest of the world. With
the world's main powers blinded the opportunity to pursue regional objectives,
with coaching from Russian envoys, is pursued. Algerian forces move into
Tunisia and against Libya. Zairian forces move to seize resources in northern
Angola. Northern Korean Naval Forces engage the Japanese fleet in the Sea of
Japan. Regional conflict flares again in Panama, Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

Domestically, as in many crippled countries in Northern America and Western
Europe, there are loud cries of protest at the interruption to power, water and gas
supplies and the environmental disasters caused by malfunctioning heavy
industries. As unconfirmed reports trickle in of the anarchy breaking out in
several theatre conflicts, a new resolve of calm and resolve to weather out global
mass disruption emerges.

WMDs to Order

2000-2002
Destabilisation after the economic collapse throughout SE Asia in the late 1990's
spreads through the region. Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines all
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begin to succumb to unrest spurred by the re-emergence of ethnic and religious
differences within their borders. In Borneo for example Indonesian, Malaysian
and British troops in Brunei are tested to contain resurgence of ancient tribal
feuds resulting in a cycle of murderous attacks and general instability.

Similar unrest ferments between minority groups in a patchwork throughout Asia.
In Cambodia, Laos and Thailand a new popular leader - Lorn Png - emerges
gaining support for raising an irregular army intent ultimately on reasserting a
'Cham Empire' through Indochina. In western China revolts by economically
disadvantaged peasants are brutally repressed as they are in Tibet with a renewed
indigenous push for independence. In Northern Korea students are massacred
reminiscent of Tiananmen Square rioting to support reunification with South
Korea.

March 2002
Deep concern spreads through the western world as new medical reports are
released that the current generation has been short-changed in its health
expectations. Fertility in males in developed countries, suspected of being in
decline for some time, is confirmed as now being on average less than half that of
fifty years previous. Additionally, aging populations are exhibiting an epidemic of
a wide assortment of cancers. Exposure to multiple industrial and domestic
chemical agents accepted as part of the environment of an industrialised society is
signalled out as the principal causative factor.

November 2002
Disaster is added to the recipe for discontent as a terrorist strike rocks the USA.
The huge explosion in a toxic waste dump in Utah exploits the media focus on the
Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. Long term effects can only be speculated at but
fuels the prevailing social climate of health concerns
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January 2003
A nuclear generator meltdown in Czechoslovakia results in fallout spreading over
Western Europe. Memories of Chernobyl are resurrected. The net effect in the
western world is a growing awareness that not only are populations greying as life
expectancy increases, but global birth rates are on the decline. One result of the
environmental concern is fierce opposition to continuation of heavy industry in
developed countries with pressure on large corporations to take such activities
offshore.

After four years of successive and worsening current account deficits, largely due
to declining mining exports with loss of Asian customers for raw materials,
Australian interest rates are rapidly elevated as inexorably the Reserve Bank is
forced to relent on monetary

policy~

Government resorts to resurrecting rhetoric

of "the recession we had to have" faced with the inevitability of the situation.

Repercussions of plummeting levels of investment are felt within Australia
through the next two years as foreign enterprise seeks opportunities in cheaper
labour markets in South East Asia. Just as Australia has enjoyed a relative
economic boom since 1998, with economic growth leaving that of its neighbours
in the region well behind, the situation is reversed with multinational corporations
diverting its interests into the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and
South Korea. Similarly new enterprise flirts with opportunities in Brazil,
Columbia, Chile, Venezuela and Argentina. The net effect in these countries is to
widen the gap between the wealthy and the impoverished. Recruitment into
irregular armies and militias is subsequently re-invigorated.

In many places multinational corporations, their interests inadequately protected
by sovereign defence forces, raise their own security forces. Asian governments,
and to a lesser degree some governments in Africa and South America, condone
these private armies as they enhance their own forces of suppression on
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insurrectionists. This is viewed as essential to maintain investment within their
borders from multinational corporations by enforcing a domestic stability.

Meanwhile a global shift of economic activity back to Asia leaves a wake of
industry contraction and enterprise closures through Europe and northern America
as well as in Australia and New Zealand. Just as in other Western nations
currency depreciation a contractions of government spending on infrastructure,
defence and social services compounded with multiplier effects bring about
serious declines in living standards and bank foreclosures.

February 2004
Expressions of dissatisfaction mount, occasionally with protests such as outside
closing factories becoming violent with destruction of commercial property.
Disgruntled individuals increasingly identify and join with issue motivated
groups, a process greatly enhanced by new freedoms in communication found in
the internet. Such groups likewise find alliances and exchanges of ideology with
partners that without internet exchange would otherwise seem unlikely.

Australian government announcement to accept a multi-billion dollar nuclear and
toxic waste dump into central South Australia is met with outrage from
environmental issue motivated groups yet greeted as the cash injection needed to
tum the economy around by others.

Within Australia's indigenous community deep rifts occur between groups and
their newly acquired wealth from royalties.

June 2004
The recently expanded Jabiluka uranium mine has caused divisions between the
large mining and pastoral companies and the traditionalist landowners who
deplore the desecration of their spiritually significant lands. These native title
landowners are increasing their claims which they are acquiring rights over at an
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accelerating rate with land rights claims. As in Asian countries in July 2004the
past few years multinational companies involved expand their security forces.

September 2004
Violent clashes become increasingly frequent between such security forces, the
police and defence forces in aid to the civil power with environmentalists and
indigenous groups.

December 2004
Populations of nearby communities are divided between concern, sometimes
unfounded, for their health with nearby industrial activity and clash, sometimes
violently, with those welcoming the positive effects on local economy.

January 2005
Internationally poor economical climate and social unrest gives rise to long
suppressed and unresolved conflicts. The Balkans again flares up in fresh
1
,

violence, Kurds clash repeatedly with Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi troops.

April2005
Basques receive renewed support for terror campaigning, as do Irish
Republicanists and Unionists.

June 2005
Paraguay finally collapses into civil war drawing Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia
into shared conflict.

August 2005
Indochina erupts in new fighting led by Lorn Png against alternately Thai,
Cambodian and Vietnamese troops in hit-and-run strikes.
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Central Africa declines into anarchy as incongruence between tribal ethnicity and
sovereign borders again draws government troops of Uganda, Kenya and Zaire
into combat with Hutu and Tutsi rebels

September 2005
The world is successively shocked when China implodes in civil conflict with
regional armies set against each other, principally the south against the north but
in a distorted picture as individual provinces declare faltering allegiances.

Globally an outbreak of use of chemical weapons appear being put to use first in
China, soon after by Lorn Png' s forc.es against Vietnam. Biological weapons are
proved to have been used in Rwanda

October-November 2005
Discovery of an attempt to generate nerve agents for use against civilian
populations is uncovered in a disused factory in Cheyenne, Wyoming. FBI
intelligence summary discloses that the perpetrating issue motivated group
purchased the information to attempt chemical weapon manufacture from a
multinational mercenary like group.

Israeli Intelligence releases a report that a Palestinian cell within its borders has
likewise been apprehended attempting chemical weapon manufacture. An
international broker has again supplied some chemical components and
connection is confirmed with lethal information sources purchased from a
multinational security entity.

A rash of reports of use of mostly chemical, occasionally biological weapons
being used in conflicts within China, United States, Central America, Western
Europe. Customers for the various weapon recipes or components raw materials
are variably guerrilla movements, issue motivated groups and multinational
companies seeking draconian measures to secure their aims or own security.
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APPENDIX3
INITIATING LETTER ON THE FIVE KEY CHALLENGES

This correspondence was drafted by me for Commander Special Forces signature
and sought to elicit the widest possible views from the organisation. Many
responses were startling in their creativity and boldness. As this had never been
attempted before it was not surprising that some concerns about the chain of
command were raised. It remained, however, a genuine and sincere attempt to
secure opinion.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL OPERATIONS
MINUTE

HQSO

/98

See Distribution List

DEFINING THE FIVE KEY CHALLENGES

"Increasing attention is being given to clearly defined goals and
corporate values, strategic planning, teamwork, ongoing critical
self-analysis . . . high performance organisations increasingly
perceive that their competitive edge is gained through their
people".
Glenn Review (1995) p.33
1.
I am sure you would all agree that the old ways of doing business are
becoming less effective. This raises the question of how we are to identify the
core issues and implement the appropriate changes. It is my belief that the
solutions we seek are within the SF Group and an efficient means must therefore
be found to draw out these core issues.
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2.
If you are a vehicle mechanic at Holsworthy, a storeman at Williamstown or
a medic at Swanbourne I want to know what you think.
3.

I ask that you consider the following question:

"What do you consider to be the five issues that
the SF Group needs to confront in order to
propel us into the future?"

4.
As you may have guessed, this is not about any particular unit, it is about
our survival and growth as a new organisation operating in a different and rapidly
changing world. The issues each of you identify will be combined with others to
form a complete, accurate and concise expression of what we need to think
about.
5.
The involvement and participation of every individual in this process is
critical. Start thinking now and fax your response to HQSO as soon as possible
(handwritten is fine). The results will be sent back to units as soon as we have a
complete list. To allow the project to proceed we must have all responses at
HQSO by 27 Mar 98.
.

6.
If you are in Sydney feel free to drop in and discuss the project with the
SOJ5/8 group. I look forward to receiving your comments.

P .J. McNAMARA
BRIG
COMO SF

(02) 95359 2476

Mar98

HQSO
COSASR
CO 1 Cdo Regt
CO 4 RAR (Cdo)
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APPENDIX4
RESPONSES FROM THE FIVE KEY CHALLENGES QUESTION

The responses presented here were analysed by members of the various
workshops. The aim was to poll the organisation for beliefs, expectations and
concerns. These were then surfaced as part of an orchestrated campaign to locate
consensus with a diverse body of opinion. The information vindicated
qualitatively the results of the futures planning (Chapter Three) and the effectsbased planning (Chapter Four).

Table 9. Full set of categorised responses.

1d

our systems into the intelligence infrastructure
n Australia to achieve seamless connectivity and

nt<'•r\Alo<:u:I\{Q.

Operations

Operations

Management

8 Management of human resources. Break away from
conventional career structures and develop specialists in
their fields
9 Consult widely outside the organisation, we have become
too insular
10 Keep all those within the organisation informed, rather than
alienated
Consolidate Restructuring the Army (ATA) changes:
Develop 4 RAR (Commando)

Communication
Leadership
Management

'3_~_ise Jb..~ .§p_~~j~)_fQ!:.C2~~-T!~J!!l!:!9_Q~r~t~~--------------- -- ·----------·1--,-------,--------·---------!-,--,-·t--_-~+c--:+-_-·,-+-:c·:-t-::c-t
clandestine

Management
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4c

18 Increase the awareness of current methods and
technologies through the secondment of members to

Personnel

r~J~Yil.r:t!~f)_e_ciaJis_t_ Ci'{~t_Q~g_c:t!lisa.!LC?!:l~.?.l'lsl ';_'_2r)~;;_·_<:~nc~l.""'::::~----~---+---------:·--:-:---+::-:+-:---:-t~-~--:-o+~c+:--:-~

1-----o---- -··t·

4d : 19 Develop a better covert communications capability through
undetectable unendorsed use of current communications

Communication

Capability

23 Development of career progression plans for both officers
and non-commissioned officers in the
Forces Gro
5d 24 Development of a cunning plan to ensure Special Forces
officers are infiltrated into key, important and influential
positions at all levels throughout both the Army and the
Australian Defence Force
• 25 Proactive marketing/selling of the Commando capability at all Marketing
levels - we need to push our requirements/development at
Australian Defence Headquarters, Army office, Headquarters
Australian Theatre and Land Headquarters. Dictate progress
on 'our' terms
-·-·----· ---····-· --------- ·-··----···--···-------··----- ---------------------------+,------·--···---··
. 26 Manning of the Special Forces Group - particularly
Personnel
.
H~_a.Qgua.!1~~s~p~cic:t!_Of)_l:l~§lt!2.1'l~_?.f'!Q4RABJ<.?g~----27 Provision of more visibility/communication from the top
Communication
dow_l}__-:__11'!?t. J~_!::I~<:t~9uarters
to the units
28 Coordination of and equity
Management
to the COAD/PMSAIAOPs

Special Forces allowances to include all members of Special Pay

l---i-------·FFg~9~~-{[Qclu~il'lg_off[9_~~~L_______ __ _____ _ __ __ _____ _-·:-:-----------------+-=----------------:-··------------+---6a

Due to workload and mental pressure endured by the
Personnel
Special Forces soldier, a course/plan/wind down period
should be established to aid the soldier at point of discharge
fit back into society at a higher level than that that is
currently provided. I believe if done effectively a network of
assistance can be called upon if required by the parent unit's
undation members to aid members with problems in
fields, such as a civilian career. Although this is the
practices at this stage, in 10-15 years this could very well be
a viable
7a ' 32 If a soldier is cross-trained giving him the ability to diversify Pay
his skill, it is my belief that the soldier should be paid for the
skills learned. This should surely apply to the Special Forces
environment. At this point in time there is N incentive to burn
and bust one's body apart from personal pride and goal
achievement. Motivation and morale would surely be raised
considerably if acknowledgment of one's commitment was
evident
one's
8a 33
ng strategy
~nt:or<>t·inr•<>

tO

rolilro<><>

317

Appendix 4

Management
· Leadership

10 . 43 Ensure capabilities are needed (ie fill an existing gap in
Capability
a
Australian Defence Force/National capability and operations
Government is willing to commit Special Forces to) and that
the capabilities are viable/survivable (ie in realistic
environments include high-tech threat for strategic Special
rati
10 44 Be able to rapidly procure leading edge technology
Technology

b
10

c
10
d

Selection

11

Capability

10

Capability

11
b
11

49 Special Forces Group needs representation within the
Marketing
ADFWC of the Directorate of Land Warfare
50 Officer tactics training is currently centred on conventional
Training
warfighting. Some portion of the ISC, IOC and AOC should
be devoted to SO to inculcate the wider Army community
with the notion that SO is another option available to
commanders. The Special Forces Gp needs to balance
marketing against the need to minimise OPSEC. It must
maintain its mystique whilst explaining its capabilities to the
rest of the ADF and Australian Government--·---------- ···----·-·----.L---·-·-··-·------··-···-·-·-----L___
~
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11 ! 51 The Special Forces Group needs a better understanding of Personnel
Y Y N N N Y
d J
its own history, its successes and its failures. An operational
L_ r~~~il!.£'l.qell wj_~hil} HO§Q_2.9uld proyide this --..----~---~ - - - - ·--+:-:-+::-·+-:+:~+::-:+-::
11 I 52 The Special Forces Gp in conjunction with DOGM-A needs
Personnel
Y N N N N N
e !
to develop an officer career plan to incorporate important
i facets of service in non-Special Forces units such as
J.~I!9.~-~ .!!~i!:t!!1_g__~D5.l.tu_!t_~~~~ed~C::~!i_~r1.. -·---·----- ___________ 1-:------------ .______________ ...... ___ ...... __ _
12 ! 53 Review, rationalise and adjust all SO staff processes in order Leadership
N Y N N N N
a !
to establish 'bes~ractice' i!l_all areas_________ ·-·---~---------r-:c-·-·_ .._______
---:-~-:-=-~::-:-+·~-::--:1
12 J 54 Successfully establish and develop the Commando
Capability
N Y Y N N N
capability, rationalise SASR to reduce duplication, maximise
b !

1 ....

-55 -6r~r!~n~~~~:~~~i~:ic~s~W~~c;~P<>~C?~~~rii--<fe-cori>s----·· Iead-erslliiJ ______ ·v· -v- N' -,( r'i' N
c .L....... . .................. -----..-----------------. -.. -___ . _.-.. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................................................... ------ . ---- . . .. . . . .
12 I 56 Identify and adopt selected emerging technologies and
Technology
N Y N N Y N
d i
capabilities relevant to the future battlefield. or theatre of
12

i

i ~;f~~!~~~lleiJaieiltialoTiildividua·lsto-contri'bllte-to

12 5i
sl)eciaTe i
Forces contingencies through multi-skilling and continuous

Personn-er·-~- v

N N

v N N'-

J. . . . .

.~.~~!!:1.!.!1.9..______________ ........................... ·----- ------------------------~---------------·-----··-- ----------------------------1-:--:13 i 58 Common information management plan within Special
Communication N Y Y N N N
__ (..........E.c::>_rQ.~-~--<:i.P........................ ______________ --------------------- . -- ---------------------------...... ...... --- _________. ___________ .. ____________ · ....... --- -- ------ ------- ------ ------Administration
N N N N N y
13 i 59 Common admin SOPs within Special Forces Gp
b !
-- IV
-y N N N N
13 i 60 More emphasis placed on Commandos, poor cousin to
Leadership
c
SASR
N y
N N
13 i 61 Prioritise our objectives both within Special Forces and more Management
d ! _ _!rnportai"!!!Y- within the HQ _
---------113 i 62 More emphasis placed on Admin and Log in order to spt ops Leadership
N N y N N N
e j ___ mq~~--~!!!c::_i_~~!y____________________________________________________________________ ---- _____ ____ ___________
14 f 63 More staff for orderly room
Personnel
Y Y Y N N N

N~

a

t

14 i 64 One computer system for all Special Forces units (integrated Administration
N N Y N N N
b J__ _____ -~9!_~a.~~ 9.! loc§l!~r1.9_QQ.C_!!~~.!l.!§__~!li!_Ln_fQ~_I!\_a!LQ!l1_______________ ------------------------ ___ ___ _ __ ___ _ _
14j. 65 A paperless headquarters (all information to be scanned
Administration
N N Y N N N
c .
onto hard drive for quick and easy location of

r·ss ~~~~:~~~~f~e--headquarters

14
is mannecfand operational 24 Personnel
.. Y Y N 1 N N .N
d i
hours a day in all departments. This eases the build up of
__L ______ -~-0!~:. ___________________________________ ------------------------------------.---•-----------.---------··-· ·-----------------------·-~
14 j 67 Only file relevant information
Administration
N N Y N N N

-·-i 68 One administrative computer system for Army. I have been

e !
15
a

!

------------------.----------~------------------·-------------------

---------------::-:- ,...,...~..,-Administration
N N Y N N N

to three different HQ and each one had its own Data

--L---

~as~/Reg!~!~!-~~Y..~!~I!l_:___ ~---·------~-.------~------~-----~------ _,_·-···--~-------·~--- r-~·
··--15 ! 69 Clerical manning for HQ. We are down to two clerks, which Personnel
Y Y Y N N N
_
___
_______
b l __ means that we are covering_!hree jobs as well as ours.
15 ! 70 Why certain staff officers last year could do their own filing
Personnel
Y N Y N N N

:5 ~1 ~~:i:;;~~f~!if~:~r~~I~ =~~;}!i~:.
d ..l.____ LHQIVIC Bks have a sports. afternoon every Thu.
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Leadership

Communication
Personnel

a happier

Personnel
Personnel

Management
Leadership

and surmount every difficulty to

! 82

The group is held together through internal cohesiveness
ratherJhan_external
. . -~r~~-_(~elly1J~?-4:L____ _ ______ _
17 ! 83 Selection and maintenance of the aim (principle of war).
e ·
Think of the group, strive to be cohesive, get rid of petty
jealousy, achieve excellence, support your mates and

Leadership
Leadership

:

Leadership

84 The lack of clear direction, eg it seems to take a long time for Leadership
decisions such as where we move to, what equipment we
choose to be made. There are probably very good reasons
for this but it still seems
ann
18 · 85 The lack of modern equipment, facilities and basic resources Equipment
b
such as communication
-------·····-·----------··- ·-· -- ---~---- ------:--·::·-----,----,------·+=·--------·:-:-----------· ------f··:··:-+-:c:18 86 The lack of operational experience. Maybe specialisation in Operations
c
one field eg amphibious may be less enjoyable. We should
in these peaceful times, take whatever job comes up as long
as there is the chance of gaining some experience (and a
18
a

18
d
19
a

lack of manpower. What can I say?

Personnel

88 The Procurement Process. The best measure of trust in a
Management
bureaucracy is the responsibility to expend funds. The
current procurement process is cumbersome. If the Special
Forces Gp is to exploit new technology and develop new,
potentially clandestine, capabilities, it needs its own discrete
funding, with the appropriate control mechanisms built in. A
guaranteed regular level of funding, even of relatively small
amounts (say $1M/year) would allow the Special Forces Gp
to achieve a 'leading edge' position within Defence. We
would have to accept however, that some of the projects
would fail. This fundi'l9~QU1d assi§!_!_!:l__t!]_E3__d_______~'-'"'~-~e_,_cn_t,__ ~-----'---------------------'---·'----'----O---"'--'-----'
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19
b

19
c

19
d

e

20
a

20
b

20

89 The Development Process. Special Forces Gp should be at
the leading edge of technological innovation within Defence.
We should be providing those short notice leading edge
(para) military capabilities that are required by Government.
We do not really know what they are! There should be
strategic guidance that moulds our effort. In absence of this
we should be developing our own. Being the leading edge,
there should be more latitude in our processes that allow for
development paths to end in options that are other than
successful!
90 Focus Equipment. We are very focussed on equipment. We
should concentrate our effort on future capability and
therefore develop organisations, structures, doctrine, tactics,
procedures AND THEN what equipment is needed as a
WHOLE SYSTEM.
91 Exploit technology. There is much TALK about exploiting
technology. Soon the Special Forces Group will have secure
connectivity throughout. We will be in position to be the lead
in the development of processes and procedures from an
Army and ADF perspective. A system like Lotus Notes for
example would give us the potential to streamline our
as we know what
We shou be pushing responsibility
to
lowest level. Individuals who own, or consider they are
part of, a process will work harder and try and improve it.
We should encourage innovation, new ideas and not be
afraid of maki
i 93 Paperless Office. For example all incoming
!
correspondence be scanned into the computer system. This
·
would prevent documents from going missing and make
access to the documents by all, simpler and faster. This will
also help with the accounting of documents much easier and
remove the need to keep unnecessary paper on file. Only
the author has the responsibility to have the original
document on hard
for
i 94 All units need to use the same computer system (same
'
software and administrative databases). Every unit seems to
be wasting resources designing their own database to suit
their unit's needs. Due to the lack of centralisation, each unit
seems to be replicating the same information, just in a
different format. This doesn't just waste time and resources
designing but also time training a new user posted to the
unit.
Formal training in software used in your work environment.

Leadership

Leadership

Management

Leadership

Administration

Administration

c
20
d

Responsibility for your own work. Everyone has a specific
Management
job to do and in a small unit it can become quite busy.
Sometimes it is necessary to delegate a menial task to the
lower link in the chain. This chain should be limited to your
relevant area of responsibility. It is fact that in most cases the
lowest link in the chain is in the Q Store or Orderly Room
and most
that
e have
r own
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specific job or area of responsibility. Because they forget
this, the work these areas are responsible for, gets neglected
because they get bogged down doing everyone else's menial
tasks. When you multiply your menial tasks by the amount

L___ -~=:~;J~~~u~!~~;J!~~.-~~~~~~9~~-~:~-~-:~~-:_::~----- --~-·-------

j

:~~~ ~;~:~~~E~~~~~~1;~~~::~r::~- A::tr:tion YN~ NNN
21 I 98 Operational capability results from effective and realistic
training. This is not new. This is achieved when all levels of
a ·
command comprehensively understand the direction, intent
and end state of the required objectives. This direction is
best articulated in the form of a Training Directive. Ideally,
Training Directives should encompass key objectives and
likely contingencies as well as addressing key
responsibilities for training management and capability
overlap. Further, it is enhanced when opportunities for
,
overseas attachments and deployments are maximised. In

_L..... ~b2~.L~l~~!_Qi~E!l_9!!9!l.J~_ctlcJi!ed. --------~-----------·-------

21 l 99 It is imperative that the resources allocated are realistic and
b ·
ensure the required capability is achievable. Whilst it is
acknowledged that resources are finite, there is a point
which if gone below, the capability will not be realised. It is
accepted that this places the onus on the user to only
.
request what is required. This is dependent on the
I
experience of the trainer - something the Special Forces

L--- §~9.!P-.!~_1").5?_~~il9.~.£!:_________________________ ---~------------------

Leadership

Y N N IY N Y

--·--------·------ _________ _
Management
N N Y N N N

---------·------------·--- __________ _

21 i 10 The framework that makes up the management of the
Management
c
0 system must be clearly understood. This is currently not the
! case. The introduction of the NATO Staff System needs
clarification. Whilst generic descriptions have been offered,
there is not a definitive over-riding document available which
clearly articulates job function and description. For the Gp to
move into the future, four key issues musts be addressed:
(1) What exactly is the NATO Staff System?
(2) What fundamental changes does its implementation
require?
,
(3) What are the key job functions and descriptions?
! (4) Does this system represent the best possible practice for

!

N N N N N N

_1 ___ ~~~-0 Group at al~ level_~----------------- ---------·-+-:-+-:-:-+-:-j_- __

21
d

l 10 With a clearly defined Staff System, it is imperative that the
1 flow and passage of information is a two-way exchange. A

Leadership

I

N Y N N N Y

number of instances have occurred that would indicate that
the passage of information down the chain is not as timely
;
nor complete as it might be. This normally manifests itself as
I an unpredicted change in direction that is not anticipated by
the units.
.
21TTo The SpeCialForces Grc)u-prriust maintain-an-holistic------- Leacfership-----~--N ·N- N N N
e
2 approach. No one particular unit makes up the team.
Mutual pride and professional respect is borne by the
attainment.~~ common goals. As situations, org~nizations
_L __ and ~ab11i!1es 9han~_ we cannot afford to be mfluenced_ _____________ '---'--- ____L_

i

i
I
i
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::l:;i~i~~~~~~~~~~~~~;f;:~~d~::;:.:~=-:::j:I :-:

b i 4 support and preparation prior to, during (if possible, eg
i Commando qualified Marine Mech) and after should be
!
considered. HQSO should have Logistic Advisors for unit
commanders to liaise with. This would also assist in the
development of the Special Forces Group as ILS can be
arranged by the user who knows what is required and when
,
it is required. This would ensure the Special Forces Group
i --··· ets the right equipment !2!_the right~~--------- __
__ _ ---~~--:--- ~ -:-r-:--:22 10 Maintenance of Capability. Ensure the appropriate steps are Equipment
N Y Y N Y N
5 developed to maintain unit equipment. Without the
equipment in an operational state of readiness, the Special
__ Forces Group has N c~itbiliW..:_____________
10 Communication and Intelligence. Commanders at all levels Communication Y N N Y Y N
6 should be able to communicate within and outside the
Special Forces Group. Computers are an ideal, however
security must be maintained. N mission will succeed without
sound communications and intelligence. Intelligence briefs
should occur to all members (regardless of rank) of the
Special Forces Group whether the member is ECN 079
____jCommandoLor EC£'-L146-2 (Fitter/ArmtL ____. --··--·
-····--··..·----·
22 10 Morale and Training. The maintenance of morale is and
Leadership
) 7 '-N ~i\1' --,( ·N N
7 always will be a commander's responsibility. Realistic
e
training and continuous course development will ensure the
Special Forces Group has members who are keen to provide
__ the manpower for the unit's capabilit~
-~------------- -~· .......... ____ ..... ~23 1 10 Structure. Define the overall structure of the group and in
Management
N Y N N N N
a _L 8 parti2_ular, the roles of the l!!dividual Ul]jts:_______________ ----·--··-+--+--+23 I 10 Training. Ensuring that the right people are trained for the
Training
N N N··v N~b I 9 right job. Special Forces training school would aid this goal
I_ an_Q__§lch!eve mucl!_~_ficie~EY.:.__________________________ -----·----·~------- ·---r-:-- ____ ...... -:-:- ___ _
23 ! 11 Facilities. High quality output requires high quality input. We Operations
N N Y N N N
c ! 0 must have appropriate facilities for training and as a firm
biise f_Q!J_aun2..!!!.r:lfl_9_1~era!~<>~-~·------------------------ _____________ _____________ ________ ____ -·-- _________ --.,.. __
23 ! 11 Equipment. We must be wise in the acquisition of
Equipment
N N N N Y N
d ! 1 equipment. Choose what is required and then fight to get it.
Jl
1
AVOID acquisition of un-needed 'nice-to-haves'.
Maintenance of this equipment must be considered and

J ___
!

_L ___

p)~.!lne~_tC>!..~~f_9R E_P~!~b_~se_.______________.______ --------------·------- _____ ·----

23 1 11 Communication. Must have quick and reliable means of
e ! 2 communicating inter and intra unit. The Special Forces
! WAN is an ideal step, however if this is a long time coming,

2-4-+fi' t~~~~f ~:~s~~~~~~~~~:~!icr:~~e~~ohlem-at 4 FfA'R('cdo)'
a

I

___ ___ --·- __

Communication N N N j N Y N
1

PersonneT··--······

·:y- -f~r · v· --N 1\f N

3

24l11 Our jobS. as mechaliics"iS-an-overlooked.job.''we seem-to-be- Personne-l--- y N y N N N
b l 4 used more as general duties people than mechanics. With
i the current manning we have only two mechanics on the
.f.~2.~r at ~DY one time. If one goes awayJor an~day_duty or
i
---

I

L__
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24 : 11 Communication within the Battalion. At times we get tasks
5 which are needed in unrealistic time. This is caused by the

1..--"+----+C::-_;h_,a~"'-in~_O.::_f, .Ci>ll}'!l_f!r'l.~ £~'!~!!)g ~t~lg_I}J~~~~~._ __

Communication

---·------- ·-···--·-----------·+:::::.··--· :-·---------·-c··--~- -t·:c·:·-t--c-:·t:-~-·i·:- c·t ·:-::-J·-~:--1

· 11 Funds to buy specialised tools and emergency parts.

Equipment

6
11 Time. The workshop seems to be doing a lot of non7 maintenance time (NMT) which is out of our control, thus

Personnel

r~cc:I.L.J.Cfr19.!~-~J!rr:!~ ~QfJ?!Q_!:J~:J91~--'---·c···-----------·--::-··:--·-:-· ---··:···c·------ ------"--··!-::--·-·---· --- ----------···· -----·····+·:": --L::-:+·::-·:-i-··:-. ·t:-:··:··t-~·:·1

11 Information Operations and C2W: SO needs to develop
Capability
a
8 capabilities for effective employment in 10 and C2W. At the .
same time we should Not try to develop these in isolation or
competition with other ADF force elm, but rather where our
existing skills or niche role can provide a unique skill set.
Examples:
(1) Physical attack on enemy C31 systems: infrastructure
targeting and strike and standoff weapon (such as EMP),
attacks on civil infrastructure such as telecommunications
and power. This would lead to a requirement for higher
technical expertise in these areas.
(2) Use of adversary C31 systems. EA on remote systems,
physical hacking of isolated and secure computer systems,
tapping of PSTN networks (capabilities developed with 7 Sig,
their employment with us or in areas where they cannot go).
(3) PR, PA and CA. The understanding that we don't fight in
Vietnam anymore and that often the overt use of Special
Forces is more valuable than the actual task they are doing
(I cite the comments by Mick Malone prior to POLLARD).
The use of Special Forces strategically inCA, PA or PR may
mean that Special Forces needs to develop much more
media savvy, and also change its MO to accommodate
media. Stop thinking that 'putting on a show' for DGPI is a
farce and that civi media are the enemy.
(4) Better OPSEC. Anyone who thinks that Special Forces
are currently good at this should come and see me. They
are not. This should not be read as a need for increased
effort for security but smarter use of security. Some in SASR
think that everything they do is TOP SECRET, when what is
l-----+------}~ealy_Qeil!9..~9n~.l~. ~~~1~~-~f-~91!_______ ~ _ __. ___________________ -------··--·-+::c·-----·---···-· -.--------··--· ---·t--·:·:·-t-,·:.·l25 11 Getting rid of the 'cult of the beret':
Personnel
b
9 Selection process at the moment is still a product of social
cloning - he gets selected because he's like me. What we
tend to produce is Special Forces soldiers that are to a
particular template that is often suited to door-kicking, but
less suited to some of the future roles that we are after.
HUMINT, for example, requires female, Nondescript (ie not
6'4", built like a tank and wearing the Special Forces watch
and daypack) and of different character. What about direct
entry to Special Forces, older recruits (ie stability and
maturity) etc?
(2) Does a few weeks of selection followed by a few years
as a troop commander translate to the best staff officers? I
that
unit and HQ staff are Not the best for
·--····-·'·------' would
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the job, and indeed are paid better because of their previous
prowess at TACTICAL skills. If Special Forces wants to
remain the best, they need to attract the best for each job,
not simply assume that because someone is beret qualified

r-:-::----, . . . tb.E!Y}El!:'"ICiLI')_!b~e-~tin__~_~t~ii2~---------~------·-·------ ------------------·- _________ .....
25
c

l-.. ____ ---·

12 Merit based promotion (a problem across the Army not just Personnel
N N N N N N
0 Special Forces):
Officers are not promoted on merit until they have served a
minimum of 15 years, a joke in a society that has moved
away from the 'job for life' mentality. (1.5 to 4 yrs, 3 to 4 yrs
LT: 6 yrs CAPT; 3 yrs to PSC; plus usually 1 to 2 yrs PSC
until promotion). What this means is that jets (and those that
continually.study to gain new skills) progress at the same
rate as also rans (you really need to tread on your dick not to
make MAJ these days.
(2) Flexible posting/promotion. NSW Police has a similar
system where internal vacancies are offered. Fixed 2 to 3 yr
postings, but with the ability to apply for your own job again
at the end of posting. People who apply can be any rank, ie
LCPL can apply for the SGT job, and if he has the skills and
experience he gets promoted. People who are happy being
CPL range controllers can stay that way for years if they
·
want to.
-1-----------------------------------·-------- ----------- ----1-:--:-c-:---·--c-:- --25 I 12 Developing roles in a comprehensive security environment
Capability
Y Y N N Y N
d !I 1 incl: drug enforcement, illegal immigrants, terrorism (beyond
! CT resolution), environmental damage, currency flight,

I

2s-h2 f~i~~~t~~~-~~~~·a~~~rs-toidentifYTdiois arlc!The ability ____ Person-nel··--·--ry- 1\f--i\ffN t-f .N
e ! 2 (and conviction) to sack them. See the private sector - we
:
are not a sheltered workshop, nor an instrument of social

i

1

policy.___.----·-------·--·------·-------·--·-------------------.-------·------------·-··-·--·_______ __ -:·+·-:+::-:+:-:-+-::-:-!

i 12 A proper work ethic exists for all personnel involved with
Personnel
Y N N N N N
~j_ __~ .92.!:'"1t:>!:lt~!.§Y~!e~~~--------------------------------------------------------------- ------------·------------- ______ ____ _____ ____ ___ __ _
26

26 j 12 Proper and effective control of resources and personnel - not Personnel
Y N N N N N
c i 5 wasting a person's time.
Y N N N N N
26 I 12 The employment opportunities'tor clerks needs to be mo're~,-§_ attractive due to t~_e shQ_~~_g_e eXt:JE!rie_r:!9.~.9:_________
t----,-·--------1-::-:-+-:-:-+---- _ _ _
26 12 A more relaxed environment due to the high work rate of
Y Y N N N N

!
.;.___L___r _!ig~o.
27
a

! 12

---·-~·--------

. _________

.

_.

---------+~o--:+--:--:-f--:--:-f--:o-:-1-::-:-i

Endorsement of an SO capability master plan (similar to the Capability
Y Y N N N N
I 8 Equa Plan) by COMO Special Forces, LCAUST and
__J ____(;Q_M~~I__Q.~t!()_t~~y~_C1r_?_QQ~__C1!lE!<3.S.L ______________ .____________________ ------------------------ ---- ---- --- --- ----27 i 12 Ensuring there is adequate manpower to man Special
Personnel
Y Y N IN N N

%?-h ~ ~~~cu~-fnia~e~~i-!~~~~~il9tc>--covercT ·iransterfo-4 RAR--- Leadership ------- 'N v N+r\f -N 'r\Jc

j 0 (Cdo) and UW role to SASR (to ensure SASR does not

'

___ J..______ rP_E!_GOme~cJ!:!!}Q~Il!i!l~..~~Y.L___~---------------- ----------------------

---.,-. ___ ---·· ---- ____"" _____

27 113 Increased operational employment of 1 Commando Regt.
Operations
N Y N N N N
d \ 1
'
--------------------~"~-----~ -~-~·"---- -~--:-!-::-:·"-:--- ,.-- 1-:-:27 ! 13 Addressing EW void at HQSO as well as OPSEC matters
Operations
N Y Y N N N
e ! 2 across SO as a whole.
!a·r~r~ -~=~f~~::;;~t-~~~:~!~~~:F=orces--Av-n7Airwir1Q- with __________ OperaiTons·-----·- ·y ·y '(
i\J"

-N·r·r.r

--1------ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------~------------------
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28 ! 13 Equipment. The ability of the Special Forces Group to
Equipment
b
4 purchase 'off the shelf' SO equip in order to ALLOW ALL
UNITS within the Special Forces Group to benefit from being
equipped with 'leading edge' technology. This will enhance

I

I

N N N N Y N

I

2a ~ 1s- ~~~~~~~~b.~~a!~ ~~g~:~rr~~¥~iL:ai~~~~i ~-~~irt Time-------- operatio-ns------ ·--r,r --r\f N1~f ·r'f r:J
9

c
-

· 5 Special Forces Group Personnel. A change in Federal
'
Government legislation is required in order to allow PT

__ i ~~;~;~~~:~;~!~~r;r;~~~~~~!~;:pep~;~~~~~~~;!~~~ -----~--- -~------~--~- _______________

28
d

! 13 Concentration of the Special Forces Group. Concentrate the
! 6 Special Forces Group in one location in order to increase

!

J_ _ _

N Y Y'N N N

training efficiencies and interoperability across the Special

!------- .f:Q!:9~~~!9_~2:______________________________________________________________________

28
e

Management

! 13

----------------------- ---- ---- --- ------- ----- -----

Full Time/Part Time Scheme for Commando FE.
Selection
Y N N N N
7 Introduction of a 'Ready Reserve like scheme' where 1
Commando Regiment part time personnel-serve for 12
months on full time service with 4 RAR (Cdo) then transfer to
1 Commando Regiment to complete their four year part time
commitment. This will increase the overall operational
capability of 1 Commando Regiment while enhancing
____ !------- l!l~~roperability wit!!i__13_~~(9dQl~-------------------------------------------- ____________________________________________ .
29 [ 13 Regional associates have long viewed AS Special Forces
N N N Y N
a I 8 and our activities with a mixture of respect and suspicion. I
would suspect that with our current moves towards Special
Forces expansion that this would, in some areas, generate
hostility and promote the development of measures to
counter Special Forces capability. We have for many years
;
now offered training to our neighbours and they have had the
I
opportunity to view our abilities both at home and abroad. I
be!ieve that in th~ long~!~!l_!_his i~U! k~y- issue.----~-------~----------------·--------------- ____ __ ___ __
29 : 13 ADF perception of Special Forces at present, as evidenced Personnel
Y N N N N
b · 9 by the reluctance of units to reinforce Special Forces (4
RAR}, I believe to be one of, 'Why should we do it for you
when it is to our disadvantage?' This being obvious
reference to the 1/98 Commando Selection Course. This
reluctance and the drain Special Forces places upon already
stretched manpower resources of ARMY units must be
addressed if we are to successfully continue to reinforce our
units. Is there a way we can obviously benefit other ARMY
't ?
-----!------- .':JD~------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------ ---- ----- ------ ----- 29 ! 14 Repaying the debt has long been in contention among SASR Personnel
Y N N N N
c
0 members. It is however the only real means by which the
rest of the ADF can actually see the advantages of having a
large Special Forces group. It is easy to see the effect that
SAS soldiers posted to regular units has. This process
however is met with little enthusiasm from members of
SASR. I myself was posted from SASR in Dec 95 to 3 RAR.
I found though that there is a huge gap in the levels of
training, an even greater gap in the levels of ability, but a
desire among the rank and file to increase their ability and
skills. Unfortunately there is N conduit to improve the
situation.

L---
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Special Forces has a role here in our own back yard. I
believe that Special Forces should expand the support it
offers other Land Comd and Trg Comd units by increasing
the Special Forces commitments to regular units and the
ARMY schools. The added exposure of SASR (Special
Forces) personnel to these units would create a long-term
gain thereby increasing the Special Forces pool. Career
issues of SASR personnel would require very careful
consideration.
--- y ry y y
29 14 Enthusiasm. I believe now more than ever before, that there Personnel
N
d
1 is a requirement to reinforce the values that Special Forces
hold high. We confront this daily by maintaining the drive
and the go forward, the can-do attitude. BUT WHY? We
need to see the effects that this daily re-affirmation has on
us. For many Special Forces members, there is N longer the
cutting edge involvement and for some it has never been
there, having only arrived in an Special Forces unit in a
I
support role. There is a requirement for all involved to at
some time view the wider picture or experience Special
Forces expertise. We need our support personnel, we value
1--r--~~..::th:,:.:~m and _'!fe must have them workingJ.<?!. us.___- ------~~-- --·----------····--- ~-::-:y N N y
- 29 I 14 Technological competencies. C3/C4 is rapidly developing to technology
e I 2 become a core requirement amongst all ADF personnel on
!
attainment of rank. Little is done to improve the capabilities
of serving members to cope with the demands (even at unit
level} in this area. Officers generally are exposed to
computer technology {be it only word processing or
spreadsheets) and it is well incorporated into their training.
This is not the case for ORs. Most aren't exposed to the
requirement until they have to start corresponding as an
NCO. Special Forces is embracing Digital Transfer and
information technology as the means of the future. If there is
a foreseen requirement, Now is the time to commence
1
~~-

·--··---------·-~-~~--~--¥--~~-~-~~..,_¥Y.~,~~~";;-~-~-.~¥.~~---"~·-~~~-=~~~-N-<

--~-·---·--~-

N

'Y ~

30
a

L___ tr~Lr)ing_:_ ____--------·-~--------------·-····--···-.--··--------______
! 14 Vision. If SO is serious about a collaborative approach to

Leadership

-

3 the development of corporate strategy then a strategic
process model should be developed. This would allow wide
participation in SO development. I am not suggesting an
additional work load but a rationalisation of a number of
concurrent process wrapped up into a corporate strategic
development plan. There are plenty of examples of these
processes around but I don't know of any that are in use in
any Army organis~tion. I would be more than happy to
assist in the development of such a model if it was part of a
wider rationalisation of work flows within the headquarters.
:
The outcome of this process should be a vision (in the best
_ i _corr:?.<?!.~~-~le}__~I}Q__~~-~bei_ of_!l:l_~~~~<:>_r:_thrus~-----··-- ·-·----·----------·-··-·-··-- ·----y y
30 [ 14 Organisational Learning. There is a mountain of literature on Leadership
b
4 the philosophy of a learning organisation. Senge is probably
at the forefront of this and his book titled the 'Fifth Discipline'
should be a must read. We cannot possibly get better at
what we do until we have an effective process in place to
___ analyse and apg[y_our exe_~rien2_~s. _There_ are frameworks _____ _
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such as the POR/PAR process for dealing with reviews but
these are generally ad hoc and are not treated with the
proper priority. This is evident in unit PARs that are full of
detail that keeps re-occurring. We could be much better at
---'- ___ !!_SjiJ_Q _Q_l!I'~~Q~!]_~I]_<?_~~_!Q_9_~~-~!~-~_ff_El9_k_ ___ _____ ~ ______ _______ ----------~------- . Y Y N N N N
30 ! 14 Personnel Management. In an environment of leaner
Leadership
c I 5 organisations and increasing change, the management of
·
the individual will be central to organisational efficiencies and
therefore capability.
The Army prides itself in the management of people and SO
probably does better than much of the wider Army. I
contend that we are mediocre managers of personnel and
outdated procedures constrain the way we use this resource.
The use of PT and ex-FT personnel is evidence of this
aspect. The PT is a most cost-effective component with
potential for development; Notwithstanding the perceived
capability difference in comparing the wages bill of SASR
and 1 Commando Regt.
This is purely anecdotal but reflects on the people you
started training with and it seems that many of the best (and
worst) potential have left. This is a significant waste of
training resource and leadership potential. This indicates an
inherent incapacity of Defence to provide people with an
adequate career challenges. We should take a broad
perspective of personnel management and allow people
flexibility in pursuing a career both within and outside
Defence. If the organisation is to take full advantage of
opportunities, we must retain and invest in bright young
f=:--+-:---:+"::-::e~o~-----·------------------___________
Y Y N·N N N
30 ! 14 Structures. The most efficient organisations are usually not Management
d ' 6 hierarchical. Unfortunately, the military is blessed with an
organisation that would be more at home in the industrial
age. There has been a fair amount of work into units and
organisations but these do not question the fundamental
existence of the regimental structure. Are these regimental
structures appropriate to a Joint environment small, capable,
integrated teams that require minimal administration? An are
these structures able to deliver operational synergies?
Teaming and project management should be adopted
instead of the Napoleonic (functional) staff structure. People
still retain the functional responsibilities but operate as part
of a team. This should improve workflows and management
withi!l_!_~~ organi~_ation. ----------------------------------------------~-----N Y Y N Y N
30 I 14 New Technologies. Information technologies are
Technology
e I 7 revolutionising the way we communicate and gain
knowledge. Resourced properly it will deliver the economies
and capabilities we seek for operations and administration.
This seems to be widely accepted but funding and
purchasing arrangements are Not in place to allow us to take
advantage of the potential. The materiel process is Not
producing the rate of outcomes we need to develop
! capability. We should have a slick process in place to

_L____
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.f 30f l 14 Creativity. It is widely acknowledged in the business
t

Leadership
8 community that creativity is a competitive advantage. De
Bono contents that creativity is the sole domain of humans
(at least at present) and machines (computers) will inevitably
take over all other work. So to be skilled in creativity and
use the creative process (assuming it can be taught) is
essential to future individual and group effectiveness.
The estabtishment of a dual organisation cultures that can
-+--~- ~ustain the ro_!:.J~inel conv~!l!ional!y m~ll.§!.9~--~-----~--·--·- ---------~------··
31 I 14 Manning the Special Forces Group in a shrinking army:
Selection
a i 9 (1) attracting the interest of the right kind of person in the
first place;
(2) motivating the soldier to want to test himself with
selection;
(3) ensuring that selection is sufficient to identify the desired
qualities in an individual without exposing him to an
unacceptably high risk of injury;
.
(4) Examining possibilities for recruiting. This could include
raising the profile of the Special Forces Gp in all three
services, including the reserve components. Examining the
possibilities for direct entry recruiting of civilian life or straight
out of JET training, and reviewing the role that female
soldiers could play in combat or combat related positions.
Direct entry recruiting of civilianas is currently undertaken by
1 Commando Regt, B Coy, 4 RAR (Cdo) contains a high
proportion of soldiers posted straight out of IET training and
female soldiers are proving that they have the necessary
physical and mental toughness to complete the current
.
Commando selection course.
7
31l15 Retention of selected and t=-:ra'-7in_e_d-=-s=-p_e_c ia-:"l Forcesp-ersonneT:- Personnel___
b · 0 Keeping the soldier motivated and interested. Poor
leadership, training and administration will quickly
demoralise an intelligent high achieving soldier and he or
she will generally leave Not only the Special Forces Gp but
the Army.
{2} Having a realistic career path open to soldiers within the
Special Forces Gp.
{3} Ensuring that a realistic attitude is taken to the
manning/tasking ratio and that we don't require soldiers to
work unrealistic hours on unachievable tasks as a result of
reduced manning.
(4) Ensuring that the soldier remains adequately
.
remunerated for exposure to high risk training and having to
j---~~ maintain a very hi~h s!ate~9L!eadin~ss to move.--,---------+31 ! 15 Acquisition of equipment and technology and continuous
Technology
c i 1 development of processes and procedures:
Continuous research and development to find ways to
enhance the likelihood of success for the Special Forces
mission. This includes constant development of doctrine,
tactics and SOPs as well as equipment.
(2) Embracing relevant leading edge techNiogy in order to
,
give the Special Forces soldier a battlefield advantage.

Y N N N N N

--r..-:- -~- --.- ___

Y N N 1N N N

Y N N N N N

N Y Y N Y N
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15
2

15
3

acquisition of technology and equipment is timely and that it
reaches the soldier before it is obsolete.
Training:
Each element of the Special Forces Gp needs to define its
core tasks and concentrate its training on achieving the
highest possible standard in the execution of those tasks.
Secondary and tertiary tasking should have commensurately
less training directed towards it.
(2) By its nature, Special Forces training is expensive in
resources. The Special Forces Gp needs to ensure that
none of the allocated resources are wasted on inappropriate .
or irrelevant training activities.
(3) Training must be varied, interesting and rewarding for
participants. It needs to be relevant to the core tasks and
should concentrate on those types of operational
deployments that the Special Forces Gp is experiencing
more
Maintaining an Operational
in everything we do:
Operations
As the likely force for short warning deployments it is
essential that the SF Gp ensure that it is able to operate
comfortably in both the Joint and Combined environments.
This will mean that we need to exercise all components of
the Special Forces Gp in the Joint and Combined
environments as often as possible. Regular work with Allies
will assist with the development of common procedures and
equipment interoperability.
(2) The Special Forces Gp needs to ensure that it is Not
misemployed during major exercises and that the tasks
allocated are both realistic and relevant to the aims of the
'conflict'.
(3) The other emphasis should be on training for
deployment on operations in an undeclared or Nn-warlike
environment with limited objectives or Special Forces
tasking. The Special Forces role in Peace Ops (both
peacekeeping and peacemaking) and PsyOps should Not be

:-:+-:~----~·:·-:--·--= ---···- ---·-------·-----~----~--------~---·---------------- -------···-·-

a

32
b

c

·

-----·1-::-~---·-· -·:---- ··--·-··---------------·1-:-:·+-:cc-!--~-1-c·c·+:--+

15 Specialist Equipment. As the Special Forces Gp is primarily Equipment
4 task orientated, it would be fair to assume that the
conventional equipment would Not altogether be adequate
for the mission accomplishment. Specialist equipment
should be required to be specific for the task at hand. Some
of the areas to look at but Not limited to are:
(1) Comms Equip,
(2) Wpns,
(3) Clothing, and
rtation.
15 Realistic Training. Realistic training and resources go hand
raining
5 in hand to effect a properly equipped and well trained fighting
force.
15 Resources. The availability of resources for realistic training Management
6 is an integral part of the mission accomplishment, some of
these would include:
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Security

Personnel

Operations
Mixed gender
Leadership

16 Person management skills
~

c

r 33

1
Personnel

16 Adaptation of the new
: 2
' 33 16 Acceptance of change
~ d

Personnel
3
16 Better access to intelligence. Implementation of the Special
4 Forces WAN and other C31 systems will improve the
situation, however, more lnt staff within the Special Forces
Gp and better liaison with Defence and outside agencies will
increase the effectiveness of
al Forces lnt
- 34 16 Improved guidance on the assumption of roles for the
Leadership
b
5 Special Forces units. While units are aware of impending
role changes or variations, I believe there is N clear time
frame and directives for the implementation of these role
changes. One example is the prospect of Commando units
on the CSAR role.
34
Increased interoperability between Special Forces units.
c
This relates to the training of personnel as well as equipment
procurement. Differences in basic skills and the courses for
these skills need to be guided in the same direction so that
all units recognise them. One example is the medics course.
Until recently, Commando Medics course was not fully
credited for personnel moving over to SASR. Demolitions
and Patrol or Recon Courses are one area where
compatibility should be sought. Equipment procurement
should be a joint Special Forces issue to ensure compatibility
and associated training levels on that equipment is standard
t------;-------·- across th~g-~Q_l:l_Q~----------·-----~-~----------------------~-------- --------------+,=-34 i 16 Expanded research and development interest. With the rate Technology
d ' 7 of advance of technology, an increasing number of
sophisticated weapons systems and other equipment that is
of direct interest to Special Forces units is being developed.
It is imperative that either the group or units maintain visibility
over these developments and where practical, implement
systems of procurement and training in this equipment.
While units currently have a limited R&D capability, I believe
an increased
in this field is
; 16 More
I believe that security,
I 8 both
in some areas and
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needs atte ntion. Being a full time unit, SASR has some
advantage in that isolation and compartmentalisation of
:.
information is relatively effective, however with more public
attention on Special Forces and related operations, I see a
.
need for a better education package on the effects of
! operationaI security and/or its breaching as well as other
__
physical se curit~ issues.
y
35 : 16 Across the board entrance tests for all Special Forces units Selection
· a __ _L___!! .0.~_9iv[g_~_~!L
--------------------------y
Training
35 ! 17 Cross-train ing in courses and exercises for all Special
b I 0 Forces units.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---· --------------------------------------· ------y
35-Tfi -Atter-car:e-·iraining courses, streamline individuals into
Personnel
c j_1_~pecialist g roups.
35 ! 17 Specialist support units: Special Forces helos, fixed wing-- Capability
N
d I 2 and S ecia I Forces !>.P~! troops.
------------------ -----·----~"'-''
y
35 ! 17 Train with allied Special Forces units to keep abreast of
Training
3 techno_!QgJ. and technigues.
e
Equipment
36 i 17 Equipment/W eapon. Procurement is taking too long.
N
onl! 4 Testing is t aking years for equipment that has been tested by
y i
various cou ntries, namely the US, UK etc. We should try to
'
buy in sma ller numbers and use the equipment/weapons for
specific tas ks that they are designed for. This would work
out to be cheaper and more effective for its users as they are
., - ':l~i!!9J'!c:l.c!er~_eq~[p_~~~-f_oLt.h~.~ ta~~~·--- ---~------- --·-------- _
--:-c-·
37 i 17 Dedicated Special Forces air elements both Army Aviation + Capability
N
- a j 5 Here Spec ial Forces elements. This relates to both
·
dedicated aircrew and SP aircraft, ie MH-60 Black
,
Hawks/MK
-----------------·----------·
---r··· ·-- ·--·-·--------·
-------47 Chinooks and MC-130 Heres.
y
37 1 17 If we are gain9tc>ilave-i=f-element5;-!tley-neea-·tab_e_____________ Training
b 1 6 integrated into the FT unit. Therefore courses run are all
'dual client '- FT/PT so that every individual is trained to the
,
same level More emphasis needs to be placed on PT

: _ . .1-- __
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37 i 17 More impo rtance/investment placed on FT Commando unit
c I 7 instead of PT unit. Resources, training time/money/etc
should be prioritised for FT Commando unit. PT unit is
i
basically a non-productive unit in the context that it cannot
__ .(.____ -~~~-~!?J.c:lY.~.s!.~~--~Jlg_l_!~-- unit immediatelY:
----37 ; 17 More impo rtance placed on Special Forces
d i 8 weapons/a quipment procurement without normal Army
i involvement, ie Special Forces orientated small arms
I M16A2/A3 Not only for water operators, but for all Special
rators.
Force~2P_~
37 ! 17 More invol vement/promoifon of Spe-cial-Forces-community
e i 9 other units/other Services. Give these units/Services a
better idea of our capabilities/limitations and ways to better
work/liaise with these outside units/Services.
e profileofso-·within theADF.arldexternar--·-38 11-8- Improve th
onl! 0 agencies. Commanders at all levels within all Services of
y i
the ADF sh ould have a basic understanding of the roles and
capabilities of SO units and how SO units can enhance their
L___ o erations/c_§!p_?bilities.__________._______.______________,_______.__
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18
_2
18
3

All courses PT or FT oerweEm
the salll_~~--~g __li_~~- ~?;_
erritorial.
1 Commando Regt disbanded to come under command 4
Cdo. Why have two units competing with each other wasted
etc.
18 Dedicated support units:
4 (1) fixed wing
rotary

40
a

41
a

41 l
b ·

41 !
c ·

18 Know who we are - Maintenance of Special Forces Gp
Personnel
7 identity and unit identity within the Special Forces Gp:
We as an Special Forces gp must be confident in our identity
in order to preserve it. We are entitled to be 'elitist' we have
earned that discretion and any cursory glance at military
history and successful Special Forces units clearly supports
this right. If we are expected to provide a capability beyond
the capacity of conventional forces then we must be
permitted to inculcate into our culture an unconventional
even non-conformist outlook.
(2) In order to preserve, enhance and develop the
uniqueness and unconventionality of SASR and the
Commando Regts it is essential to preserve the particular
attributes of each unit. Each element is tasked to conduct
different missions within the SO spectrum. The opportunities
and advantages provided by the establishment of the Special
ForcesTraining Centre are numerous and I welcome the
challenges this will bring. However, any attempt to achieve
commonality in selection procedures predicated on resource
effici
criterion must be resisted.
18 Get the job done - Maintaining an operational 'outcome' or
8 capability based focus.
(1) Provision of an effective SO capability as part of the
wider Army and ADF warfighting capability requires us to
concentrate on the end-state. This will ensure we are Not
constrained by process based methodology, one which is
currently espoused by technocrats and their flow charts and
models.
(2) Our doctrine must withstand intellectual review to ensure
its credibility, but pragmatic methods providing a
demonstrated effective capability must take precedence over
an approach based on jargon and theoretical systems. An
example of this is the conduct of our individual and collective
traini
18 Ensuring we are 'Comfortable in Chaos'
Personnel
9 We must ensure we welcome and embrace the uncertain
and
environment that characterises

333

Appendix 4

d

19
0

41

19

41

e

1

SO. In order to develop this ability, we must continually
expose ourselves to this circumstance in order to develop
our confidence and the ability to operate effectively within it.
This requires us to accept mistakes in the conduct of our
training and Not define success as 'zero defect'. This is a
cultural issue that requires the Special Forces gp to confront
the wider ADF mentality, this is of particular importance to
commanders who must take ownership of their subordinates
errors and be prepared to, in fact enjoy, defending their
actions to the less flexible or enlightened.
We cannot expect or demand timely and accurate
information or advice, nor should we. This is Not an excuse
for unprofessional conduct, more so it highlights and
acknowledges the demand for Special Forces commanders
to rigorously apply the proven doctrine of mission analysis
and SO MAP. This will enhance our mission focus and
ultimate success when everything and everyone around us is
s~_£2_':1_mQ!_r}gJ.QJb..~.£hao~!h~tJ~~id~!!L___________________~-~-----Marketing our utility - but know when to say N!
The Special Forces gp must provide the logical first choice
FE to the ADF for the conduct of ops. This requires us to
actively seek a niche in the range of contingency planning.
Recent history demonstrates this issue is well advanced.
We must nowbe mature enough as an organization to
acknowledge our limitations and Not blindly snatch at 'each
and every' task or comply with every request for support that
emerges. This discretion will preserve our uniqueness and
prevent any over extension of our capacity. We can exploit
every opportunity and be 'all things to all people' but be
smart enough in doing so, to ensure we maintain the integrity
of ou~.C?.~Qab!~!i-~~:.____________________ ---------~---------------------Enjoy the moment - manage the training tempo.
This issue is linked to the previous one but remains discrete
from it as it refers to directed training activities - Not
operational tasks. This comment is based on my experience
1n SASR and relates to this unit, however I am confident it
has application to the Special Forces Gp. We must be
selfish to some degree and Not continually be directed to
participate in and/or host training activities for or with ADF or
allied/regional nation units. We are our own worst enemies
in this area, however we must ensure we retain the capacity
to surge to meet operational commitments.
Our people are our most valuable resource and they
underpin our capabilities, in order to preserve and develop
their skills we must balance the workload to prevent burnout. It is na'ive to believe that operational employment will
come without an accompanying requirement to support and
participate in collective training activities within the ADF, but
we must now impose our own pre-requisites. The simple
pleasures of regimental service must be preserved to ensure.
a sense of pride, esprit-de-corps and humble enjoyment.
We should never be too busy training to miss out on
established unit activities such as Regt Birthday festivities.
These events are funda_r:nental to maintainingJ enha_IJ£!!:!.9.
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19 The Procurement Process. The best measure of trust is the
2 allocation of funds. The current procurement process is
cumbersome. If the Special Forces Gp is to exploit new
technology and develop new, potentially clandestine,
capabilities, it needs its own discrete funding with the
appropriate control mechanisms built in. A guaranteed
regular level of funding, even of relatively small amounts
(say $1 M/yea:r) would allow the Special Forces Gp to
achieve a 'leading edge' position within Defence. We would
have to accept however that some of the projects would fail.
·
fund
d assist in the
42 19 The Development Process. Special Forces Gp should be at
b
3 the leading edge of technological innovation within Defence.
We should be providing those short notice leading edge
(para) military capabilities that are required by Government.
We do Not really know what they are! There should be
strategic guidance that moulds our effort. In absence of this
we should be developing our own. Being the leading edge,
there should be more latitude in our processes that allow for
development paths to end in options that are other than
successful!
19 Focus on Equipment. We are very focussed on equipment.
4 We should concentrate our effort on future capability and
therefore develop organisations, structures, doctrine, tactics,
procedures AND THEN what equipment is needed as a
WHOLE SYSTEM.
Exploit Technology. There is much TALK about exploiting
technology. Soon the Special Forces Gp will have secure
connectivity throughout. We will be in position to be led in
the development of processes and procedures from an Army
and ADF perspective. A system like Lotus Notes for
example would give us the potential to streamline our
are
rocesses
as we know what
42 19 Responsibility. We should be pushing responsibility down to
e
6 the lowest level. Individuals who own, or consider they are a
part of, a process will work harder and try to improve it. We
should encourage innovation, new ideas and Not be afraid of
mistakes.
19 Force Projection Platforms. The biggest limitation for the
7 use of Australian Special Forces is our lack of force
projection platforms. We have a well-trained and equipped
organisation that is essentially limited by our inability to firstly
it.
the force element
Direction. One of the main reasons for the raising of 4 RAR
(Cdo) was to remove the domestic CT role from SASR. Both
oranisations will need to be given the direction of what they
will need to achieve. Specifically for 4 RAR Cdo relating to
CT and for SASR the emphasis of training, ie Type A
operations/war roles/unconventional warfare. The direction
SASR will take after the hand over domestic CT is
currently being generated internally. HQSO must provide
SASR with a clear direction that the
will take
2003.

Management
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43

19 Special Forces Selection. Selection is the most important
Selection
9 course conducted at SASR. Detailed research and
discussion should be conducted before any sweeping
changes to selection or combined selection are considered.
Commandos and SASR are looking for similar
characteristics in their personnel. However, the mental
toughness and stability under extreme physical and
psychological stress which is required of SASR operators is
only provided on the longer SASR selection process. SASR
selection is essentially a personality test that has proven its
value in the past and in my opinion will continue to do so in
:
the future.
43 i2o C2. Thecommand and co-ntrol of SASR is extremely----- Operations
d ! 0 disjointed. The Regt comes under Land Comd for 'raise,
train and sustain'. However for operations falls under
command of HQAST and for DFCAP specifically CT answers
to the CDF. SASR should be controlled and tasked at the
highest level. With so many different chains of command
surely there is scope for things to go wrong. Particularly with
the nature of some Special Forces operations being
'sensitive' a simpler chain of command would prevent
OPSEC breaches.
''
43T2o s-pecfai~F=orces
toe I 1 an Special Forces AAvn elm. Crews of both the S-70 and
CH-47 and the platform chosen through AIR 87 (preferably
Not the Tiger) need to train for missions that would most
likely involve the use of Special Forces. Such tasking for
Special Forces avn may incl:
a. Low level flying by night under NVG
b. Low level formation flying (pertinent to (CT
COMMANDOs) and SASR ops)
c. Ability to fly onto and off to Naval assets at night
:
d. CH-47 crews trained in RORO
! e. Air to air refuelling capability
i f. Helo gunships to prov fire spt to Special Forces ops (AIR

Y N N N N Y

c

Avn:-fntiletuiu-reTiwouTcfhe-wis-e raise -- capahiiity--

N

Y

N N N N

········----------------

··-··---

N N Y N N N

i

______(________ 8_?l___;···--·-··--------------------------------------·--·-··-·--·--·---------····- ----------------·--·-··--- -- -···· ·--- ··--·· --- --

44 i 20 Specral Forces must have a global focus. As the planet
Personnel
Y Y N N N Y
a l 2 shrinks due to increasing technology, a regional focus is too
_j____ n~rro~_t_tbis must be expan_ded to inci!Jd~ the ~ntire_e_!_~ne!_·_
_ _____ c-::--:- -:·-:-r-:-:- __ --:-:- -:-:44 j 20 Special Forces must be capable of Strategic Projection.
Capability
N Y Y N N N
b ! 3 Special Forces must possess a real time capability to project
i
itself strategically. This force projection capability must be
I
on the same reduced notice to move as the Special Forces

_j __~ -~]ement_s.__~-~£~.i~-~-~E2r~2-~------~-------------------------------------------44 ! 20 Special Forces must be interoperable with other Services
c I 4 and other nation's Special Forces. lnteroperability must
_____J___ .92\f~r__R!29.~Q!!.~~~-~!:!9__ ~g~il?.r:!:l~~~~------------------------------------------------44 I 20 The research, development and procurement systems must
d · 5 be overhauled to cater for the rapid advances in technology.
,
If the Army procurement system cannot be fixed then Special
_ _L___ E.<?!9es_mus_t div~Q~J!~_f!!Jt!rs>!!IJ~~-Q.tirf!!JY.~------------------------44 ! 20 Special Forces must expand itself into more Type A

------------- ··:-:- ·:-:-+--::-t-:--:t+.~-1

Operations

Y Y N IN Y N

_________________________ ____ _____ ------ _____ ____ _ __
Equipment

N N Y N Y N

----------------r-:-:- _____ --r:-:-

Y Y N N N N
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a. A wider recruiting base
b. Proposed restructures taking place, such as SASR
passing on the CT role
c. The Commando units assessing whether some of their
more conventional roles could be passed to other infantry
units.
45 j 20 The following areasneed~to-bereviewedand chan-ges-~made: Leadership
a ' 7 a. The identification and allocation of roles and task for
SASR and Commando units
b. Personnel are held accountable for the positions and
responsibilities they hold at all levels
c. Clear and timely direction and a clear aim for the future
d. Quick/timely passage of information and/or tasks both
internally and externally, eg Ref A received after the
nominated response date
e. A tendency for some to put career progression above or
in conflict with benefit to the unit
.
f. Tendency to micro-manage activities and personnel
g. Lack of Special Forces doctrine for the full gambit of
,
Special Forces activities, this needs to be coordinated at a

f-J~·~·· £~ntrai_QQ!nt___~-----~--·---------·-- . .
·---~--~------45 i 20 Training/Standards. At the moment SAS pers trg to maintain Training

··-·· -·.-r--:-:- --r-;-:-r:--:Y N N Y N N

b · 8 20-30 skills, this needs to be reviewed and decide whether
we are multi-skilled or highly skilled (both could apply in
some cases). The following needs to be considered:
a. Identify core skills and specialist skills
b. How to maintain standards/skills for quick deployment
c. Maintenance of capability
d. Central control on doctrine and trg development
e. Future Special Forces pers requirements may differ from
the normal SAS/Commando operator. There needs to be a
selection, trg and management process in place to facilitate
these needs.
'ECiucation:AftFlerrlOment-education inatiroad range-of-- ·-------··-..--·-----··-t·Nr-N-ty
c · 9 areas needs to be addressed. Some specific areas are
listed as follows:
a. Computers have been introduced but little or N training
has occurred for the majority of personnel
b. Special Forces doctrine and staff duties is Not covered on
the current promotion courses leaving a void in knowledge.
We need to identify Special Forces niche within the ADF and
educate Special Forces pers and the ADF to our capabilities
at the relevant organisations/personnel level
c. Standardise staff duties/doctrine within Special Forces
d. Security trg and procedures is ad hoc and pers Not held
accountable
e. Computers have Not enhanced information flow due to a
lack of equipment in all areas or are incompatible with other
equip/systems
f. Computers are an aid as with technology but they do
suffer from harsh climate or primitive conditions needing
!
redundancy in e9!!.!2ment or ~cedures _______._______
~5t·21 Logistics/Acquisition. The ~urrent acguisiti~system is _ §l':Jipment

45T2o
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0 dated and Not responsive to Special Forces needs. The
following need review:
a. Flexibility of identification and purchase of items oft the
shelf to maintain/attain capability
b. Some items may be required in limited numbers or have a
short life expectancy, eg required for a single task only
c. Technology is superseded in 12-18 months, the
procurement system needs to be aware of this and Special
Forces needs accommodated
d. SAS/Commando need to co-ord their procurement on
items identified as suitable for both units if the item meets
requirements by 80 percent then preferable to procure item
rather than wait years for the perfect thing and risk
obsolescence
e. Because of the cost of hi-tech gear, a trg and
maintenance program needs to be in place prior to issue
f. At times it will be necessary to delete Australian content
on some items because of specific needs, development time
and a need to operate with other Special Forces units
g. If ADF assets are to be used with Special Forces force
elements, then Special Forces requirements should be
considered and implemented at the user requirement stage,
!
eg COLLINS Class Submarine
,____ _
y
Person nel
45 i 21 Personnel Management. The areas of careers, pay and
e l 1 compensation need review and some concerns are as
follows:
a. Because of the number of Special Forces units, trg
centres and HQ, etc now in existence (abnormal posting
cycle), there is a need to identify and manage the career
path of personnel more closely particularly in the next few
years; the future impact of unit/posting locations needs to be
thought through and ample time given so that the impact on
families is minimised
b. By the nature of Special Forces Cps/training personnel
are exposed or suffer injuries or illness at a higher rate than
the majority of the ADF. Because of exposure to CS gas,
lead, asbestos, anthrax, etc, some of the dangers are not
known at the time of exposure, so allowances need to be
made for compensation at a future date and in a timely
manner. '
,
!---+--- .
.
~~-..-.~-,---·- - - - - - ·
y
46 j 21 The retention of an operational focus in an environment
Person nel
a : 2 which is increasingly demanding the focus of human
·
resources on non-operation~! issues.
46 i 21 Maintaining a technological advantage with the right but
Techn ology
N
~,_-I 3 most advanced e~-~,en~: ______________________
-- y
46 1 21 Identifying the right people for SO and then attracting,
Select ion
~-! 4 selecting, training and retaining those people.
__ ~----....y
46 I 21 The effective marketing of Australian Special Forces to the
Marketing
d j_5 Gov~rnll]ent and civil_~~!!:l.f!l_l!nitl':..__________________-+--46 j 21 The promotion and development of the credibility of
Comm unication y
e l 6 Australian Special Forces within the international Special
Forces_ community.
----------------------__
1-:-,j7 111 Ma~ketln_9:__ We__!!!~§_t__§_~_!l__<?_l!rseiY.~l:> to_the !~.§!i>l!b~-~~'=- so_ fY1ar]5~tj_l}_g___________ y
d
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~

~

a

l

l~~¥7~==~~-~---~-~-~~~~~---~-------~----~---------~-+-+~~4-+~
l 47
Operations
t ~b~~~~------------------~--------~~-'--~-~-------~----~--------~~~r-+~~-+~~~
i!c 47 i

Capability

~

;:._

;_

.•
'

~

,-

47 : 22 Looking after our people. We must consider career
Personnel
d · 0 management, personal and professional development and
the needs of families (for real, Not for pretend} and this
means putting our establishments in places where people
want to live.
1----,'--c··c+cc----- ------------------------------- ---------- ---·--:-----::----------=-------------------:-·-------------+--:- c·-:·---:---c:------l--:-c~!-:-:-f-::·-+::-_--!~-f-::--::-1
; 22 Communication and Admi
Process must be
Administration
! 1 refined to ensure that
flows well at all levels.
48 i 22 Laser Weapon and Technology. In recent years there has
Technology
· 2 been a marked improvement in this technology, and a future
role for this type of weapon could exist on the battlefield - we
,
should address both measure and counter-measure to this
j _ _
()f__t~<?-~!!<?_IQgy.___ ___ _ __ ___ _ _____ _______ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ __________________________ ----------1---- --------------------------+---+-+------l------l----+----. 22 Computer Literacy. Computers these days are an integral
Training
3 part of society, we need to stay at the sharp end of what
in this
ent.
Personnel

d

48
e

49

22 The Dawn of the Space Age is close.
next century the Leadership
5 permanent space station will be completed and there are
talks about a Moon base. This might sound like science
fiction now, but so was once the idea of travelling through
the air or underwater. World War I proved the point that
going over the top en masse was a waste. World War II
proved the point that armoured formations could determine
the outcome of a battle. Time and again we had to learn
from our mistakes. Consequently we should look to the
future with a futuristic mind, an open mind that is Not preconceived.
Capability
22 Increased Air Mobility. An air squadron should be a
6 dedicated part of a Special Forces unit, integrated with the
unit to train and operate together without having to rely on
outside assets.
22
Leadership

7
Training
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49

e
50
a

50
b
50
c

50
d
50
e

51
a

51
b

23 Improve career management.
Personnel
1
23 Leading Edge CISEW Technologies. Mounting any Special
echnology
2 Forces operation, regardless of size, will be dependent upon
our ability to gather, interpret, analyse and employ
information. The success of this operation will be
determined by the protection and distribution of that
information throughout the Special Forces Gp. To do this
effectively Special Forces need to have, and be able to gain,
leading edge technologies. Rapid procurement of this
tech
is critical.--·--··-----------------------·--------------·---··-------------··---·--··--··----------- --1--------··------·,-------------·-·-·---+-:~-:-+·c--c-l-,--,-+-c·c·-+-c+-c·:·~
23 Force Projection Platforms. Raising and sustaining
Capability
3 supportable force projection platforms. These include
ic and tactical air water and land
23 Recruiting and Training. A re-focus and restructure of the
Training
4 recruiting procedures and training priorities is needed for the
specialised Special Forces roles and tasks. It doesn't matter
how unconventional we think we are the ingrained
'militarisms' identify us as Army and more so as Special
Forces. The re-focus needs to be radical if this mind shift is
to work into the next
23
issue. Something that
5
must be raised in
23 Marketing/PR. Special Forces needs to be proactive in
Marketing
6 selling itself as a useful tool over a wide range of areas. This
must be the case towards Government. A great emphasis is
needed here as without Government s
we will do little.
23 Unconventionality is a big issue that is often talked about but Operations
7 never really exercised. Need to become realistic and form a
group within the Special Forces Gp that deals entirely in
unconventionality. Which could mean working under cover
of a business, etc. (Disassociated completely from the
Defence
23 Grasp technology constantly. Be able to trial and purchase Equipment
8 equipment off the shelf without going through the current
long procurement system which only puts us behind the
current technology when a decision has been made to
purchase that particular technology trialled three years

51

c

51
d
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1
selection criteria for both and Not trying to have a single
\ · unified selection course for both units.
-------------- -----· 1-:--·- -- --51 ~r24 Need to~tocus on.iilteroperahilitywitil-otile-rciVilianan(f--~--- Civilian
N Y N
e I 1 government departments, ie assisting real time ops such as: Agencies
!
drug enforcement agencies, surveillance agencies, police
_ ~- _ Efiid_sl_~~-1 9!~!~~~9..QR~,__e_tc;_ __ ____________ _ ______ _____________ . _ ---~----- ___ ___ ___ ___ _ ___ _ ___
52 i 24 More Computer Operator positions within the RegVmore
Personnel
Y Y N
~_J __?. qQmR~~UrC~:ining_._______.. __________________________________________ --------------------- __________
52 ! 24 More positions for unconventional deployments.
Operations
Y Y N
b
I
3
!-::c'..:·-<-------- ----------·----···----------.. --". _____________________ _,_ .., _____________ _, _______ ------------------1--:-:-· ---- -----52 ! 24 Some sort of EW capability introduced.
· Capability
N N N

_

·-· ----- - -

N N Y

_______ _
N N N
-~ ____ _
N N Y
----- - ·N Y N

l

~--"~ =-----------..------------------------------ --· ----·----·------·--····------- ·-··-----------·------------- c:::.----------~-- --:+:--.-+:-:-+:-~-+:.--:-{

52 ! 24 Exchange soldiers to more Special Forces units so that on
Training
Y N N Y N N
d
5 deployments members are able to understand the workings
!
of each other's units.
r--_--;------·
----------------------------------..
------------------------------ _____________, __________________ ----------·---·----- ---- ----·· , __ --- ----· --53 ! 24 To further develop the image capture and transfer
Equipment
N N Y Y N Y

i

~

_ J _ _§ Qf1f>?.Qi!i~!~-~--Lrl_f1_rl_!:!r~_f1_n.__~n.Y_!rg_JJ~~!:l.!.·_____....__~....-......................________, __ .... ________________.. _____ ----- --..-..... ----- ----- ..i 24

------

Improve information systems (knowledge) both software and Technology
Y N N Y N N
! 7 hardware knowledge, to keep up with the changing
!
technologL_ ______________ ~--------------+------+-+--o+--:-+--if--1-.-1
53 1 24 Develop/improve an EW capability.
Capability
N N N Y Y Y

53
b

c I 8

53 i 24 More use of unconventional warfare.

Capability

Y N N Y N Y

.Q._j
__~ ------------------------~~------------------------·. ----- -=-------- -+-j-!--+53 l 25 More exchanges with other Special Forces units world wide Training
Y N N Y N N~_j____Q_ !Q share/exp_b_~IJ_g~ s~i~~-'---------------·------ ----------------.-..----- _______ ......_______________ ..... -- .. ~-:--- ---- -54 i 25 Identification of Special Forces role in both war time and in
Operations
Y N N N N Y

....

~---..l. J.. .P~fi<;~ ..k.~~I?_i_llf!:_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
Training
N N N Y N Y
54 i 25 Identification of skills other than those already taught,
b
2 needed in a future conflict, egIS skills, EW and Counter EW

I

----,+----~~ksL~~~~ns 9. !-J!s!~~~~Liltc._____~---~----~-------------------- --~-----------------+--+--1-----l,--"1---11---J
54 25 Closer ties between SASR and Commando, sharing of
Training
N N N Y N Y
1

c

! 3

training facilities and assets, joint ex, eg SASR Pathfind prior

54--j--25 ~u~~~-~!~!eif~!:~~~~~nci~~il~~f~-u~~i~~~fs~~;~~~tllE!r ______ oi)eratians_________ - -v- -~T
d I 4 Government agencies, Federal Police, Customs, etc in
I

N'~v

-f\fN--

carrying out surveillance of remote locations or carrying out
raids on possible drug growing areas or criminal

i

~--L organis~~!2n.~----------------------------------

-----------'--------------------- ____________________ ---Exchange exercises with UKIUS/CAN/NZ Special Forces
Training
Y N N Y N N
1
5 forces especially those deemed as leaders in Special Forces
operations and leaders in assimilating new technology in
.
their
roles.
,____--+-------- --------------------------·-------------·------------------------------------------------------------------------------~--- -::·-:- -· -:-:- ---- ---·r:--:55 ! 25 Expert in skills.
Training
Y N N Y N N
a i 6
------··· ~------· -------------------------------- ----·------------------------------ .. ------ --------- ·-- -------·--·------------·---------------·-· ------------------------ ------ ·-:--1-::- --- ---:- --,-,55 1 25 Up to date in technology.
Technology
N N N N Y N
54
e

i 25
1.

b I 7

-:-:-:----"'7'------------------------------+=:--'7":·:::-----~~-+---,--+--+-+---l

i 25 Ability to perform numerous jobs expertly.
c ! 8
55

55
d

! 25

I

Capability

Leadership

More unconventional.

9
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a

0 Could be improved by running an Special Forces
communicator course at SOS (School of Signals). At
l
present there are only a few pieces of equipment within the
:,1

,

-4---Sqn that are used to tea.ch oeera_!9rs ar~athneESWOdSe.t--p--~er--troo--p--.- 1Pers-on_n_e__---·- r:y·-· ·-y- .N ·r.-:-y -N:·:- __
Y
56 ' 26 Introduction of an EW Tp to the Sqn 0
ii
1
b
56

i 1
! 26

-:··-+--···-- ·--·- ·--- --- ---··----- --------- ·---··---- --------- ···------· ' ' . ,_ .. ·- -- - -· -------------------·---·------ --· ---·--------- . -------- --------- -----------·--- ---- --

.

- - --· --- ----

How to attack/detect ground radar systems (that are used to Training
N N N Y Y N
_9___ )___?_ c!~!~_C?!_!~.<?..QE__rn_ov~_I!.I~Il!L _______________________________________________ -------------------------- --- ----· ------- --- ---- ----56 1 26 Explore possibilities of becoming involved with
Civilian
N Y N N N Y
d i 3 surveillance/anti drug agencies within Australia, for real time Agencies

~6j~~~~a=~~t of selection processfor sup-port-staff:~--------~- seTectTon-~--

y N N y

-N-N

a i 4
57 ! 26 More PT. Too often PT is-paid offfor-wor'k.""'vou~Shouldbe- Training·--------ry- N Nr-y-r-N-Nb : 5 incorpor_~[r:!_g__pT _!!:1!91()_~_r_ §Q!'l~.Q!!!~:_____ __ ---- ______________ _____ ____________________________________________________ _

~~57 .L~;26 -~~~~~~;~i~~~-~;~~~~~i~~~i~~~-:i~~--~-~--i-~~:--~~----------------______ -~-i-:~~ -~~~~~~--- __:_ -~- _~- -~---~-- --~More Computer Operator positions within the Regt and Sig
Personnel
N Y N N N N
d
57
e
58

7
26
8
26

a

Sgn to keep up with the co_!!!Euter 2-~~~ms:_____________
-------t-:-7- __ -:-:-t-:-7- ·-:-:- --=--=More soldiers with relaxed dress standards to develop and
Leadership
Y N N N N Y
~~Q!~__qp.!!_<?ns with!!:J_.~~Q!l_'!entiQ_1]5l!_~_§lrfare. __________ --------t-:-7- __
__ __ -:-:Females in Special Forces
Mixed gender
Y N N N N N

9_

.

____

-----·-r::·-:-+-1-,.-,-i-:-c-+-:-+~

58 27 Involve Special Forces in surveillance of criminal activity.
Operations
N N NJI N N Y
b
0
58 i 27 Train with all Special Forces units in world Not just local
Y N N'Y N Y
c I 1 countries, ie Chinese, Japane!?_~-·- - - - - - - - - - - - ·
---------~--~-+-~~---58 ! 27 Involve soldiers more in UN operations.
Operations
Y N N Y N Y
d
:
2
---+------- ---·---------------------------------- --------------------·-- ______ ,_ -58 1 27 Allow soldiers to be posted to Embassies on short rotations Postings
N Y N Y N Y
e i 3 to understand other countries and ho'l,lt~!~g_s yvqr.~Jh~!~~ _ _---59T27 Do-Noilei's)i,SRsiandardsslip-or-selection criteria slip as it Selection
-y
N N
a
4 merges with Commandos into the Special Forces Gp. Allow
~SAS to keep its identity.
59 l 27 Deployment on more UN Operations to allow an experience Operations
Y Y N Y N N
E__j_ __ ~ ~5l§~_tQ_c!~~~IE£ in th~!:I-~.!L_________________________________ ------------------·- ---------- --------- ---·59 ! 27 Prescibed Service Officer commission experienced NCOs
Personnel
Y Y N N N N
c I 6 into the squadrons to allow a higher level of competence at
'
command level. Most Special Forces units in the world try to
---L~- ~e~ th~_k!lle!l in Special ~or2_es unit~--~----------------- ,___________ --i-+--+~
59 ! 27 Deploy unit members to overseas embassies to gain
Operations
N N N 't'N V~
d i 7 information on overseas countries and develop real skills in
[
the culture and language. Full target reports could be
_j___ compiled on lik~ targ~ts at the same_!!!!!e. - - - - - - ·=--=----~--r:-:-t-::-:-t-::-t·:-:-1·-::-:-f--::--,59 j 27 Streamline trials and development by sending competent
Equipment
Y N N N Y Y
e ! 8 unit members around to other overseas Special Forces units
___ L_.~r:!.c! checking_ on th~ir trial reports to ~~E3e~ procurem~nt.
.
________ __.. __ ,___. -----r-:---60 l 27 Serious inter-Service integration. Let's look at our liaison
Communication Y Y N N N N

Yr

-----------------------------~------

I

t

~o--J-2~ -t:~~~~~~.:facu-5;--e9-wi1enc-o;-co"KIItfs!Jecfai-Forces_________·-- ca·a-aersilip_______ ·v- -N- -N·[-r\i1-N N
_l?____ j___Q_C?b~!:'_9_~LQ!JLf.Q~~-s___C2_~_~g_E}~__wiLc_:!!~{________________________________________ l_______________________________________________ _
~QJ?~- T~E3_9P!i<?!:'§!()_~-~!.E:l.~~E!!?€l~.§~!Yi9__E3_Q_f!i_~El~g(?!!!!!!if!~iQ'.l.§.
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28
2
f---.;--~
28

Operations
Greater interoperability of NATO forces, 'let's get working
with the people we will be going to war with', eg the
Americ~ll§L Briti§!!:______=_-,-=""':-,::::o-:.:..:.w__S=c..: O:. :.P:-'s:_,._--------------_--,------::·----+ ____________________ _
Selling ourselves to the Politicians, making us user friendly. Marketing

3
Operations

28 More deployments overseas on operations.

i 4

1-="--·+----:c+·,---··-c--------:---~-:::---

---- ------------- - '" ----~----- ·---- ··---:-----::-----,---_-·-:··-----------}.~----; ··:·-------------11-:-:-+::-:+:-·+:-:+:-:-+--::-:--i

! 28 As Special Forces increases in size, standards of training

Training

· 5 and realistic training should stay at a higher level than the
rest of the
28 Only see a role for women in a UW role.

Mixed gender

6
28 A set direction in the
7 so we are Not /'I''II'Y'In,otir'ln

Forces units

Capability
Selection

28 Special Forces selection process - is it regressive to
Selection
9 combine the two? Will it allow easier entry to accommodate
. . . . _m_....b
. . . .e___,r_ s_r~q!JJ!~~-~y~J3f'B1_____ ___ ___
___ _. . . . __ . _____ . -------------1___ .....,...... ,...., ..1.n,. . . . ~
62 29 I question the limitations imposed by project Delta. Granted
ing
b
0 focus must be specialised, however some skills (ie RAPSL
tr''"'niron shelved and SL parachuting put forward as a 'viable'
insertion option?? 1000-1500' over enemy territory isn't my
idea of a stealthy insertion if parachuting is the only option).
Should be considered as positive and useful across the
board
too.
1----·+ --:--!------ ------------------------ ----- ----------· ----- . ------ ------------------ ..
- ... . --- ......................... ---- ---+-=----·: ---:::---------- ----------+-:·:·+·::·· :+·:-- 62 29 Special Forces specialised/integral helo capability. Why use Capability
1 half-trained crews on rotation when we could have continual
c
support by specialist pilots. Also limitations on training with
helos due to hours training locations =Nn-realistic practices
that lean on perceptions of capability rather than on intimate
.
_ of actual li!Tlitations.
62 : 29 Reduction of time for water ops course. Creates burden on
Training
d
2 troop to free up exercise time in order to train operators in
basic skills. Also long water course provides a formal
environment within which fledgling NCOs can gain basic
knowledge on considerations for command of a water ops
patrol, liaison with Navy, employment of all methods of
projection, passage planning, etc - rather than assume that
time in a water troop means the possession of this
knowledge. As there are many gaps where opportunities
exist to miss the use of assets or skills.
62 ! 29 Pay levels in Special Forces group 4 RAR - SASR. Are they Personnel
e · 3 equal? Is there incentive to cross over - N! It's like a
nishment rather than career
ression.
~C..J~-~~=~~~~-CC---·---·------------+---------------~-1--+--~
63 : 29 More involvement with international peace keeping.
Operations

" a

a · 4
to exchanges with international forces, at
Israel.
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Operations

Training
ng with other

Operations

Operations

Leadership
Leadership

Leadership

65

- c

Operations

66
c

Operations

66

Operations
Training
Capability

rtir'"'"t''"n for future (long term - 5 yrs on), ie swift strike

"""1n1,.,,.,.

vehicle.
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Personnel

69 32 More Prescribed Service Officer commission chances for
e
7 Other Ranks.
70 : 32 A lack of understanding of the Special Forces environment
a ' 8 and culture impending on efficient and effective support to
units.
{1) Difficulties in communication arise due to a lack of
understanding of the role of Special Forces units by some
HQ pers that could be improved with closer liaison with units
and members. It is suggested that these pers be posted to
Special Forces units prior to filling positions on the HQ.
{2} Misconceptions also exist within supporting units
concerning the seemingly endless entitlements of certain
Special Forces units. Supporting units can significantly slow
down Special Forces response times by questioning
requests and demands. An active PR program could
enhance the reputation of Special Forces units and improve
co-operability whilst maintaining operational security.
{3} It is also Nted that some junior Special Forces members
have an almost non-existent understanding of the logistic
and pers support functions. It is an Army wide responsibility
1
to educate all
on the
and admin streams.
70 1 32 Special Forces posting cycle for non-Special Forces qualified Postings
b ' 9 pers. Following para 70.a., experience in Special Forces
units is obviously limited to small numbers of non-Special
Forces pers and it would be advantageous to manage this
experience in future postings to other Special Forces units or
HQ rather than wasting valuable experience by posting
members
back into mainstream
70 33 IS Training. There is an increased emphasis on the
c ! 0 requirement for electronic communications between all
Special Forces members/units. However, adequate
resourcing {dollars and manpower) is Not being provided to
train and sustain this
uirement.
70 33 The manner in which the Special Forces Gp is employed
Resources
d
1 provides intangible benefits to the Australian community and
as such should be afforded the resources both human and
to maintain a
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Equipment
N N NIN y N
71 : 33 Ensure that weapon systems are adopted th at keep pace
a 1 2 with current world technology, eg 50 cal vehi cle mounted
___J ....... p_q_~!:lJ!l!~.J2Urchase of M19.
--··--~------··--·-----------:-c-·
Training
N f-N N y N ~71 I 33 Increasing time dedicated to training personn el in their
b _L~ r~~eectiye areas of expe_r:tj_seL~.9...!!1.2Q!~Y-~~-9.,_Jjy~_Er.~-=------··N N N N N
71 I 33 Ensuring that personnel are given the apportunity to further Leadership
c ' 4 their careers throu h promotion courses. _
y N N N N N
71 I 33 Allowing selected personnel to work with oth er agencies that Training
d I 5 may be beneficial to their unit tasks, eg Spec ial Forces pers
_L_ ~o exchan_g~-~ith ~~~-~-~atLons ::Jr:'~.Q-~7_______
_..J..__
---------·-- Cc:·:y N YIN -:--::·
Personnel
N N
71 I 33 Initiation of a support program to help familia scope when
__l__
e I -~ ~e~i~.Lf9.~2~~-~P..Q.l:l~~~--~r~_~way on exte_l}~e_d opera![ons. __
N y NiN '"N ~
72 \ 33 Command Restructure. Move from LHQ to a n independent Management
a
7 organisation on a level with the other environ mental
.
commands.
--------------·------------- -----------··----------------y y N N N -o-:PIanning.
N
Personnel
b · 8 (1) Work place agreements (contracts for lo ng term
,
implementation)
i
(2) Continuity for ops and trg.
j
(3) Priority given to accommodate strategic plans .
L~- iiL.B~~!.~~prLQEi!Y.!9Ls_peci~!!.~-~-~1:!1!~ ts.
-,---····---------·
r-c·
Administration
N N y N y
72 j 33 Special Forces Admin and Log.
c ' 9 (1) Minimising a duplication of effort with oth er Aust services
(Navy).
(2) HQSO protecting units from admin and Iog decisions that
is a time consuming distraction from corps b usiness.
(3) lnteroperability with other foreign forces.
(4) Minimising government red tape (peace time
administration and logistics limitations when conducting real
time operations).
i
(5) HQSO ensuring every decision is resourced (including
__j __ time and space). __
r-c· -;-;72 34 Appropriate Timely Trg for Special Forces.
Training
N N N y N '1\f
d 1 0 (1) Special Forces offr development.
(2) Special Forces OR development courses
,
(3) WAN trg.
i -~ 4 _Recruit trg_:_. _______________________~---------------- ------------ r:--·
y y
y
l\f ~72 i 34 Operations. To provide a force appropriate t o a full range of Operations
I
e i 1 operational possibilities (women, Nn-beret q ual pers being
co-ordinated by qualified SASR specialists, e quipment

r-~1__

~·-·-

y

I

-·---------------~-

72Tss· ·s·iJ-ecTaT"Forces--P-ostTn9lmiJacton-strate9ic..
...

1--y

---------~~-

I

!

"N'ir::r

i

----~----- e!)hancement prog_r:_~~~l: ...- .....-----------···· __

------~~---·

·-------<-~~~---

73 ! 34 Force Projection. Inadequate force projectio n arrangements Capability
N
a · 2 currently inhibit operational capability. Dedic ated Special
Forces aviation assets and better working ar rangements with
RAAF and RAN assets are desirable. Curre nt deficiencies in
Collins Class submarines and range and payload restrictions
_______,____ gf Black. Hawk ar~ exa_I'!!P.L~~--_____
y
73 I 34 Type A Operations. For SASR in particular, it has become
Capability
b i 3 apparent that type A operations have an important role to
I play in achieving likely tasks. Implementing this capability
__..;._
successfully will be a signific~t challenge to so.
r::,-.~~-----~-~-y
73 i 34 Special Forces Selection. Selection is central to Special
Selection
e.
With
a
c_.L 4 Forces s~nse of ide!J.!!!Y an~~erefore mQ!~l- - - - - - - -----~·
--~~·~-

--~-~~-~~----
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i
j
1

~

regular Commando organisation. SFTC and changing roles
of SASR post-CT the nature of selection is an important
issue to Special Forces soldiers. Issues such as women and

! ~~

~~-~2-~J~I3~>..~~<2~()~!) -~~gi~~l~f_()~£13l>J§l1L[11to_t~i!) g_~!I39Q'Y~-- -~- . --~~ . ~~~--·---·-·-- ........ ____ ·-:-·:- .... ....C" -~-73 : 34 CT Handover to 4 RAR. The transition of this role is likely to Management
Y Y N N N Y
d
5 be a significant undertaking and as yet little planning
"==- _J __ .c:lEE13~r~_!9...~c:lYI3QE:lE:l~.g()l'!~.'!.cted:___ ___ _ __ -------~~ ______ __
---------·--r::-- ____________
73 i 34 SASR Post-CT. The structure, size and training focus of
Leadership
N N N N N Y
e ! 6 SASR post-CT is likely to be a contentious issue. Issues
I such as rotations, type A operations and overseas recovery
<:1!.13..~13Ltc:> __~l3.!13~.e>!YI3.~. -....... --------------··----- ·---------- _-----· ----------·-----------··-------------- ------------------------------------- ----···
...... ______ ·----73f! 34 A number of other issues were raised that are worthy of
Leadership
Y Y N N N Y
7 note:
(1) C2 Arrangements. Is is appropriate for SO to remain
under Land Comd for raise, train and sustain?
(2) Procurement. The current system is Not giving SO the
techNiogical edge in a timely manner.
(3) Overseas Exercises. Should Ferdinand replace much of
the Night series to enable more regional engagement and
!
less reciprocal training?
:
(4) Locations of Units. Where will Special Forces units be
! b~sed )D__the future? ----------------------------------------------·-------- ---------------~-- _____________________
74 i 34 To strive to be truly unconventional.
Leadership
Y Y Y Y Y Y

i

_____ L______

a i 8

?.fT"34 to- inc-r-ease-ow:--i<-no-w-ted'9e--ot-an-d-stailaili9-in..t't1e ______________.. coilimunication- v

N N ·v--N~-

~-~ ~lligenc~90mn:!_t~nl!Y.·-------------------------------..---- ------c-------+,-,-+-:-:-+·-::-.,-1--~+:-:-l

74 i 35 To continue to gain operational experience over a wide
Operations
Y N N
.
. __
---------r--1--,-,
74 ! 35 To continue to acquire 'state of the art' technical equipment Equipment
N N N
d I 1 to enhance our capabilities.
- - - - - -f---c-c74 35 To ensure our Operational Security Procedures are sound so Security
Y N Y
e
2 ()!J!_QE_I3.!~-~ors__~r:!~-~13r:.c:l~L()!_1S -~!.~_gondl!_~.l3i sa!~------ --------------·-----~- _____ ___
75 35 Officer Career Management within SO. Upon completion of Training
Y N N
a
3 the suite of selection courses for service within SO units,
officers are posted into command and administrative
positions. These positions are demanding in terms of
commitment and time and do Not allow SO officers to
conduct professional development courses within the SO
stream other than the core or mission essential skills. Of
concern is that professional development courses for officers
specific to SO are almost Nn-existent. I have recently
completed the SOOBC and found this to be beneficial and
appropriate to my-employment within SO. I hope this course
continues in the future for new officers coming into the SO
stream. I believe that for the future a continuum of
t=-::-+-·-~'erofe~sional development courses ne_13.Q.~J2.. be ~ddresss~ --------·-+--v:+:-v·- -:N·-75 35 Officer Tenure within SASR. Currently officers are selected Selection
b
4 for service in SASR as a result of their performance on the
selection course. On completion of a basic tactics course
and a basic para course, the officer is deemed 'beret'
qualified but returns to his parent unit to complete his posting
with that unit prior to being posted to SASR. On posting to
'--~---..C..-----'---t'-'-'h~e=--~R-~eg_!ment the ()ffic~!l~-13~_<_e~cte~Jo t~~E:l.il_ comm~E!.~L ____,____

~---0 variety of deeloY!!Jents.
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position. Although the command responsibility is within the
capability of officers selected, they lack the core skills
required of them to operate effectively as a member of their
patrol/troop without further training. This could be addressed
by having officers complete a cycle of courses relevant to
their employment. I believe moves that are in place to have
officers posted to SASR serve tenure of four years in the
Regiment are sound. This allows the officer to complete the
cycle of courses and the three-year cycle that currently
exists. I believe this concept has been proposed but to date
it has Not occurred.
f-----+--c···---t·--·--·-·------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------·----------··---- ---· ----· ---··
1-::75 35 Special Forces Training Centre. The concept of a Special
Manage ment
N y N N N -N
5 Forces Training Centre appears at a glance to be a good
c
concept. It allows the consistency in training and allows the
Operational Support Squadrons of the respective SO units to
concentrate on their role of operationally supporting the FEs.
There are however, particular skills that are relevant to
particular units, for example a commando unit's requirement
to conduct platoon level operations compared to the
requirements for an SAS patrol. Therefore, I see a
requirement for each unit to maintain an element responsible
for unit specific training. Under the Special Forces Training
Centre, resources and funding would be controlled by Trg
Comd. Who then resources and funds the training
conducted within each unit, Trg Comd or Land Comd under
!
the raise, train, ~_us~?ii)_L!!flbrella?
______
f-:--::-y b-:-:75 i 35 Common Selection. The selection courses that exist across Selection
N N N N N
d I 6 the Special Forces Gp today are designed to select a
particular soldier and officer for service in a particular unit.
! Common selection does Not allow for a specific to unit
i
selection. Currently the Commando selection course is run
1
over a 7-day period and the SASR selection course is run
1
over a 21 day period. Successful applicants for these
I courses tend to display a higher degree of motivation and
I mental toughness than those that are unsuccessful. The
'
duration of the SASR selection course places an additional
I test on the applicant's motivation and mental toughness,
;
both during the course and the lead up training. Due to the
fact that a different type of soldier is required for the different
roles that each unit has, a separate selection process should
be adhered to. This may take form of a separate selection or
1
a combined 'barrier testing' phase followed by a specific to
..l;!!!t selection p~~~~----------·-------------------+=---:--=----··:--o-::--:-76 1 35 After 2000, concern our training with the UW role.
Capability
N y Ny N y

!

1,

i
____J_=a I 8

76T36 MovSSASR- over to iiie eastern states.--·-------------- Manage ment
c i 0
----- -----:-=76 I 36 Gender diversity needs to be encouraged within Special
Mixed Gender

y N N N N N

d i 1 Forces. The male domination leads to closed-mindedness.
76 l 36 We need a specialised air force unit for Special Forces.

N y y N N N
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Capabilit y

N N N N N N

e ! 2

77!"36 cam"bmecn3eiection-cou-r5e:--E"xamTnation-otthe-resiJ-eciive-- selection
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com bin ed selection course. Commandos operate in raid
companies and are employed in large groups with supporting
elemen ts. Conversely SASR soldiers are essentially
require d to operate as small teams or indiividuals, isolated
from extensive command structures and for protracted time
frames Considering this then, the requisite personal traits of
candidates for these two separate roles are different.
Unilate ral selection will most likely result in a reduction of the
1--···'l-::-::.-rquality of selected soldiers for both units.
Training
77 36 Specia I ForcesTraining Centre. Whilst the concept of a
b
4 SpeciaI ForcesTraining Centre is sound, in theory it poses
somei nherent concerns. The level of detailed training
require d by SASR soldiers, who are to be employed in an
extend ed operational role, isolated from support elements
and the refore relying upon training and initiative. This differs
from th e commando who is rarely separated from his or her
basic c ommand structure. His or her role is that of
special ised infantry conducting offensive operations outside
the sco pe of the general ADF. The SASR soldier is tasked
with a range of specialised roles at strategic level beyond the
scope of the ADF. So while some overlap of training may
occuri n certain subject areas, combining courses risks a
reducti on in training level. This is likely to occur as courses
be com e progressively directed at the Special Forces
L_. ~~~tru.!!1 as__~p_p_os~.9__!~~Q.~~J!i~_rg!~~~-- ----------------------·-- _
_ 77 36 It is ack nowledged that cross-pollination of SASR and
Training
5 comma ndos will be of mutual benefit to both, however SASR
c
needs to retain its independence in order to effectively train
its ope rators to meet the ADF mission requirement. Current
stand ards and the loss of valuable knowledge bases stand to
be com promised with the creation of Special Forces Training
Centre
--78 f-36- Need ur own aircraft like US Special Forces.
Capability
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N N N
78!36 N worn en in Special Forces combat roles.
b i 7
-------------------------------------------·-------· ----------------- ----- ----- ------ ----- ---·y N N N N N
7aT36 "Need-to focus more on diving.
Training
c !___8+-----·
---------------------------Training
N N N y N N
78 i 36 Longer bush exercises with other units as enemy.
d i 9
y N N y N N
79 i 37 A camp rehensive reinforcement cycle where new members Training
a I 1 to the t roops are fully trained in their basic skills and
!
insertio ns so that tp trg time is Not wasted bringing these
!
membe_I'_~_!J_[>j_Q_~ J:>!l§]~-!~'.1.~!~---- -- -. - ------------------------- ---------------·-----------1-:c-·:
y ··.--:79 T37 OPS-EC needs to be addressed and those violating the rules Security
N N N N y
b ! 2 should _be_de~:!!L~l!.h__~~ord[Qg!y.:.___________________________ r=----------79_,__37 ·More orporals or senior diggers should be sent away on
y N N ·y- N ~
Training
3 exchan ge (even short term- several weeks) to other Special
Forces units around the world. This is necessary to gain
,___ exposu r~__to ~_ew ~g~pment,_assets and techn~es. ____
79 i 37 Moret raining should revolve around offshore recovery,
Trafning
N N N y N y
d ! 4 especi ally since this looks like one of our main roles after
·
Comm andos take over the CT role.
------------------------------··---------~---
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79

37 More emphasis should be placed on strategic strike
5 capabilities, as this appears to be the new direction in
modern day warfare. Also a larger emphasis place on UW
harassment tasks.
l-8·o··~+-3~~7-+M-a~i=nt'--".aC..C.in trainingfocus on~patrollirlg~sl<iiTS-and speciaiTst~----

Capability

Y N N Y N Y

Training_________

·Nry.~

e

a

N

v~ -N

v

6 insertion skills (as with Project DELTA recommendation), eg

need for water op NCOs to instruct/supervise during all water
op cses as part of the DSO qualification - PTCO cse, dive
l---+-----+~~-~-'-!_~g9~_Q!!~~~: __________________________________________________________ ------------------------- "7':- --- - - - ---·- ----- ----80 37 Maintain overseas deployments to SE Asia and Pacific
Training
N N N Y N N
b
7 Region. If Regt is over-committed, these trips could be
reduced to a ptl/team deployment. Worthwhile deployments
for a water op FE would be Paskal at Lumut in Malaysia and
Thailand seals at Sattahip in Thailand. These units are
water operations orientated, have soldiers that are
approachable and motivated to train with Aust SASR. The
locations are such that an important cultural and language

~---~----~exchange is ~sibl~---------···----·------~---- -··------·-·······-·------· ---~-- ____ ··--- ·-·--· --~-:- ____
80 1 37 Maintain policy of leave or stand down period to overlap with Personnel
c : 8 school holidays as is occurring with 2 Sqn in 1998. This is a
good way of compensating families for time lost (evenings,
! nights and weekends) when their husbands or fathers are

Y N N N N N

i

,_..f-...

a~~-2!:1.-~~~r_c:!~-~~------------------------------·-·-·--------

80 ! 37 Encourage senior troopers and corporals to participate in
d ! 9 Amelio activities (advice, free time to plan.) Previous in:
country experience is invaluable in times of operational
______ J ______g_~~!2YI_!l_e_!:l!:______________________________________________________________________________________ .... ________ ......
80 I 38 Development of ship under way capability. Also, submarine Capability
Y N N Y N Y
e I 0 skills with the new Collins Class submarines.
~T 38 Combined Selection~- The r'..:;e::.:sp:..::e_::c:,.:ti:..v-:ce.:.:.:::ro::.:le~s-=-a=-=n-d-:-t_a_s~ks--of:-t-:-h-e-f-S-:::-e--:1-e-ction
YNNNNYa

1 two tunbitsd~ffre difftereTnht and th~rehfore tthl ed~efflectiotn process
mus e 1 eren .
ere are 1n eren y 1 eren
i
requirements of manpower, that is, a man suitable to
j
Commandos, (larger raiding forces), may Not necessarily be
,
the same man that the SASR is looking for, (small team
1
capable of operating removed from command/support
,
elements). Therefore, I believe, separate selections should
J

!

--~~- be maintained. ----------------------------------~81 ! 38 Special Forces Training Centre (Special Forces Training
b

!

I

Training

s1rssl'f~~!~~~~JB~~~;t:~ :~ta~~ts,-co~o-cat"ed with-Special·---- c-apability_____
c

N Y N Y N N

2 Centre). The concept is sound but it poses some possible
problems. There are a number of courses that could be run
at a Special ForcesTraining Centre. These would be
courses that are c.ommon to all members of the Special
Forces Gp, ie basic demolitions, PTCO, CQB, Special
Forces Sniper and Climbing/Survival. There are, however,
courses that are specific to SASR, ie small team insertion
skills, LRPV, CPP, PAS and advanced demolitions.
Therefore, some elements of Op Spt Sqn should be
maintained within SASR to continue its role of conducting

: 3 Forces Gp so as to provide and perform to Special Forces
requ~remen~-L~~Iieve !!!Ls will enable better, closer and

.___ !
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more capable inter-operability for both aviation and Special
Forces
alike.
38
that 4 RAR (Cdo) and Special Forces Training
Capability
4 Centre will provide a much needed string in the Special
Forces Gp's bow and will prove to be of a mutual benefit to
both Commandos and SASR, however, given that SASR and
Commandos roles are inherently different, SASR needs to
retain and maintain its independence so as Not to prejudice
1------+·- ···--··l

QJ?~~~-~Q~-~L~~~!:!i~~~--------- ------- --- --- ----- -·----- ···--- --------------------------+--,---- ·--·-···----------------J··c·c:··l--c·+-----+:··:

82 : 38
ng. To enhance our ability to better cope with all
Training
a
5 contingencies, all personnel within the Special Forces family
require a thorough grounding in the basics. There was a ·
tendency in the past to shorten time on courses, however
this has been addressed with P
DELTA.
82 ! 38 The Special Forces Training Centre may be able to address Training
b i 6 combined training, however there has to be set guide lines
both Commando and SAS training. Basic combined
training can be achieved with thorough preparation and set
goals. There must be high standards set for each unit as
they have completely different roles and tasks. We should
Not get confused with what is really required versus what is
~~E_~~!~~-t______________________________________ -------------·-·. -.. ·---- ---- .---------·- ---· ----------· .
82 38 Courses such as Patrol Tactics, Supervisor Infantry Ops
Training
c
7 (Section), Medical, Signals, Demolitions and
MOUT/FIBUAICQB (the American model), can be conducted
by the Special ForcesTraining Centre. Basic insertion skill
courses such as Small Craft Handling (PTCO), parachuting
and mobility can also be conducted, however specific
ltr.ooinir,n would need to be carried out within the individual
units. These are the basic core courses that are required for
al Forces.
a new member in
82 38 Selection must be looked at completely differently as both
d
8 units have different requirements. The question of whether
training centre would be able to conduct a combined
selection must be determined by each individual unit. There
needs to be standards applied to these selection processes
so there is clear delineation between SASR and
Commandos. SASR selection is vastly different to that of
Commandos. Completely different types of people are
required. To overcome the short fall in training, there is a
requirement to collate all teaching points and separate these
for both Commando and SAS tr~inir1n
82 38 Commando Company Training.
9 (1) SASR has been involved in training teams to
Commandos in the past. These courses are a very good
start point for the future, however continuation training will
differ from east coast to west coast and by each individual
instructor. To ease the burden on training between both
Commando units and SASR, 16 RWAR could be utilised as
the training company for reinforcements for commandos. All
the training facilities are within Western Region along with all
the necessary training support and expert instruction.
Commandos would be better
for the hand over of
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a

83
b

83
c

83
d

83
e

84
a

the CT role post-2000 if the training
for over a decade.
unit that has been conductin CT
39 Relocation of SASR. To have all the Special Forces
0 community based to the one side of the continent is a little
short sighted. At present the other assets locally based offer
_ __! !~_)(j_~i!i!y__?_n_c:j p_~!~ll-~ al ~ _______ __ _ __ __ _____ _.
39 Special Forces Personnel on UN Deployments. The
1 opportunities for sending Special Forces personnel on UN
deployments are becoming more prevalent. However if the
hierarchy within the ADF wish to maintain a high standard
then the opportunity to send Not only individuals or
uadron but
s and
must take more of a focus:
39 Selection of Special Forces Candidates. Currently the
2 selection process for both Commando and SASR are
uniquely different and should continue their separate
selection process. However in saying that, the Special
Forces community should be given the opportunity to
combine the courses to see if it is feasible, both on a budget
and performance point of view. There are many 'pros and
cons' for combining the selections and we won't know unless
out of our fixed
and be a little more flexible.
39 Dedication of Aircraft for Special Forces. One of the key
3 issues concerning the ADFs Special Forces community is
the lack of dedicated aircraft for Special Forces, however
36/37 Sqn do a great job in their wide spectrum of
employment. The current C-130s are Not equipped with
GPS or FUR for Special Forces ops, to add to that, on a
recent Vector Flash exercise, the Australian freefallers and
mobility operators had to rely on a foreign agency to
ete the task at hand.
39 In recent years
ADF has been triallling two DH Twin
4 Otters as a replacement for the Porters. As of last year the
staff involved in the aircraft commented that for the type of
aircraft it costs more to lease the aircraft than to buy it over
e 5-year lease period. To add to that, the aircraft is
governed by civilian restrictions so it can't support Special
Forces type roles by the dropping of Heli Boxes. If the ADF
were to have dedicated aircraft with the sought after
technology it would greatly enhance the capability of the
ADF to rescue hostages in foreign countries. To date we are
probably the only western country without its own dedicated
aircraft in location.
39 Combined Selection Process. I believe we can only combine
5 the selection process to a certain degree. That could
possibly be that all the physical tests are conducted in the
initial phase to get the physically/mentally fit personnel
required to then go into the Special Forces fields req. This is
where the course can split but conducted at the same
school, for obvious cost cutting reasons. The selection
process for SASR and Commando has to be different due to
the varied nature of tasks that both units conduct. It has
been proven in the past that a Commando can operate as an
Reserve unit but a unit such as SASR cannot. CT
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skills nowadays, are Not considered a 'black art', SASR has
been t raining police forces in the region for years, some of
those -police offic~rs were females.
__ -~-------~- r:-:- ·-:-:-t-:-:-t-:-:+::-::+:-:-l
84 39 Speci al Forces Training Centre. A central school for basic
Training
Y N N Y N N
6 skills is a good concept to eliminate duality of facilities and
b
instructor base, but there will be a need to have training cells
that gi ve the mission essential skills to each different Special
Forces formation. These cells or training wings should be
located at the individual units.
--- ----- ··---- --- --- --1
84 r-39 Paradi gms. As a Special Forces force there still seems to be Leadership
N N N N N Y
7 a limited view on how we do our business. These are
c
generated by a lack of assets and restraints placed on
Speci al Forces by Army, ie insufficient ranges for organic
'1!-~~.P.~ !:!..~Y-~!-~~§_t_§Q_g~~--~-~Q3 i!!__f:\.:.~~:mt~~t d~[!!t _____________ ---·---------···-------·- r:---~-~ ______ ...... __ _
84 39 Regia nal Focus Language Training. Language skills are
Training
Y N N Y N N
8 very much a perishable skill and need more attention for its
d
upkee p, ie 2 month emersion training in tC).rget country, 6
week Customs and Patrol Boat attachments, 3 months
attach ments to a unit of similar role and tasks (KOPASSUS,
Task Force 90 P.l. SAF, PGK) in target country. The amount
ofmo ney and work that go into training a proficient linguist is
Notrefleeted in continuation training or time to conduct
train in g to keep these perishabel skills alive. A more serious
look at giving the linguist training time support and TIME to
do the training, three continuous days per month with at least
some time spent in country, once a year. This sort of
train ing is mostly time intensive with the use of limited
resources.
y y y y Ny
85 39 Select ion.
Selection
a
9 (1) T he current selection process should be adapted to meet
the ch allenges of the future. I believe that due to the very
differe nt roles and expectations of each unit that a separate
selecti on needs to be run for SASR and the Commando
units.
(2) In line this the SASR selection should look to the future
and address the following:
(a) T he selection of women to serve in predominantly UW
roles.
(b) T he selection and recruitment of specialists into a
reserve component (eg journalists, linguists, technicians and
ethnic minorities, etc).
c- Maintaining a larger reserve component with an
operat
ional role.
N~
(3) s election
and recruitment of suitable personnel remains
the key_g!_.o ha'{l~J_g a c~pable~_for~~s unit.
_____
--~-------1r:N·-:-r:-:-N . N y -N-~N
85 40 Traini n
Training
b
0 (1) T he training focus of each Special Forces unit needs to
bema re defined to ensure that units are able to effectively
maintain mission essential skills to a higher level. The
adage of 'Jack of all trades Master of none' seems to define
the Au stralian approach to training Special Forces operators
in all o
______________________
.l~L-~
-~------------------------~--------·----·----------------·--··-------------------------------------·
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85
c

dup lication, the units will be able to achieve a higher level of
skill and capability in their mission essential skills. Obviously
so me cross-training will still be required between units.
(3) Training courses should be approached in a more
ben eficial way. For example, all language training of SASR
ling uists should be done 'in country' using the University
Campus courses offered in most Asian countries, thus also
givi ng a higher level of cultural awareness and local
kno wledge. If this is prohibitive financially, then the courses
run in civilian campuses in Australia would be suitable by
providing a different perspective to SASR members.
(3) SASR should start to have a greater focus on UW
trai ning and operations in urban environments out of uniform,
as t he scope for such activities in the future political
environment in the region is increasingly relevant. The
con tinuing need for green roles troops is as important as
everJor _.Q!_~_~! roJ~_sj_re~~y~_r:~!_g_SAft _fJ._!l~ ~BQL________________________ __ ________________ ____ _____
__________ _
40 Eq uipment and Funding.
Equipment
N N Y N Y N
1 (1) To enable all Special Forces units to operate to their
hig hest potential they need to be equipped with the most
suit able equipment that maintains a technology edge over
thei r rivals. This is especially true of items such as night
visi on and image transfer equipment.
(2) Weapon systems need to be capable of adapting across
the range of mission profiles and the M4 modular weapon
systern would do this for SASR allowing both recovery and
con tingency roles to be covered with one weapon system.
(3) New equipment needs to be assessed quickly and
bro ught into service, allowing us to maintain the technology
edg e. Two and three year procurement cycles leave us
beh ind both our allies and adversaries.
(4) Funding needs to be maintained at a suitable level to
ens ure challenging and relevant training can be conducted in
bot h Australia and the region. This should be characterised
by N notice activities planned and conducted by HQSO to
ens ure the Special Forces group is at the capability level that

I

J=!Q.§_Q_!:~_9~!eS~-------------------------------------------

~a5+4·o Leadership Training.
Training
d
2 (1) The focus for Special Forces should be developing our
fut ure leaders now. To do this the JNCO showing potential
sho uld be given the opportunity to train on exchanges with
oth er Special Forces units overseas. In the same way our
juni or officers should be exposed to the planning and training
sys terns of other units in the Special Forces community
ove rseas.
(2) Exposure to our overseas allies at all levels will ensure
we maintain the technological and technique edge into the
fut ure.
(3) Vital to leadership of SASR in the future is the continuing
poli cy of having SASR officers serve as patrol commanders
for at least one year. Without this they will Not undersand
the hardships and complexities faced by a patrol they may
tas k in the future as XO and OC.
~---.-.-.~-~-~~-~-~-----~-~--~~---~-~~-----·-~-~--'=-'·'---->~-~~---------~--~-~

354

---------~~--~-=--~

Y N

N Y

~-........l...-~-~=

Appendix 4

85 ! 40 Planning and Staff Processees.
e · 3 (1) To ensure that the Special Forces group remains
effective into the future, it is vital that planning and staff
processes are standardised across Special Forces and that
a suitable training course is conducted for all officers and
SNCO.
(2) This course should take the form of an Special Forces
joint planning course and it should initially target all officers
and SNCO identified for planning or staff jobs, eg Tp XO and
SSM and ultimately all Special Forces officers and SNCO.
(3) The course should be compulsory for any Navy or Air
Force personnel that are involved in the planning or conduct ·
of missions supporting Special Forces units. It would give
them a valuable insight into the capability and requirements
of Special Forces, while teaching the correct planning
sequence.
!
(4) The US military currently run such a cpurse that may
L-~-·- J?.~q_vid~_~_g_Q_g_Q__st~n..P£tQ.t!9.~-HQSQ_~----------------85f! 40 The future of Special Forces will rest on the clear definition
· 4 of unit roles, effective training of suitably selected personnel
in mission essential skills within these defined unit roles,
maintaining the technological and technique edge over both
allies and adversaries and ensuring that our future leaders
and planning staff are trained to the highest standard
:
through exposure to foreign units and through relevant
!
courses in Australia.
86 I ·4o Observation. The.i'mp·o·rt-anc.e oftacticai.ancfoperation.al __ _
a
5 manoeuvre is directly proportional to increased dependence
on the technology for transmission of timely information and
intelligence. This increased reliance on the timely provision
of information, in order to penetrate the enemies decision
process is forcing SAS FEs to meet shorter response times.
Recommendation: In order to maintain a short response
time the skills required must be routine. Routine comes from
repetition in training and a high degree of competency in the
fundamental skills. Therefore the Special Forces Gp should
maintain its focus on reducing the amount of inappropriate
training and tasking. This will increase time to maintain a
reasonable skills competency. DELTA projects have gone
along way to achieve this; however, this should be constantly
monitored and updated.
Full mission rehearsals with joint assets and full C2 should
be increased because at present our weak link in a majority
of missions is the assets that we rely on. Assets and related
.
units can Not match our response times, therefore negating
_j____ one of the~ecial Fq_r:9es §_R__!ijyant~~l~-~: ______ _
86 ! 40 Observation. SASR and Commandos have different
b
6 missions and tasks, therefore, the selection criteria need to
reflect these differences.
Recommendation: SASR should retain its selection course
to ensure that we continue to get suitable officers and men
.
based on the qualities required to complete the unique

_____l____ IT!L~~lQ.Il~_!Jlat__~EEIYJ.2__$~_~R. __Q_C?!!Ir_Tl_al_l~iQ..:~~~o':l_!Q_h~Y-~-~---355
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'C amman do trammg course' that teaches and selects
personnel on their ability to perform the related skills in a
'strenuous environment. SASR and Commando situation is
Not the sam e as 22 SAS and SBS. 22 and SBS perform
.
similar missi ons, therefore, their selection criteria are similar
and joint sel ection is appropriate. In our case the missions
'
of both units are different and to impose joint selection will
~
degrade the ability of SASR and Commandos to select and
train the a ~riate personn~--~-Leadership
Y N N ·Y N N
~ ~0 Observation . Career concerns appear to have a greater
7 effect on th e decisions made, than do operational interests. ·
c
This is an effect which, historically proven, comes with
'Peace Tim e' defence forces. This effect is present among
officers and NCOs throughout the Special Forces
community. As a direct result micro management is frequent
at all levels and if this trend continues it would be harmful to
the develop ment of future leaders. With diminished
leadership development, innovation and flexibility will
decrease wi thin the Special Forces community.
Recommen dation: Commanders at all levels (in particular
the junior commanders) must be given more responsibility
and made accountable for their decisions and actions.
Leadership training within the Special Forces group needs to
be increase d and monitored to ensure that our future
commander
change:-- Leade-rs-hip________
rN
-N-86 40 Some of th
8
However,
I
believe
that
the
Special
Forces
Gp
should
d
maintain its focus on developing leadership at all levels.
Maintaining a high degree of competency in the fundamental
skills and having the appropriate selection and training to suit
individual unit requirements. These factors have Not
changed throughout history and probably will Not change in
the future.
··-----------87 40 (1) Combin e Yr 1 Sqn with Trg Sqn leaving two operational
Y Y N Y N N
1
a
9 squadrons within SASR:A Contingency Sqn and Recovery
Sqn. Perce ived advantages would be:
(a) All reinf orcements would undergo common Special
Forces skill s training at the Special Forces school, eg
patrolling, demolitions, para and COB. Reinforcements
would be posted to units only on successful completion of
these cours es.
(b) SASR reinforcements would then receive one full years
specialisVu nit training within Trg Sqn. Upon posting to
Contingency Sqn, all reinforcements would be fully trained in
mission/ins ertion skills and require N. further training to reach
OLOC level
(c) This system would also cater for the expected reduced
future SAS R manning due to our commitment to supply
instructor s
-personnel- Training ---->y N '1\f y "f\i y
87 41 Introduce a
b
0 at sub-unit Ievel on lessons learnt on all operational and
contingenc y deployments. Currently a lot of knowledge and
e~~rie.!l£~-_gained_ on t~~~-~-missiQ_IJ~J~_yery ______________~--- - - - - - - - · .·----'-·'--.L·-·· .________

..

e~~!~s-~:~~~~~~~u~~s~~=~~d~e~~edto

·---~--------·
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lessons are only being
that mission.
87
Currently there is a widespread lack of knowledge across all
c
levels in Special Forces on the benefits and procedures of
using information technology. The IM systems currently
available are Not being used to their full potential (ie Special
Forces WAN, SASRLAN) or their inappropriate use is
causing security concerns, all through lack of training and
awareness. A solution could be to introduce an
intelligence/information systems management position into
all sub-units within Special Forces (SAS Sqn) whose
responsibilities would be to advise, train and regulate on
current information management systems available and in
use within
al Forces.
87
Currently there are two individual weapon systems used
Equipment
d
within Special Forces (M16 and Styer). Neither system is
issued with a night aiming device (NAD) as .standard. In
1998, most Special Forces soldiers will cannot accurately
employ their individual weapon in low or N light conditions
despite it being recognised at least 10 years ago that the
likely future battle would be fought at night and indeed, most
of our training doctrine is based on nighttime activity. We
need to standardise a weapon system within Special Forces
and immediately channel our efforts into addressing this
inadequacy. My suggestion is to discard the Styer and equip
all Special Forces personnel with the M16/M4 modular
weapon system. Not only would we benefit from continuity in
training, ammunition type and 40mm capability, but the
mounting system allows for great flexibility in the choice of
day/night sighting aids. All weapons should be issued with
at least a NAD such as Aimpoint, Trigicom scope or tritium
sights, etc. The current NFE procurement projects will
obvio
further enhance this
1---+----f-C..:::-. .:.:
87 41 A serious UW capability within Special Forces needs to
Mixed Gender
e
3 address the possibility of recruiting women and intelligence
specialists from the civilian intelligence community. We
need to change the way we think in relation to covertly
acquiring intelligence as I don't believe an Special Forces
member could ever develop enough skill in this field to be
viable.
88
1. Education of SASR Personnel. Since my return in
Personnel
a
January from a two year posting with 1 Commando Coy I
have observed a distinct lack of knowledge, understanding
and belief in the raising, development and employability of
the following Special Forces elements:
(a) raising of 4 RAR (Cdo)
(b) expansion of 1 Commando Regt (3 Coy)
(c) Special Forces School
(d) relocation of SASR
Education of SASR members in these areas will Not only
increase the unit knowledge and understanding of the
development of Special Forces, it may increase the number
of SAS members that are wi
to be
out of the unit
vauJau•c

357

Appendix4

41 Location of Special Forces
is my understanding that Management
5 4 RAR (Cdo) is to remain in Holsworthy. This is unfortunate
in two areas:
(1) Being an amphibious unit, its distance from the ocean.
While major activities will be forecast, casted and transport
organized, a great deal of experience can be gained through
minor activities being conducted in a suitable close training
area such as experience in the surf (PT), swim fitness,
swimmer scout drills and general small craft training without
the need to include excessive transportation times into the ·
activity. This is especially beneficial to members from
country areas.
(2) Isolation of Special Forces units. One of the advantages
that the SASR has in its location is that it is isolated from
conventional units. This restricts involvement with a more
regimented environment allowing for concentration in other
(task related) areas. Perhaps locations such as Holsworthy
(4 RAR) and Singleton (Special Forces School) will Not allow
, . . for this to occur.
88 i 41 Development of the Special Forces School. During my
· 6 service with 1 Commando Coy I observed the raising of the
Commando Training Wing (CTW). With only ttwo SAS
qualified 'instructors' the CTW that was predominantly
manned by members of the RAR and 1 Commando Regt
personnel on full time service lacked the qualifications and
experience required to train Special Forces soldiers in
inherently hazardous activities such as amphibious
operations and close quarter battle which are two of the skills
required by all commando soldiers. To that end it will be
important that the SASR be well represented throughout the
raising and implementation of the Special Forces School.
This will ensure that the better interests of SASR, skills and
standards are maintained. It will also ensure that suitably
qualified and experienced instructors are available to train
the
Forces soldiers of the future.
88 ! 41 Selection and Training of SASR Personnel. Due to the
d i 8 changes in society and the likely combined SAS and
Commando selection course that is likely to last for an 8 to
10 day duration, while being of adequate time to select a
suitable commando soldier, I do Not believe that this is
enough time to successfully select a suitable soldier for
service within SASR and unfortunately I feel the ability to
select suitable personnel for service within SASR will
gradually be reduced. Until the unit training demands are
reduced (CT role to 4 RAR) this may result in a required
reassessment of the units manning capabilities or a
reduction in the units training requirements. This is another
reason for the unit to ensure that it provides appropriate
instructors for the raising of the Special Forces school.
Shortfalls in the current present training system resulting
the
era' are
In
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particular in the field of water operations. Members are
being posted into the troops with minimal training which is
likely to impact on the unit capabilities if Not addressed in the
future. The intentions of Force Projection Troop to
:
reintroduce the assault swimmers course, all be it a
__j __. shortened version is a ste~?_ in the right direction. ----:--:-+-::--y N N N y
"Y --:--:88 j 41 The Future of SASR. Given that the raising of 4 RAR (Cdo) Capabi lity
e · 9 is successful and they take over the CT role in 2003? SASR
will inevitably take on the 'grey role' in a more active way.
The grey role should be conducted by a troop size group
comprising of a regular component for the administration and
planning (in conjunction with the Swan Island detachment),
with a reserve component to be activated when required.
Ideally the group should be located outside of the barracks,
never in military uniform and distanced from the regiment.
The reserve component comprising of ex-SASR personnel
and suitable females all of varying ages and appearance
who have slipped back into civilian life and hold a credible
cover story. The recovery capability will have to be
maintained which will include continued practice of insertion
and field skills as well as a reduced CT and maritime CT
capability. Until SASR is relieved of the domestic CT role
the regiment will need to maintain its current activities.
However, a grey roles component should be identified to
commence the raising of this skill and conducted utilising the
~~!!!~_§lD_<!_~~perience__9f other agencies.
---···-·----·------ _______
,---·----:-;-- --· :·-:-·y N NjN N N
42 The continued selection of high quality personnel for the
Selecti on
0 Special Forces Gp, ensuring standards are Not
-- -- £~f!!~?.r:.<?!!Ji§~_qf~r:_!~~9~~9~.!-~-~-~2~~:___ ____ --·-------------- - ------- ------- -- ----·--------···--· ------- ---- - ---- ----- ---N N y y N N
42 The effective training of personnel in an Special Forces
Trainin g
· 1 training centre to meet the needs of the individual units,
ensuring standards are Not compromised in combining
train!!:!g_:____
___
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ________----N y y N N N
89 l 42 Ensuring HQSO is an effective organisation, ie fully
Manag ement
c . 2 integrated into HQAST for operational needs and LHQ for
!
maintaining training resources required for high risk and
_____ j_ ___ dema__!l<!!!l9.2J~era~2nal qcm:l_!_llitmeQ_!~.:..---~------=-----:--=---·- _____
y N N N N y
89 ! 42 Developing a Special Forces ethos across the Special
Leadership
d j 3 Forces Gp to encompass the unconventionality and unique
_____L ____ nature_of Special qe._~r:_~!!2_rlS.
_
_
Trainin g
N N y y N N
89 ! 42 Developing and improving the Joint nature of training
e i 4 conducted by the Special Forces Gp. SO requires close
____ __j___ SUQE2.'!.!!.2~ the B_&.F and RAN to ~_nsure its success.
y
N y
90 l 42 There must be more clarification on the direction that the unit Leader ship
1
NIY
a
5 and individuals are to take in regards to Unconventional
Operations. I feel formal training is required in this subject
and that Unconventional Operations are Not just a mindset,
which can be suited or applied to all members. I know that
there are many different facets within this subject, but to me
they are undefined. Currently the UW course is held at
Swan Island but would be more beneficial conducted at
____ SASR on a mor~_reg.ular basis.
______
y N N y N~
nel
9_9 : 42 The operational experience level of the SNCO within th~~~~SO_!l___
-------'---- ----~-

~¥·--~-----

L
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6 Regiment is lacking. Therefore, I feel the Regiment needs to
prioritise operational experience and overseas exchanges
against training requirement, during the three-year cycle.
This would develop experience levels and gain exposure for
the senior members of the unit.
1-----;-·------"l''--:......._____________________ ---- ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----- -- ---- --------------- -- - - - - - - -------------- - - ------ --- - - --- - 90 42 Career management within the regiment in the past has
Postings
Y N N N N N
7 been handled very poorly. It needs to be addressed
I
c
considering the start of the Special Forces school is going to
see members from the regiment being posted to other
Special Forces units, with 15+ years experience and possibly
being the rank of CPL at N fault of their own and in many

b

~-..---+·------+9_ases ~il.Yln.9 rev_~!:t~<t!t:~_.I9D~J~2~!:'!~--~!!hLr:!__§~~B~---- ........ ------------------------ --- ------ __ --90 42 There is the need to increase the amount and level at which Training
Y N N Y Y N
d

8 the training is directed in computer and information systems.
There is also the need within the troops to develop computer
literacy, starting_~!_!he lo~~,st levels. -------------------1------··---+--+--lf--+-+--+----1
90 l 42 HQSO and SASR need to clarify the direction, allocation of
Equipment
N N Y N Y Y
e ! 9 money and manning for the future of oxygen parachuting
:
within the unit. There is a deficiency in the maintenance and
! serviceability of the current oxygen equipment held in the
~-_j_______!:!!:lit a!_lhis J~resen_!_!ime:.____________________________
.. -------------- __ _ ,-~ ____________ _
90fj 43 Special Forces require dedicated aircraft to maintain interCapability
N N Y N N Y
0 operability between SASR and aircrew in order to develop
and constantly update SOPs. It will also alleviate the
problem of the time restriction for the deployment of the
§!§l_r:!~b.Y~!I'P~-~-sho~_QQ!ice_._ ________.. ----------------------------· _________________ -:--:-- _____ --r---91 i 43 Group Identity. Finding an identity and an esprit de corps
Leadership
Y N N N N N
a
1 that all Special Forces units can relate to considering the
I differing roles, the different unit backgrounds and histories
!
and with the tyranny of distance will Not be easy. The
ii creation of a joint Special Forces school, a joint selection
;
process and even a Special Forces Corps would, I feel, be
Ii
positive steps towards forging a strong bond. It must,
j
however, be well managed and there must beN lowering of
!,•.:

i

-:-J ____
I

9Th~s- -~:~~!~~~:_r~~~f-~!~fs!~~~u:~~r~!!§~sR-ancftlle_______

v'N'

Marketing-- ·yN-N+N
b : 2 Special Forces community in general 'market' themselves
i
more vigorously and cleverly. For such a 'tall poppy' like
Special Forces, this trend needs to continue and progress for
our survival to be assured. Acceptance, both by our military
colleges as well as our political masters is essential, Not only
i
for our existence, but for our deployability. This, obviously,
___j ______g_oesJ:l.§l_~lr:!..b.§l.r:!_Q__~ith~_~trong_ identity.
__________________________________ -----1--- __
91 1 43 Projection. By this I mean the subtle, but relentless
Operations
Y Y N N N Y
c ' 3 projection of individuals, sub-units and unit Not only into our
region, but on a global scale. Obviously the greater the
;
operational exposure the better. Recent events graphically
i
illustrate that it is, perhaps, a little shortsighted to focus
primarily on one area. Every effort must be made and every
I opportunity taken to project ourselves, be it through the UN,
! aid agencies/NGOs, DFAT, trade missions, industry,

I
!

____ _!__ _____

~t~~~~W:q:~~~,~~;;~~;fu~~~~~~~~~~~~~g:~D~~-~~~m~:~. _____________________ ~-- __
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91 l 43 DFAC-P Role. It is my belief, and I am sure I am Not the
Operation s
N y
d ; 4 'Lone Ranger' on this, that we are an under utilised resource.
The development of an 'extended' DFAC-P role, if correctly
handled, would benefit all agencies concerned. We have
valuable skills to offer and complement agencies such as
Federal Police, State Police Services and Customs. These
skills include recon/OP, patrolling, tracking, reporting and
ICAT. Greater training opportunities also exist as does the
____ attachment of observers ..t'-o_t_h...,e_se_a.,.g_en_c.cc.i-'-es"_.________-+-=--91 l 43 Equipment. Although some of the equipment issues I intend Equipment
N N
e l 5 to raise are in the process of being addressed, I believe they
need to be satisfactorily completed sooner rather than later ·
as they directly affect our strategic capability. Firstly is the
avionics update (including GPS fit) of the F-111 fleet. This,
along with a working SOP for ground based LTO without the
aircraft having to 'see' the target, is crucial to this weapon
systems effectiveness. Secondly, the ne~d to fit at least
some of the Collins Class submarines for Spec Ops; at least
to the same standard as the '0' Boats and preferably
beyond. Thirdly is the need for some form of refit to at least
the Spec Ops C-130 aircraft. An in-flight refuelling and a
GPS fit with a download capability would be a minimum.
Fitting of FLIR and an ECM/ESM suite would be nice also.
To that end the timely creation of a dedicated Special Forces
air wing with dedicated aircraft would Not only increase
training standards but also interoperability and significantly
reduce deployment lead times. Lastly, and certainly Not
least, is the issue of procurement. Special Forces units
require greater autonomy in the trail and procurement of all
types of equipment. We all know how protracted the process
:
I
is under the normal system, ie the combat boots, cams and
_____ L____ the_)_Q_ad 2~9.~Y~!_em. -------------·-----r.:y
92 ! 43 Maintaining Quality Personnel. It is imperative that the
Selection
N
a ' 6 Special Forces Gp maintain the quality of its personnel. To
do this we must look at our system of selection, bearing in
mind that we are still Army u nits and ultimately must be
prepared to operate at the highest level of conflict in a
conventional setting. I believe that cost cutting techniques,
such as joint selection courses, and applying conventional
training wisdom, such as validating selection as a course on
a percentage pass rate, can only be self-defeating in the
long run. Without a doubt the selection process demands
scrutiny, and should be a dynamic process, as otherwise it
risks atrophying into an ineffective sieve. It cannot be
validated as a training course however, as it is selection Not
training, and most importantly should Not be judged on a
;
percentage passing or quota basis as this could lower the
1
quality of those selected. With the operational tempo on the
:
rise for the Special Forces Gp, it is critical that commanders
!
will still be able to trust their subordinates to make the
! correct decision, especially with the strategic and political
_l consequences ot_~pecial o_p~rations beir:!_g potentiai!Y so dire.
N -·-N
~?..L4.~ Ba!~-~alisin_g__ Q_~r.I!~!1J.!::19£~~~·-'tl.i!b__!!l_~-~-~p-~~~~-~!J~e-r.T=__r-a-:-i!li!lg___-------- -----
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b

7 Special Forces Gp to formation level, it is essential that
training of core skills be rationalised to ensure that the most
is made from the training dollar allocated to HQSO. The
consolidation of all core skills to the Special Forces Training
Centre is a good plan and with the amount of money being
constricted to the group an essential one. It is a move
however that I perceive as being fraught with peril. It is a
unit that will take some time to become effective, and until it
is fully accepted and operational all core skills will be better
trained under the current regime. The future without a doubt
is toward some skills being consolidated at the Special
Forces Training Centre, but to rush toward it will mean that
,
the basis in core skills of some operators will be

__
L_ _ ~oi!IErQ.rnl~~.Q.~------------··---------------·--·-----------·--- -------··-----·
92 I 43 Developing an Operational Focus. It is critical that units on Operations
c

!

N Y Y N N Y

8 short warning be able to match that with a focus that allows

.

~J _____

92! 43
d · 9

__\ _
92 i 44
e
0
·

!

_____ L_

them to deploy with minimum fuss and then carry out tasks
in a competent and disciplined fashion. To develop this
focus there needs to be Not only the perceived chance of
deployment but also the reality. In addition 4 RAR and 1
Commando Regt must have the operational ethos instilled
into them, as their current focus appears to be Not dissimilar
to the rest of the Army. Without this focus being spread
across all units, the perception will be simply that of the
group still having only one viable deployable unit. For the
Group to be a viable formation size group all units must
f~l~U!:!_~-~?m~~yel_ of OJ:>erational fO<?!J§· ___ ----------------- --------------- ____
Maintaining Technlogical and Capability Edge within Region. Equipment
N Y Y N Y N
As other countries within the region close the gap with
Australia in technology, it stands to reason that they will
begin to improve in quality as well. Our assumed superiority
in technology is already being eroded, though this will slow
with the current economic crisis, and as other countries gain
advanced equipment their quality will have to improve to
operate it. In addition as we improve our ties with our
neighbours they will naturally gain experience and training
from operating with us that further closes the gap. It will
take a great effort to maintain our technological edge, by
both improving our current line of equipment as well as
identifying other equipment swiftly that will fulfil our new roles
and responsibilities. This will also tie in with the requirement
to maintain the quality of our personnel, as this will be the
critical aspect in maintaining and improving our superior
~tanding._
_____
. --~-----·----------------------~------- ___________
Develop Operational Experience within Group. It is essential Operations
Y N N N N N
that the Special Forces Gp take every opportunity to gain
operational experience that it can. Without the operational
experience within the group, we will find it increasingly
difficult to train quality individuals and retain highly trained
operators in the units. Advanced training and selection
requires experienced instructors, and an operational focus
]
will be best fostered by the regular deployment on
gp_~-~?~i~l1-~~-f...!:l9_!()_~2~f~--~':!':~_qg_~_gy~r~tbl:lrc.:r:>Y_Il!~!-~_!>_()l!r____________________________ j ______ _

362

Appendix 4

capability must be validated on operations, even if it is just
combined training with other nations. This final point is the
critical issue that must be addressed, as it will effect all the

-~-~~-- <?.!he!s in ~-£~~QJ?_9rtiQ!lateJ~~b!2-r:!.!"-~---~----·"·----~~----93 I 44 Force Projection Platforms. Presently we have a distinct
a ! 1 lack of force projection platforms available to Special Forces.
To maintain a truly strategic capability we need to have
greater access to:
(1} Chinook CH47
(2} Collins Class submarines
(3} Naval Assets (Kanimbla}
(4} Naval Aviation assets
"5)_ Qiyi1J~~-9E~J~
-----·········-·--····-------- _ ................................. __ . ........... .. .
93 !
Special Forces Training Centre. The Special Forces
Training
b
2 Training Centre has the potential to undermine an Special
Forces unit's ability to conduct its unit specific individual
training. Receiving the appropriate resources and
establishing a good working relationship with TC-A, I believe
1

~~m~~~sde §~~:~~~n~ ib~~~i~~~e~electi'onhas

___ _
N N Y Y N N

-v

~r+N

9-s-+·44
thep.otential - Selection____
N N
-N
c · 3 to undermine SASRs ability to select the soldiers and officers
that are suitable to serve in the Regt. The concept in the
future of selecting members for SASR only after they had
spent time in Commandos, I believe is ludicrous and will
undermine the ability for SASR to draw from a broad
spectrum of the three services. With the possible changing
,
roles of SASR in the future there may be a need also for
§~§-~_!.<?. cq_~-~!~-~-~-~~Q~-~-~ingJ!~~~~~~l~i!:J.g_!>a~~~~-9.L~Jil~~~:____ _________________________ ____ ____ ____ __ __ r---93 ! 44 Officer Career Management. Presently there is some
Training
Y N N N N N
d ' 4 resistance (depending maybe on your CO} for officers to be
released from their units to attempt an Special Forces
selection course. Once an officer has passed, the problem
can become even worse and getting released to conduct
further courses or an early posting may become a real fight.
Special Forces units need to be more proactive in pursuing
:
the release of officers and should Not just leave it up to the
_j___ Jndiyidual with little backii)_9J9 S.2EL9ll2.:_____________~·---------- --·---------- ____ ·-::--:- ______ 93 l 44 Information Systems and Information Management.
Technology
N N N Y Y N
e · 5 Presently the Special Forces Gp and the Army as a whole is
way behind in our ability to maintain a grasp on computer
technology. The Special Forces WAN is a great concept, but
it is a double edged weapon which could lead to numerous
:
security and IS breaches if the appropriate training is Not
__ I______ Qroyided ~ith_!_~~--~__stem. ...
··--··-------··------- ________ --~ --+-+~--1
94 I 44 Dedicated Special Forces air wing, including Chinook, small Capability
N N Y N N N
~L.§ fast helq__~~QE.Q.I!.an~_C-1}Q.~pec .2P_£EY?~ble:.______
_______ - r - - ___ --r--~
94 ! 44 Corps of Special Forces. Provide for career management
Personnel
Y Y N N N N
b ! 7 separate to the Corps of Infantry which does Not recognise
_j___ the ~xJra hards!]ips of ~~_kl_9J!!_~_p_~ci~! Fore~-~---__ -------:----+o~~-,-1-:-:-~+:-:-J
94: 44 Special Forces Development and Trials Team. Allow for
Personnel
Y Y N N Y N
~--l-- 8 faster ai'!~P to d~te eq~pmentE.I!rch~~e. _________ __" _____ ·-I.,-:- -+-+-:+~
94 : 44 Relocate SASR to eastern seaboard.
Management
N Y N N N N

____ L.....
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94 l 45 All Special Forces training conducted at one location
Training
l e l 0 separate to operational regiments, this wo uld allow for
~ r-~-~~~--~~---,~ ~~-~Ime_nt§~y!9~2__0n9entrate on ~-~.2E_~r_ati9_r}.al focus.
--=---------o. 95 l 45 W1th the likely approach of a Joint SpeciaI Forces training
Selection
~ a ! 1 establishment, it is important to realise that the two Special
·:.,;
Forces roles (SASR and Commando) sho uld remain
separate in selection and in some areas of training. It is
'
apparent that the basic SASR trooper and the Commando
i PTE are a different animal. There are rna ny reasons; reason
l
for joining, attitude, maturity, type of roles they will be
expected to fulfil, etc. All these qualities will need to be
distinguished on a selection course and eventhough
i! candidates will probably indicate their preterence, this will
,
Not be easy in such an environment as se lection, therefore
__J ·--- t_b~_ql!~~ty_~!ll drqp: _______ . . __ . _____ _
---------·- -·- ---·- --- ·--·--·------····--··--- .
95 i 45 Currently the C-130 Spec Ops crews can not fulfil the
Capability
b i 2 requirements of the stand-by patrols or th requirements of
1
some types of insertions. This came to lig ht recently where if
it was Not for the USAF Talon, the trainin g would Not have
been conducted as planned. The only rea son the training
took place was because of the spare airc raft and the fact
they used GPS and had the use of FLIR. Special Forces
needs dedicated crews who are on as mu ch notice to move
l-·-+----+'a,.:.Cs'--we ar~_IJd a!r_9_r_~~J~.§lt_~~D..9Q!h~!Q!:> ------------------------------------- -----------------------------------95 45 There are Service and civilian aircraft that could be used for Capability
c
3 training/ops that at the moment have rest rictions on them.
Islanders and Twin Otters could be used in parachuting and
resupply, but currently there are restrictio ns on their use.
These should be another option open to pIanners as well as
1----+----J-other civiliani.'Ilili!ar~~-'=!!J?.ment.
95 45 Computer training is absolutely essential for all members,
Training
d
4 Not just clerical. The new computer cell in Campbell Bks is a
great step, but with only 20 or so terminal sand a lot of
people to train and Not a lot of time to do it in, training will be
slow.
1----+---~~~'--------~----------------95 ! 45 Operational experience within the Army is very low.
Operations
e I 5 Thankfully it is getting better but there are opportunities
! around the world where Special Forces o perators could
dep~ or detach -~ith O~!lJ:Se~ natio~ns._
96 i 45 Defining the Aim. This is not the elusive a nd shape'leadership
a : 6 changing spectre that some would have us believe. As it
:
has been since the beginning, the aim is always success in
i
battle. The evolution of 'battle' and of 'we apon' may change,
but the desired outcome (or 'end-state' to r those who may
feel more comfortable with military geek s peak) 'success' - is
immutable. If this is the essence of our aim then all training
and tasking will easily flow from it. The new theories (there
have always been new theories) of 'Revo lution in Warfare',
'Bloodless War', C3 .. 4.. 5 .. 6.. ? .. I Warfare' , make wonderful
subject for learned debate and essay writing. The problem is
that at the operator level such 'smoke' on ly obscures the
f---_1- f~cus of the~:. _________________ _
~~__l_4~ M.§lint~Q.iD_g_!be ~Lf!!~___I<?_I!l<il!:!!!ll!!._fQ.91:l~C?_!l_lh~-~~-~t is _________ _LQ.§lP.§l~!U!Y _______
-.T--~~-~~.~-----~----
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7 necessary to train soldiers who are able to plan, co-ordinate,
integrate, synchronise and execute a mission successfully.
first glance, this may appear to be daunting but if the
training concentrates on the essence of military operations,
the base skills - ie navigation, communication, weapons
skills, planning and orders, insertion methods - any
additional/special tasks can more readily be assimilated and
executed by the properly trained soldier. The reason that we
have moved from the baseline in our recent past is because,
in peace time, there is the easy lure of chasing the attractive
and the exciting in our training schedules and disregarding
the physically demanding or repetitive ('Hell- We can
already do that; why waste time doing it again?). It is an
interesting observation that as soon as it appears that there
may be a job on, everyone wants to go to the Q-store for a
new compass, new magazines, to go to the range, to
rehearse drills - the very things that we an said that we had
or were proficient in and did Not require to get or to practise.
Recent training reviews have done much to correct this
deviation.
1-·----·+-----+:::.::
96 45 Exploiting Opportunity. Given that we have well trained
soldiers that are able to deploy at reduced notice to move, it
is now the task to find them employment. It is here that we
all must revisit the First Key Challenge - Defining the Aim. If
the job that is being offered does Not fall within our focus
then it should be passed on to the people who should be
doing it. Prolonged peace has made us willing to take on
tasks that may Not necessarily be ours and may offer little
back to Special Forces. However, benefit may be gained in
areas that, on first glance, may Not seem obvious. It is up to
all members to be constantly vigilant to possible
opportunities. (These opportunities may well lie outside the
country or outside of the military but offer something nonethe-less). It is also up to all members to be on the lookout
for tasks and trainin that are time wasters and Not relevant.
~--f:~----:--~------------------t~~-r~~-1~-:·+-~~+:~~+~-i
96 45 Disregarding the Superfluous. In war and in peace we face Training
d
9 the external problem of the lack of manpower and the lack of
funds. It we were to decide, for example, that the focus of
the unit was to be able to fight as well as carry out
reconnaissance and surveillance tasks, we could be led to
assume that there would be a requirement for modern and
efficient weapons systems for our soldiers and for the
platforms that they may serve. (in a unit on reduced notice
to move one would think such matters would already have
been decided and acted upon). To then be able to outfit the
unit with a weapons upgrade it would be a matter of deciding
what attractive items would need to take lower priority. Once
our basic requirements are met, then we can move onto less
needed items. This also goes for exercises, courses and
training. If equipment or training is Not essential nor relevant
to our aim, it needs to be cancelled. Believe me, there are
innumerable activities that do
uire our attention!
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0 finishing statemen t but is based on observing the unit
training cycle for a number of years. Again and again it has
been identified that the intensity of training puts extreme
strain on our reso urces and personnel toward the end of
each year. I have Not observed teeming hordes attempting
to over-run our ra mparts but the intensity of training would
give the lie. The main problem that this poses is, that if we
should be activate d for conflict during this period, I see that
we are carrying ve ry little physical or mental 'fat' and would
be more susceptib le to making wrong decisions and to
mental and physical burn-out. (For anyone who does Not
understand what I am saying - I can only suggest that you
take a posting for a year or so and then return on posting in
September!). Stro nger directives need to be implemented
and supervised wi th regard to our use of time. Also, anyone
who says: 'If you c an't handle the pace- get out!'; to them I
suggest that they are Not unlike the hamster in the wheel
who is so busy ke eping the thing turning that he can't see
that it is taking him nowhere! The problem of leave (or lack
of) is a direct resul t of this increased activity period - people
become so enthral led by the intensity of the training on
'OLOC', 'NTM' an d other marvellous combinations of letters
that take on such hallowed meaning that common sense is
pushed aside (one e again, N 'enemy at the gates'). Our men
face two years wit hout leave again and again. This is Not
realised by the co mmanders as they only snatch two and
three year glimps es of the Regt. With this overwork it is
generally the willin g horse that receives extra load - in fact,
the person that sh ould be the one being looked after. On top
of this, there is the prospect of actually losing what leave is
j
owed!!!!
N -N
46 In future years, Haso sho-u-ld-c-on-ductsta_ff_i-nd-uction-~,·---- Trainin,_g_ _ _t Y2 training. This is essential for non-Special Forces personnel
and of benefit to Special Forces personnel given the rapid
advancesintechn ology, force structure and strategic affairs.
Despite attending a Joint Operations Planning Course and
studying SO doctri ne, I require more background information
to maximallY- contr ibute to the HQ.
46 Address the wider Army perception that Special Forces is a Marketing
Y N N N N N
3 resource black hoi e. Clearly the nature of SO means that
j
higher training, materiel and wages costs are involved,
however, the fore e multiplier effect of SO offsets this. The
extent to which thi s occurs should be quantified and should
present an arguni ent that debunks the resource issue. The
endstate should be wider perception that Special Forces
presents a cost effective and very versatile asset well worth
i
the resQ_l:!!.9.~-~~E~ nditure.
46 Information Opera
capability----·--NlJ_N_ N
4 capabilities for eft
same time we sho uld Not try to develop these in isolation or
in competition with other ADF force elements, but rather
where our existing skills or niche roles can provide a unique
skill set:
··-··--···---------·------·· - - --·------- - - - - - - - - - - - - -----·----- -- ---
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Examples:
(1) Physical Attack on Enemy C31 Systems: infrastructure
targeting and strike and standoff weapons (such as EMP),
attacked on civil infrastructure such as telecommunications
and power. This would lead to a requirement for higher
technical expertise in these areas.
(2) Use of Adversary C31 Systems. EA on remote systems,
physical hacking of isolated and secure computer systems,
tapping of PSTN networks (capabilities developed with 7 Sig,
their employment with us or in areas where they cannot go).
(3) PR, PA and CA. The understanding that we don't fight in
Vietnam anymore and that often the overt use of Special
Forces is more valuable than the actual task they are doing
(I cite the comments by Mick Malone prior to Op POLLARD).
The use of Special Forces strategically inCA, PA or PR may
mean that Special Forces need to develop much more media
savvy, and also change its MO to accommodation media.
Stop thinking that 'putting on a show' for CGPI is a farce and
that civil media are the enemy.
(4) Better OPSEC. Anyone who thinks that Special Forces
is currently good at this should come and see me. They are
Not. This should Not be read as a need to increased effort
for security but smarter use of security. Some in SASR think
that everything they do is TOP SECRET, when what is really

~. ;

be in done is wasted effo'!.
-------~·· - - ~·-·---·-··- ~~.~-r:-:-t-:c~":"'i-: -t-::-:-l-:-74
Getting Red of the 'Cult of the Beret'.
Selection
Y N N N N N
(1) Selection process at the moment still produces social
! cloning: he gets selected because he's like me. What we
i
tend to produce is Special Forces soldiers who are of a
particular template that is often suited to door kicking, but
less suited to some of the future roles that we are after.
HUMINT, for example, requires female, non-descript (ie Not
6'4", built like a tank and wearing the Special Forces watch
and day pack) and of different character. What about direct
entry to Special Forces, older recruits (ie stability and
maturity)?
(2) Does a few weeks of selection followed by a few years
as a TP COMO translate as the best staff officers? I would
argue that many unit and HQ staff are Not the best for the
job, and indeed are paid better because of their previous
prowess at TACTICAL skills. If Special Forces wants to
remain the best they need to attract the best for each job,
;
Not simply assume that because someone is beret qualified
___) ______ .!tJeY: rem~!D the_ b~~!_!n a__staff jo_~_:._ __________________ ----------------··--- -----~-:-:- ________________ _
98 i 46 Merit based promotion (a problem across the Army Not just Personnel
N N N N N N
c ! 6 Special Forces)
(1) Officers are Not promoted on merit until they have
served a minimum of 15 years, a joke in a society that has
moved away from the 'job for life' mentality. (1.5 to 4 yrs
training, 3 to 4 years LT, 6 yrs CAPT, 3 yrs to PSC, plus
usually 1 to 2 yrs PSC until promotion). What this means is
that jets (and those who continually study to gain new skills)
progress at the same rate as also rans (you really need to
_j__ tread on xour qick Not to ma_ke MAJ !hese day~·------<-98
b

I 46
i 5
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(2) Flexible posting/promotion. NSW police have a similar
system where internal vacancies are offered. Fixed 2to3yr
postings, but with the ability to apply for your own job again
at the end of posting. People who apply can be any rank, ie
LCPL can apply for the SGT job, and if he has the sk ills and
experience he gets promoted. People who are happy being
CPL range controllers can stay that way for years if t hey
want
to.
1--:c-·::- !-·····-- . - --- ---······· ·-··-···-·-····-·········---·-·-··-·-·· ----· -··-··-········-··-···---- . . ··-··- ...... ·········-·····-········· ·····-·-·----·-··---··-···-··········---·-··--·-········-····
-- ···-----------··Operations
98 46 Developing roles in a comprehensive security enviro nment
d
7 including: drug enforcement, illegal immigrants, terra rism
(beyond CT resolution), environmental damage, currency
r-·- -+···:·--:-1_f~gb_t and resourc~ero~_c__ti_on_._-----:~·-- ~-----Personnel
98 46 The ability of commanders to identify idiots and the ability
e
8 (and conviction) to sack them. See the private secto r-we
are Not a sheltered workshop, nor an instrument of social
_
policy.
99 j 46 Administrative planning needs to be timely, accurate and
Administration
~J

..

__i} COI!!EL~!~:_____________________________________________ _--------

····- ·------- ·--------N y N N N y

----

y N N N

N 'N

N N y N N N

-------·---------·--·-·-·------ ------- -------· ··--· ----·-- ---- -·---Administrative procedures standardised across the Special
Administration
N y Y1 N N y
l 0 Forces Gp by use of SOPs for Admin and the SpeciaI Forces
:
WAN.
ry
y -y99 i 47 Units are Not to develop procedures in isolation, mus---,~----------t staff
Management
N

99
b

! 47

""~,-·~~!~,~~--

I
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~-~--~~---------------·--"--'----~~---~--~~-~----------

~-J _J ti:J!Q~.9~!~-~--Ij.Q.._ -------·---··. --~------------------- ..... -· --- ------ --

·---------------------

99 i 47 More emphasis must be placed on administration in order to Administration
d .J 2 enhance train~. Timely information from o>ps etc. _____
g-g·! 47 The importance at personal administration needs to be
Administration
~---: 3 rbl[l:lJlg_!:lted _to all le~~!§..:.__!!is a co~mOiJ_!esponsib~i!Y.:._
Leadership
99f/ 47 A far greater emphasis needs to be placed on the lower
! 4 levels, ie TP/PL SGTs, 21Cs, etc. The soldier's
------~=-~~_Q.rn_i_nistration is t!:teir _r~~EQ.~§ibi!!!L_______
10 ! 47 Location of Units
Management
Oa j 5 1. With the selling off of prime Defence land to deve lopers
and heritage groups, much of the better locations for units
within the Special Forces Gp are disappearing. For
example, since AMS moved, Chowder Bay would be a good
location for 1 Commando Regt HQ and 1 Command oCoy
with a Water Ops Wing conducting courses on beha If of the
Special Forces Training Centre. Other examples inc lude Pt
Cook and Gan Gan. These bases are N longer avai lable to
us.
2. The remaining bases are increasing in importanc e, Not
because of their strategic location or other intrinsic
importance, but que to diminishing resources and as sets
available. Therefore, consolidation is required to ide ntify the
remaining bases to units.
3. Other limitations imposed upon the group is poor
allocation of existing bases. In the LMA, Luscombe Field is
presently being used by two Sig Sqns. What would a Sig
unit do with a landing field. I understand that some t ra1mng
facility may be built there in preparation for the 2000
Olympics, but surely the sooner the Special Forces Gptake
,
over the area, the better. I would have thought that with a bit
ethe
__ ___1______ ~~!~..!!l-~!l~Y_§P~!:l_t~-~--b.~i1_~!_!:19__i!l_t~~--~Mf1..!~_!!:1_~!.f3_~§-------------·-----------·----------------·
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Management

Communication

10
1e
10
2a

48
5

10 48
2b
6

10
2c

Australian SF soldiers on a regular basis to allow us
carry out our critical self-analysis, and develop
ress with TECHNLOGY.
Retention of Personnel
1. Giving clear cut tasks and goals to achieve (based on a
plausible mission} and have these efforts recognised and
confirmed by higher than battalion or regimental level (ie
COMO SF upwards visit courses or activities}.
2. Equalising pay across the SF Gp for those with the same
and ~~-~~-~-,'-------~-----------------------------------------------------------·}c=---,-----~-----------t-:-~}~-:1-:-:-+
Embrace Technology
1. Have a clear point of contact or a central agency that can
research or give advice on equipment that is used to conduct
SF tasks, also give each unit a contact list of people who are
conducting or researching new/replacement items as often
or three people are conducting the same research but
for different application. Also many items that are Not
suitable for SASR are suitable for Commando operations
and vice versa.
2. Incorporate lessons on new technology and computer
software used to improve work performance.
3. Purchase off the shelf items and issue them to user units
to conduct trials and have the civilian companies compete to
adapt the equipment to our use, thus avoiding individuals
with a fixed perspective conducting a trial aimed at what they
the
to ach
Change Work Practices
Management
1. Due to limited resources and equipment in some areas,
change the work schedules or work place of selected
individuals to suitthe units and individual needs.
2. Give a clearly defined end state to be achieved in work
produced/fitness etc and let the individuals set their own
work practices. This would allow the manager to grade their
reviews accu
Raise the Profile of the Full Time Commando Bn
Marketing
1. Put on show and tell exercises to impress on the HQ staff
and politicans they have created an extremely versatile and
cost effective unit.
2. Conduct Joint exercises to demonstrate the skills
;......~,·~·,.,uired to other ADF units. Also conduct a more
r-niiiAr·r"'"'l''

48
7

10 i ·48
2d · 8
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aggressive recruitment program to ensure the quality as well
as 1~f:l_9!1.~D!i!}'__()j_~ppl!9~1]-~~-!~!.tnP!.O.Y~Q:___ ---~-------- -------------~'!·-----·· --------------·--- -r:-:·-1---c+-·:+--t
48 Training and Living Facility for the Individuals on Holsworthy
9 Barracks
2e
1. Improve the living accommodation for members in
Holsworthy Barracks (or at least have all the unit in one area
and not scattered over three barracks) and Not have other
units intermingled in the live in lines as this detracts from the
work quality, ie reverse weeks when the other unit is in the
Bks during the day and the soldiers cannot sleep.
2. Design and build ranges and facilities to
supplement/improve day to day individual and collective
training, ie MOE, COB and MOUT.
3. Ensure access to field training areas for day to day
trai
:··-·-l·-=-·-.,.-,·-"'--- -----·-·----------··------- ·-··-·-- . --··-··--·----- --· - ---------------·· -··-·--··--·-+-------·---··:··:---------··-+-::---:·)
49 Be Vision Led
Leadership
0 1. There exists the requirement of clear definition,
continuous refinement and articulation of where our future is
headed. Individuals need to understand what is expected of
them. This vision is what we as a Group will create. It is Not
the past or what others may be doing. This vision with its
own implementation strategies should be adapted to or
enlarged for its audience as it moves down the chain of
command. Every unit, sub unit and department/element
within the Gp has a responsibility and role in moving towards
a situation when the vision becomes reality. Articulation of
the clearly defined vision at all levels in a language that is
easily understood at that level is required to Not only
command compliance, but empower individual commitment.
2. Visions are best evolved out of the process of merging
personnel and shared visions. Soldiers should be
encouraged to share in what it is they personally value. This
ensures the concept of vision represents more than the
collective view of superiors. Relying too heavily on someone
else's vision reinforces a culture of dependence and
conformity. People become committed to visions when they
embrace their own personal visions. If they do Not have
one, then all they can do is sign up for someone else's.
When people with strongly committed values and a sense of
purpose come together collaboratively, the potential for
rful outcomes is
10 49 Transition from a Traditional Military Structure
Management
3b
1 1. The Army is a traditional oranisation with a hierarchical
structure. Within this structure there are many levels of
authority. Everything passes through the chain of command.
Logical argument is provided on paper. There are many
when paperwork is Not required, but insisted upon
(because that is the way it is done). Traditional
organisations deprive workers of the opportunity to engage
in continUous learning and constantly fail to allow soldiers to
accept responsibility and authority for their job. How people
do things is Not really important, the process is just the way
L ______L ______L()~>Jf:l~~!!Y~f;__~a~rr•e~--~ac~rhieved. What is of
rtance is the
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II
outcome, the capability. On occasions we concentrate far
t oo much on the wrong area. At times there exists a
I
requirement for a more level structure within departments
and sub-units. The military would find it extremely difficult to
change from its pyramidal structure. Within the group
another structure could be implemented to address this. It
i
I
could be similar to an administrative chain of command and
an operational chain of command. There are levels in the
administrative chain of command that are Not required in the
operational chain of command. Maybe a strategic chain of
command for our own economic or growth and development
strategies is required. This would promote networking,
which has proven to be a valuable tool within the Gp in the
past. It allows personnel to draw skills, knowledge and
information from others in a timely and effective fashion
without the bureaucracy normally involved in travelling
through chains of command. There are many benefits from
a more flat or level structure. Just because things worked
effectively in the past does not mean that there are Not
I
better or more effective processes available. Networking
also has the ability to avoid re-inventing the wheel and
keeping pace with what others are achieving or working on
within a subject ?lr~~t therefore, becoming more effective.
-- --N N N N N N
Improve Acknowledgement and Recognition for Soldiers and Leadersh ip
NCOs
1. Rewarding effort or giving credit where it is due in
traditional organizations can be complicated. Middle and
upper management generally accept most if Not all of the
credit for an organisation's achievements. Soldiers are
I
I
generally Not acknowledged or recognized for their abilities.
There is a tendency within the Gp to accept high levels of
performance or ability as normal, yet remember times of
failure. Care needs to be taken Not to develop collaborative
individuals who bear no allegiance to anything other than
themselves and their own careers. Without those who
continually go outside the comfort zone and risk failure we
would Not evolve. Recognition is a powerful incentive and
can result in behavioral change and commitment from
soldiers. . .
__..
... ...
-··- -::y N N y N N
A Need to Develop Our Own Resources
Personn el
1. Our most important resource is our line soldier. The man
who carries the weapon while wearing face paint. The
soldier has other needs outside of battle skills. By
diversifying our training we could develop more lateral
thinking and develop soldiers who can think on their feet.
Lateral thinking and problem solving skills are achieved by
most because of their own attributes and the varied
situations they are placed in by quality training. However,
we should devise strategies to create the environment where
soldiers learn lateral thinking and problem solving skills far
earlier in their career. We need a focus on developing
individual problem solving skills, a tolerance for ambiguity
and the capacity to cope with diversity. This relates to the
sol~!~-~s we!!2~_th~_.2_f!!c~. esj:>eci~I.Y early in the~ careers.

I

I
I

I

I

10 49
2
3c
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3f
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4a

10
4b

10
4c
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49 Develop Efficiency
4 1. To be effective we need to be efficient in all areas,
ensuring something is learnt, gained or reinforced by every
bullet fired, every minute written and every task undertaken.
If nothing is learnt, gained or reinforced then we do Not need
to do it. Time and resources may be better employed on
more useful tasks that will benefit and develop our culture
a_!lcj_~ap_~_t:l_iliJy._ .
______ _______ _ ____ _
49 Learn from Our Past
5 1. So many times we re-invent the wheel and do what was
done several years before. We need to heed the advice of .
those who have experience. Education and experience
when combined are powerful qualities, but when separated
have different characteristics. Many good ideas and
warnings come from our subordinates, yet they are often
ignored. If something was tried in the past and did Not work
effectively, then quality research may proyide an answer. In
this case, quality research comes from consulting widely and
listening to people with subject experience. Databases
should be implemented to record all PAR recommendations.
Employ networking to gain and pass on ideas within the Gp.
We should attempt to always go forward by whatever means
even in the face of advers
49 The first issue would be the one of locations. We are all
6 beginning to feel trapped in by the urban growth around our
bases, be it SASR or 4 RAR (Cdo). We are supposed to
deploy under secrecy, yet everyone can blatantly see us
when we do. This includes other units of the ADF. I strongly
believe that we should be in isolation from the rest of the
ADF and civilian
areas as much as
49 The issue of pay is one which really only involves 4 RAR
7 (Cdo) and 1 Commando Regt. SASR has a special
allowance for the risks they take and I understand this and I
have N complaints. Realising that SASR are usually
employed in a higher risk environment than the above units,
I still believe that we warrant the need for a risk type of
allowance.
I believe strongly in the introduction of joint training between
.
the three units of the SF Gp. With the financial problems
affecting the ADF we need to start amalgamating courses.
Fewer courses and exercises obviously means less money
spent but we gain the advantage of getting to know the other
members of the SF Gp and how they operate. We must start
to learn each other's capabilities and operating procedures,
for when it comes to
it will be too late.
49 I think it is inevitable that 4 RAR (Cdo) and 1 Commando
9 Regt will amalgamate someday and I believe it should be
sooner than later.
50 4 RAR (Cdo) should get rid of the RAR and the Colours so
' 0 we can begin to separate ourselves from the rest of the
Corps. If this happens we could have more time to train on
SF related subjects. We are starting to think and perform
like SF but we would reach the desired result
if the
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10
5a

50
Personnel
1 1. Due to the rapidly changing world climate it is more than
probable that strategic limited engagement type warfare will
be conducted. It is therefore more practical to have a large
'standing Army', but a well trained and fully manned SF GP.
It is necessary to bring all SF units up to full manning so that
they are capable of meeting any threat that may be posed to
Australia and her interests. The manning of a unit is directly
linked to its effectiveness.
~'~"' '+-''''-~'"~'
10 50 Equipment
, Equipment
5b
2 1. It is necessary to 'keep up with the times'. A lot of the
equipment on issue to the AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE
FORCES (ADF) is outdated, unsuitable, or too cumbersome
be used effectively. I feel that the reason that this problem
has arisen is that the 'operators' are Not necessarily the
ones who trial the gear, and if they are, what they trial is Not
is purchased. This must be overcome if we are to be
10 : 50 Retention
5c ! 3 1. Hand in hand with manning this issue is just as important
as any other. We must be able to retain the members we
currently have if we are to move forward. This could be
achieved by offering 'rewards' to hold people in the SF Gp,
whether this was to take the form of financial or conditions of
service. An incentive to stay in the SF Gp may be required
to solve the retention issue.
10 , 50 Resources
5d ! 4 1. To keep SF units up to speed in all of their skills, it is
necessary to use up to a great deal of resources. For this
reason it is imperative that all units within the SF co-operate,
and try to work together to share what resources are
available. This may be achieved by scheduling
exercises/training courses to run concurrently. This should
have the effect of easing the strain on an already stretched
resource base.
Communication
1. Communication from unit to unit, operator to CO, is the
key to our survival. If we do Not communicate with each
other, wastage of manpower and resources will continue.
The notion of 'protecting our turf' is an out moded idea in this
day and age. Information sharing will only make us stronger
as it will lead to better resource
ent.
Reduction in the number of SF units allows for:
6 1. Maximum use of current resources
2. Ability to train necessary number of paratroopers rather
compete with other units and against diminishing assets
and facilities
3. Joining or amalgamating units under one command will
avoid duplication and free up extra vital personnel required
elsewhere.
4. Eliminate the unnecessary problem of trying to please the
RAR Assoc.
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50 Identification and occupation of appropriate and permanent
7 locations/facilities.
F,+·-·=c':··t~,_=-:=:=:..:':::.::===-=:..::.:_,,--,-:-::"·-.,... ------· .,, .. ,·,····-···--···------,---· ·-r:-·,---:-··-;--;,------··r~:-7!-·.-:-t-.--:-+-:-:+:·:t:-·:-i
50 Stop Reinventing the Wheel.
Leadership
6c
8 1. Continual unnecessary rewriting and updating of
Doctrine, TMPs and SOPs, etc.
2. Wastes valuable time and manpower that could be better
spent on what we are here for, ie to train for operations
rather than sitting at a desk typing.
3. New documents are generally minutely different and N
more i
than the one
10 . 50 Dedicated permanent ADF assets to train and operate with: . Resources
6d · 9 1. Saves time and efforts wasted on assets that fail to
materialize at the last and or crucial moment.
2. Allows for actual capability rather than a spoken, written
or notional capability. Allows all to be trained properly at all
rather than rushed training and the chance of
accidents or incidents because of lost skills or proper training
over looked or short cut to meet time lines on assets.
10 51 ndependent
Command.
Management
7a
0 1. SF capabilities cannot be fully developed or utilised as
long as we remain under command of Land Comd. We
cannot develop our full potential as long as we are controlled
by an organisation that inhibits our growth, curtails our
independence, fails to understand our ethos and which
appears Not to have embraced SO and the need for SF.
2. SF needs to develop political sponsorship to ensure its
survival.
Training
10 51 Career Courses.
7b
1 1. One of our major weaknesses is the lack of formal
training for SF officers and to a lesser extent NCOs. We
require our own SF career courses. These courses should
Not be an added formal training burden but replace specific
course
irements.
10 51 lnteroperability
Capability
7c
2 1. If SF wants to promote itself as the force of choice then
the broad range of capabilities that exist within SASR and
Commandos should also be packaged as a single capability.
(However I would be reluctant to promote such
interoperability as long as 4 RAR (Cdo) remains part of the
RAR).
2. It goes without saying that for this interoperability to work
there also needs to be a more unified approach to formal
training, and research and development issues between the
SF units. Although the SFTC will address common training
issues, the establishment of the school is seen by some as
rlinninii.,hiinn the overall effectiveness of SF train
Consultation
Leadership
3 1. Consultation on significant issues needs to involve a
broader group. At the CO/RSM level many ideas have been
filtered. When was the last time COMO SF conducted a
seminar involving key unit personnel including OC and
SSM/CSMs to discuss critical issues? (Granted this
Five
in the ht
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10 51 Mobility
Personnel
7e
4 1. Administrative procedures need to be put in place that will
allow for greater mobility for FT and PT SF personnel within
e SF Gp.
2. The ability for PT personnel to serve for periods of fulltime
service or for FT personnel to take time out will assist in the
. lifiE:!9PE:!E~_9_r:lt:JI:)I._ .... ...... _
. _ ...
retention of
10 51 Communication. I submit that, in my experience with SF Gp, Communication
Sa
5 communication is at the minimum standard it should be.
This lack of communication breeds both resentment between
the units and rumour
10 51 Focus. I assert that the focus seems to be misdirected at
Leadership
Bb
6 times, eg hat badges and para wings rather than the real job
at hand.
10 51 Technology. The acquisition and use of technology, which is Technology
Be
7 sound enough to carry the SF Gp into the next century, eg
use of··--------····NVG.
·- ··-·-····-········-·-------···--··-···----·--···-··········--·--------·li--·-------·-·-·--- --l·--1-···+·-·+-··+--+--:-l
suitable personnel to Personnel
10
Bd
Marketing
10
9a
10

9b
Marketing

10

Marketing
Communication

as

a:re

52 eat all individuals
individuals.'"soidiers
being treated
5 as a number Not as people. Officers are losing contact with
eir soldiers.
11 52 One Standard for the Entire
N difference in PT
Leadership
Oc
6 standard between Land
Cor:n~~t:~c!_!_~g__Q_<?I!l_~~-- __ -+-=·--.-··--,--,---·---:--·-····--+:·-:-l-c:-_+·c·,-l·o·c-!·-::-:-·l-::-:-l
11 52 More Awareness with Entitlements. Soldiers should be
Administration
Od
7 informed of their entitlements and people should Not bend
the rules to suit themselves.
service conditions to keep the
Personnel
11 52 Maintain and im
Oe
8 retention rate hi
11 52 Information Flow. The information across the SF Family is of Communication
9 a poor standard. This needs to be improved so that the units
1a
can perform their tasks correctly. [Sigs requesting returns
from units Not arriving until the day after the task was to be
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11 i 53 Public Relations Issue. That the information that is read in
1b · 0 the print media or electronic media is correct and gives the

j ___~ 9_2.rrect _'!!es~~..:-~~~------------·-·····-------·--·--------

Communication y N NIN N y
.~--~~~--~--r.-~---r-~~~~~

11 i 53
1c · 1
:
11 [53
1d i 2

PUBLICATIONS. That the units across the SF Family a re all Leadership
N
using the correct doctrine and Not individual unit's mad e up
doctrine.
······------· --·-----···--··-·--· --·-------- ---y
PA'llss0E-:079lsPECIAL-FORCE.-PAY7fRAiNING. The Pay
SF Family needs to establish an allowance that is for al I
members. At the moment, SAFA is and was raised to
furnish the SASR. With new SF units being raised, it is now
time to revisit the SF allowances. The ECN 079 pay ca se
needs to be looked at in the respect that if a clerk or a- Store
member completes the Basic Commando Course, he is not
entitled to a pay rise because in all likelihood he will Not be
.
required or get the chance to complete the other course s
_\_ reg~ired to gualify_for the 079 pay level.
_
y
11 i 53 Manning - Posting plots are released early so that short falls Postings
1~j_ 3 _car:!_ be_q_Q!1:_~_9_t_~~f9!~1~~--~9..9.L~_po~~~g__p~~!Qg: _____ ----·----- --------------------------------y
11 i 53 SF Family. The SF Gp must forge strong family ties
Postings
2a i 4 (between 4 RAR (Cdo), SASR and 1 Commando Regt ).
Key positions in commandos should be offered to Nn-S ASR
personnel (providing they are competitive and suitably
qualified) so as to develop a feeling of unity within the 3
units. A SGT in 4 RAR (Cdo) or SASR should be able to be
:
posted to a W02 position in 1 Commando Regt then backto
i
whichever unit they have qualified in. We must avoid a
____ _L__ J?_~rc~p_t[Q_!J__!b~~!l_th~ k~y_l~osi~~~-?re g_!_~_!l to JQ_e "'!__est'.
·------- rc---·-- --------------------N
11 53 The SF Gp should attempt to develop a better image w ithin Marketing
2b i 5 the ADF, by this I mean give something back, whether it be
'
good quality instructors on short term courses or permanent
positions at some of the schools. We should attempt to
,
avoid the image (currently perceived) that only rejects are
------~--- paste~ frQJB SASR. __________________________~-y
11 i 53 Focus less on the paper and more on the action. It see ms to Management
2c l 6 me that there are currently more papers and submissio ns
1
being drafted than ever before yet action is rare. This is at
all levels and it is creating an uncertain environment. Many
a time a direction (eg the location of HQ 1 Commando Regt)
will change, then change again and again and again. T he
amount of staff effort that is wasted is enormous. The s ame
applies to some of the proactive projects that are going on;
:
you get half way through a task and the goal posts cha nge
i and all ou've done thus far has been wasted.
-=-------1·-n 53 Staying abreast of technofo-gy:··weneec"fto.be.onthe·-N
Technology
2d i 7 leadin ~e of new technolo9Y:__________~------y
Personnel
11 53 Appreciate the person. One of the most important
2e i 8 challenges is to have individuals recognised and accepted
regardless of the role they fulfil. Whether they are the d uty
hygiene person or the lead scout of an operational patrol,
! providing they are doing their job to the best of their ab ility
___t.,__ they should be acce~?,ted ~~ual.____________
y
11 j 53 Development of a group ethos and identity, ie:
Leadership
~~_L_§! 1_:___ QQI!.li!.IQ_11___~f_Qft! . {B_Q~_9B.QAQ1 . .<:1..~9. ..1\.JQQ_{~E__~.!!~~)__~_!!~ .
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skills {where appropr iate) training.
2. Equitable remune ration {eg SAFA and Pay Rates).
3. Leadership of the SFGp by HQSO; manned by the best
personnel from within the group {as well as some from

;

____ _L ___ _Q~t§_iQ~l!l~--------------·----------------------------------------- ------------- --------------------

11

i 54

~E L__Q

11 l 54
3c l 1

11T5·4

3d

l

2

11 i 54
3e i 3
11 i 54
3f.._L_ 4
11 i 54
4a i 5

I

i

--~---~-~----~--~--~-~~------------~·-··¥·--~--~------

~-

~--

--~~~~---~--~~---

---t---

-----N N NIN y N

----------~-----·-·-----·---·-----

The acquisition and i ntegration of technology to continually
Technology
im .!£Ve QE~~.!lC?!:!~--effectiveness.
Integration of SF Com d and Force Elements into mission
Operations
orientated SF Task F~J::£_~~~i<:>!_Qper~~~!Qt:12_~ndJL~DJE!9!-~-------Marketing__________
-sellingats_F:_toTtierest of the Army at all levels {primarily
achieved by professi onal conduct and high levels of
·
achievement on all occasions). Conversely ensuring that SF
remains relevant to t he Strategic and Operational needs of
the ADF.
r=-:-------Recruiting, selecting and retaining the people we need at the Selection
standard we need th em.
Conducting realistic and effective operationally focussed
Training
training_2--t BQTHJ!l~- -individual and collective levels. ------ =·-----Pay and Allowances The structure of the SF Gp has
Pay
undergone a sea cha nge in the past two years. The
commando is an increasingly important part of the group,
however he is clearly Not being remunerated to the level that
-----~--~----~------"~----
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54 PT FE Deployability. Some legislation for the callout of the
Operations
N y
J
6 PT currently exists. This legislation does allow for the
!
deployment of part ti me soldiers on operations. However
there is considerable risk to the individuals civilian
employment and as such it affects 1 Commando Regt's
ability to deploy part time soldiers at short Ntice.
,
Representation shou ld be made to have this legislation
_____ __! ______ --~11'!~!:!~~-~YJ>~~!!~~-ent.
----------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------¥-•
---------··
y N
11 i 54 Technological Advantage. SF must continue to seek out
Technology
N N
NIN
4c i 7 new technologies to maintain a technological edge in the
'
region. However the resources available to this
development in SF are limited and as such we must further
strengthen links with the development agencies in the US,
11
4b

j

. ~--•--·-- ~!l~I~.!b.~re J~~---~-~JL--~~Y~!QE_~d_f{_~Q£~. t.>~L!Y:.~----~-~----~--------------- __
11 I 54 OS Education. It does appear that HQSO is attempting to Operations
4d I 8 spread the joy regard ing operational deployments. However
some of the most valuable deployments regarding future
development of the S F capability are to the US, where SASR
has a stranglehold on deployments. This is preventing
commando personne I from learning and gaining experience
____ from what is ar9.!:1~
the most advanced -----------SOF in the world.
Communication
11 54 Information Flow- interoperability, visibility and efficiency
5a i 9
.
-11 i 551-F-o_c_u_s--economy of effort and lack of duplication
Management
5b i 0
11: 55 Credibility- displayin g the capability to perform as a versatile Marketing
5c : 1 force of choice
1ft55 Recognitionof individual and corporate performance
Leadership
5d i 2
-------------------------------------- f:=--
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55
5

11
6c

11
6d

55
6

55
7
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What is the SF Gp
Management
1 . What are the roles and tasks of each unit within the SF
Gp? More importantly are they realistic?
2. Does a third PT Commando Coy add value to the SF Gp
capability? How do we justify it?
3. Should 4 RAR take over MGT and Domestic
CT/Recovery? Is it just an expensive changeover?
4. Do we need two Commando units? Take the plunge and
create an integrated unit!
5. Where do we get our support from? Is maintaining two
Ops Spt Coys and a small logistic effort at 1 Commando
viable? Can we effectively brigade these assets at a
'megabase' on the Eastern Seaboard?
6. Should we just take the plunge and build an SF
megabase at Holsworthy, forgetting traditional allegiances to
Perth and Mosman?
SF Ethos and Recreation of the SF Spirit
1. The SF Gp is growing and Not everyone is from SASR.
Commandos do have something to offer - just ask most exSAS personnel who have had the 'misfortune' of serving at 1
Commando Regt. At the moment outsiders/newcomers
could be forgiven for thinking that Commandos were poor
cousins.
2. Likewise there are some good spt staff out there who
believe that they have something to offer. They go to the
effort to fit in - they do selection courses and put in the
hours. Consistently they miss out on deployments,
exchanges and the like. They are soldiers too. They join the
Army and SF Gp to do these trips and get experience.
Remember to look after he who feeds, clothes, houses and
bombs you up. Keep them happy and they will keep on
bending over backward, and coming back for more. What is
more they will tell their mates and promote the SF cause.
3. An SASR and operator first ethos will only undermine the
efforts of the SF Gp to establish a more credible profile
within the
SF Pay
Pay
SAFA needs a massive overhaul. Essentially it is SAS
allowance. That's fine! They do something very, very
special, well deserving of extra-remuneration. So do
Commandos. ECN 079 is not the same as 343 and should
be recognised as such. I guess enough has been said on
IS 1ssue
others so I won't
on it.
All Corps SF
Selection
1. There are a lot of good officers and soldiers in the Army
who have something to offer to SF. Yet apart from a very
small number of motivated individuals we fail to capture this
audience. SF needs to target this wide population if it is to
have any hope of manning its SED, particularly from a
support staff perspective.
2. This is Not a case of saying 'Hey SF is in town, come and
see us at the
theatre if u are interested'. We need to
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go to the CSSBs, the LSF, the Fd Hasp, the Armd Regt and
I
the lnt Cays see their CO/OC and say: 'W e don't want to
I
steal your people. We want one, maybe two of your
brightest and best, develop them in SF and send them back
with a whole new set of skills and experie nces you can use'.
3. We need their skills to help SF achieve its goals. They
understand procureme nt, and logistical p rocesses, they
knowthelanguage,the mindset. We nee d to exploit this and
have supporting agenc ies develop a pas itive attitude to SF.
There is a fascination out there, we have an aura. Let us
use it, develop relation s with these units and achieve some ·
M UTU!-J:,__g_Qi!!_~=-------- ___
.
-- ---------------------------------- r:::----------55 The Viability of SF Avi ation
Capability
N N y N N N
8 1. A dedicated SF Avn Sqn is probably Not realistic. If
Defence can't organise AIR 87 then what hope is there for
SF Avn? Would web e better off training aircrew to use
existing platforms in SF roles? Should we modify a small
I
number of existing S-70/CH-47 to be AA R capable? Do they
need a FLI R and/or EC M suite. We aren 't that big to justify a
dedicated SF Avn elm.
2. What input do we t ry and have with C-130J and the
_. . ~~r~~C?~!~P!~~~~~~!?
···--······--·-·--·----·-· ···-· ·-. ····-······-····-------- -------·--·-· ········-·······------------- ·········•·· ·-----·· ······---- ........... 1 .. .. ·---··- ·-·55 Resources
Resources
N y N y N N
9 1. As the SF Gp is now under command LCAUST, there is
greater scope for previ ously allocated res ources to be
redistributed at the dis cretion of the form ation HQ. When
I
this is combined with t he cost of develop ing theFT
commando capability and a tightening of fiscal allocations,
there will be an even g reater strain on th e units that
consume these resources. When this strain is great enough,
either more resources will be required to maintain the current
capability or one of the following may re suit:
I
a. a reduction in traini ng activities across the SF Gp
(resulting in a reduced capability},
b. a reduction in size of the SF Gp (or on e aspect of the
group), or
c. a restructure of the SF Gp (and possib ly a change of roles
I
for one or more eleme l'}tS}:_ _
----y N NiN
56 Manning
Selection
NIN
I
0 As the Army and the A OF as a whole red uce the total
number of personnel, t here is a smaller base from which SF
can recruit. If the SF Gp increases to the anticipated size,
therefore changing the ratio of SF to its recruiting base, can
the high standard still be expected upon selection and can
the Army staff such a Iarge, personnel intensive
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7a

I
I

I

I

---~---

11
7b

I

i

11
7c
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56 CIT. The effect of Cl T can be expected to be twofold.
Personnel
1 1. Firstly, the ARA sol diers are now effectively undergoing
training for half the tim e of their predeces sors. This will
mean more time on th e job (OJT) to gain the same level of
proficiency. Will this 0 JT time be added to the time a soldier
must spend in their parent unit prior to el igibility for selection
in order t~_gain the sa me ~~perie_nce level?
.•
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I

2. Secondly, a GRes soldier must now spend three times as
long to become qualified as a basic infantry soldier. Add this
to the time it takes to train a fully qualified SF soldier and the
total time will now be in the vicinity of 3-5 years. The
following questions need to be asked:
a. How long does the average GRes soldier stay in the
Army? Is this long eNugh to train and maintain under the
CIT system?
B. Do most GRes soldiers have the capability to undertake a
period of FTS in order to complete this initial suite of
courses?
C. The benefit of recruiting trained infantry soldiers into SF
to alleviate the initial training time has already been
discussed. What will the effect be on the manning levels of a
standard infantry reserve unit who will be targeted to provide
r--·+·-t·budding volunteers for §F selection?__
11 56 Location
Management
7d
2 1. There has been much talk about where the SF Gp and its
various elements will be located in the future. One option
that has emerged is that the SF Gp will be co-located at
Holsworthy. Although this may be a good option politically
and economically, it is Not so viable for the PT units that
require close access to water on the short training periods
that they undertake. The extra administration and logistics
that would be involved in moving such a distance every time
the water is needed will make any such training unfeasible.
2. The PT Commando Cays regularly conduct amphibious
training, rehearsals and raids on a Tuesday night parade.
This training often takes a parade night well into the hours of
the following morning. This would be exemplified if the unit
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11
7e

56 Emergency of Technology
Technology
3 1. There are many aspects of technology that the SF soldier
must grasp in order to remain proficient. This includes
information systems (C41evel and combat control systems),
equipment, weapons and most importantly for SF, non-lethal
weapons. In many roles within SF (including CT, personnel
and equipment recovery and peace keeping), non-lethal
weapons provide an excellent option for subduing personnel
without drawing undue negative PR through collateral
damage and dead enemy personnel.
2. It will become harder for a soldier to remain proficient in
all aspects of technology as this area diversifies. More time
,
will need to be spent training and maintaining these skills

I

N N N Y Y N

I
1

___ _j____ ~avir]_gJ_~~~!!_meJ.c:>.r:.~..9_'!l_~~.I.e.!~ed -~~i!!.~J!~r:!L~g~------------- _______________________ ,_,__ ,__,_______
11 I 56 SED. Due to the inability to meet the current manning
Personnel
Y Y N N N N
8a i 4 requirements, it is important to develop an integrated SED
l
for the Commandos.
11 56 Legislation. The implementatiOn of legisT~iion-thatallowsthe PartTime_______ --~f
N- -N
a~_
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11 ! 56
8d ! 7
1

...

1

56

11 i 56
Be · 8
11
9a
11
9b
11

are recognised financially and the system is fair and
itable.
Technological Advantage. Many projects for the SF Gp
Equipment
seem to be done in isolation so that only one unit benefits
from the results. The development methodology should
inc!~g~_~l_§t~~~I:JQIC:i_~~~ '{'o'Q~~~--~PP_!I?P!!~!~:.............
Promotion. It is important to market the SF Gp as offering a Personnel
career for both officers and soldiers and the need to target
the correct
for the mann
of the SF G
Fitness - PT designed Not to wear people down.
Training

i 9
! 57
; 0
· 57
1
57

2

Equipment - look at
Equipment
task at hand Not an
Medical - one standard for the entire Army Not double
Leadership
standards for the different commands.
---------- -------· --·- --··---------·------------------ -----f-c---------------·----,----··--·-------+-:-:--!-:-·:+·c-:-+:·-:-+:·-_·+
Welfare - more emphasis should be centred on family unity. Personnel

'

57 Conditions of Service should be maintained for the retention
3 of soldiers Army wide, members should be informed of all
the entitlements he/she is entitled to.
Orientation to Asia/Pacific

Personnel

Recruiting of both sexes

Mixed Gender

Person management skills

Leadership

Adaptation of the new

Personnel

Acceptance of change

Personnel

57 Recognition of SF Units. A soldier in the SF Gp should be
Personnel
9 proud to say he is a member of the SF and feel he is respect
as an equal in the SF community. Individuals and units
should Not be seen as being better because they train full
time or because they have a more distinguished unit history.
Be standardising the SF selection course it will reduce this
mentality. However soldiers will always see the SAS as
being more elite than the Commandos, which will continue
the 'us and them' attitude. I feel the SF Gp should become a
standardised organisation with standardised specialist skills.
Unit would still maintain different capabilities however the
soldier would have done the same basic SF training. Also a
standardised emblem should be given to the SF Gp instead
of having different unit badges. By doing this, units would
simply be known as One, Two and Three Regiments or by
their capability such as Reconnaissance, Strike and
Recovery Regiments. This will hopefully reduce any
and allow
soldiers intcrnnt:lr<l
12 58 lnteroperability. SF soldiers both Part Time (PT) and Full
Training
1b
0 Time (FT), should be able to operate in the SF community
depending on the individuals and units NTM requirements.
By maintaining standardised training across the SF Gp, an
individual could have the
to ..nn<>r<l1IO
:L~~~:~~~l~---L--------------L-L~--L-~-J_-~

1a
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organisation depending on his aptitude and abilities. This
will allow greater flexibility for planners at Headquarters and
also allow a better posting cycle for soldiers. PT soldiers
would then have the ability to conduct Full Time Service

~=:~:!~~;r~~;;:;;;~~-~;;;~n;;:__ Trilin9 ___ NY N~N--N N

12158
1c i 1 have
·

j

i

interoperability and a standardisation of training across
the SF Gp, a SFTC must be established. This training
centre should be the heart of the SF Gp and control Not only
doctrine but also all SF courses. By standardising courses
and conducting them at one location it will reduce any
discrepancies in training. Also by conducting all SF courses
at the SFTC it would increase the overall SF Gp efficiency
and allow better soldier interoperability between units. I feel
this will occur over the next few years however the SASR
should be trying to lead the way by providing experienced
operators as instructors. I also believe the SASR has a lot to
offer the Commando Regts in future SF doctrine and

II

·--L~- l?_21icies. --------··-----··---------------------- ·-----------l·-::-o-1-:-:-+-:-:+-:-:+:-::-!-:-:-l

12 ' 58 Establishment of an SF Gp Goal and Not Three Individual
Leadership
N Y N N N N
2 Unit Goals. The future of the SF Gp depends on the clear
definition of unit roles, capabilities and size of force required
to maintain these capabilities. Once these issues have been
decided, an overall SF Gp goal can be established so as to
refine these capabilities. Only be clearly defining these
issues will units be truly distinguishable which will assist in
the esprit de corp of the SF Gp. Also as a result of this
analysis, unit manning and size may change which may
_____,______ ~~':!lt.!!l.. ~~~-gQ_~t_d_l}~_Q!_i~!~9!~_t_j_q!)_Q_f_I,J!lH§l~--------··-------···-·-· ------------------- -· -:-:-f--- --- -c·:- ~12 58 Integration. RTA has highlighted the need for the Australian Personnel
Y Y N IN N N
1e 3 Army to place more emphasis on the PT Army. With the
reduction in numbers of the FT Army, it has meant a
reduction in the pool of personnel who could be selected for
the SF Gp. This therefore means that the SF Gp must also
I
rely on PT personnel to maintain unit manning. Units in the
SF Gp could maintain a c~rtain size force of PT personnel
who have the ability to conduct FTS or deploy on a suitable
NTM. However, it would mean that it could take the PT
soldier a number of years to become fully qualified due to the
large amount of specialist skills required by personnel in SF
units. I believe for this concept to succeed there must be a
new rationale in the PT Army to change the focus away from
time in rank to focus on skills competency. An example is
instead of having SF PT soldiers spend previous time doing
subject courses, they should focus on their individual
specialist skills and abilities. Therefore after a few years the
unit would have highly skilled PT soldiers and Not poorly
skilled PT NCOs. Also by operating in the same unit as FT
personnel they will feel part of a larger team and Not as an
unwanted member of the SF Gp. Sooner or later there has
to be a reason why so much money and time is spent on
,______,___ ,_;_th.c.: e. .:.s--=-e~oldie!~-~!bQ.l:l_t_p_!g_yLd~_l}_g_~--r~-~!~~J~~-~~R~!?_!!!!Y.~---------·--- --------------------· ---- __ ________ _____ _
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12
2c
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12
2d
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2e
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58 With the current constrain ts placed upon the military, in
Management
Y Y N N N N
4 numbers of personnel and the availability of finance for
equipment and training, it seems ludicrous that SF is
expanding at such a rate. This expansion rate surely cannot
be supported by the curre nt standing Army in regards to
personnel. It seems to me that within the 1 Commando Regt
there is a functional HQ el ement and QM stream that with
minimal expansion would quite easily have been able to
accommodate a regular c ommando element. This utilisation
of 1 Commando Regt caul d have saved the duplication that
is now seen to be occurrin g within the 4 RAR (Cdo). The
initial concept of a regular commando unit was sound,
however, the reality of bei ng able to support such a unit is
beyond the current streng th of the ADF. Maybe the SF Gp
should set our sights fracti onally lower and bolster the 1
CommarJdO Regt with a re~ular commando force.
_c.~-!-::::::-----:-·-+:-~+:-:+.:-:+::-+-:
58 The appeal of getting the regu Iar commandf
o orce on th e
Personne I
YNY!NN r:-:-N
5 ground is a nice to have but has been to the detriment of the
,.
reserve force element. Currently there is an imbalance of
support personnel posted within the SF Gp. 4 RAR (Cdo)
has RAEME pers in abun dance who have limited equipment
to maintain whilst the rese rve unit, with its full compliment,
makes do with possibly one craftsman per company. I feel
this should be addressed.
N
58 I am currently led to belie veihat-th-ere--is.areView-bei-ng___ -- Leade-rship___
6 conducted as to the feasi bility of the regular commando
battalion. If this is so, wh y has SF perceived the need to
change the current select ion process to accommodate both
unit's individual requireme nts before the results have been
1
published. Why is it rushi ng into something that may have to
be reversed. In the pasts ix years SASR have been driven
to change by members ill conceived ideas which have had to
be reversed. In the proce ss it has caused damage and
disruption to the system out of all proportion to the foreseen
~gains. I believe the SF Gp should look before it leaps, it
ake of outside influences.
shouldn't ~l:l_an~_!_q_~_!_~_f; --------------------------·--·-·--·-·-------------------·-···-··-----1·---.
----·
58 Military personnel posted to SF units within the Q system
Personnel
Y Y N N N N
7 should be closely vetted by the system so as to place the
right person in the job. Th e CQMS position is Not something
that a regular person from a battalion can easily grasp due
mainly to the size of the account he would be working with.
A member posted from a battalion to the company is usually
done on promotion. He wauld Not be prepared to administer
an account of this size or deal with the associated problems
that may be only found at possibly the Bn RQ level. This is a
major concern for OCs in isolated commando company
locations.
----------·--------------------··-·-·-·----------------------··-·-·-------- -------·--··-··-------·-. --··--!·-··-·- --- -~
58 Knee jerk reactions are seen as panic within the system and Equipment
N N N 1N N Y
8 thus do Not instill confide nee in a special force unit. Any
reaction to a potential pro blem should be addressed by the
qualified personnel within the system and widely
disseminated before beco ming law, ie the preparation of
weapon systems erior to working_!!1_~n am12hibious
..
_ __ '-'---

J
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environment and the oiling of

~---~---~-~~d_et__r_i~e~_~jQ_~~~~e~E~~-~~---------~--:-~=--------------~--~,~-----r~~--~-;-,-4-~

58 Consolidation of the SF Gp into one unit. SASR, 1
Capability
9 Commando Regt and 4 RAR (Cdo) currently duplicate some
roles and tasks and are occasionally reluctant to share
information. The ADF would benefit if they were part of the
one unit with each element specialising inthe various skills.
12 59 Selection and placemenTofreinforc.ements: -·=rFieco"in:-_b_,..~i~n:'e:.:.:d:::: ... +S-e-cl·e--c--t~io_n______-l-:-o-~+:c":·f.c-:4--l··::-:-l

3b

0 selection course is a positive step and needs to be
developed to comprehensively determine an applicant's
suitability for SO. The current SF Reinforcement Analysis
'"'""'"'''""'to address most of these issues.
59 Officer development and management. In the past this has
1 been lacking. Current procedures are a vast improvement.
This can only have an extremely positive effect on the SF

Personnel

§_P·..........................................................................................________________________________________ +·:··-.,-·------_-··-----------------····1-:-:·+:··:·1-,--,-+-:·c--f·c-_-1--:·:--l
12 59 Targeting specialist personnel. We should actively acquire Selection
3d
2 pers with spec skills in areas such as technology, security,
regional specialists, languages, weapons and explosives to
. name a few. This includes females an~_pe:_.:.r_s~___o=__f: ___e:_t_:oh_ : n_:i_c,,. . . . c.·..:.•>e:.:.:-J---------------------------+--:+----+---+---+--12 59 Establishment of a Force Projection Cell. This cell would
Operations
3e
3 address and develop the current shortfall in our ability to
deploy and co-ordinate our FEs to deal with situations
outside Australia.
12 59
Orientated Equipment. Ensuring all equipment is
Equipment
4a
4 specifically designed tor SF roles rather than trying to modify
conventional
communications.
~~~~=~~~----+"~---:--~---------+~~--~~-1~,~~-r.~l
12 59 Realism in Training. Ascertaining a realistic role tor SF
Capability
4b
5 GRes. If 1 Commando Regt is a GRes unit it has limitations
of deployability simply because the Government has political
ems d
the reserve.
12 59 Co-ord Between SF, RAN, RAAF. To ensure SF elements, Management
4c i 6 RAN and RAAF can work together smoothly there needs to
be more education and co-ordination between these
12 • 59 Access to Training. Regardless of which unit within the SF Training
4d , 7 Gp an individual comes from, he/she must have greater
'
access to standardised
f--------+----12 • 59 Marketing. The
Marketing
4e_ : 8 Australia's SF
12 ! 59
Selection
Sa , 9 1. With the raising of 4 RAR (Cdo) as a regular commando
regiment, the number of ARA SF personnel required will
increase greatly. This places an extra burden on the SF Gp
to select and train troops. In an army that is being reduced
in size, an increase in the number of SF troops means that
more are going to be selected from less. As identified in
Reference A, 'our competitive edge is gained through our
people'. The challenge then is going to be to attract enough
high quality personnel to the SF Gp to maintain the high
standards set by Australian SF to date.
2. Exactly what is required of an SF soldier serving in
SASR, 4 RAR (Cdo) or 1 Commando Regt in a rapidly
world needs to be identified. Are the fundamental
'--·· ••t ..:..:..:.:;;.:c.:..<il::...:v•.• ::
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attributes required the same? Because of the primarily
offensive role of commandos, is a different type of soldier
needed for the reconnaissance and surveillance focus of
SASR? Is 4 RAR (Cdo) going to be a stepping-stone to
SASR? If so, what age are personnel going to be when they
are selected for service with SASR?
3. There is no question that SF personnel need to be of the
highest quality. However, it is recognized that capable and
professional soldiers are needed in all areas of the modern
Australian Army. The other corps and branches of the army
are going to take a dim view of 'losing' a large portion of their
more capable soldiers to SF. The SF Gp needs to show that
army at large receives a generous return for their
'""'"'<>·trn•:ont of soldiers.
t-·-· ---+---·-1--'-C..C
12 60 Career Management.
Personnel
5b
0 1. Career management of soldiers in the SF Gp will be very
important in the retention of personnel. Some issues relating
career management are as follows:
a. Retention of rank on posting to 4 RAR (Cdo) as an
operator,
b. SASR and 4 RAR (Cdo) troops being interchangeable,
c. Subject courses specific to SF,
d. Establishment of career streams,
e. Dedicated SF support staff, and
f. Deployment of 4 RAR (Cdo) personnel in conventional
roles.
12 60 Defining SF
Capability
5c
1 1. In an environment where resources, especially soldiers
are becoming increasingly finite, the SF Gp needs to have a
clear vision of what capabilities it must provide to the ADF.
Once these capabilities are decided upon and established
they should be promoted (inside the limits of security) within
e army and the ADF as a whole. Commanders at all levels
ld then be aware of what the group can offer their
organisation and what it cannot.
2. Justification of the SF Gp's existence requires it to be
recognized as a highly professional and capable
organization. This may require responses to input from
outside sources.
12 60 Roles
Leadership
5d
2 1. The capabilities that the SF Gp will provide to the ADF
are multi-faceted varying from offensive in nature to
humanitarian operations. A clear division of possible roles
should be determined. This will allow units to concentrate on
r tasks and develop a greater expertise in these specific
areas.
2. If an entity called the SF Gp is to function effectively there
should be N 'poor cousins'. Units within the group should be
confident that they are on an equal footing with the other SF
units. Unit pride will grow once units are given clear roles.
There are also implications on the selection and training of
personnel. It would be retrograde to establish an element of
the SF
that is
Forces'.
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12
5e

60 1 Commando Regt
Capability
3 1. If SF is to be defined in terms of capability, the role of 1
Commando Regt in contributing to this capability needs to be
examined. As mentioned above, the competition for
resources throughout Army and the ADF has intensified.
Therefore justification of expenditure is becoming essential if
units intend to receive the same annual allocation of
resources. Against this background the expense of
maintaining a part time commando regiment could be seen
as excessive, unless its role in the group can be clearly
identified.
2. The desirability of having equal partners in the SF Gp has
also been discussed. It is difficult to see how this perception
within the group and the wider army could be prevented
unless the 1 Commando Regt contribution is demonstrable.
3. The current policy of selected part time personnel from 1
Commando Regt supplementing ARA overseas deployments
is a positive step in establishing a capability. This could be
expanded to deployments of teams or ideally sub-units on
tasks or training activities.
4. Another strategy for development of 1 Commando Regt
could be to employ part time personnel in ARA SF units on
full time service tor extended periods. This practice would
establish the reputation of part time personnel as capable SF
'
soldiers and enhance the skill base in 1 Commando
[.
Regjment.

Y Y N N N N

·~f' ~ ~~~~!~~~;:~:i~~~=~;:~~~~~~i~;_i~;~~~~t..th-:et --- Manage-ment_____ v
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1
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;
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environment, and the changing doctrine of the ADF.
Special Forces Group is to capitalise on change and cement
itself as a permanent and indispensable part of the ADF
ORBAT, I believe we need to address the personnel and
o~gani~ati2_n issues disc~:~2~ed.________________
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12 i 60 SF part time members being more involved in the goals of
Part Time
N Y N 1N N N
6b I 6 SO and maintaining an element at a higher state of
l readiness
'12.! 60 Maintaining controTot S-F-·eTements under-~:iaso-raXherthan~- Manageme-n'f N y N N N N
6c i 7 tor exam~le the ne'{V SFTC COfT!ing under Training_Com_m~an__d-+::::------+-:c-:-r::-:-t-:-:-t·-=~~--:--:-i
12 ! 60 Career management in SF
Personnel
Y N NlN N N
6d
i 8
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12 l 60 Viability of 1 Commando Regiment
Capability
N Y N N N N
6e i 9
-1~ns1 un-it_r.oies-ancftasl<smust ·be-Ciearlycfeiined~-fliey_m_ustbe--~peraiio-ns------,,r'Y- r;;r N N N
?.~J_..Q -~ealistic__~!:l.9.. evenly_~ai~!J£~-~thin the~f.§~
. __ _
12 I 61 Duplication of effort within the group must be reduced
Management
N Y N N N N
7b i 1
·12 i 6f The group-needs restructuring toreduce-waste.arldproduce- Capability-N Y N N N N
7c
2 the most effective and efficient use of resources. Why is
there a need for Full Time and Part Time Commando
.... --~----'~!~!'l_e.rlt~JQ__~~~~r!!!~_g_rga_n_i~_~![Q_rl~-------- ------------------·------------ ------------------ _________ _____ ____ __ __ __________ _
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61 Reduction of intra Special Forces Group politics

3
1-:,.:::••;---·:::+:o::··-·········---·---·-----·-·-............................
_,_,_,._................................ _, ...................., .......... +--·--------·--------··-..---J----+----1---+·
Recognition of the value and effort of non SAS units within
the SF Group in the form of restructuring and broadening
allowances to adequately compensate members of those
units

387

Pay

Appendix 5

APPENDIX 5
RECONFIGURING FOR THE STABLE STATE

The list below sets out the order in which Capacities were achieved through
organisational realignments to achieve the optimum stable state. The central idea
that supports this realignment process is that those organisational capacities or
competencies that are more tightly bound to the effects should determine the
shape and structure of the organisation. Effectively the colours within the report at
Figure 29 (although using the 'Capability to undertake' ratings) are being adjusted
to bring high levels of capability to the left of the chart and force a reduction in
capability for those means (and their underlying) capacities that have less utility.

1.

Communicate using foreign languages

2.

Establish and maintain cover/legend/appropriate norms

3.

Establish rapport/win trust

4.

Operate in a civilian environment

5.

Implement psychological operations

6.

Manage distribution of resources

7.

Elicit information

8.

Identify networks of contacts

9.

Analyse information

10.

Build personal profile

11.

Evade surveillance and access control measures

12.

Observe/monitor using surveillance/intercept devices

13.

Employ target acquisition and cueing devices

14.

Employ support weapons

15.

Defeat security systems

16.

Place surveillance/intercept devices

17.

Breach information systems

18.

Interfere with electronic/manual information systems

19.

Recreate events
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20.

Administer business

21.

Interfere with production and services

22.

Track financial dealings and assets exchanges

23.

Provide funds

24.

Provide shelters and basic living facilities

25.

Broadcast information

26.

Handle and preserve evidence

27.

Seal an area

Means - Capacities Set Completion Procedure

In this section I set out the full solution procedure for completing Means Capacities sets (a 'Means - Capacity set' is defined as the group of Capacities

required to achieve a single Means. A worked example is set out on page 3 of this
appendix.

The table below shows the Means with their associated Capacities shortfall, how
many are in the set and the percentage complete resulting from this. The list has
been ordered on the Capacities shortfall column with fewest at the top.
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assistance to dissident movements
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Algorithm Description
Begin with the assumption: A single Means needs all of its Capacities to be
present and able to be performed in order to achieve the Means.

The aim of the process is to determine the optimum order of achieving Capacities
so that the most Means could be performed with the achievement of the fewest
possible Capacities. An iterative process is used, involving the selection of the
best Capacity to adopt in each iteration, or cycle. In each cycle the Capacities that
bring the most number of Capacity sets (or Means) to 'near completion' are
chosen.

Worked Example

In the table below are the two Means (Establish haven and Sponsor relocation)
that contain the fewest Capacity shortfalls for cycle two. Also shown is the
number and statement of Capacities necessary to complete these two Means.

Establish haven

2 Provide shelters and basic living facilities
2 Seal an area

Sponsor relocation

2 Implement psychological operations
2 Manage distribution of resources

The next step compares each of the four Capacities to identify how many Means
would be completed with each individual Capacity. In this example, Implement

psychological operations and Manage distribution of resources are selected as
they bring to near or full completion a larger number of Capacities sets and in
fewer cycles than the other two Capacities.
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Comparing the first five (see table below) Means - Capacities shortfalls for each
of the four Capacities, we see:

•

Implement psychological operations has 2, 3, 4, 4 and 5.

•

Manage distribution of resources has 2, 7, 8, 8 and 8.

•

Provide shelters and basic living facilities has 2, 5, 7, 8 and 8.

•

Seal an area has 2 and 10.

Implement psychological operations has the lowest set of numbers and, therefore,
rates as the most valuable Capacity for this Cycle, in contrast Seal an area is the
least valuable. The remaining two, .whilst similar, do not outweigh the value of
completing the set for Sponsor relocation.

•

Create false business or inject super-
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•
•

Provide shelters and basic living
facilities

C--------------·---------------j---------------------------------------------------~~--------------~

•
•

Empower local functionaries and
local
Materiel/financial/intelligence
assistance to dissident movements
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Means in Order of Being Solved

The table below contains the ordered sequence of Means completed using the
process outlined earlier. It should be remembered that after each cycle the entire
Means list is re-ordered within the decision-making logic to reflect changed

priorities, resulting from the partial solving of Means that occur at lower levels.
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!

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15

16

17

18

19

20

Provide communications
Sponsor relocation
Release information to media
Engage with neutral/hostile groups
Foster and exploit relationships with key individuals
Collect Humint
Wide surveillance
Cue precision weapons
Attack by stand off
Attack by close action
Strike individuals or small groups
Accompany other forces
Seize and recover individuals or small groups
Recover detainees/friendly forces/authorised
Stand off info gathering (technical/cueing)
Close reconnaissance/monitor specific target/named area
Deceive physically/electroniCally
Tap-hack electronic information systems
Collection technical information/items
Escort specialists
Penetrate/ threaten leader physical security
Provide close protection
Deny resources/render key infrastructure
Disrupt shipping and facilities
Interfere with aircraft movement and facilities
Create false business or inject super-competitive products
Damage product or brand
Threaten/damage leader personal wealth
Manipulate financial holdings/stocks
Manipulate/damage business functions
Orchestrate 3rd party attack
Enable infrastructure
Generate/train forces
Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate NGO effort
Provide vital services and/or resources
Disseminate physical/electronic psychological operations material
Empower local functionaries and support local organisations
Materiel/financial/intelligence assistance to dissident movements (onshore also)
Attack leader moral/financial integrity/authority
Establish haven
Gather evidence
Penetrate/infiltrate groups/networks

Note:
Text in bold indicates the Means and Capacities that were chosen in each cycle.
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Cycle 1

•
•

Seize and recover individuals or small · 13

I

•

ousme:ss or inject super-

•

'14

!

:14
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•

Stand off info gathering

•

Deny resources/render key
11
infrastructure ineffective
Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate NGO 11
effort

•

f-···--------------------------·----------~---------t--------------.-----------------------·-----------'-------------.-----

•
•

Seize and recover individuals or small : 13

!

•

or inject super-

•

i 14
j 14
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•

Attack leader moraVfinancial

•

Interfere with aircraft movement and
facilities

•

Deny resources/render key
infrastructure ineffective
Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate NGO : 11
effort
.

•

17

•
•

14
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•
•

Interfere with aircraft movement and

17

•

Deny resources/render key
infrastructure ineffective
• Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate NGO 11
effort
.
................................ ............................. .... j..........
.. ................................

i
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•

Create false business or inject super-

•

Disseminate physical/electronic
14
psy~~s>!?_g!~a} ()P~!~!!()!!~ ~~ten_~--a_l__ ........... -+-·········································
Gather evidence

17
17

400

Appendix 5

Cycle2

•

Seize and recover individuals or small

•

Create false business or inject super-

401
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~--. ·-···--········ --- --··-····-···············-···

Provide shelters and basic
facilities

f--·----····-·····-- -------·-·- _ ---------+--·--==-=:.::.:..~c..=..:.c,.,c:.:c::.c:.::::.c:.:::.:=.________-t-77---·--·------j

•

MaterieVfinanciaVintelligence
assistance to dissident movements
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Cycle3

•

Seize and recover individuals or small

•

Recover detainees/friend! y

•

for~~~il!_l!..th.()r:i~~~Y~!~onnel ____
MaterieVfinanciaVintelligence
assistance to dissident movements

12

•

Penetrate/ threaten leader physical

12

•

Interfere with aircraft movement and
facilities

13
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Cycle4

•

Engage with
neutral/hostile groups
thr,roncrh intermediaries
Foster and exploit
relationships with key
individuals

2

•
•

Empower local
functionaries and support
local
• Infiltrate/manipulate/con 5
centrate NGO effort
• Provide vital services
5
and/or
resources
----··-··--------····-------------------------------··--------------------·-··--------+----------------------------------------------- --+----------------------------------------·1
• Collection technical
6
information/items
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I

6

•
•
•
•

•

Close
reconnaissance/monitor
specific target/named
area of interest
Disseminate
physical/electronic
psychological operations
material
Orchestrate 3rd party
attack
Create false business or
inject super-competitive

7

7

i7

8

•

Threaten/damage leader
wealth
MaterieVfinanciaVintellig ! 10
ence assistance to
dissident movements

•

Penetrate/ threaten leader : 10

•

•

Attack leader
moral/financial

12

•

Disrupt shipping and
facilities
Interfere with aircraft
movement and facilities
Manipulate/damage
business functions
Engage with
neutral/hostile groups
intermediaries

12

•
•
Build personal profile

•

•

•
•

12
12
2

Empower local
functionaries and support 1
local
Infiltrate/manipulate/con •5
centrate NGO effort
Strike individuals or
i5
small
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•

Seize and recover
individuals or small

•

7
Disseminate
physical/electronic
psychological operations
material
7
Orchestrate 3rd party
attack
Create false business or 8
inject super-competitive

•

•

•

Recover
detainees/friendly
forces/authorised
leader

i9

------- ·· -- -------------- ------- ---------------- ------- ····--· --1----1:~~~:~~~-':'"~~----------------··t-·:-:c···---------· ------------------

•

Materiel/financial/intellig 10
ence assistance to
dissident movements

•

Penetrate/ threaten leader 10

•

Attack leader
moral/financial

•

Disrupt shipping and
facilities
Interfere with aircraft
movement and facilities
Manipulate/damage
business functions
Collect Humint

•
•
Evade surveillance and access control
measures

•
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•
•

Materiellfinancial/intellig ·10
ence assistance to
dissident movements
....... __j~ns~or~_~!~ol_____ ______ _
• Penetrate/ threaten leader : 10

-·--·-------------·-·---------------·----~---

'11

•
•
-~--··- ·--------------

---------·--------{--•

•

•

i12

morallfi nancial
----~~~~~~~-----r:--,:-----------------1

Disrupt shipping and
i12
facilities
Interfere with aircraft
i12
movement and facilities
:12
Manipulate/damage
business
functions
----- --- --------------- ---------------.
Accompany other forces 12
-

···------·-· -----···--

-

----·--------------~-

•

Seize and recover
individuals or small

•

Stand off info gathering

6

•

Close
reconnaissance/monitor

7
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•

Recover
detainees/friendly
forces/authorised

• Penetrate/ threaten leader 10
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Attack leader
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and/or resources
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CycleS

•
•

Deny resources/render
key infrastructure
ineffective
Seize and recover
individuals or small

!5

•

5

•

Close
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reconnaissance/monitor
specific target/named
area of interest
;6
Penetrate/infiltrate

•

•

Recover
detainees/friend! y
forces/authorised

•
•

Threaten/damage leader
wealth
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•

leader 8
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Cycle6
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Attack leader
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Cycle7
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Penetrate/ threaten leader
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8
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4
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specific target/named area of
interest
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•

•

•
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•
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•
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•

Disrupt shipping and
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CycleS

•

•

Seize and recover individuals or
small
Provide vital services and/or

•
... -·-····-···

-----------·--

Place surveillance/intercept
devices

Penetrate/ threaten leader physical

•
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Accompany other forces

•
•
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•

•
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7
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Cycle9

•
•
•
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specific target/named area of
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•
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•
•
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•
Place surveillance/intercept
devices

•

Manipulate/damage business
functions
Accompany other forces

•

..................

Seize and recover individuals or
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• Recover detainees/friendly
:3
i
forces/authorised
• Close reconnaissance/monitor
!4
specific target/named area of
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•
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•
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Interfere with electronic/manual
information ~"~"""'~

•
•
•

•

Manipulate/damage
business functions
Tap-hack electronic
information "v"t"n,.,
Deceive

1
2

Close
3
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specific target/named area
of interest
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3
information/items

•
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4
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•
moraUfinancial
-·--··--··-···----------------·-··--

information

~----

•

Manipulate financial

•

6
Manipulate/damage
business functions
1
Tap-hack electronic
information
2
Close
reconnaissance/monitor
specific target/named area
of interest

•
•

6

•
•

Collection technical
information/items

3

Deny resources/render key ! 3
infrastructure ineffective
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Disrupt
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..................... ----------------·----+ -- ·-- ----------------- --------<:--·:---·-----------------------j
• Disseminate
i4
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............................................... - . . . . -~--------- -+-- material
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attack
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•
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425

5

Appendix 5

Cyclel2

Close reconnaissance/monitor specific target/named
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•
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electronic/manual
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Disrupt shipping and
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material
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attack

•
··----------·-----.

•
•

-- ---------------------------
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-

3
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3
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•
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•
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•
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Manipulate/damage
business functions
1
Close
reconnaissance/monitor
specific target/named area
of interest

information systems

1

•

Tap-hack electronic
1
information ~v~TP.n>~
• Coiiection technical
2
information/items ·
1-·····-------- ------~------·---·-··--·'----------------------··i--------------------------·-·--------------+-~----------·-----·------·----1
• Deny resources/render key 2
infrastructure ineffective
•

Disrupt shipping and
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_________ .._____________________ ......_____________ -+------.:C.--,---------,----------------------------+::-------------·-----------------------j
•

Disseminate
3
physicaVelectronic
psychological operations
material
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Interfere with aircraft
3
movement and facilities
Orchestrate 3rd party
3
attack
3

4

5

5
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Cycle13
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Disseminate physicaVelectronic ,
material i
Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate i 2
NGO effort
Interfere with aircraft movement i2
· and facilities

•
•
•

4

Manipulate/damage business
:4
functions
------------------------------------------ ----------+-:-------------------------------·------Materiel/financial/intelligence
4
assistance to dissident
movements
Deny resources/render key
·1
infrastructure ineffective

1---------- -----······ ------ --------------- ····--------------- ----- _______ ,___________ - ---

•
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•
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Cyclel4

Deny resources/render key infrastructure
ineffective
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•
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Disseminate physicaVelectronic
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material,
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NGO effort
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functions
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shipping and facilities
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material

•
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•

Materiel/financial/intelligence
assistance to dissident
movements
Penetrate/infiltrate

1

•
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•
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•
•

Q~!ll~&I::.P!_Gd~-~-t-~-- ------------1---------------------------------------------1
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wealth
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•

Provide vital services and/or
resources
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3
and
local
3
• Manipulate financial
•
-·-·····--- ·· -·· -- ·- ····---·
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3
functions -·····-----------------------·-c·c-·-·-----------·············------··---------·--·
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eNGO effort
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•

Provide shelters and basic living
facilities

•

•
•

MateriellfinanciaVintelligence
assistance to dissident
movements
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Cyclel6

•

Broadcast information

•
-~---------------

___ __
,

·------------------- ------------··-----------------------

Handle and preserve evidence

•
•
•

Disseminate
physicaVelectronic
psychological operations
material
Empower local
functionaries and support
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Materiel/financiaVintelligen
ce assistance to dissident
movements
Penetrate/infiltrate
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Attack leader
moral/financial

•

'1

,3

3

1

2

Manipulate/damage
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3
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ce assistance to dissident
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Cyclel7
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psychological operations
material
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Handle and preserve evidence

Provide funds

Materiel/financiaVintelligence
assistance to dissident

•
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•
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•

Manipulate financial

•
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•
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Provide shelters and basic living
facilities
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•

436

Appendix5

•

Provide vital services and/or

•

Materiel/financial/intelligence
assistance to dissident

Seal an area
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1 Broadcast information

Broadcast information
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